QUESTION: The Gemara says that "anyone who marries a woman for the sake of money will have children who do not act properly." RASHI (DH Banim Zarim) explains that the Gemara does not refer to one who marries any woman solely for the sake of monetary profit, but rather it refers to one who marries a woman who is Pasul to him for the sake of profit. The Gemara discourages a man from transgressing a prohibition for the sake of monetary gain.

The REMA (EH 2:1) quotes the Gemara according to Rashi's explanation and writes that "when the woman is not Pasul to him, he is permitted to marry her for the sake of monetary gain."

The Rema continues to discuss a case in which the parents of the Kalah promised to give the Chasan a certain sum of money and then retracted their promise. The Rema rules that the Chasan should not start a quarrel or delay the wedding because of monetary considerations, and one who makes an issue out of money to which he feels entitled will not have a successful marriage "because the money a man receives by virtue of his wife is not rightful money ('Mamon Shel Yosher'), and anyone who does this is called 'one who marries a woman for the sake of money.'"

The Rema here seems to contradict his earlier statement that the Gemara's prohibition applies only to one who marries a woman who is Pasul, while one is permitted to marry a woman who is not Pasul for the sake of money. How are these two statements of the Rema to be reconciled?

(a) The BI'UR HA'GRA explains that the Rema's two statements express the opinions of conflicting Rishonim. The Rema's first statement is the view of RASHI and the RIVASH, who indeed maintain that there is nothing wrong with marrying a woman for the sake of money or delaying a marriage because of money matters.

The Rema's second statement is the view of the BEIS YOSEF in the name of the ORCHOS CHAIM, who understands the Gemara differently from Rashi and explains that marrying a woman "for the sake of money" refers to any case in which a man marries for monetary gain (even when the woman is permitted to him). The Vilna Ga'on adds that even according to this view, the prohibition applies only when the man otherwise would not have been interested in marrying this woman. If, however, he would have considered marrying her even without a monetary incentive, there is nothing wrong with taking money offered to him as part of the nuptials.

(b) The CHELKAS MECHOKEK (EH 2:1) explains that the two statements of the Rema are complementary. Everyone agrees that one may not transgress a prohibition for the sake of monetary gain, as Rashi here explains. The first statement of the Rema, in the name of the Rivash, expresses the prohibition against marrying a woman who is Pasul for the sake of monetary gain. The second statement of the Rema, in the name of the Orchos Chaim, teaches that delaying one's marriage because of monetary concerns is akin to transgressing a prohibition for the sake of money. The delay of the marriage is prone to cause the man to have sinful thoughts (Hirhurim Ra'im), which itself is a sin. If he delays his marriage in order to gain money, he effectively transgresses a prohibition (of Hirhurim Ra'im) for the sake of monetary gain, and thus he is like one who marries a woman who is Pasul for the sake of monetary gain.

OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that "from the time a person is appointed as a leader over the community, he is prohibited from performing labor in front of three people." What is the reason for this prohibition?

(a) RASHI explains that this Halachah is intended to protect the dignity of the community. It is below the dignity of the community to be subservient to a leader who must perform menial labor himself and does not have servants to perform the work for him.

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Sanhedrin 25:4) explains that this Halachah is intended to protect the dignity of the leader. If the people see their leader performing menial labor like a common citizen, they will look down upon him. They will fail to have the proper respect not only for the leader but for the position of authority which he represents.

The Rambam adds that certainly a Dayan or Nasi should take no part in the frivolous activities of the Amei ha'Aretz, for doing so would cause a terrible disgrace for the Torah.

QUESTION: The Gemara relates that Rav Nachman told Rav Yehudah to deliver greetings to Yalsa, the wife of Rav Nachman. Rav Yehudah refused on the grounds that Shmuel ruled that "Kol b'Ishah Ervah"; if he delivers greetings to Rav Nachman's wife, she will return the greeting and he will transgress the prohibition against listening to a woman's voice.

