Explanation: Rebbi Shimon, according to this explanation, holds that even movable objects is enough.

Question: This is difficult, as it doesn't fit into Rebbi Shimon's statement "if there is a Mosar Dinar." If Rebbi Shimon's point is that he argues on the Tana Kama that even movable objects are good, he should (at least) say "because there is a Mosar Dinar."

Answer: The Gemara asks a better question instead.

Explanation: It must be that the Gemara is currently understanding that according to Rebbi Shimon even less than a Dinar is fine.

Question: This is difficult, as now the question asked in the previous Tosfos returns. If Rebbi Shimon's point is that he argues on the Tana Kama that even less than a Dinar is valid, he should (at least) say "because there is a Mosar Dinar" not "if there is a Mosar Dinar." [The Gemara itself asks later that this answer is generally difficult as the Beraisa says that there is a Mosar Dinar, not that there isn't a Mosar Dinar.]

Rashi's Opinion: Rashi explains that when the Beraisa earlier states "and this one's sons" it refers to the sons of the first wife.

Rashi's explanation implies that he does not have the text earlier "this one's sons come after the death of their mother" as this would clearly imply that it is talking about the sons of the second wife. Rashi therefore must have the text "this one's sons after death."

Questions on Rashi: This is difficult, as this text is found in all of our editions of the Gemara.

Additionally, if the Beraisa is referring to the first mother's children, why even say the words "after death" at all? Of course it is referring to sometime after her death, as the Beraisa started off by saying that she died!

Moreover, once the Gemara has to say the opinions should be reversed, they should have just said that their argument is regarding whether or not one of the Kesuvos can act as the Mosar for its fellow Kesuvah (as implied by Rebbi Shimon's statement).

Additionally, the Rach explicitly has the text "the children of the second wife come after her death."

Rabeinu Tam's Opinion: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that the Beraisa's statement is referring to the (children of the) second mother. The logic of the Tana Kama and Rebbi Shimon is merely reversed (from the Gemara's previous thought).

The Tana Kama says that the sons of the second wife come and take the Kesuvah of their mother, while the first wife's children receive nothing when there is no Mosar. If there was money leftover, even if it was less than a Dinar they would receive a Kesuvas Banin Dichrin. [See below regarding where this is implied in the Beraisa.]

Rebbi Shimon argues that only if there is a Mosar Dinar do the sons of the first wife receive a Kesuvas Banin Dichrin. Once we see this is the opinion of Rebbi Shimon, we can fully understand the opinion of the Tana Kama (as we explained above). Being that Rebbi Shimon said "If there is (a Mosar Dinar)," it implies that the Tana Kama means that only when there is no Mosar at all will the sons of the first wife not collect a Kesuvah.

Explanation: This is as we explained (the argument) beforehand. The Tana Kama says that the sons of the second wife collect their Kesuvah, while the first one's do not collect when there is no leftover money at all. However, they can collect from movable objects or assets that were on lien (even less than a Dinar).

Rebbi Shimon comes to say that there must be a Mosar Dinar from land and from property free of a lien.

First Explanation: Rashi and the Rach explain that this means that the inheritors split the money.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Bava Basra (139b), however, states that when there are few assets to the estate the daughters should be supported and the sons should beg for their food. The Gemara there qualifies this by saying that in a case where the assets were few (when the father died) and later increased, or where they were many and decreased the sons have the upper hand and inherit while the daughters are merely supported.

We do not say that if the assets were originally very few and they later increased that the daughters already acquired their right to be supported without the sons inheriting. This is seemingly unlike the conclusion in our Gemara that the sons of the wife that have the smaller Kesuvah divide the estate equally when there originally was not a Mosar Dinar.

Answer: This is because we always try to arrange that the inheritance should be in accordance with Torah law over an arrangement that is not prescribed by the Torah (that the daughters should receive support and the sons not receive anything).

Second Explanation: Rebbi explains that our Gemara means to say the following. Just as in the case where there originally was a Mosar Dinar and the assets decreased the inheritors with the bigger Kesuvah receive their portion, so too when there is originally not a Mosar Dinar and the assets later increased, the inheritors with the bigger Kesuvah receive their portion.

Implied Question: At first glance this might seem difficult, as this would mean that we are seemingly going after a Rabbinic solution here more than in the Gemara in Bava Basra (ibid.), where we did not neglect basic Torah law that sons should split inheritance.

