QUESTION: The Gemara asks why the Mishnah teaches that a man may be Mekadesh a woman himself when it has already taught that a man's Shali'ach may be Mekadesh a woman on his behalf. If the man's Shali'ach may be Mekadesh a woman for him, certainly the man himself may be Mekadesh her! Rav Yosef answers that the Mishnah is teaching the principle of "Mitzvah Bo Yoser mib'Shelucho" -- it is considered a greater Mitzvah to do the act oneself than to do it via a Shali'ach.

The Gemara records another version of the question on the Mishnah. The end of the Mishnah says that a woman's Shali'ach may accept Kidushin on her behalf. If a woman's Shali'ach may accept Kidushin on her behalf, why does the Mishnah need to teach that the woman herself may accept Kidushin? Rav Yosef answers that the Mishnah is teaching the principle of "Mitzvah Bo Yoser mib'Shelucho." (The first part of the Mishnah is not problematic, because the law is that a man is prohibited from being Mekadesh a woman via a Shali'ach until he has seen her. Accordingly, it is clear why the first part of the Mishnah adds that a man should be Mekadesh a woman himself.)

The Rishonim explain that the Mitzvah to which the Mishnah refers is that of "Peru u'Revu." Since it is through the act of Kidushin that the Mitzvah of "Peru u'Revu" is fulfilled, the Kidushin is also regarded as a Mitzvah.

However, the Gemara in Yevamos (65b) clearly states that a woman is exempt from the Mitzvah of Peru u'Revu. Why, then, does the Gemara here assert that the reason why the Mishnah adds that a woman may accept Kidushin for herself is to teach that "Mitzvah Bo Yoser mib'Shelucho"? The woman performs no Mitzvah when she accepts Kidushin since she is exempt from the Mitzvah of "Peru u'Revu."

(a) The RAN explains that although the woman herself is exempt from "Peru u'Revu" and therefore does not fulfill a Mitzvah by marrying, she nevertheless assists her husband in the fulfillment of his Mitzvah. This assistance ("Mesayei'a l'Devar Mitzvah") itself is considered a Mitzvah, and thus the principle of "Mitzvah Bo Yoser mib'Shelucho" indeed applies.

(b) The SHITAH LO NODA L'MI compares the Mitzvah of "Peru u'Revu" to the other Mitzvos from which a woman is exempt. The Halachah is that although she is not obligated to fulfill those Mitzvos (such as the Mitzvos of Shofar and Sukah), she still may perform them if she wants and she may even recite a blessing when she performs them. Although she is exempt from the Mitzvah, she may voluntarily perform the Mitzvah and she is credited with the fulfillment of a Mitzvah when she does so.

(c) The SEFER HA'MIKNAH suggests that since a woman who lives with a man out of wedlock commits a sin ("Lo Siheyeh Kedeshah"), the act of marriage, which saves her from transgression, is considered a Mitzvah.

QUESTION: The Gemara derives from the Mishnah that "Mitzvah Bo Yoser mib'Shelucho," it is considered a greater Mitzvah to do the act oneself than to do it via a Shali'ach. The Gemara proves this principle from the fact that Rava and Rav Safra personally involved themselves in the preparations for Shabbos.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Shabbos 30:8) adds an interesting point when he records this Halachah: "Although he was an Adam Chashuv b'Yoser (an extremely important person) and it is not the manner for such a person to buy things in the marketplace or be involved in the labors of the house, he is obligated to personally perform acts which are for the sake of Shabbos because this is his honor." The reasoning the Rambam gives -- "for this is his honor" -- seems superfluous. The Gemara states that the reason why one should involve himself personally ("b'Gufo") in the Mitzvah of honoring Shabbos is the principle of "Mitzvah Bo Yoser mib'Shelucho." Why does the Rambam give an additional reason, that "this is his honor"?

ANSWER: The BI'UR HALACHAH (OC 250) explains that the intent of the Rambam is to reconcile a contradiction between the Gemara here and the Gemara in Berachos (20a). The Gemara in Berachos teaches that a Talmid Chacham is not required to perform certain Mitzvos when doing them will cause him disgrace (such as carrying a lost sheep to fulfill the Mitzvah of Hashavas Aveidah). This contradicts the Gemara here which says that a Talmid Chacham is required to take part in menial tasks in preparation for Shabbos, even though such tasks are below his honor. The Rambam answers that there is no greater honor to a Talmid Chacham than to be involved in the preparations for Shabbos.

The PRI MEGADIM (see Bi'ur Halachah there) adds that only when the fulfillment of the Mitzvah is not evident, such as when a Talmid Chacham carries a sheep and no one knows why he is carrying it, does the honor of the Talmid Chacham override the fulfillment of a Mitzvas Aseh. In contrast, when it is obvious to all that the Talmid Chacham is involved in the fulfillment of a Mitzvah (such as preparing for Shabbos), he is not subject to disgrace and, on the contrary, "this is his honor."

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that a father may not marry off his Ketanah daughter until she is old enough to consent. The Rishonim explain that the reason for this decree is the concern that the girl might eventually come to hate her husband and transgress the Mitzvah of "v'Ahavta l'Re'acha Kamocha" (Vayikra 19:18).

The Gemara earlier teaches that although a man is required to see the woman he wants to marry before he is Mekadesh her, a woman is not required to see her future husband. This is because of the assumption that every woman prefers to live with a companion, even one who is uncomely, than to live alone ("Tav l'Meisav Tan Du..."). Why does the same assumption not apply to the marriage of a Ketanah? Since every woman prefers to have a companion than to live alone, there should be no concern that she will be disgusted with her husband when she comes of age, even if he is uncomely.

(a) TOSFOS (DH Asur) explains that the principle of "Tav l'Meisav Tan Du..." applies only when a woman agrees to a marriage by her own volition. In such a case it is assumed that she is willing to tolerate some unpleasantness in return for the benefit of companionship with a husband. A Ketanah, in contrast, has insufficient intellectual capacity (Da'as) to choose to consent to the marriage which her father arranges. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that she will be willing to suffer in order to have companionship with that man.

(b) The RASHBA explains that an adult woman makes a firm decision to marry this man and to tolerate some unpleasantness, and she is committed to her decision. A Ketanah, however, is easily persuaded by others, and thus there is a concern that others will persuade her to demand a divorce from the man.