QUESTION: The Gemara attempts to identify the Tana who does not expound the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir" which compares the laws of an Eved who sold himself ("Eved Mocher Atzmo") to the laws of an Eved sold by Beis Din ("Eved she'Machruhu Beis Din"). The Gemara cites a Beraisa in which Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov states that the verse, "v'Shav El Mishpachto" (Vayikra 25:41), teaches that not only does the Yovel year liberate an Eved who sold himself and an Eved who was "Nirtza," but it even releases an Eved who was sold by Beis Din. If Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov accepts the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir," he should not need a verse to teach the law that the Yovel year frees an Eved sold by Beis Din, since that law is written in the Parshah of an Eved who sold himself. It must be that Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov does not expound the Gezeirah Shavah.

The Gemara refutes this proof and asserts that Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov does accept the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir," and nevertheless he cannot derive the law that an Eved sold by Beis Din goes free at Yovel from the Parshah of an Eved who sold himself, because an Eved sold by Beis Din deserves a harsh penalty for transgressing the prohibition against stealing. Since he sinned, perhaps he should not go free with Yovel. Therefore, the verse of "v'Shav El Mishpachto" is necessary to teach that he indeed goes free at Yovel even though he sinned.

Why does the Gemara suggest that the freedom of an Eved sold by Beis Din cannot be derived through the Gezeirah Shavah because the Eved committed a sin? A general rule states that a Pircha (logical challenge) may be asked only on a logical argument like a Binyan Av or a Kal va'Chomer. A Gezeirah Shavah, in contrast, is not a logical argument but is a tradition from Sinai on which no Pircha may be asked. Although there is a logical distinction between an Eved who sold himself and an Eved sold by Beis Din, the Gezeirah Shavah nevertheless teaches that all laws that are taught with regard to one apply to the other!

Although a Gezeirah Shavah which is not "Mufneh" may be rejected with a Pircha, the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir" clearly is a strong Gezeirah Shavah which is "Mufneh." (A Gezeirah Shavah is "Mufneh" when the two similar words are not used for any other Derashah, in which case they may be used unconditionally for the Gezeirah Shavah between the two topics ("Mufneh mi'Shenei Tzedadim"). When only one of the two words is free, the Gezeirah Shavah is not "Mufneh" and, according to one opinion, it may be used only if there is no logical argument against the Gezeirah Shavah.)

The first proof that this Gezeirah Shavah is "Mufneh" is the fact that the Gemara derives through the Gezeirah Shavah the law that an Eved who sold himself can become "Nirtza" as well as the law that the master may give his Eved a Shifchah Kena'anis. If the Gezeirah Shavah is not "Mufneh," only an Eved sold by Beis Din should be able to become "Nirtza" and be given a Shifchah Kena'anis, as part of the penalty he receives for stealing.

The second proof is the Gemara earlier which derives that Kinyan Kesef applies to an Eved who sold himself from the Gezeirah Shavah which compares him to an Eved sold by Beis Din. Even though the Gemara says that there is more reason for Kinyan Kesef to apply to an Eved sold by Beis Din (since he is sold against his will), the Gezeirah Shavah still applies.

Since the Gezeirah Shavah is "Mufneh," why does the Gemara refute the Gezeirah Shavah (which teaches that the law of Yovel applies to an Eved who sold himself) merely because of a Pircha, the logical argument that perhaps Yovel applies only to an Eved sold by Beis Din as a penalty for stealing? (TOSFOS HA'ROSH, TOSFOS CHOCHMEI ANGLIYAH)

(a) The CHAZON ISH (cited by the YOSEF DA'AS) suggests that the Gemara is not merely suggesting a logical distinction between an Eved who sold himself and an Eved sold by Beis Din. Rather, the Gemara is relying on a verse to override the Gezeirah Shavah. The verse, "v'Nimkar b'Geneivaso" (Shemos 22:2), teaches that the thief is to be sold in order to compensate the victim of the theft. The verse implies that whatever is necessary to do to compensate the victim is to be done. Therefore, if the theft occurred the year before Yovel, one might have thought that the thief may be sold for six years and the sale overrides the impending Yovel year. It is this verse, and not merely the logical Pircha, that overrides the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir."

This answer needs elucidation. The law is that even if a person steals more than the value of six years of his service, Beis Din still does not sell him for more than six years in order to pay back his theft, even though the victim will not receive full compensation for the stolen item. Accordingly, the verse obviously cannot mean that Beis Din does literally everything possible to ensure that the victim is fully compensated.

Moreover, why does the Gemara mention that the Eved sold by Beis Din should not go free at Yovel because he deserves a penalty, if the actual reason for why he should not go free at Yovel is because he must pay back the full amount that he stole? That is not a penalty for his act of stealing; it is a basic obligation to compensate the victim!

(b) The ATZMOS YOSEF and SEFER HA'MIKNAH (DH Mihu) suggest that the logic that a thief deserves a penalty is so strong that it indeed overrides a Gezeirah Shavah.

