Question: We should expound also "v'Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah" - Lo, mi'Daito (with his consent)!

Implied question: It says "Lo Yuchal Shalchah"! (This implies that he is forced to be married to her.)

Answer: That is if he already married her (but he may choose not to marry her)!

Answer #1: It is unreasonable that it depends on his consent, since if he married her, he may not divorce her.

Answer #2: V'Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah refers to the woman. Therefore, we require her consent. Mahor Yimharenah refers to the man.

Explanation: We do not ask about when he found immorality in her (she was Mezanah), for then there is a Lav and an Aseh, like it says in Yevamos (11b) "Lo Yuchal Ba'alah..." includes a Sotah who was secluded (was Mezanah). This is a Lav;

We expound "v'Nitme'ah... v'Nitme'ah" - one forbids her to her husband, and one forbids her [permanently, with an Isur Aseh] to the Bo'el.

Rather, we ask about a woman not proper to marry into Kahal.

Question #1: What is the question that the Aseh should be Docheh the Lo Sa'aseh? We explicitly expound a verse in the Mishnah that we require a woman proper for him!

Question #2: According to the answer that it is not considered an Aseh, why do we need a verse to exclude a woman not proper for him?

Answer #1: In our Mishnah, we do not learn from an extra verse. Rather, v'Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah connotes with her consent;

Therefore we exclude a woman not proper for him, for if she says that she does not want him, there is no Aseh at all. Therefore, it is not considered an Aseh, and it is not Docheh a Lav.

In any case, we asked because we are thinking now that when she wants him, the Aseh should be Docheh the Lav.

We conclude that even if she says that she wants him, it is not considered an Aseh, for it is not like cutting off Tzara'as through doing Bris Milah.

Answer #2: We expound an extra verse. We ask that the Aseh should be Docheh the Lav, and we should establish the extra verse for Chayavei Kerisos;

If not for the extra verse, we would permit even Chayavei Kerisos. Since they were included for a fine above in the beginning of this Perek (29b), we would say that they are included also for Nisu'in;

The verses properly connote that whenever there is a fine, there is also Nisu'in.

Answer #3: We ask that the Aseh should be Docheh the Lav;

Question: Here is different, for the Torah revealed [that it is not]!

Answer: If so, we should learn from here to all places that [an Aseh] is not Docheh [a Lav]!

Answer #3 (cont.): The Gemara answers that [here] it is not considered an Aseh.

In any case, we need a verse, for without a verse we would consider that it is impossible to fulfill both of them [so the Aseh is Docheh the Lav].

It is considered an Aseh, for the primary Mitzvah is to marry, just like we say in Yevamos (21) that Chalitzah in place of Yibum is not [a Mitzvah] at all.

Explanation (R. Tam): This is a mere Siman, for a Lav and an Aseh forbids cutting off Tzara'as, like it says in Shabbos (132b) according to one version written in Seforim;

We do not learn from there that in general, Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh v'Aseh. Milah is different, for 13 covenants were made on it.

Rather, the primary source is Sha'atnez in Tzitzis.

Question: Regarding Sha'atnez in Tzitzis, one can fulfill both of them through a wool garment and wool strings! (Why is the Aseh Docheh the Lav?)

Answer (Ri): With a linen Talis, it is impossible to fulfill both of them. One fulfills Techeiles only through Sha'atnez, for Techeiles is [dyed] wool;

We should not say that it is forbidden to wear a linen garment because it is possible to wear a wool garment. This is not considered possible [to fulfill both of them].

Question: We say in Menachos (40a) "whoever puts Techeiles on a linen garment in Yerushalayim is shocking." The Gemara explains that this is a decree due to Kala Ilan (wool strings dyed with blue tree sap). One fulfills Techeiles only through Sha'atnez, for Techeiles is [dyed] wool;

Citation (40a) Question: Why is this worse than Lavan? (The regular strings (not of Techeiles) need not be white. We should say that Aseh Docheh Lo Sa'aseh!)

Citation (cont.) Answer: It is possible to fulfill both with the same species (linen), like Reish Lakish, who taught that whenever [you can fulfill both of them, an Aseh is not Docheh a Lav].

Answer: There, surely since there is no Techeiles, rather, everything is Lavan, one can fulfill the Mitzvah of Lavan with its species.

Question: It says there above that wool strings exempt [a garment of] linen, and linen strings exempt wool;

Why do they exempt? It is possible to fulfill both of them. One can use Lavan of the same species [as the garment]!

