Question (R. Aba bar Zavda): If Levi lived in Yehudah's yard without Yehudah's knowledge, must he pay him rent?

Answer (Rabah bar Rav Huna, citing Rav): No; and one who rents a house from Reuven must pay to Shimon.

Question: How is Shimon involved?!

Correction: Rather, if one rented a house from Reuven, and it was found to be Shimon's, he pays rent to Shimon.

Question: This contradicts his answer to the question!

Answer: If it is not normally rented, he is exempt. If it is normally rented, he must pay.

(R. Chiya bar Avin): If Levi lived in Yehudah's yard without Yehudah's knowledge, he need not pay. If one rents a house from people of the city, he pays rent to the owner.

Question: What owner does he discuss?!

Correction: If it is found to have an owner, he pays rent to the owner.

Question: This contradicts the first law he said!

Answer: He must pay only if it was normally rented.

(Rav Sechorah): If Levi lived in Yehudah's yard without Yehudah's knowledge, he need not pay. We learn from "She'iyah (desolation) breaks the gates." (It benefits Yehudah if someone is there!)

Mar bar Rav Ashi: I saw it. It gored like an ox. (Rashi - She'iyah is a Shed. Ramah, in Nimukei Yosef - it is mold, and it damaged like a goring ox.)

(Rav Yosef): A settled house will last.

Question: What is the difference is between Rav Sechorah's teaching and Rav Yosef's?

Answer: If Yehudah was storing wood or straw in the house, according to Rav Sechorah, the house would have lasted anyway, so Levi must pay. According to Rav Yosef, Levi gave benefit to Yehudah, so he is exempt.

A man built a house on a dumpsite of orphans. Rav Nachman forced him to pay rent for the time he lived in the house.

Inference: He holds that one who lives in Reuven's yard without Reuven's knowledge must pay Reuven.

Rejection: No. Originally, other people were living there and paying a modest rent to the orphans.

Rav Nachman told the man to appease the orphans. He didn't, so Rav Nachman collected the house from him (until he gave the orphans a proper price for a ruin on which to build a house - Rosh).

Version #1 (Mishnah): It pays for the benefit...(if it ate from the side of the Rechavah, it pays the damage (Rashi - half-damage)).

(Rav): The case is, it stretched its neck to eat from the side of the Rechavah.

(Shmuel): Even that case it is exempt (it pays only for the benefit).

Question: According to Shmuel, when does the Mishnah obligate paying the damage?

Answer: It is when the animal left the Rechavah and went to the side.

Version #2 (Rav): If an animal stretched its neck to eat from the side of the Rechavah, it pays full damage;

(Shmuel): It is exempt. (In this version, Rav and Shmuel did not come to explain the Mishnah.)

Question: According to Shmuel, when does the Mishnah say that Shen pays the damage?

Answer: It is when the animal left the Rechavah and went to the side.

Question (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak - Mishnah): If it ate from the entrance to a store, it pays what it benefited.

Suggestion: Isn't the case when it stretched its neck!

Answer (Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak): No. The case is, the store is on a corner (of the alley; the animal can eat without stretching its neck).

Version #3 (Rav and Shmuel): If an animal stretched its neck to eat food from the side of the Rechavah, it pays the damage.

(Rav): If one allowed people to walk on his property adjacent to the Rechavah, and an animal ate there, the owner is exempt.

(Shmuel): Here also, he pays the damage.

Suggestion: They argue about a pit (obstacle) on private property (that one was Mafkir).

Rav says that one is liable for such a pit. Therefore, (food or anything else he leaves there that could damage is Hefker, so) one who eats from there is exempt;

Shmuel exempts for such a pit, so (his food is not Hefker, so) one who eats from there must pay.

Rejection #1: Perhaps Rav normally exempts for such a pit. Here is different, for his food was too close to the Reshus ha'Rabim.

Rejection #2: Perhaps Shmuel normally obligates for such a pit, for animals (which may walk there) do not see it. Animals see food, so he is not liable for this.

Suggestion: Tana'im argue about stretching to eat.

(Beraisa - R. Meir and R. Yehudah): If an animal ate from the Rechavah, it pays what it benefited. If it ate from the side of the Rechavah, it pays the damage;

R. Yosi and R. Elazar say, it is not normal to eat, only to walk.

Question: The first Tana'im agree (that one is liable for the side of the Rechavah)!

Answer: They argue about stretching to eat. The first Tana'im obligate paying only the benefit, and the latter Tana'im obligate paying the damage.

Rejection #1: No. All agree about stretching (like Rav or Shmuel). They argue about "it will consume in another's field";

The first Tana'im expound "in another's field", but not in the Reshus ha'Rabim;

The latter Tana'im expound "in another's field", but not in the damager's domain;

Question: Surely he is exempt in the damager's domain. He had no right to bring his food in!

Rejection #2: Rather, they (agree about stretching to eat from the side of the Rechavah, but) argue about Ilfa and R. Oshiya (20a, stretching to eat from another animal's load, and jumping).

(Mishnah): If a dog or kid jumped from the roof and broke Kelim, it pays full damage, because it is Mu'ad.

If a dog took a cake (with a coal inside) to a pile of grain, and ate the cake and burned the grain, it pays full damage for the cake and half-damage for the grain.

(Gemara - Inference): It is liable only because it jumped. Had it fallen, it would be exempt;

The Tana holds that one who was negligent at the beginning and Ones (blameless) at the end, he is exempt!

Support (Beraisa): If a dog or kid jumped from the roof and broke Kelim, it pays full damage. If it fell, it is exempt.

Question: This is like the opinion that one who was negligent at the beginning and Ones at the end, he is exempt;

According to the opinion that he is liable, how can we explain the Mishnah?

Answer: The Kelim are close to the wall, so if the dog or kid jumps, it will not break them. Therefore, it was not negligent to allow them on the roof. (R. Peretz - we obligate for jumping and breaking Kelim far away. Regarding Kelim nearby, this is considered Ones. Rashba - 'negligent at the beginning' applies only to total negligence. Here, it is not utter negligence, for usually they will not break Kelim by jumping, but it is not called unusual to exempt from full damage.)

(Rav Zvid): Sometimes it is liable even for falling (according to both opinions), e.g. if the Ma'akah (a wall around a roof so people will not fall) is weak.

Question: Surely, this obligates the owner because he should have realized that bricks [of the Ma'akah] might fall;

In the end, bricks did not fall. The dog or kid fell. The beginning was negligence, the end was Ones! (How can we explain according to the opinion that exempts for this?)

Answer: The Ma'akah is Tzar (narrow; alternatively, sloped. In either case, animals are prone to jump on it and fall off.)

(Beraisa #1): If a dog or kid jumped up (and damaged), it is exempt. If it jumped down, it is liable;

People and chickens are liable for jumping up or down.

Version #1 - Contradiction (Beraisa #2): A dog or kid is exempt for jumping up or down.

Answer (Rav Papa): They acted abnormally. The dog jumped, and the kid dug its hooves in the wall.

Question: If so, why are they exempt (this is Keren)!

Answer: They are exempt from full damage, but pay half- damage. (Also in Beraisa #1, for jumping up they are exempt from full damage, but pay half damage.)

Version #2 (Rif, Rambam) Contradiction (Beraisa #2): A dog or kid is liable for jumping up or down.

Answer (Rav Papa): In Beraisa #1, they acted abnormally. The dog jumped, and the kid dug its hooves into the wall.

Question: If so, why are they exempt (this is Keren)!

Answer: They are exempt from full damage, but pay half- damage.