Answer: Although this is true, we are not uprooting Torah inheritance altogether (as sons are inheriting).

However, if we would go after the Rabbinic solution we would totally uproot Torah inheritance and sons would not inherit at all.

Observation: This is the source of the famous claim that an argument described in Bava Metzia (110b) is actually that of Rami bar Chama and Rava in our Gemara. The Gemara there states, "this is good according to the opinion that if the purchaser has money he cannot remove the creditor's claim with his money. However, according to the opinion that the buyer could remove the creditor with money etc." [Their argument is seemingly regarding a case where a creditor has a lien on a field that the borrower proceeds to sell, and the borrower defaults on the loan. The creditor typically has the right to seize the field from the purchaser. The argument is whether or not the purchaser has the right to give him the cash owed to him by the borrower instead of the field in a case where the creditor would rather have the field.]

This is understandable, as in our Gemara Rami bar Chama holds that the purchaser cannot thwart the creditor while Rava says he can.

Question: This is understandable according to the opinion of Rami bar Chama. However, it is unclear that this fits Rava's opinion. It is possible that Rava only said in our Gemara that the purchaser can remove the creditor with money because the purchaser is willing to pay twice the value of the field.

However, where the creditor wants the land at the same value that the purchaser is willing to pay for it, it is possible that Rava will agree that the purchaser cannot take precedence over the creditor by merely giving him the value of the land in cash.

Answer: The opinion in Bava Metzia (110b) stating that the purchaser can remove the creditor can still be Rava. This because the purchaser can always evaluate the land as being worth double its true value, and be willing to pay that amount. This might be the intent of the opinion stated in Bava Metzia (ibid.), which may indeed be that of Rava.

Explanation: The field is not considered to have risen in value (the extra five hundred is merely what it is worth to the purchaser to currently keep it, and is not reflective of its true worth).

Observation: Rabeinu Tam observes that our Gemara leads us to better understand the Gemaros in Bava Basra and Bava Kama that state that if a person sells his future inheritance from his father, the sale is invalid. Based on our Gemara, Rabeinu Tam concludes that these Gemaros must only be referring to a case where he said "whatever I will inherit from my father." However, if he said "this field that I will inherit," the sale is valid. This is even true according to the opinion that a person cannot give over for acquisition something that is not yet extant.

First Proof: Otherwise, how could the person in our Gemara have sold his mother's Kesuvah? According to Rashi's first explanation in the Gemara, this refers to his mother's Kesuvah when she is still married.

This is why the Gemara's case is where he sells it for a pittance. This implies that if his mother would die, her husband would inherit her anyway (and he would not have to pay her Kesuvah). Even if he would die first, perhaps her son would die in her lifetime and the purchaser would therefore not gain anything (as he is only selling that which he will inherit from his mother).

Accordingly, where he knows exactly what he is selling it must be that this type of sale is valid. It does not make sense to say that these Gemaros are in accordance with the opinion that a person can sell something that is not yet extant, as we rule that this is incorrect.

Observation: However, according to Rashi's second explanation of our Gemara there is no proof. Rashi's second explanation of our Gemara is that he sold a field that his father had set aside to cover his mother's Kesuvah in case of his death. He indeed died, and his son inherited him.

As long as she did not demand her Kesuvah in Beis Din, if the son sells the field the sale is valid and he cannot normally retract the sale, as he is a full-fledged inheritor. He just has an obligation to honor his mother's Kesuvah when she demands that he do so.

Her Kesuvah has a lien on this field, meaning that she can take it away from the purchaser. This is why her son told the purchaser, "if my mother comes and complains that the field should really be hers I will not reimburse you, and you will lose your money." This is also why he only sold it for a pittance.

According to the first explanation in Rashi there is also no proof to support Rabeinu Tam's statement, as Rashi himself explained (that the Gemara is dealing with having to return the money, not the validity of the sale, see Maharsha).

Second Proof: Rabeinu Tam further proves this concept from a Gemara in Bava Basra (159a). The Gemara states that if a son sold his own rights to his father's property in his father's lifetime, and the son died before his father, his son (the property owner's grandson) can take those fields away from the people who purchased the fields. Why? He inherits his grandfather directly (without receiving the inheritance through his father).

It would seem that if a person cannot sell the rights to his future inheritance, the Gemara did not have to bother stating the reason that he inherits his grandfather directly. It must be that the sale was valid because the son stated that he was selling a specific field that he was poised to inherit from his father (before his apparently untimely death).