Explanation #1 (Rashbam): He asks whether he says so she'Lo Lehasbi'a Es Banav (lest people think that when his sons will inherit him, they will be wealthy). Or, perhaps since he admitted, he admitted.

Implied question: It says in Sanhedrin (29b) that a person is prone she'Lo Lehasbi'a Es Banav! (We should resolve the question from there.)

Answer: There, he establishes himself to be a borrower, who is a slave to the lender, he is prone she'Lo Lehasbi'a Es Banav. Regarding a deposit (he does not make himself a slave), surely he does not say so she'Lo Lehasbi'a Es Banav. Rather, he admits.

Objection #1: This is unreasonable. Just the contrary, we should rather say that he says the truth about a loan, since he obligates himself, but regarding a deposit, he is prone she'Lo Lehasbi'a Es Banav!

Objection #2: What was the proof from Isur the convert? Surely his admission was true, in order to give, for she'Lo Lehasbi'a Es Banav does not apply here at all! (He wanted to give to his son.)

Explanation #2 (Ri): If a Shechiv Mera admitted, what is the law? If he admitted that he has a Maneh (100 Zuz) of Ploni, even though it is established to us that he does not, do we say that he acquires through Matanas Shechiv Mera, and if he recovers, he can retract?

Or, perhaps he acquires totally, and if he recovers, he cannot retract?

He resolves this from the episode with Isur the convert. [His son] totally acquired through Matanas Bari (a healthy person's gift). If it were through Matanas Shechiv Mera, how did he acquire? We say that anyone to whom inheritance applies, Matanas Shechiv Mera applies (and conversely)!

Conclusion: If so, it is Matanas Bari, and if he recovers, he cannot retract.

Support: R. Chananel's Perush connotes like this. He explained that Isur should admit that the money is of Rav Mari his son, and (the son) acquires through his father's admission.

Explanation #3: Some explain "if a Shechiv Mera admitted, what is the law?" I.e. he admitted that he has a deposit with others, and he was Makneh it to Ploni. Does this help to be Makneh it through mere words, or not?

He resolves this from the episode with Isur. [His son] acquired through mere words.

Observation: He could have asked also about a Bari. Rather, even regarding a Shechiv Mera, who is Makneh through mere words, it is not clear to him whether or not [the recipient] acquires [in this case];

However, if it acquires regarding a Shechiv Mera, we do not learn that it acquires regarding a Bari. However, if it does not acquire regarding a Shechiv Mera, all the more so for a Bari.

Conclusion: This is from my Rebbi. The first Perush is primary (i.e. Explanation #2. Tosfos rejected Explanation #1!)

Reference: In Yevamos (45b) we say that Rava was Machshir Rav Mari bar Rachel and appointed him [over Yisraelim] in Bavel. Even though all appointments of authority must be "mi'Kerev Achecha", since his mother was from Yisrael, he is called mi'Kerev Achecha.

Surely [Rav Mari bar Rachel] was a convert. Perhaps he is [Rav Mari] here, the son of Isur.

Distinction: In Shabbos (154a), Rav Mari bar Rachel was a full Yisrael. It says there "Rabah, the father of Rav Mari bar Rachel." We must say that there two Rav Mari bar Rachel's.

Explanation #1 (Rashbam): Rav Mari was the son of Isur the convert. Isur had Bi'ah with Shmuel's daughter before he converted. Rav Mari's conception was not in Kedushah. [His mother] was captured, like it says in Kesuvos (23a).

Rebuttal: We say in the Yerushalmi that she said truthfully "I was captured, and I am Tehorah." (If so, she did not become pregnant through this!)

Also the Bavli connotes like this. R. Yochanan said to Rav Shemen bar Aba (a Kohen) "go marry one of your relatives" (Shmuel's daughters. Both were captured, and said that they are Tehoros.)

Explanation #2: "Rav Mari the son of Shmuel's daughter" mentioned elsewhere was someone else. Perhaps it is [the Rav Mari] whose father is mentioned in Shabbos (154a);

He was called on his mother's name (even though his father was a Yisrael) because we want to trace his lineage to Shmuel, like we find Ravna Ukva and Ravna Nechemyah the sons of Rav's daughter, and R. Shimon ben Pazi (Pazi was R. Chiya's daughter) and Aba Sha'ul ben Eima Miryam (Kesuvos 87a).

