QUESTION: The Gemara relates that "Rav Menashya bar Gada sat before Abaye, and he said in the name of Rav Chisda" that if the Kohen burns the Kometz with intent to burn the Levonah tomorrow, it does not cause the Minchah to become Pigul. This is because a thought during one burning (that of the Kometz) to perform another burning (that of the Levonah) in the wrong time cannot cause the Korban to become Pigul. Rav Chisda added that this is true even according to Rebbi Meir, who says that one can cause Pigul with a thought during half of a Matir. Rebbi Meir maintains that one can cause the Minchah to become Pigul when he intends, during the burning of the Kometz, to eat the leftovers of the Minchah the next day, since the Kometz is what permits the leftovers. However, the burning of the Kometz does not permit the Levonah in any way, and thus a thought about the Levonah, during the burning of the Kometz, is not effective to render the Minchah Pigul.

After Rav Menashya finished speaking, Abaye asked him, "Answer me, my master! Did Rav Chisda say this in the name of Rav?" Rav Menashya answered that he did.

If Rav Menashya knew that Rav Chisda made this statement in the name of Rav, then why did Rav Menashya not quote it in the name of Rav as well? The Gemara in Megilah (15a) teaches that when one relates a Torah teaching in the name of the person who originally said it, he brings redemption to the world. Why did Rav Menashya not attribute the teaching to its original source? (SEFAS EMES)

(a) The SEFAS EMES suggests that this Gemara provides proof that one does not need to attribute a teaching to its primary source; he may attribute it to the secondary source (from whom he heard it directly), even when he knows the identity of the primary source, and he still merits to bring redemption to the word.

However, in a parenthetical statement which the Sefas Emes apparently added later, he notes that this suggestion is clearly incorrect. The Gemara in Nazir (56b) infers from the fact that Rebbi Eliezer said a law in the name of Rebbi Yehoshua, when he actually heard that law from Rebbi Yehoshua bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Yehoshua, that one must relate the original source of a statement, and one may omit any intermediate sources (hence Rebbi Eliezer omitted Rebbi Yehoshua bar Mamal). Accordingly, Rav Menashya should have related this teaching in the name of Rav.

On a simple level, this may have been Abaye's intention. Abaye was pointing out to Rav Menashya that one must relate the original source of his statement, and it does not suffice to name the person from whom he heard the statement, as the Gemara in Nazir concludes.

(b) The Sefas Emes suggests a reason for why Rav Menashya omitted the name of Rav. It is possible that Rav stated only the first law, that a though during one act of burning about another act of burning cannot cause the Korban to become Pigul. Rav Chisda is the one who said the second statement, that this is true even according to Rebbi Meir.

Rav Chisda understood that Rav must have disagreed with the logic of "the sharp ones from Pumbedisa" (end of 16b), who said that a thought about the Levonah during the burning of the Kometz is not considered a thought of Pigul during only half of a Matir (since both halves of the Matir are involved). Rather, Rav's logic must be that since the Levonah is not permitted by the burning of the Kometz, an improper thought during the burning of the Kometz does not cause Pigul. Accordingly, even Rebbi Meir would agree that it is not Pigul. Since this was Rav Chisda's understanding of Rav's ruling, Rav Menashya said this ruling in the name of Rav Chisda. (Y. MONTROSE)

QUESTION: The Mishnah (17a) records a dispute between the Rabanan and Rebbi Eliezer in the case of one who has improper intent about an item that is not normally eaten. The Rabanan maintain that when a Kohen performs the Kemitzah of a Minchah with intent to eat or to burn, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the Minchah that is not normally eaten or burned, the Korban remains valid. Rebbi Eliezer says that the Kohen's intent invalidates the Korban.

The Gemara explains that Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning is based on the verse, "v'Im He'achol Ye'achel" -- "And if he plans to eat..." (Vayikra 7:18). The verse's usage of two words for "eat" ("He'achol Ye'achel") implies that it refers to two "eatings." One eating is the Mizbe'ach's consumption of the Korban, and the other is man's act of eating the meat of the Korbam. A thought about either one constitutes a thought of "eating" which renders a Korban invalid. Accordingly, if one has intent to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, limbs that are normally burned on the Mizbe'ach, the Korban is invalid.

How do the Rabanan explain the verse? The Gemara says that the Rabanan understand that the two "eatings" mentioned in the verse teach that whether the Kohen has intent to "feed" the Mizbe'ach or intent to "burn limbs" on the Mizbe'ach Chutz l'Zemano, his intent is effective and the Korban is invalidated. The verse teaches that burning something on the Mizbe'ach is also called "eating" (i.e. "feeding"). However, this applies only to something which is supposed to be burned on the Mizbe'ach.

TOSFOS (DH d'Lo) has difficulty with the Gemara's answer. The Gemara in Zevachim (31a) explicitly derives from the verse, "Te'achlehu Esh Lo Nupach" -- "a fire not blown shall consume him" (Iyov 20:26), that the consumption of fire is called "eating." The Gemara there indeed concludes that although a Kohen who intends to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis has not had a thought of Pigul, one who intends to eat half of a k'Zayis and to feed half of a k'Zayis to the Mizbe'ach has had a thought of Pigul. Why, then, do the Rabanan need the verse of two "eatings" to teach this, when the verse elsewhere explicitly uses the term of "eating" as a reference to the burning of a fire?

(a) TOSFOS answers that the Gemara in Zevachim discusses only a case in which the Kohen has intent that "fire should eat" the Korban. This is the exact phrase mentioned by the verse in Iyov. In contrast, the Rabanan here refer only to a thought that "the Mizbe'ach should eat tomorrow," without the thought that "fire should eat." The fact that the concept of "eating" alone, without the word "fire," also may refer to the consumption of the Mizbe'ach is derived from the two "eatings" mentioned in the verse.

(b) Alternatively, Tosfos answers that in the case of the Gemara in Zevachim, the Kohen intends to eat something which is normally eaten. Accordingly, the thought that "fire should eat it" should be valid only for something which is normally eaten. The Gemara here refers to limbs that are burned on the Mizbe'ach. There is no proof from the verse in Iyov that the term "eating" should be valid for something which is not supposed to be eaten. The Gemara derives from the two "eatings" in the verse of "He'achol Ye'achel" that the term "eating" applies even to something which is not supposed to be eaten.

Tosfos asks an obvious question on this explanation. The Gemara in Zevachim explicitly states that intent to eat half of a k'Zayis and to feed half of a k'Zayis to the Mizbe'ach, Chutz l'Zemano, constitutes a thought of Pigul. Half of a k'Zayis clearly refers to the limbs of the Korban, and yet the Gemara assumes that the term "eating" is considered valid! If the Gemara there already knows that the term "eating" is effective even for something which is not supposed to be eaten, then why are the two "eatings" in the verse cited here necessary, according to the Rabanan?

Tosfos answers that it must be that the Gemara in Zevachim knows that "eating" applies to the limbs of the Korban only because of the teaching of the Gemara here. Without the verse of "He'achol Ye'achel," the Gemara there would know only that "eating" is an appropriate term for something which is usually eaten. (Y. MONTROSE)