1)

(a)According to the Neherda'i, one is not permitted to write an Urch'sa (a power of attorney) on Metaltelin.

(b)Ameimar explained to Rav Ashi that the reason for this is the statement of Rebbi Yochanan 'Gazal ve'Lo Nisya'ashu ha'Ba'alim, Sheneihem Einan Yecholim Le'hakdish ... ve'Zeh Le'fi she'Eino bi'Reshuso' (denying the owner authority over Metaltelin over which he has no jurisdiction).

(c)The ramifications of the Neherda'a's ruling are that should the Shali'ach lose the article, the owner may reclaim it from the guardian (see also Tosfos DH 'Lo Kasvinan').

(d)The second Lashon qualifies the statement, limiting it to Metaltelin which the guardian denied in which case the reason for the prohibition is due to the fact that the document then appears to be false (as if the Shali'ach was claiming the article on behalf of someone who does not really own it).

2)

(a)The Neherda' also insist that an Urch'sa must contain the statement 'Zil Don ve'Zachi ve'Apich Lenafshech' because otherwise (if the Shali'ach claims the article purely on behalf of the owner), the guardian can refuse to give it to him, on the grounds that he (the Shali'ach) did not give him the article, and that the claim is therefore none of his business.

(b)Abaye validates the Urch'sa even if the owner restricted this to a half, a third or a quarter because of the principle of 'Migu' (meaning that once he has the authority to claim part for himself, he can extend the claim to the part that belongs to the owner as well).

(c)According to Ameimar, if the Shali'ach seized the article, he is permitted to retain it. This appears to pertain to the Shali'ach who claimed the article on behalf of the owner, even though the owner failed to add the required wording on the Sh'tar. The preferred explanation however is that it refers to a Shali'ach who decides to keep the article for himself.

(d)Rav Ashi disagrees with Ameimar in this point. According to him, since the owner also adds in the Sh'tar Harsha'ah that he undertakes to reimburse all the Sheli'ach's expenses, he clearly appoints him a Sheli'ach, and nothing more.

3)

(a)According to others, the owner makes the Shali'ach a partner in which case, he would have the authority to keep half for himself.

(b)The Halachah is that he makes him a Shali'ach (and not a partner).

4)

(a)A Ganav who Shechts or sells a sheep or an ox pays Daled ve'Hey irrespective of whether the witnesses who testify that he Shechted or sold the animal are the same ones who testified that he stole it, or different ones.

(b)Our Mishnah says that ...

1. ... 'Ganav u'Machar be'Shabbos', 'Ganav u'Machar la'Avodah-Zarah', Ganav mi'shel Aviv ve'Tavach u'Machar, ve'Achar-kach Meis Aviv' are all obligated to pay Daled ve'Hey', and the same will apply in a case of ...

2. ... 'Ganav ve'Tavach, ve'Achar-Kach Hikdish.

(c)According to the Tana Kama, the Ganav is also obligated to pay Daled ve'Hey in the following cases 'Ganav ve'Tavach li'Refu'ah O li'Kelavim', 'ha'Shochet ve'Nimtza'as T'reifah' and 'ha'Shochet Chulin ba'Azarah'. Rebbi Shimon exempts the last two cases in this list from Daled ve'Hey.

(d)The basis for Rebbi Shimon's Halachic distinction between the first two cases in the list and the last two is that whereas in the former, one is permitted to eat them, in the latter, one is not.

5)

(a)Aba Chalafta was the father of Rebbi Yossi.

(b)When Aba Chalafta went to learn by Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, or vice-versa, they unanimously agreed that if someone ate one year's produce in a field over which he was making a (three-year Chazakah) in front of one set of witnesses, a second year's produce in front of a second set and a third year's produce in front of a third set it is a Chazakah.

(c)He quoted Rebbi Akiva, who disagreed on the basis of the Pasuk in Shoftim "Yakum Davar", from which he Darshened "Davar", 've'Lo Chatzi Davar' (and in the current case, each set of witnesses constitutes only a third of the required testimony).

