QUESTION: The Mishnah states that everyone may perform Shechitah, with the exception of a Cheresh, Shoteh, and Katan. The Mishnah does not say whether or not a Shechitah performed by a woman is acceptable. TOSFOS (DH ha'Kol) cites the HILCHOS ERETZ YISRAEL who rules that women should not perform Shechitah because of their tendency to get queasy. Tosfos disagrees with this ruling and maintains that women may slaughter animals even for use as Korbanos, and even l'Chatchilah. Tosfos cites proof for his ruling from the Mishnah in Zevachim (31b) that states that a woman's Shechitah is valid even for Kodshim, and from the Gemara there (32a) that states that a woman may slaughter an animal for a Korban even l'Chatchilah.

The TAZ (YD 1:1) challenges the ruling of Tosfos based on a statement of Tosfos in Kidushin (76b, DH Ein). The Mishnah in Kidushin there teaches that if it is known that a man's grandfather performed the service on the Mizbe'ach in the Beis ha'Mikdash, then the grandson is presumed to be fit to marry into the Jewish people. The fact that his grandfather served in the Beis ha'Mikdash is proof of his pure lineage. Tosfos there writes that the Chidush of the Mishnah is that even if it is known only that the ancestor performed parts of the Avodah which may be done by non-Kohanim, such as the slaughtering or skinning of a Korban, that suffices as proof for the descendant's pure lineage. Even though Shechitah is valid when performed by women or by slaves, such a Shechitah is permitted only b'Di'eved, and, in practice, only adult males with pure lineage are permitted to perform those parts of the Avodah.

Tosfos in Kidushin clearly states that a woman's Shechitah is valid only b'Di'eved. How are these conflicting words of Tosfos to be reconciled?

ANSWER: The TAZ answers that according to Tosfos in Kidushin, the practice to permit Shechitah by adult males with pure lineage was not a strict requirement of Halachah. It was merely a custom that developed in the Beis ha'Mikdash, whereby women, and men of questionable lineage, would refrain from performing Shechitah of their own accord.

This understanding of Tosfos in Kidushin is reflected in the practical Halachah. The SHULCHAN ARUCH (YD 1:1) rules that women may perform Shechitah even l'Chatchilah. However, the REMA adds that some say that l'Chatchilah women should not perform Shechitah.

The BI'UR HA'GRA there cites the words of Tosfos in Kidushin as the source for this stringency. Although the Halachah permits a woman to slaughter an animal, it is preferable that a woman refrain from performing Shechitah since there is a greater chance that a woman might not be sufficiently familiar with the laws of Shechitah.

The YAM SHEL SHLOMO explains that perhaps the woman might make a mistake during the Shechitah, and, out of fear of her husband, she will not report the mistake. The HAGAHOS MAIMONIYOS explains that since women tend to be more sensitive than men, there is a greater chance that they might feel faint during the Shechitah and, consequently, invalidate the Shechitah. (The reasons of the Bi'ur ha'Gra, Yam Shel Shlomo, and Hagahos Maimoniyos for why women should not perform Shechitah l'Chatchilah also explain the ruling of the Hilchos Eretz Yisrael.)

QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that when the Mishnah in Erchin (2a) says, "ha'Kol Ma'arichin" ("everyone may make a pledge of Erchin"), it does not mean that one is permitted l'Chatchilah to make a pledge of Erchin, because a number of sources teach that it is always preferable to refrain from making any type of Neder. The Gemara says that even according to Rebbi Yehudah -- who maintains that it is acceptable l'Chatchilah to make a Neder and to fulfill it -- one should not make a Neder of Erchin, because Rebbi Yehudah permits making a Neder only with the words, "Harei Zo," but not with the words, "Harei Alai." Since a Neder of Erchin must be made with the words, "Harei Alai," even Rebbi Yehudah does not permit making such a Neder l'Chatchilah.

Why must a pledge of Erchin be made specifically with the words, "Harei Alai"? Why may a person not simply set aside money and say, "Harei Zo" -- "This money hereby is set aside as payment for my Erech"?

ANSWER: The RITVA explains that in order for money to be considered consecrated as a pledge of Erchin, there must be an obligation upon the person to give that amount of money. Once the obligation exists, the actual money can be set aside as the payment for the obligation. Therefore, one cannot say, "This money is for my Erech," until he first creates upon himself an obligation to give that amount of money by saying, "I hereby obligate myself to pay my Erech to Hekdesh."