Although it is clear from the Gemara and Rishonim in a number of places that a logical consideration can override a Gezeirah Shavah (see YOSEF DA'AS, and see Insights to Yevamos 3:2), the logic that the thief deserves a penalty is not the type of logic that can override a Gezeirah Shavah. This logic merely gives a reason for why the Halachah should be more stringent in the case of an Eved sold by Beis Din. It does not provide a direct reason for why this particular Halachah (Yovel) should not apply.

Perhaps there is another logical consideration which does relate directly to the Halachah of Yovel. Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov may follow the view of the Tana Kama quoted earlier who rules that a Jew who sells himself as an Eved may sell himself for more than six years, because the verse, "v'Avadcha" (Devarim 15:12), excludes an Eved Mocher Atzmo from the Gezeirah Shavah. Perhaps this verse teaches not only that the Halachah of going free after six years does not apply to an Eved who sold himself, but also that the Halachah of going free at Yovel does not apply to an Eved sold by Beis Din. The reason why an Eved who sold himself goes free at Yovel is that no other time period frees him, while an Eved sold by Beis Din goes free after six years because he does not go free at Yovel.

Although this approach is plausible, it is not the logic proposed by the Gemara. The Gemara suggests that an Eved sold by Beis Din should not go free at Yovel as a penalty for sinning and not because he will go free anyway after six years.

(c) Perhaps the Gemara does not mean to suggest that the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir" should teach that an Eved sold by Beis Din goes free at Yovel, because -- as mentioned earlier -- there are strong grounds to assume that the Torah does not apply the Halachah of Yovel to an Eved sold by Beis Din. Rather, the Gemara means that if Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov accepts the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir," the laws of an Eved who sold himself and the laws of an Eved sold by Beis Din will be identical (except for the few explicitly-stated differences). Consequently, the Halachah that an Eved sold by Beis Din goes free at Yovel should be derived through a Kal va'Chomer from the law of an Eved who sold himself (according to the Tana Kama who argues with Rebbi Elazar on 14b). If an Eved who sold himself goes free at Yovel even though he does not go free after six years, then certainly an Eved sold by Beis Din who does go free after six years should go free at Yovel! (The logic suggested in the end of answer (b) above, which can refute a Gezeirah Shavah, cannot refute a Kal va'Chomer.) The Acharonim (Sefer ha'Miknah, Atzmos Yosef, and others) indeed point out that the Halachah of Yovel should be derived even without the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir," through a Binyan Av or a Kal va'Chomer.

If, however, Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov does not accept the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir," it is clear that he also does not accept this Kal va'Chomer. Without the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir," the Halachah that a relative redeems an Eved Ivri ("Ge'ulas Kerovim") would apply only to an Eved who sold himself (see TOSFOS 15b, DH Amai). The Halachah of redemption by relatives would not apply to an Eved sold by Beis Din. This difference would be grounds for a Pircha on the Kal va'Chomer: perhaps only an Eved who sold himself goes free at Yovel, just as he goes free with "Ge'ulas Kerovim." An Eved sold by Beis Din, however, should not go free at Yovel, just as he does not go free with "Ge'ulas Kerovim." The fact that Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov requires a verse to teach that an Eved sold by Beis Din goes free at Yovel is the Gemara's proof that he does not accept the Gezeirah Shavah.

The Gemara refutes this proof. Even if Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov does accept the Gezeirah Shavah of "Sachir Sachir" and therefore does not have the Pircha of "Ge'ulas Kerovim," he still would have another Pircha on the Kal va'Chomer: an Eved sold by Beis Din should not go free at Yovel because he committed a sin.

QUESTION: Rebbi rules that an Eved Ivri who was sold to a Jew cannot be redeemed by relatives. Rather, if he wants to be set free he must redeem himself.

If an Eved Ivri can redeem himself, what difference does it make if his relatives cannot redeem him directly? The relatives can simply give him the money to redeem himself! What is the practical implication of Rebbi's ruling that relatives cannot redeem the Eved Ivri directly? (TOSFOS RID)

ANSWER: The TOSFOS RID answers that the concept of the redemption of relatives ("Ge'ulas Kerovim") does not mean merely that the relatives are able to redeem him, but that they have a Mitzvah to redeem him. When an Eved Ivri is sold to a Jew, the relatives of the Eved have no Mitzvah to redeem him, but they certainly may redeem him by giving him money if they so choose.

This ruling has two practical applications. If the relatives do not want to spend money on the redemption of the Eved Ivri, Beis Din cannot force them to redeem him because they have no Mitzvah to do so. Moreover, if the Eved Ivri himself does not want to be redeemed, he does not have to accept money from the relatives to redeem himself. In contrast, when an Eved Ivri sells himself to a Nochri, Beis Din can force the relatives to redeem him, and even if he does not want to be redeemed he can be forced to be redeemed, since the Torah does not want a Jew to remain vulnerable to the foreign influences of the Nochrim (20b).