Assertion: If a convert had children, he has (can give) Matanas Shechiv Mera, even if the recipient is a convert, who has no inheritance. The concern is that the giver have inheritance, and there is no concern for the recipient.

Proof #1: It says in Yevamos (99a) that a son can sell his father [so his mother will collect her Kesuvah from the money]. The Ri establishes this to discuss Matanas Shechiv Mera. (If it were Matanas Bari, the Kesuvah would not be collected from it.)

Proof #2: We learn also from a Shechiv Mera who wrote all his property to his slave. He can retract the property, but he cannot retract the slave. If he died and did not retract, the slave acquires everything, like it says in Gitin (9a), even though a slave does not inherit.

Implied question: Likewise, Isur could have admitted that he has land, like I explained above (44b)!

Answer: Below, it properly says that he can be Makneh to him through Odisa. He admits that the coins themselves are of Rav Mari.

Question: It says in Kidushin (17b) that if one borrowed coins from a Nochri whose children converted [and the Nochri died], he does not return them to his sons. If he returned them, Chachamim are displeased;

We ask from a Beraisa that says that Chachamim are displeased, and resolve that here conception and birth were not in Kedushah (then Chachamim are displeased), and here conception was not in Kedushah, but birth was in Kedushah (Chachamim are pleased). If so, Rava should have returned [the coins. Why was he upset?]

Note: Some explain oppositely, that when both were not in Kedushah, Chachamim are pleased. According to this, there is no question.

Answer #1 (R. Tam): There, since the Nochri did Chesed with the Yisrael, i.e. he lent to him, he should do Chesed with him and give to [the Nochri's] children. Here, [Isur] did not do Chesed with [Rava] when he deposited with him, so [Rava] need not return to his children.

Answer #2 (Rivam): Since the Beraisa did not explicitly say that if he does not return to his children, Chachamim are displeased, Rava was not concerned [to return].

Rebuttal: This is wrong. Since it taught "if he returns, Chachamim are pleased", we infer that if he does not return, Chachamim are displeased!

All of these clauses are taught in Shevi'is (10:9). If one returns a debt in Shevi'is (after it was canceled), Chachamim are pleased. If one borrows coins from a convert and returned to his sons, Chachamim are pleased.

It taught there also "all Metaltelim are acquired through Meshichah. If he fulfilled his word even though Meshichah was not done, Chachamim are pleased";

It says about this in Bava Metzi'a (48a) that if he did not fulfill his word, Chachamim are displeased. This connotes that in all of the clauses, we infer the negative from the positive.

Question #1: Why didn't Rava [want to] fulfill [Isur's] words? We hold that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes!

Question #2: We hold below (151b) and elsewhere that words of a Shechiv Mera, it is as if they were written [in a document] and handed over. It should suffice that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes, according to the opinion that says so, i.e. R. Meir. Also Matanas Shechiv Mera is acquired only after death (so we cannot say that it is needed to acquire in his lifetime)! (Kovetz Shi'urim - Tosfos holds that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes makes a Kinyan. If not, this is not a question!)

Answer #1 (Rivam): We say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes only when he said "give this Maneh to Ploni." However, when he said "this Maneh is to Ploni", and he did not say "give", we do not say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes.

Question #1: Chachamim brought a proof for R. Eliezer, that words of a Shechiv Mera are acquired verbally, from the case of Bnei Rochel's mother. Chachamim fulfilled her words (below, 156b). This shows that words of a Shechiv Mera, it is as if they were written and handed over;

What proof is this? Perhaps the reason was because Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes! We should not distinguish between saying "my clasp should be given to my daughter" and "give"!

Question #2: It says in Gitin (65b) that Geneiva was going out in a noose [to be executed]. When he went out, he said "give 400 Zuz to R. Avina from wine of Nehar Panya..."

We do not say there Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes, even though we say so even when [the giver] said when he was healthy, like is proven in Gitin (15a)!

