1)

(a)What makes Metamei, Medamei and Menasech a Kenas (rather than a Chiyuv min ha'Torah) is the fact that it is a 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar' (a damage that is not discernable).

(b)We learned earlier that Rav interprets Menasech literally. He learns that one is Chayav for mixing Yayin Nesech with Kosher wine ('Me'arev', as Shmuel interprets Menasech) from Medamei, which is also Chayav because of 'Me'arev', and he learns one Kenas from another.

(c)According to Rav, having taught us Metamei, the Tana nevertheless finds it necessary to add Medamei, assuming Metamei to mean ...

1. ... Metamei Terumah because Metamei would then be a total loss, as we explained in our Mishnah, whereas Medamei is not.

2. ... Metamei Chulin because we might then ascribe the Kenas to the fact that he transgressed the Isur of causing the defilement of Chulin in Eretz Yisrael, which is not applicable to Medamei.

(d)Having taught us ...

1. ... Medamei, he needs to add Metamei because the former is common, whether the latter is not, and we would have applied the principle that whatever is not common, Chazal did not issue a decree.

2. ... Metamei and Medamei, he needs to add Menasech because there is no other punishment involved that might exempt them from paying, whereas in the case of Menasech, he might have been Patur, because he is Chayav Misah (as we explained above), were it not for the Chidush of Rebbi Yirmeyahu (as we explained on the previous Amud).

2)

(a)The Chachamim issued a decree forbidding the causing of Tum'ah to Taharos in Eretz Yisrael to accommodate the P'rushim, who are particular to eat their Chulin b'Taharah.

(b)According to Avuhah d'Rebbi Avin, the Chachamim intially forbade only two of the three damages listed in our Mishnah Metamei and Menasech, adding Medamei only afterwards.

(c)They did not include Medamei in the first list because compared to the first two, the loss is relatively small.

3)

(a)Chizkiyah holds that min ha'Torah, 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Shemei Hezek, and the Chachamim exempt Shogeg to encourage the Mazik to inform us that the fruit is forbidden.

(b)They did not exempt Mezid for the same reason because seeing as his very intention is to hurt the owner of the fruit, he does not require an inducement to inform him of what he did.

(c)According to Rebbi Yochanan 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar Lo Shmei Hezek' min ha'Torah ...

(d)... and the reason that Chazal obligated Mezid to pay is to discourage people from taking advantage of the Halachah, to render other people's Taharos, Tamei.

4)

(a)The Mishnah later states 'ha'Kohanim she'Piglu ba'Mikdash, Mezidin Chayavin', to which the Beraisa adds 'Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam'.

(b)Chizkiyah (according to whom the Mishnah's Din is really d'Oraisa) will explain that 'Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam' is mentioned with reference to the inference 'Ha Shogegin Peturin'.

(c)We derive the Psul Melachah by ...

1. ... the Parah Adumah itself from the Pasuk in Chukas "Asher Lo Alah Alehah Ol".

2. ... the Mei Chatas from the Pasuk there "l'Mishmeres l'Mei Nidah".

(d)The Beraisa rules that someone who worked with either of them is Patur mi'Dinei Adam, but Chayav b'Dinei Shamayim.

5)

(a)Chizkiyah, according to whom he ought to be Chayav mi'Dinei Adam, establishes the case of ...

1. ... Paras Chatas when he brought the cow into the stable mainly for it to suckle its baby, in which case his secondary intention of letting it thresh simultaneously, is only a Machshavah, for which one is not Chayav.

2. ... Mei Chatas where the water is already placed on one of the scales, and all he did was to place a piece of meat on the other scale. Here too, the Melachah that he performed with the Mei Chatas is only b'Machshavah.

(b)To reconcile Rava, who validates Mei Chatas even mid'Rabanan if one used it to weigh with, with the Beraisa, we say 'Ha b'Gufan, Ha b'Kenegdan' meaning that Rava speaks in the way that we just explained, whereas the Beraisa speaks when he actually poured water into a measuring vessel, and then placed the weight into it to see how high the water has risen.

(c)We refute this answer on the grounds that if that is how the Beraisa speaks, then he ought to be Chayav b'Dinei Adam, too.

(d)After establishing both Beraisos in the case of Kenegdan, we finally reconcile Rava with the Beraisa by establishing the Beraisa when he took his mind off guarding the Mei Chatas against Tum'ah (which renders them Pasul mid'Rabanan), whereas Rava speaks when, despite his using it for weighing, his mind is still on them.

6)

(a)The Beraisa rules that if someone steals a coin which has been withdrawn from circulation, Terumah which subsequently became Tamei or Chametz after Pesach he can say to the owner 'Here is yours before you. Take it!'

(b)If he were to lose any of these objects he would be obligated to pay for them (according to their value at the time when he stole them), because otherwise, he would not fulfill the Mitzvah of "v'Heishiv Es ha'Gezeilah Asher Gazal".

(c)Despite the fact that the articles that he is returning are now useless, he fulfills the Mitzvah of "v'Heishiv Es ha'Gezeilah" because the Torah adds the words "Asher Gazal ", and that is what he stole.

(d)Rav Papa proves from this Beraisa that 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Lo Shemei Hezek' (like Rebbi Yochanan), since according to Chizkiyah, he is like a Gazlan, and would be obligated to pay in the Reisha too.