Answer (R. Tam): Surely, it is forbidden for all four Lavan strings [to be of wool], for it is possible with the same species;

There, the Gemara said that two strings of wool Lavan exempt a linen garment. Migo (since) Techeiles exempted it, and it already became Sha'atnez through the Techeiles, also wool Lavan exempts;

Migo that two strings of wool Lavan exempt a linen garment, also two linen Lavan strings exempt a wool garment, even though it did not became Sha'atnez through Techeiles in it.

Question: This requires investigation, whether two strings of linen Lavan and two strings of wool Lavan are permitted on a Talis of wool or linen;

Perhaps we permit two Lavan strings only where there is Techeiles, but not where there is no Techeiles;

Or, perhaps there is no difference, for two linen Lavan strings exempt a wool garment, even though there Techeiles has no effect, for it does not make it Sha'atnez!

Question: If we permit Sha'atnez of two strings of linen Lavan, even if there is no Techeiles with them, why is one who puts Techeiles on a linen garment in Yerushalayim shocking? He can put with it two strings of linen Lavan!

Even if the "Techeiles" is really Kala Ilan or total Lavan (white), it is permitted!

Answer: We decree lest he cast with it two strings of wool Lavan, and people will think that the two colored strings are Techeiles, and all four strings will be wool Lavan.

Question (R. Ezra): Why do we need a verse in Yevamos (5b) to teach that the Aseh of Kivud [Av v'Em] does not override Shabbos?

There is no Aseh, for if [the parent] says "I do not want the honor", there is no Aseh at all!

Answer #1: There, in any case, once the father commanded, there is an Aseh to do his command.

Answer #2: Here, regarding her, there is no Aseh, for if she wants, she can say "I do not want him." therefore, she should not transgress a Lav due to his Aseh;

She is commanded like him, and the Torah equated a woman to a man [for all punishments], like it says in Yevamos (84b). (Tosfos Yeshanim)

Explanation: Since it says that Ones is obligated and Mefateh is exempt, this shows that she has a fine, and the fine is hers;

We cannot say that it mentioned that Mefateh is exempt due to an orphan. Obviously he is exempt, for she pardoned!

Rather, you are forced to say that it mentioned that Mefateh is exempt only due to a Na'arah who became Mekudeshes and was divorced;

The Mishnah mentioned an orphan only to give the reason why Mefateh is exempt. Doesn't the fine go to her father?! (He should be liable!)

[The Mishnah] teaches that she is like an orphan; the fine is hers.

Question: What is the source of this? Just the contrary! We should say that it mentioned an orphan to infer that the reason [Mefateh is exempt for a Na'arah divorced from Eirusin] is because she is also an orphan;

Inference: If she were not an orphan, even Mefateh would be liable, for the fine is her father's!

Answer: We should not say that it comes for an inference as long as we can say that it comes l'Gufei (for the law itself).

Note: If we would say that it discusses an orphan Na'arah divorced from Eirusin, it is no Chidush that Mefateh is exempt. It is needed only for the inference, if she were not an orphan.

Implied question: It should have mentioned she'Lo k'Darkah first! (If the first was Bo'el k'Darkah, she is a full Be'ulah, and the second is exempt!)

Answer: The Gemara often is not concerned [for the proper order], like it says above (35a) in Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah "whether he intends or does not intend";

Implied question: It should have mentioned first without intent, like it says "whether Shogeg or Mezid"!

Answer: Rather, this is the Gemara's style when it must teach positive and negative. (It teaches the positive first.)

Explanation: The first was Bo'el she'Lo k'Darkah. One is liable a fine even Lo k'Darkah, like it says in Kidushin (9b) "if 10 had Bi'ah with her, and she is still a Besulah..."

I.e. they had Bi'ah with her Lo k'Darkah, and we say that Rebbi agrees about a fine, that they all pay.

In Yevamos (59a), regarding v'Lo Sihyeh l'Ishah - a woman proper for him, to exclude a widow to a Kohen Gadol...

Citation (cont.) Question: What is the case? If [he had Bi'ah with her] k'Darkah, even without this [that she is a widow, she is not proper for him, for] she is a Be'ulah!

Citation (cont.) Answer: Rather, [he had Bi'ah with her] she'Lo k'Darkah.

Observation: Here, we could have said that both of them had Bi'ah with her she'Lo k'Darkah.

Implied question: In Sanhedrin (73b), we asked about [the Mishnah of] Na'aros for whom there is a fine [29a, and asked why one is liable for Bi'ah with his sister. If one may kill him to save her, he should be exempt!]