Question #3: Also, it is difficult from Gitin (40a) regarding "my Shifchah Ploni pleased me. Please her..." We say there Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes (even though he did not say "give")!

Remark: This is not difficult at all, like I will explain below (Answer (j). We say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes regarding freedom more than regarding other matters.)

Answer (R. Tam): We say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes only when [what the Mes wants to give] was in the hands of a third party, like the Beraisa of one who says "give a Shekel to my sons...", and the case in Kesuvos (69b) of one who gives money to his daughter through a third party. The third party does like he was instructed to do with what he was entrusted with. (This Dibur continues on Amud B.)

We establish there the reason because Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes. The case is, it was Hushlash mi'Tchilah l'Kach (from the beginning, the property was put in the third party's hands in order to do so), lest it contradict the episode with Isur the convert. Here we do not say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes, even though it was in the hands of a third party!

Rather, the reason is because he was Hushlash mi'Tchilah l'Kach.

Question: We say in Gitin (40a) "my Shifchah Ploni pleased me. Please her..." We force the heirs... because Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes. There, nothing was given to a third party!

Answer: We must say that regarding freedom, we should say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes more than regarding other matters.

Support: Now it is fine that it is not difficult what we say below (151b) that if one says "give a Get to my wife.... (we do not give after death)" but if one said "give a Maneh to Ploni", and [the giver] died, they give after death;

The Gemara infers from this that a partial Matanas Shechiv Mera does not require a Kinyan. It could not have said that the reason is because Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes, for we say so only when it was Hushlash mi'Tchilah l'Kach.

Question: On this Mishnah in Gitin (13a), that we bring below, but if he said "give a Maneh to Ploni", and [the giver] died, they give after death, Rav said in Gitin (13a) that this is when [the Maneh] is resting in a corner;

Some establish the Mishnah there [according to Rav] to discuss a Bari, and through Ma'amad Sheloshtan, and some establish it there to discuss a Shechiv Mera;

Why didn't [Rav] establish it the Mishnah there when it was Hushlash mi'Tchilah l'Kach, and due to Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes?

Answer #1: [Rav] did not want to establish the Mishnah like an individual, even though we hold like the individual, like it says in Gitin (15a, that we hold that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes).

We find like this in Gitin (30a) that Shmuel does not establish the Mishnah there of one who lends to a Kohen or Levi like R. Yosi (who says that Chachamim made one who does not acquire as if he acquires), for we do not establish like an individual, even though [Shmuel] holds like him in Bava Metzi'a (12a);

Rabanan argue with R. Meir, who says that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes in Gitin (14b). Even though R. Yosi argues with him in Kesuvos (69b), in any case [R. Meir is called an individual against a Rabim, for] Rabanan argue with R. Meir in Gitin (14b) regarding "take a Maneh to Ploni."

Disclaimer: There is not such a proof from R. Yosi in Bava Metzi'a (12a, that we do not establish a Mishnah like an individual, even if we hold like him). We could reject this; the reason [Shmuel] did not establish [the Mishnah in Gitin 30a] like an individual, is because R. Yosi is an individual where he argues in Bechoros (18a, and there Shmuel does not rule like him);

Shmuel rules like him only in the case in Bava Metzi'a, for presumably, Aniyim themselves are pleased, like is brought there (12b). Therefore, [Shmuel] agrees in our Mishnah in Gitin (30a, that we do not establish it like R. Yosi in Bechoros, who makes one who does not acquire as if he acquires, even when "the Aniyim themselves are pleased" does not apply).

Answer #2 (in the name of R. Tam): [Rav] did not say there Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes since it was proper to give in his lifetime, and not to give after death. Therefore, Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes does not apply.

Proof: This is like a Get or document of freedom, which is proper to give only in his lifetime.

Objection (Ri): Even something that could be given in his lifetime, we say in a Beraisa in Gitin (14b) "take a Maneh to Ploni" and he went and looked for him and did not find him, it connotes there that even something that could be given in his lifetime, Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes!

Answer: We could say that the sender commanded to give it to him after [the sender] dies. We establish it to discuss a Shechiv Mera; his command is primarily only for after death.