7)

(a)In another Beraisa, Rebbi Meir obligates a Metamei, Medamei and Menasech to pay, irrespective of whether he did the damage b'Shogeg or b'Mezid. Rebbi Yehudah says 'b'Shogeg Patur, b'Mezid Chayav' (like our Mishnah).

(b)Initially, we explain that they are arguing over whether 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Shemei Hezek' (Rebbi Meir), or not (Rebbi Yehudah).

(c)We learn that generally, a Mazik b'Shogeg is Chayav from the Pasuk in Mishpatim "Petza Tachas Patza".

(d)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak concludes that both Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah hold 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar, Lo Shemei Hezek', and the basis of their Machlokes is whether 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Mezid' (Rebbi Meir) or not (Rebbi Yehudah).

8)

(a)Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa, permits someone who cooks on Shabbos b'Shogeg to eat the food even on Shabbos 'be'Mezid Lo Yochal'.

(b)Rebbi Yehudah forbids the food to the Mezid forever but he permits the Shogeg to eat it on Motza'ei Shabbos.

(c)We qualify Rebbi Yehudah's concession to eat it on Motza'ei Shabbos by permitting it only after the time that he would have needed to prepare it (so as not to benefit from his sin).

(d)Rebbi Yehudah forbids the transgressor to eat the food that he cooked on Shabbos until Motza'ei Shabbos because he holds 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Mezid'.

9)

(a)Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar is the most stringent of all. He forbids Mezid to be eaten by anybody ever because he holds 'Ma'aseh Shabbos Asur'.

(b)'b'Shogeg' he permits others to eat it on Motza'ei Shabbos, but not the person who transgressed Shabbos.

(c)We see from this Beraisa that Rebbi Yehudah holds 'Kansu Shogeg Atu Mezid', whereas Rebbi Meir does not whereas according to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's explanation, they reverse their opinions.

10)

(a)We reconcile Rebbi Meir in this Beraisa, where he does not decree Shogeg on account of Mezid, with his own opinion regarding Metamei, Medamei and Menasech, where he does by differentiating between Isurim d'Oraisa (where he does not decree, because they do not require reinforcement) and Isurim d'Rabanan (where he does, because Rabbinical decrees need to be reinforced).

(b)Granted, Menasech is d'Oraisa, yet he decrees because of the stringency of Yayin Nesech (which is a branch of Avodah-Zarah).

(c)And we reconcile Rebbi Yehudah in this Beraisa, who decrees Shogeg on account of Mezid, with his own opinion regarding Metamei, Medamei and Menasech, where he does not inasmuch as Rebbi Yehudah decrees Shogeg Atu Mezid by Isurim d'Oraisa, but not by Isurim d'Rabanan (the exact opposite logic of Rebbi Meir).

(d)To be sure, Menasech is d'Oraisa, yet he does not decree because Yayin Nesech is such a serious Isur, that it does not require reinforcement.

11)

(a)In another Beraisa, Rebbi Meir obligates someone who plants in Shevi'is to uproot what he planted 'bein b'Shogeg, bein b'Mezid' 'be'Shabbos, b'Shogeg Yekayem, b'Mezid Ye'aker'.

(b)Rebbi Yehudah obligates someone who plants on Shabbos to uproot what he planted 'bein b'Shogeg, bein b'Mezid' 'bi'Shevi'is, b'Shogeg Yekayem, b'Mezid Ye'aker'.

(c)Besides the discrepancy between Rebbi Meir's previous ruling (that he is not Ko'nes Shogeg Atu Mezid by a d'Oraisa) and his current ruling with regard to Shemitah, we also have a problem with Rebbi Meir's opinion here (in fact, the same problem exists in Rebbi Yehudah) since he seems to contradict himself from Shabbos to Shevi'is, seeing as both are d'Oraisa.

12)

(a)In fact, Rebbi Meir's ruling regarding Shabbos conforms with his previous opinion. His ruling regarding Shevi'is however, is based on two considerations. One of them, because Yisrael are suspect on transgressing it (so Chazal decreed on Shogeg, too). The other the fact that since Yisrael need to count the years of planting (to know when is Orlah and Neta Revai), people will easily be able to work out retroactively that he must have planted the tree in the Shemitah. Consequently, unless we decree even Shogeg, they will jump to the conclusion that planting is permitted in Shevi'is (in which case, it is a branch of Mar'is ha'Ayin).

(b)This reason does not apply to someone who planted on Shabbos b'Shogeg because there is no reason to count the days with regard to planting, so people will not realize that he planted on Shabbos.

(c)It is possible to apply the same reasoning to someone who planted on Shabbos b'Shogeg in a case where he planted on Shabbos which fell on the thirtieth day before Rosh Hashanah. When two years and thirty days later, the fruit of the tree leave the realm of Orlah and become permitted, and people will ask how fruit becomes permitted after two years, they will be informed that this is because the tree was planted exactly thirty days before Rosh Hashanah. This will bring to their attention the fact that it was planted on Shabbos.

(d)By saying this we answer the Kashya why Rebbi Meir found it necessary to give his second explanation, pointing to a flaw in the first explanation, which differentiates between counting the years and counting the days. So he concludes that, even if people would realize that he planted the tree on Shabbos, they would never come to permit planting on Shabbos.