(This is similar to the way through which a borrower's object becomes collateralized to a lender. An object can become collateral only after there is a pre-existing debt.) (Z. Wainstein)

QUESTION: The Gemara explains that its question on the Mishnah's statement, "ha'Kol Shochtin," is as follows. After the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it adds, "And whatever they slaughter is valid." The latter statement implies that their Shechitah is valid only b'Di'eved. Thus, it is logical that the first statement ("everyone may perform Shechitah") means that they may perform Shechitah l'Chatchilah, because if it means that they may perform Shechitah only b'Di'eved, then why does the Mishnah need to state twice that their Shechitah is valid b'Di'eved?

RASHI (DH Tarti Di'eved) explains that the Mishnah should have said only, "Shechitas ha'Kol Kesherah," and not, "ha'Kol Shochtin u'Shechitasan Kesherah," which is repetitious.

However, when Rashi earlier (2a, DH Lo sheha'Adam) explains the wording "ha'Kol Mamirin" in the Mishnah in Temurah, he writes that the Tana of the Mishnah occasionally begins his teaching with the phrase "ha'Kol..." even though doing so necessitates adding a line of explanation later in the Mishnah (to prevent a misunderstanding). Why, according to Rashi, does the Gemara here ask that if "ha'Kol Shochtin" does not mean l'Chatchilah, then it is superfluous? Perhaps the Tana here, like the Tana in Temurah, simply begins his teaching with the phrase "ha'Kol"!

ANSWER: The MAHARSHA explains that Rashi understands that according to the conclusion of the Gemara, the Tana of the Mishnah does not prefer to begin his teaching with the phrase "ha'Kol...." Earlier (2a), when Rashi suggests that it is the manner of the Tana to use this style of wording, Rashi intends merely to explain the Mishnah in Temurah according to the Gemara's original assumption that "ha'Kol..." always implies permissibility l'Chatchilah. If this assumption is correct, Rashi earlier explains, then how can the Tana in Temurah say "ha'Kol Mamirin" with regard to the prohibited act of making a Temurah? Rashi there answers that the Tana merely prefers to begin his teaching with that phrase.

However, the Gemara concludes that "ha'Kol" does not always mean that it is permitted l'Chatchilah; sometimes it means that the act is valid only b'Di'eved. Therefore, the phrase "ha'Kol Mamirin" in Temurah is justified, and there is no need to rely on the suggestion that the Tana there says "ha'Kol Mamirin" because he prefers to begin his teaching with such a phrase.

QUESTION: Rabah bar Ula explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who is Tamei may slaughter an animal of Chulin even l'Chatchilah. Even though the Tamei person is stringent not to let his Chulin food become Tamei, he can slaughter the animal with a long knife and avoid touching the meat. When the Mishnah continues and says that "their Shechitah is valid," implying that it is valid only b'Di'eved, it refers to a Tamei person who slaughters an animal of Kodshim. He is not permitted to slaughter Kodshim l'Chatchilah because of the possibility that he might touch it and make it Tamei. However, if, b'Di'eved, he slaughters an animal of Kodshim and he attests that he is certain that he did not touch the animal, then the Shechitah is acceptable and the animal is not Tamei.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 1:1-2) rules that, "All of the people who are ineligible to perform the Avodah are nevertheless permitted to slaughter a Korban, even Kodshei Kodashim, except for one who is Tamei, who is not permitted to slaughter [Kodshim]... since we are concerned that he might touch the Korban [and render it Tamei]. If, however, he already slaughtered the animal, the Korban remains valid."

The Rambam makes no mention of the Gemara's requirement to ask the Tamei person if he touched the Korban. Why does the Rambam omit this requirement?

ANSWER: The NODA B'YEHUDAH (YD 1:4) answers that, logically, it would seem that Chulin food prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" and actual Kodshim should have the same Halachah with regard to the Shechitah of a Tamei person: if he is permitted to slaughter a Chulin animal that is being guarded "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh," then he also should be permitted to slaughter a Korban. The only reason why the flesh of a Korban can become Tamei (if it has not become Huchshar l'Kabel Tum'ah by becoming wet) is the principle d'Rabanan of "Chibas ha'Kodesh" -- the special quality of being Kadosh makes a Korban fit to become Tamei (TOSFOS DH Shema Yiga). Since this principle is d'Rabanan, the prohibition to cause Kodshim to become Tamei is the same as the prohibition to cause Chulin prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" to become Tamei; both prohibitions are mid'Rabanan!