Answer #3: There (Gitin 13a), Rav does not hold that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes, rather, like Shmuel, who concludes there in Kesuvos like R. Yosi, who does not hold that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes.

Implied question: We challenge Rav Yosef there (15a) "we hold that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes." We do not ask this against Rav!

Answer: That is because we did not know any answer to give for him (Rav). This is not astounding [to establish Rav unlike the Halachah, and we did not challenge him] if he holds like Shmuel.

Implied question: We challenge Rav (13a) "we hold that words of a Shechiv Mera, it is as if they were written and handed over"! (Why didn't we also ask that we hold that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes?)

Answer: That is because no (Bach - Amora) argues about this (words of a Shechiv Mera).

Answer #4: [Rav] held that the Mishnah does not connote that he was instructed to do so from the beginning, since it taught "give a Maneh to Ploni', and it did not teach "give this Maneh to Ploni', which would connote that he was Hushlash mi'Tchilah l'Kach.

Implied question: In the Gemara (Gitin 14b), regarding "take a Maneh to Ploni', it taught Stam, Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes, and it did not teach "this [Maneh]"!

Answer (Tosfos' Rebbi): That is because even without "this", it properly connotes that he was instructed to do so, for at that time he said "take'.

Answer #5 (R. Tam): Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes does not apply in our Sugya, because anyone to whom inheritance applies, Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes applies, and anyone to whom inheritance does not apply... like it says about Matanas Shechiv Mera.

Question #1: This is unlike Matanas Shechiv Mera, which is like inheritance. We should compare that more to inheritance, like it says above!

Question #2: Just like the Gemara says that Matanas Shechiv Mera does not apply to a convert, it should have said also that Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes does not apply a convert!

Answer: It is obvious to [the Gemara] that [Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes] does not apply to a convert, since inheritance does not apply to him. It is obvious, for once he died, (his property is Hefker and his authority over it) is Batel, and he has no rights to bequeath it. How can his words be fulfilled?!

Remark (Tosfos' Rebbi): However, what we explained above is better (Answers #3,4).

Answer #2 (to Question (a) - Ri): We say Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes only when he tells him mouth to mouth. Rava did not go to [Isur].

Retraction: The Ri retracted from this, like it says in Gitin (40b) "I freed my slave Ploni..." R. Yochanan says, all of these expressions are written in a document;

Consequence: If so, what was taught afterwards "I will free him" - Rebbi says, he acquired. Chachamim say, he did not acquire, but we force the heirs [to free him, because Mitzvah Lekayem Divrei ha'Mes...

Also this is in a document, and not mouth to mouth, for if he told the heirs to free him, why does it mention a document? Also R. Chananel explained like this.

Explanation #1: He did not specify which land, rather, "except for land" Stam, any amount, and we can say that he left over the slave himself, for slaves are like land.

[R. Yirmeyah bar Aba says that] also Metaltelim are a Shiyur. If he said "except for Metaltelim any amount", [perhaps] he left over in the slave himself [for slaves are also like Metaltelim]. The Mishnah said land [even though the same applies to Metaltelim] for parallel structure, like the Gemara says (150a).

Citation (Yerushalmi): R. Yosi said in the name of R. Elazar "if he left over Metaltelim, [the gift] has no effect. I can say that he left over the slave himself!"

Explanation #1 (cont.): In the conclusion (150b), it explains that it is not Krus Gita. Since the master has rights in the document, for he wrote that he left over land for himself, he was not totally Makneh the document to him, for also the master's rights are written in it. Therefore, it is not called Sefer Kerisus. (A Get of divorce is called "Sefer Kerisus", and we learn freedom from Get Ishah.)

R. Shimon says that he is always free [unless he wrote...], because he considers it Krus Gita, since he did not leave over anything in the slave.

However, initially [the Gemara] thought that the first Tana's reason is because he left over in the slave himself.

Support: Also in Gitin (8b) we establish the argument about dividing his words. Initially [the Gemara] thought that the first Tana holds that he left over in the slave himself, and R. Shimon holds that he did not leave over, for we divide his words, and the slave acquired himself.