We answered that he had Bi'ah Lo k'Darkah with her (which blemishes her. After this, one may not kill him to save her), and then he had Bi'ah k'Darkah with her (for which he pays the fine. If there is a fine for Lo k'Darkah, we could have said that both times was she'Lo k'Darkah!)

Answer: Indeed, we could have said that also the second time was she'Lo k'Darkah.

What is difficult with Rashi's Perush there, I explained in Yevamos (59a) and Kidushin (9b).

Implied question: I explained above (38b) that Boshes and Pegam are equated to Kenas. They are given to the one who receives the fine!

Answer: That is after we know from here that everything goes to her father.

Question: Why don't we say that her father receives it, since a Mefateh pays it, like we say below (42a)? (If it were hers, she pardoned him!)

Answer: [If not for this reasoning, we would say that] perhaps a Mefateh does not pay [Boshes and Pegam]. The verses that Abaye and Rava bring are written about Ones.

Observation: We cannot learn from her earnings, for her father feeds her (so he deserves them. We cannot learn to other matters), like it says in Kidushin (4a);

We cannot learn from Kidushin money, for it comes to her from elsewhere [not due to anything she did or suffered from].

We cannot learn from [a Tzad ha'Shavah of] both of them, for wounding of her body is different [than both sources].

Question: Here, we know that her father receives Boshes and Pegam only because he can be Mekadesh her to a disgusting man or leper;

If so, how did we want to say in Kidushin (3b), when we asked "what is the source that money makes Kidushin, and the money goes to her father", that perhaps we learn from Boshes and Pegam?

Boshes and Pegam themselves, we know [that her father receives them] only because he can be Mekadesh her!

Answer #1 (Ri): The Gemara is wont to reject [like this]. Even if you had another source that her father receives Boshes and Pegam [you could not learn to Kidushin money].

Answer #2: There, we want to learn Kidushin of a Na'arah from Boshes and Pegam of a minor;

We would have learned [Kidushin money of a Na'arah] from Kidushin of a minor, if not that one might have thought that a minor is different, for she has no Yad (power of acquisition), but a Na'arah has a Yad, like we say above there;

Therefore, it says "if you will say that we learn from Boshes and Pegam" [i.e.] of a minor, even though for this she has a Yad, like it says in Bava Kama (87b, that if someone wounded a minor,) we use the payment to buy Segulah (something lasting, i.e. a Sefer Torah or a date tree), and even so the father receives it, the same applies to Kidushin of a Na'arah.

Answer #3: If the Gemara did not suggest learning [that her father receives] Kidushin money from Boshes and Pegam, rather, her earnings, which were mentioned there above [we should learn from Boshes and Pegam], this would be fine.

Rejection #1: The Gemara connotes unlike this.

Rejection #2: If so, also here we should conclude "if you will say that we learn from Boshes and Pegam", since we discuss her earnings, and similarly below (46b).

Question: What is this estimation? Does an esteemed woman from a great family lose through this blemish (loss of virginity) only the same amount as a Shifchah married to a slave?!

Answer: Every woman, we estimate in this way based on her standing, i.e. the difference between what one would pay for a Besulah from a Be'ulah, to marry his slave to a woman blemished like this.

Implied question: If so, why does it mention a Shifchah?

Answer: This is a typical case. It is not normal to marry one's slave to a princess.

Question (Ri): What is the difference if the verse discusses a Bas Onshim (one liable to be punished)? In any case we can say that the same applies to a minor;

According to Rabanan, one who has Bi'ah with a minor Me'orasah is stoned, in Sanhedrin (66b), even though the Parshah is written about a Na'arah Me'orasah, who is Bas Onshim!

It says "v'Es ha'Na'arah Al Davar Asher Lo Tza'akah" (also she is stoned).

Answer #1 (Ri): There, it is because we conclude below "here it is written Na'arah (with a Hei). This implies that everywhere else, where it is written Na'ar (without a Hei, even though we pronounce it Na'arah), even a minor is included;

Therefore, we obligate him there (Skilah for Bi'ah with a minor Me'orasah), and we learn all Arayos from her.

Answer #2: Only regarding Motzi Shem Ra it is reasonable to say that one is liable a fine and lashes only for an adult, since the verse discusses a Bas Onshim, but not in general;

This is because if one is Motzi Shem Ra on a minor, it is reasonable that he is exempt, for enticement of a minor is Ones. He is like one who was Motzi Shem Ra on a Na'arah that she was raped. He is exempt.

Suggestion: It is reasonable that he is liable only for a Bas Onshim, because he came to get her killed.

Rejection: In Sanhedrin (8b), in the Sugya of concern for scandalous talk, it connotes that he is not liable for [trying to] cause her death.