It is obvious that Rabah bar Ula -- who differentiates between Chulin food prepared "Al Taharas ha'Kodesh" and actual Kodshim with regard to the Shechitah of a Tamei person -- maintains that the principle of "Chibas ha'Kodesh" is mid'Oraisa, and it functions to make the Kodshim fit mid'Oraisa to become Tamei. Therefore, l'Chatchilah a Tamei person may not slaughter Kodshim.

The Rambam, however, rules that "Chibas ha'Kodesh" is only mid'Rabanan. The Rambam does not require that the Tamei person be asked if he touched the Korban when he slaughtered it b'Di'eved, because even if he did touch it, the Tum'ah is only mid'Rabanan. Thus, since it is not known if he touched the Korban, the Tum'ah of the animal is only a Safek d'Rabanan, in which case the Halachah is lenient. Rabah bar Ula, however, maintains that there is a Safek d'Oraisa, and therefore he requires that we ask the Tamei person if he touched the animal. (Z. Wainstein)

OPINIONS: Rabah bar Ula explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who is Tamei may slaughter an animal of Chulin even l'Chatchilah. The Gemara asks that it is obvious that a Tamei person is permitted to slaughter an animal of Chulin. RASHI (DH Peshita) explains that this is because the Torah does not require that one ensure that food of Chulin remains Tahor.

Does this mean that all types of Chulin food may be allowed to become Tamei?

(a) Food that is Tevel, from which Terumah or Chalah must be separated, must be kept Tahor, because if it becomes Tamei, the Terumah that eventually will be separated from it will become Tamei. The Torah prohibits causing Terumah to become Tamei (as Rashi writes in DH uv'Mukdashin). Moreover, allowing Terumah to become Tamei is prohibited because it causes a monetary loss to the Kohanim, the rightful owners of the Terumah (as Rashi and Tosfos write in Avodah Zarah 56a, DH she'Mutar).

(b) Rashi in Gitin (53a, DH d'Asur) explains that one opinion in the Gemara there maintains that it is prohibited to cause any produce in Eretz Yisrael to become Tamei, lest it be eaten unknowingly by the many people in Eretz Yisrael who are careful to eat all of their food in a state of Taharah. (That opinion in the Gemara is not accepted as the Halachah, and the Gemara here obviously rejects it as well.)

(c) TOSFOS in Avodah Zarah (56a, DH she'Mutar) quotes an earlier version of Rashi in which Rashi asserts that even according to the opinion that permits one to cause produce in Eretz Yisrael to become Tamei, such Tamei food may be eaten only by a person who is Tamei and not by one who is Tahor. Tosfos here (DH Tamei) alludes to this opinion but does not decisively state whether he accepts or rejects it. (In other places, Tosfos sometimes accepts this opinion and sometimes rejects it. See Tosfos to Chulin 34b, DH veha'Shelishi, and Tosfos to Pesachim 115a, DH Kol). Tosfos in Pesachim adds that the concern about produce of Eretz Yisrael that is Tamei does not apply when the Beis ha'Mikdash is not standing (because only when the Beis ha'Mikdash is standing must one protect his state of Taharah).

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Tum'as Ochlin 16:12) relates that "the early Chasidim used to refrain from eating Tamei throughout their lives as a measure of extra holiness." The Yerushalmi, cited by the TUR (OC 403), states that even if one is unable to refrain from eating Tamei food during the entire year, he should eat only Tahor foods at least for seven days of the year, referring to the seven days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. The MAGEN AVRAHAM writes that this was the practice of the holy Arizal.

