1)

(a)According to Rav Papi ...

1. ... Rebbi Nasan learns from the Pasuk "v'Chafrah ha'Levanah" (as if it had written "v'Hafarah Chal Banah" - Rashi) - that the building (i.e. the Bamah, which Rebbi Nasan considers every Noder as having built) can be annulled after it has been built (after it has taken effect), but not before.

2. ... the Rabanan learn from the Pasuk in Iyov "Mefer Machshevos Arumim" - that the husband can annul his wife's Neder the moment it has been declared.

(b)He also holds that, by Hataras Nedarim, even the Rabanan agree that a Chacham cannot annul a Neder until it has taken effect - and he learns it from the Pasuk "Lo Yachel Devaro" (which he understands to mean 'Chalos Devaro' - from the time that it takes effect).

(c)Even assuming that Rav Acha bar Huna (in the story at the end of the previous Amud) might well agree with Rav Papi, Rava nevertheless cites him as saying that they argue by Hatarah in the same way as they argue by Hafarah - because it cannot be proved from the story that he agrees with Rav Papi, seeing as it is possible that he did what he did in order to accommodate Rebbi Nasan (as we explained above).

(d)The Beraisa says 'Konam she'Eini Neheneh li'Peloni ul'Mi she'Esh'al Alav, Nish'al al ha'Rishon, v'Achar Kach Nish'al al ha'Sheni'.' We ...

1. ... try and prove Rav Papi's ruling from here - because otherwise (if not for the fact that the Rabanan agree with Rebbi Nasan by Hataras Nedarim), there is no reason why he should have the second Neder revoked first.

2. ... subsequently reject the proof - because how do we know anyway which Neder the Tana is referring to when he says 'Rishon' and 'Sheni' (in other words, the first Neder might mean whichever one he revokes first and the second one, the remaining one).

2)

(a)We bring a similar proof from another Beraisa ''Konam she'Eini Neheneh li'Peloni, Hareini Nazir l'che'she'Esh'al Alav, Nish'al al Nidro, v'Achar Kach Nish'al al Nizro' - in that, if Rebbi Nasan and the Rabanan argued by Hatarah too, then, according to the Rabanan, why does the Tana require the Hatarah specifically in that order? Why should one not be able to revoke them in the reverse order?

(b)We reject this proof too however - by establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Nasan.

3)

(a)Mereimar told Ravina that his (Ravina's) father, quoted Rav Papi differently than we quoted him earlier. According to him, he learns from "Lo Yachel Devaro" - that it is Rebbi Nasan who concedes to the Rabanan that Hataras Nedarim can be annulled before the Isur has been effective (and not vice-versa) ...

(b)... because according to him, "Lo Yachel Devaro" implies the Neder at its inception, and not after it becomes effective.

(c)We refute this interpretation of Rebbi Nasan however, from the Beraisa ''Konam she'Eini Neheneh li'Peloni, Hareini Nazir l'che'she'Esh'al Alav, Nish'al al Nidro, v'Achar-Kach Nish'al al Nizro', (because a Chacham cannot annul a Neder before the Isur takes effect) - and if Rebbi Nasan agrees with the Rabanan that a Chacham can annul Nedarim before the Isur takes effect, who will then be the author of the Beraisa?

4)

(a)We rule like the Rabanan of Rebbi Nasan, because Rebbi Akiva in the previous Sugya holds like them, and so does the Sugya of 'Im Erchatz Im Lo Erchatz' at the beginning of the Perek. But the most basic reason of all to follow their opinion is - the principle 'Yachid v'Rabim, Halachah k'Rabim'.

(b)There no proof from Rava (who was Rav Papi's Rebbi, and who praised Rav Acha bar Rav Huna) that the Halachah is like Rebbi Nasan - because his praise was due to fact that he did what he did to avoid getting involved in Machlokes, and not because he held like Rebbi Nasan (and because of the adept way in which he went about it, as we explained).