The Halachah of "Kol b'Ishah Ervah" appears in a different context in Berachos (24a). The Gemara there teaches that one is prohibited to recite Keri'as Shema in the presence of Ervah. The Gemara adds that since the voice of a woman is also considered Ervah, one may not recite Keri'as Shema when he hears the sound of a woman's voice. When the TALMIDEI RABEINU YONAH cite this Halachah, they write only that the singing voice of a woman is considered Ervah. This is the ruling of the SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 75:3) as well: "One must avoid hearing the sound of a woman's voice as she sings at the time he recites Keri'as Shema." The Poskim infer that only the sound of a woman's voice as she sings is considered Ervah, but the sound of ordinary speech is not considered Ervah.

The Gemara here seems to contradict the ruling of the Poskim. Rav Yehudah's fear was not that he would hear Rav Nachman's wife singing but that he would hear her talking (when she would respond to his greeting). If the prohibition of "Kol b'Ishah" applies only to a woman's voice as she sings, why was Rav Yehudah concerned with the prohibition of "Kol b'Ishah"?

ANSWER: The BEIS SHMUEL explains that there is no contradiction between the Gemara here and the Gemara in Berachos. The reason why only a singing voice, and not a talking voice, is considered Ervah is that it arouses a man's Yetzer ha'Ra. Under ordinary circumstances, speech does not arouse such Ta'avah. However, delivering greetings to a woman (as in the case of the Gemara here) is different. Delivering greetings and inquiring about the welfare of another person expresses the presence of a relationship and engenders a degree of intimacy between the two parties. Hence, if a woman responds to such a greeting even in an ordinary tone of voice, there is valid reason to be concerned for "Kol b'Ishah."

OPINIONS: Shmuel rules that one may not inquire about the welfare of another man's wife, even by sending the inquiry to the woman via her husband.

What is the reason for this prohibition? Are there circumstances in which one is permitted to inquire about the welfare of a woman?

(a) RASHI (DH Ein Sho'alin b'Shalom Ishah Klal) writes that asking a woman about her welfare is prohibited because one thereby "makes her heart and mind familiar with him" and creates a feeling of affection within the woman which could, Chas v'Shalom, lead to sin.

According to this reasoning, inquiring about a woman's welfare from her husband should be permitted because the woman herself is not aware of it and thus she will not feel affection towards the other man.

This seems to be the way Rashi rules in Bava Metzia (87a, DH Al Yedei Ba'alah). The Gemara there explains that the reason why the Mal'achim were permitted to ask Avraham Avinu about the welfare of his wife is that they asked only her husband. Rashi there explains that the prohibition applies only when one asks the woman directly about her welfare; it does not apply when one asks her husband about his wife's welfare. (For this reason, the BACH (EH 21, DH v'Ein) writes that one may ask about a woman's welfare from any other person and not only from her husband. The CHELKAS MECHOKEK (EH 21:7) disagrees and rules that one may ask only her husband, as the Gemara in Bava Metzia implies, because her husband specifically avoids relating the man's inquiry to his wife, while any other person will not be so particular.)

(b) The RITVA, however, implies that the reason why a man may not inquire about the welfare of another man's wife is that the man will feel close to the woman and might, Chas v'Shalom, have sinful thoughts. (This also seems to be the view of the ME'IRI.) The Ritva writes that if a man knows that he has subjugated his Yetzer ha'Ra and is in complete control of his thoughts such that he never allows sinful thoughts into his mind, he is permitted to ask a married woman about her welfare.

According to the Ritva, the prohibition is because of the man's tendency to have sinful thoughts, and it is not because the woman will feel affection towards the man. Consequently, a man who is in complete control of his thoughts is permitted to ask a woman about her welfare. In contrast, according to Rashi, such a man still is prohibited from asking a woman about her welfare. On the other hand, according to the Ritva, a man is not permitted to ask a husband about his wife (even when his wife will not know about it), since there remains the concern that the man will have sinful thoughts.

How does the Ritva understand the Gemara in Bava Metzia which states that the Mal'achim were permitted to ask Avraham Avinu about his wife? The DIVREI SHALOM (2:14) explains that the Ritva learns like TOSFOS in Bava Metzia (87a, DH Al Yedei). Tosfos explains that the Mal'achim were permitted to ask only "where is Sarah" (in order to make her more beloved to her husband by emphasizing how modest (Tzenu'ah) she was, or because of the requirement to act with Derech Eretz and ask a man about his wife), but not to ask about her welfare.