There, R. Chananel explained that initially [the Gemara] thought that the first Tana holds that since he left over land Kol she'Hu Stam, the slave cannot clarify what his master was Makneh to him;

He did not acquire the property, for we say that the bearer of the document has the lower hand. Since he did not acquire the property, also himself he did not acquire.

R. Shimon holds that even though he did not acquire the property, he acquired himself, for we divide his words, unless [the master] says "except for one part in 10,000", for we can say that he left over the slave himself. So the Yerushalmi explained. This is from R. Chananel.

Note: The next lines are from Maharshal's Hagahah.

Explanation #2 (Ri): Also from the beginning, [the Gemara] held that the first Tana does not discuss only when he left over Stam, for [then] perhaps he left over in the slave himself. Rather, even if he left over something clear and specified what he leaves over, even so the first Tana argues.

Support: The Tosefta proves like this. R. Shimon says, if he said 'all my property is given to my slave Ploni, except for one part in 10,000 in it", it has no effect. If he said "except for city Ploni or field Ploni', even if it is the only field or city, the slave acquired the property, and acquired his freedom...

He acquired the property, if there is other property, and in every case he acquired his freedom. So explained R. Shimshon in Pe'ah (3:8).

Inference: Since R. Shimon said about "except for city Ploni or field Ploni', he acquired his freedom, this implies that he heard Rabanan say that even in such a case, he does not go free. They argue as follows. R. Shimon holds...

Note: Maharshal says that the rest of Tosfos is a later comment.

Comment: It seems that the Tosefta is errant. What does R. Shimon come to teach, that even when he said "except for city Ploni or field Ploni"? Because he mentioned what he excludes, is the slave less free?!

All the more so he is freed [in this case] than when he said [a Shiyur] Stam, for the bearer of the document has the lower hand! (When it is Stam, we explain in the way that minimizes his rights.) We erase the Tosefta (attribute the mistake to it) due to the Yerushalmi. (The Yerushalmi holds that Chachamim say that he is free, unless we can attribute that the Shiyur refers to the slave. The Tosefta holds that whenever the master keeps some property, he is not free, for we do not divide his words.)

Retraction: However, it seems that we should not say that the Tosefta is errant. (In the coming Tosfos, the Ri says that there was a Havah Amina to say that when he mentioned what he excludes, the slave is not free.)

Explanation #1 (Rashbam): [Chachamim say that he is not free, for] perhaps the slave was the exclusion.

Rebuttal (Ri): The Tosefta explicitly says 'R. Shimon says, [if he said] "all my property is acquired to you, except for city Ploni or field Ploni', the slave acquired the property, and acquired his freedom...'

Explanation: Even if he explicitly mentioned what he excludes from the freedom, for then we should say that he did not free the slave, even so he acquired the property and he is freed, for we divide his words;

We should say that from that field or city he retracted, but he did not retract from the slave.

Note: It is not clear to me why mentioning the Shiyur suggests that he did not free the slave, like the comment at the end of the previous Tosfos asked, unless Tosfos means that he explicitly excludes the entire gift, except for the slave. Our text of Tosfos does not connote like this.

Inference: Rabanan who argue with [R. Shimon] hold that we do not divide his words. Since he retracted from the property, he retracted also from the slave. Or, since he left over in the property, he left over also in the slave.

Reference: In Gitin (8b) regarding R. Meir says, Ako is like Eretz Yisrael [regarding Gitin] we bring also this about dividing his words, according to R. Shimon;

This is unlike Rashi explained there, that [R. Shimon holds that] he did not leave over at all in the slave, only in the property, and Rabanan argue with him like he explained. (When the master did not specify which property he keeps, the slave does not get any property. Chachamim say that then, likewise he does not acquire himself. R. Shimon divides his words. Even though he did not acquire property, he acquires himself.)

Implied question: This is difficult for the Rashbam, who explained that he left over in the slave because slaves are considered land. It says (150a) that they made Metaltelim a exclusion regarding a slave!

Answer: Surely it is true that [people consider a slave to be] Metaltelim, just like land. (Therefore, there is concern lest the master kept also the slave.)