QUESTION: Rabah bar Ula explains that when the Mishnah states that "everyone may perform Shechitah," it is teaching that a person who is Tamei may slaughter an animal of Chulin even l'Chatchilah. Even though the Tamei person is stringent not to let his Chulin food become Tamei, he can slaughter the animal with a long knife and avoid touching the meat. When the Mishnah continues and says that "their Shechitah is valid," implying that it is valid only b'Di'eved, it refers to a Tamei person who slaughters an animal of Kodshim. He is not permitted to slaughter Kodshim l'Chatchilah because of the possibility that he might touch it and make it Tamei. However, if, b'Di'eved, he slaughters an animal of Kodshim and he attests that he is certain that he did not touch the animal, then the Shechitah is acceptable and the animal is not Tamei.

When the Mishnah later says that "v'Chulan she'Shachtu v'Acherim Ro'in" -- "all [of these people] who slaughtered while others are watching," the Shechitah is valid b'Di'eved, it refers to a case in which a Tamei person slaughtered Kodshim and is no longer available to tell us whether or not he touched the animal. In such a case, the animal is Tahor only if there are others present who observed his Shechitah and who attest that he did not touch the animal.

TOSFOS (DH d'Leisei Kaman) asks why the principle of "Safek Tum'ah b'Reshus ha'Rabim Tahor" does not apply in this case. This principle teaches that in a case of doubt about Tum'ah in a public domain, the object is deemed to be not Tamei. (See Insights to Sotah 28:2.) Since the courtyard of the Beis ha'Mikdash -- where animals of Kodshim are slaughtered -- is a public domain, the animal slaughtered by a Tamei person who is no longer available to inform us about whether he touched the animal should be considered Tahor, even if there is no one else who observed the Shechitah!

(a) TOSFOS answers that, in this case, the principle of "Safek Tum'ah b'Reshus ha'Rabim Tahor" does not apply because in the majority of cases (Rov), the Shochet cannot avoid touching the animal. Therefore, unless there is evidence otherwise, it must be assumed that the Tamei person touched the animal when he slaughtered it, and he thus caused it to become Tamei.

The answer of Tosfos is difficult to understand in light of the words of Tosfos earlier (DH uv'Mukdashin). Tosfos there questions why the Gemara says that a Tamei person should not slaughter a Korban lest he touch the animal and make it Tamei, when the Gemara later (121b) says that an animal in the stage of "Pirchus" (spasmodic, jerking motions), immediately after the act of Shechitah, is considered a live animal and cannot become Tamei. Tosfos answers that a Tamei person still should not slaughter an animal of Kodshim l'Chatchilah, since he might touch the animal after "Pirchus."

If the animal can become Tamei only after "Pirchus," then certainly it is easy to avoid touching the animal after that time. Even though, in most cases, one cannot avoid touching the animal during the Shechitah, the Shechitah occurs some time before the "Pirchus" is over. Why, then, does Tosfos here say that the principle of "Safek Tum'ah b'Reshus ha'Rabim Tahor" does not apply here because it is likely that the Tamei person will touch the animal during Shechitah? Even if he touches the animal during Shechitah, the animal does not become Tamei! Only if he touches the animal after the stage of "Pirchus" does the animal become Tamei, at that point it is easy to avoid touching the animal!

The ACHI'EZER (2:1:2, DH uv'Tosfos) resolves this problem by suggesting that the answer of Tosfos here -- that in most cases the Shochet cannot avoid touching the animal -- indeed does not agree with the statement of the earlier Tosfos that during the stage of "Pirchus" the animal cannot become Tamei. Rather, the answer of Tosfos here is compatible with the second answer given by Tosfos earlier, that an animal can become Tamei as soon as the two Simanim are cut, since at that point it is considered "food" and can become Tamei with Tum'as Ochlin (even though it is not considered Neveilah until after "Pirchus"). (See also CHIDUSHEI REBBI AKIVA EIGER.) (D. BLOOM)

(b) The RAMBAN and RITVA answer that the principle of "Safek Tum'ah b'Reshus ha'Rabim Tahor" does not apply to a Safek Tum'ah that involves Kodshim. This is because the Torah refers to Kodshim as "Mishmeres" (Bamidbar 18:8), which implies that an extra degree of attention is necessary to ensure that Kodshim do not become Tamei, and that even a Hesech ha'Da'as, a temporary removal of attention from it, will cause the Kodshim to be considered Tamei. Consequently, the lack of knowledge of whether the Tamei person touched the Korban when he slaughtered it constitutes a lack of proper Shemirah, and the Korban is considered Tamei out of doubt. (See YOSEF DA'AS.)