1)

(a)We just cited Rava, who extrapolated from the case brought in the Beraisa that silence after having accepted the money is construed as indifference, but not as consent, that the same applies to Kidushin. On the...

1. ... one hand, the people of Pum Nahara in the name of Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua queried Rava's comparison on the grounds that this Din will not pertain to the latter, even though it pertains to the former because it is only by a Pikadon that we translate silence as indifference, seeing as (for fear that he will be held liable if he throws the article back at the depositor), the trustee has no option but to remain silent; whereas in the case of Kidushin, the woman (not having undertaken to look after the mat), has the option of throwing it back at the man, in the knowledge that she will not be held liable even if it becomes damaged in the process.

2. other hand, Rav Achai queried this distinction on the grounds that one cannot expect all women to be so conversant with the Halachah, and that consequently, Rava's inference is justified.

(b)When Rav Acha bar Rav (presumably, this should read 'Rav Acha bar Rava') asked Ravina what the Din would be in such a case, the latter replied that since he (Rav Acha bar Rav), and the people of his town, had heard of Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua's query, they should go by it. As far as he was concerned, the people of his town had not heard about it, in which case they would follow the ruling of Rava.

2)

(a)When, instead of returning the bandages that he had grabbed from that woman unconditionally, the man asked her whether she would agree to become betrothed to him in exchange for their return she greeted his proposal with silence, though she did accept the bandages.

(b)Rav Nachman ruled that despite the principle 'Shesikah k'Hoda'ah' ('Silence is construed as consent'), she was not Mekudeshes, because she was only accepting what was rightfully hers (borne out by her initial demand for their return).

(c)Rava queried Rav Nachman from a Beraisa which, in a similar case, rules that she is Mekudeshes.

(d)The Tana also speaks about betrothing her with Gezel, Chamas or Geneivah. The difference between Gezel and Chamas is that whereas one retains the former without paying for it, the latter, one retains but pays for.

3)

(a)In order to conform with the Tana Rav Nachman establishes the Beraisa when the man who grabbed the money from the woman was already unofficially engaged to her.

(b)The Tana of another Beraisa says that when a man said 'Kinsi Sela Zeh she'Ani Chayav Lach', and later added 'Hiskadshi Li Bo', b'Sha'as Matan Ma'os Ratz'sah Mekudeshes, Lo Ratz'sah, Einah Mekudeshes'. By 'le'Achar Matan Ma'os' he rules 'Afilu Ratz'sah Einah Mekudeshes'.

(c)We cannot interpret 'Lo Ratz'sah' to mean that she declined to accept his offer (insinuating that if she was silent, the Kidushin would be valid) because that would be obvious, and the Tana should rather have just said Stam Mekudeshes (and every child would know that if she declined to accept the offer of Kidushin, she is not Mekudeshes).

(d)So 'Lo Ratz'sah' must mean that she was silent, and nevertheless the Tana rules 'Einah Mekudeshes' because we interpret her silent acceptance to mean that she merely wants her money back (like Rav Nachman).

4)

(a)The Rabanan gathered to collect the sayings of Rav Asi after his death in order to preserve them (that they should not be forgotten).

(b)A certain Rav Yakov quoted Rav Asi Amar Rav as saying that the same as one cannot acquire a woman with less than a Shaveh Perutah, so too, can one not acquire Karka with less than a Shaveh Perutah.

(c)Rav Yakov established the Beraisa which rules that Karka can be acquired for less than a Perutah by Kinyan Chalipin, but not by Kinyan Kesef.

5)

(a)The Navi Hoshei'a writes "Alah (- an oath) v'Chachesh v'Ratzo'ach v'Ganov v'Na'of Paratzu, v'Damim b'Damim Naga'u".

(b)Based on Targum Yonasan, the last phrase in the Pasuk ("Paratzu, v'Damim b'Damim Naga'u") means 'to add sin upon sin by conceiving children from the wives of their friends' (often the result of people who deal with Gitin and Kidushin without being familiar with the Halachos) as Targum Yonasan translates it.

(c)The significance of the fact that it is Rav Yosef who cited the Targum is that he was an expert on Targum Yonasan.

(d)Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan extrapolates from the continuation of that Pasuk that dealing with Gitin and Kidushin when one is not conversant with the Halachos is a worse sin than those perpetrated by the generation of the flood from the fact that the fish there died too, a tragedy that did not occur by the Dor ha'Mabul.

(e)We learn from the Pasuk ...

1. ... "Ki Mipnei Alah Avlah ha'Aretz" that the punishment described by the Navi pertains even to someone who is guilty of contravening even just one of the sins listed in the Pasuk (and not necessarily all of them).

2. ... there " ... v'Ratzo'ach v'Ganov v'Na'of Paratzu" (and not "u'Partzu') that it is not only the sin of a false oath that is punishable on its own, but also any of the others, including that of adultery.