(d)This prompt us to suggest that the author of our Mishnah cannot be Rebbi Akiva who, by the same token, ought to require the same set of witnesses for the Shechitah or the sale as testified on the theft.

6)

(a)We answer this Kashya by citing a case where one set of witnesses testify that a woman is betrothed and a second set, that she is married. We take for granted that Rebbi Akiva will agree there that it is not one of Chatzi Eidus because the first testimony is independent (since it establishes that she is betrothed, forbidding her to the whole world), unlike the case of Chazakah, where the first two sets of witnesses only testified in order to combine with the third set.

(b)We compare our case (of Eidei Geneivah) to that case because here too, the testimony that the Ganav stole is independent of the Shechitah, since it obligates him to pay Kefel.

(c)We try to refute the initial suggestion that Aba Chalafta and Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri use "Davar" to preclude where one witness testifies that a girl has one hair on the back of her hand, and another, that she has one on her stomach on the grounds that, in addition to being 'Chatzi Davar', it is also Chatzi Eidus. seeing as there are not even two witnesses on one of the hairs, and one witness is not even valid when it comes to a complete Eidus.

7)

(a)The Rabbanan therefore learn from "Davar" that if two witnesses testify on each hair, the testimony is considered 'Chatzi Davar', seeing as each one testifies that she is a Ketanah.

(b)What makes this case worse than that of Chazakah is the fact that each set of witnesses have not testified on all that it could have done at that moment, unlike the case of Chazakah, where each set did (see Tosfos DH 'Lim'utei').

8)

(a)We learned in our Mishnah 'Ganav u'Machar be'Shabbos, Chayav Daled ve'Hey', Rami bar Chama reconciles this with a Beraisa which exempts him by establishing it where the purchaser acquired the animal through the Ganav picking a fig from his fig-tree. Consequently, the Ganav is Chayav Misah and due to the principle 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih', he is Patur from paying Daled ve'Hey.

(b)Initially, we reject this explanation, on the grounds that in such a case, the sale would not be valid (because the Ganav is Chayav Misah for picking the fig, and will therefore not be obligated to return the fig or its value to the purchaser), in which case, he would not be obligated to pay Daled ve'Hey anyway.

9)

(a)Rav Papa establishes the Beraisa where the purchaser instructed the Ganav to throw the animal into his Chatzer on Shabbos and there is no reason why his Chatzer should not acquire the animal for him, even though the Ganav is Chayav Misah for his deed.

(b)We try to establish the Beraisa like Rebbi Akiva who says 'K'lutah ke'Mi she'Hunchah Dami', meaning that the moment the animal enters the air space of the buyer, it is as if the animal was lying on the ground, and he has transgressed the Isur of Shabbos, at exactly the same moment as the purchaser acquires it (which explains why he is Patur from Daled ve'Hey due to 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih'.

(c)The problem with establishing the Beraisa like the Rabbanan of Rebbi Akiva would be that, according to them, the buyer would acquire the animal immediately it enters his air-space, whereas the Ganav would not transgress the Isur of Shabbos until it landed in the buyer's Chatzer (in which case, 'Kam leih ... ' would not apply).

(d)We finally establish the Beraisa even like the Rabbanan however in a case where the purchaser specifically states that he only wishes to acquire the animal after it lands in his Chatzer, in which case, both the Chilul Shabbos and the Kinyan will take place at the same moment.

10)

(a)Rava concurs with Rami bar Chama, and he answers the Kashya we asked (from the fact that the sale is not valid anyway) by saying 'Esnan Asrah Torah, va'Afilu Ba Al Imo' meaning that the Torah forbids an Esnan Zonah, even though the gift is invalid (seeing as if the Zonah happened to be his mother, she would render him Chayav Misah, and he would be Patur from paying what he promised her). The Torah forbids an Esnan because one attempted to give her the article as a gift, irrespective of whether the gift is actually valid or not.

(b)Likewise in our case. The Torah obligates Daled ve'Hey for attempting to sell a sheep or a cow, even if the sale is not valid. Consequently, he will be Chayav even if the sale comes into effect through his picking a fig on Shabbos, automatically invalidating it, and exempting him for paying for it.