QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Yehudah visited a place called Bei Evyonei. After he returned home, he came before Rava who asked him if he had ruled on any cases while he was there. Rav Huna replied that there was a case in which a Nochri forcibly coerced a Jew to show him where the possessions of a fellow Jew were located, and the Nochri confiscated those possessions. Rav Huna ruled that the Jew must pay for the damage he caused to his friend by divulging the location of his property.

Rava told Rav Huna that he must retract his ruling and ensure the return of the money that was paid. A Beraisa states that if a Jew was coerced by a Nochri and showed him where his friend's property was located, he is exempt from paying for the loss. However, if the Jew physically took his friend's property and handed it over to the Nochri ("Natal v'Nasan b'Yad"), he is liable. RASHI (DH Nasa) explains that in this case he saved himself with his friend's property. Rabah added that if he showed his friend's property to the Nochri on his own initiative (Rashi explains that this means he was not forced to do so), it is equivalent to "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad" and he is liable.

The CHOCHMAS SHLOMO writes that Rashi's words imply that the person who caused his friend's loss is liable only when was not coerced by the Nochri. If he was forced, he is exempt even if he was "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad." The Chochmas Shlomo cites the RIF (43a of the pages of the Rif) who indeed mentions such an opinion. However, the Rif challenges this opinion and argues that if it is correct, the Beraisa which states that one who is "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad" is liable must refer to a case in which one voluntarily divulged the information. However, in such a case one would be liable even if did not physical hand the property to the Nochri, but merely showed the Nochri the location of the property! Why, then, does Rashi imply that if the Jew was coerced, he is exempt even if he was "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad"?

ANSWER: The CHOCHMAS SHLOMO answers that according to Rashi, the Beraisa's case of "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad" indeed refers to a case in which the Jew was not forced. The reason the Beraisa mentions "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad" is that if the Jew merely showed the Nochri where the property was, even if he did so voluntarily he is liable only according to Rebbi Meir, who says that one is obligated to pay for damages done through "Garmi." ("Garmi" refers to a more causal form of indirect damage. It is damage that one did not do directly, but which one directly caused. For example, the Gemara (98b) says that if one burns a deed of debt and the holder thereby loses his right to collect the debt, the one who burned the deed must pay because of Garmi.)

Therefore, the Beraisa says that one who was "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad" is liable even according to the Rabanan who disagree with Rav Meir and obligate one to pay only for damage done directly.

However, the Chochmas Shlomo's question on Rashi seems to be unfounded in the first place. The words of Rashi as they appear in our text (DH me'Atzmo) read that the person showed property to the Nochri without being forced, in the case of Rabah. Rabah said that even without "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad," one must pay if he voluntarily showed his friend's possessions to the Nochri.

Perhaps the Chochmas Shlomo had a different Girsa of Rashi, in which the two comments of Rashi here appeared as one, with no separate "Dibur ha'Maschil" between them. Accordingly, it is possible that he understands the words of Rashi (in DH me'Atzmo) as a continuation of the previous comment of Rashi (DH Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad). Accordingly, Rashi indeed comments on the case of "Nasa v'Nasan b'Yad" and states what the Chochmas Shlomo understands him as saying -- that the person who caused his friend's loss is liable only when he did so without being forced. The MAHARSHA and PNEI YEHOSHUA indeed point out that these are two separate comments of Rashi, unlike the understanding of the Maharshal. (D. Bloom)

QUESTION: The Gemara relates an incident in which a Shomer was entrusted with watching a silver goblet. Thieves broke in and he handed them the goblet so that they should leave him alone. Rav Ashi concluded that if the Shomer was wealthy, it may be assumed that the thieves broke in with the intent of stealing his possessions. He therefore is obligated to return the value of the goblet to the owner because he saved his own property by giving up someone else's.

However, if the Shomer was not wealthy, it may be assumed that the thieves came specifically to steal the goblet that he was watching. The Shomer therefore is exempt from paying, because it was the goblet itself that the thieves sought to steal, and he was permitted to give it to the thieves in order to save himself.

The Gemara relates another case in which a person was guarding a wallet with money that had been collected for the purpose of Pidyon Shevuyim (redemption of captives). The thieves broke in to his home, and he handed them the wallet so that they should leave him alone. The case came in front of Rabah who ruled that the Shomer is exempt from returning the money that was in the wallet.

Abaye challenged Rabah's decision and argued that the Shomer had saved himself with somebody else's money, and therefore he should be obligated to pay. Rabah defended his ruling by answering that since the Shomer was in danger, there was no greater act of redeeming captives than the act he did with the money in order to save himself. Since the money was designated exactly for this purpose, he was entitled to use the money to save himself.

The Gemara, in the second incident, makes no distinction between whether the Shomer was wealthy or not, as it distinguishes in the first incident. This implies that even if the Shomer would be wealthy, he still would be exempt from replacing the money in the wallet. Why, though, would he be exempt? Since he is wealthy and possesses the means to redeem himself, why should the public have to pay for this expense?

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Ein) answers that the Gemara's intention is to teach that even when the Shomer is a wealthy man but has no funds of his own on hand when the thieves threaten him, he is permitted to give them the charity funds. Since his situation is considered one of Pidyon Shevuyim, he is entitled to take the money set aside for this purpose.

The SHULCHAN ARUCH (CM 292:9) apparently incorporates Tosfos' answer into the Halachic ruling. The Shulchan Aruch writes that "if the householder had no other money accessible to him with which to redeem himself" he is exempt from returning the charity funds. The S'MA (CM 292:26) writes that the Shulchan Aruch means that even if he has money in his house or in another place, he may hand over the charity money and does not have to replace it later.

The S'ma adds that this case is comparable to the case of the Gemara in Chulin (130b, and as recorded by the Shulchan Aruch, YD 253:4) in which a householder, even a wealthy one, who travels from place to place is allowed to accept the gifts given to paupers. The Chachamim in the Gemara there state that even if he has money at home, he is permitted to accept gifts because at that time he has no money with him and is considered a pauper. Even when he returns home he is exempt from returning the money to the charity funds. The REMA (YD 253:4) explains that he is exempt because he is considered a pauper who later became wealthy, who is exempt from returning what he received when he was a pauper.

Similarly, the wealthy householder who was attacked is exempt afterwards from returning the money of charity when he had no other money available to give to the bandits. (D. Bloom)