6)

(a)We learned in a Mishnah in Kinin that if a Yoledes brought her Chatas and died, her heirs must bring her Olah. Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel establishes the Mishnah when the woman had already designated the Olah during her lifetime. Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan rules that they must bring it anyway, whether she designated it or not.

(b)The basis of their Machlokes is whether Shibuda is d'Oraisa (Rav Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan), or d'Rabanan (Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel).

(c)'Shibuda d'Oraisa' means that all the property of a person is automatically Meshubad (mortgaged) to pay his debts (irrespective of whether they are self-obligated or Torah orientated).

(d)According to Rav and Shmuel, the creditor can claim from Meshu'abadim in the case of a written loan because one automatically designates one's property in the Shtar.

7)

(a)Rav and Shmuel say that one cannot claim an oral loan from the orphans or from purchasers.

(b)Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree, and permit claiming from either because they hold 'Shibuda d'Oraisa; whereas Rav and Shmuel hold 'Shibuda Lav d'Oraisa'.

(c)Shmuel and Rebbi Yochanan seem to repeat their Machlokes twice. They find it necessary to present their dispute in the case of ...

1. ... the Korban of a Yoledes because we would otherwise have thought that in this case, even Shmuel will agree with Rebbi Yochanan, because it is Torah orientated.

2. ... a loan because we would otherwise have thought that in this case, even Rebbi Yochanan will agree with Shmuel, because it is not.

(d)In spite of the fact that ...

1. ... in principle, we rule like Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, we nevertheless conclude that one cannot in fact, claim an oral loan from purchasers because since the debt does not have a Kol, the purchaser has no way of anticipating that he might lose the property after having bought it, the Rabanan safeguarded him from losing on the deal.

2. ... min ha'Torah, we hold 'Shibuda d'Oraisa', the creditor nevertheless loses his right to claim from the purchaser because (unlike the purchaser, as we just explained) he has the option of safeguarding is interests by writing a Shtar when lending the money.

8)

(a)We know that a woman acquires herself by means of a Get from the Pasuk "v'Kasav Lah Sefer Kerisus". We refute the suggestion that she acquires herself with the death of her husband ...

1. ... because of the Sevara 'Hu Asrah, v'Hu Sharyah' by citing the precedent of many instances of Arayos (e.g. Eshes Aviv), who forbid a man on their relatives, yet those relatives do not become permitted with the death of the one who forbade them.

2. ... because the Torah writes by a Yevamah that when she has no children she is prohibited to marry because rather than inferring that if she has children, she is permitted to marry, perhaps we will infer that if she has children, she is even forbidden to the Yavam as well.

3. ... from the fact that the Torah forbids an Almanah to a Kohen Gadol, insinuating that she is permitted to others because maybe the Lav becomes permitted, but the Aseh of "v'Shilchah mi'Beiso" (and not through any other means) will remain.

(b)We attempt (unsuccessfully) to reinstate the proof from the latter Halachah by rejecting the notion that although there is no Lav, there is an Aseh, and by arguing that 'mi'Mah Nafshach', if the Torah removes the Lav, then she should be completely permitted!

(c)We substantiate the disproof, from Pesulei ha'Mukdashin which the owner redeemed, where ...

1. ... on the one hand the Lav "Lo Sagoz bi'Vechor Shorecha" becomes permitted, whereas ...

2. ... on the other, the Aseh "Tizbach ('ve'Lo Gizah') "v'Achalta" ('ve'Lo li'K'lavecha') "Basar" ('ve'Lo Chalav") comes into effect is (from which we see that it is feasible for the Torah to permit a Lav, but to retain a partial prohibition based on an Aseh).

(d)We finally learn that the death of a husband permits a woman to marry, from the Pasuk (concerning those who are sent home from the battlefront) "Pen Yamus ba'Milchamah, v'Ish Acher Yikachenah".

9)

(a)Rav Ashi ...

1. ... explained to Rav Shisha Brei d'Rav Idi that "Ish Acher" referred to in the previous Pasuk does not refer to the Yavam because a Yavam is not called 'Ish Acher'.

2. ... brings another disproof to the previous contention that although there is no Lav forbidding an Almanah to remarry, there is an Aseh) from the Pasuk there "u'Senei'ah ha'Ish ha'Acharon v'Kasav Lah Sefer Kerisus ... O Ki Yamus ha'Ish ha'Acharon" which, by comparing Miysah to Gerushin, permits her completely at the death of her husband (just like Gerushin).

(b)He does not cite the following Pasuk "Lo Yuchal Ba'alah ha'Rishon Lashuv Lekachtah" (implying that somebody else may marry her) because there too, it is possible that although there is no Lav, the Aseh remains.