(c)Despite the fact that we rule like the Rabanan, in whose opinion a husband can annul a Neder even before the Isur has taken effect, we nevertheless ask the Kashya (at the beginning of the Perek) 'Lamah Lah Hafarah, Lo Tirchatz v'Lo Litseran' - because the concession of annulling Nedarim before the Isur is effective is confined to Nedarim which his wife would otherwise be bound to contravene (such as not giving Hana'ah to his or her parents), but not to Nedarim which she can easily avoid breaking, such as 'Lo Erchatz'.

5)

(a)The Halachah regarding Hataras Nedarim is - (like the first Lashon of Rav Papi) that even the Rabanan concede that a Chacham is not permitted to annul Nedarim, before the Isur has taken effect.

(b)If someone declares a Neder connecting it, not to an event, but to a number of days - a Chacham may annul it even before the time-period elapses, because it is bound to materialize (although some disagree with this ruling).

6)

(a)Our Mishnah lists three women whom initially, Chazal permitted to demand a Get and to receive their Kesuvah. This Mishnah belongs in Nedarim - because the woman is believed only on account of the Neder that accompanies each statement.

7)

(a)The first of the three women is one who claims that she was raped. This can only be speaking about the wife of Kohen - because the wife of a Yisrael is not forbidden to her husband if she is raped, and does not receive a Kesuvah if she participated willingly.

(b)Despite the fact that (wittingly or otherwise), she was the one to cause the divorce - she is entitled to claim her Kesuvah - because she can argue that, seeing as the wife of a Yisrael is permitted to remain with him after she has been raped, the fact that her husband happens to a Kohen is due to his Mazal, not hers.

(c)The second woman is one who claims that her husband is responsible for their childlessness (because his Zera does not 'shoot like an arrow', which a woman perceives more than a man). Despite the fact that a woman is not obligated to have children, she can force him to divorce her - if she claims that she wants children to look after her when she grows old, and to bury her when she dies.

8)

(a)The words 'ha'Shamayim Beini l'Veinecha' mean - 'Hashem is a witness that I am telling the truth'.

(b)According to the Medrash, when Sarah complained to Avraham (in Lech Lecha) "Yishpot Hash-m Beini u'Veinecha", she really meant 'Ha'Shamayim Beini u'Veinecha' ...

(c)... by which literally meant - that, after marrying Hagar, Avraham kept his distance from her (which was now as far as from heaven to earth).

9)

(a)The third case is when a woman claims 'Netulah Ani min ha'Yehudim' - a Neder that she does not want any Hana'as Tashmish from anyone ever again (because Tashmish is painful to her).

(b)Chazal retracted however, in all three cases - because they were afraid that the woman might exploit her rights (presumably women were already doing so) by claiming in Beis-Din (even when it was true), taking her Kesuvah and then moving (together with the man whom she wanted to marry) to a place where she and her Neder were unknown, and remarrying.

(c)Therefore, if a woman claims ...

1. ... 'Teme'ah Ani Lecha' - we ask her to bring witnesses to that effect.

2. ... 'ha'Shamayim Beini l'Veinecha' - we pacify her by arranging a party for her and her husband, and then try and talk her into remaining with him, in spite of her protests.

3. ... 'Netulah Ani min ha'Yehudim' - we allow her husband to annul his part of the Neder, in which case she must continue to live with him as before, and she remains forbidden to everyone else (even after she becomes divorced or widowed).

10)

(a)The problem with Chazal's Takanah, with regard to the first case (a woman who claims 'Teme'ah Ani Lach') is - that, seeing as the Torah forbids her on her husband, how can Chazal permit it?

(b)We ultimately resolve the problem - by pointing out that the Mishnah Rishonah originally believed a woman who claimed 'Teme'ah Ani Lach', not strictly according to Din Torah (since how can we absolve a woman from her marital duties on the basis of her own testimony?), but mid'Rabanan (because she would not make such an embarrassing statement if it was not true). Consequently, the Mishnah Acharonah was perfectly justified in reinstating Din Torah (on the basis of the fact that women had become suspect of deliberately lying, in spite of the shame), and no longer believing their testimony.

(c)What is wrong with the initial answer given by some commentaries (that Chazal permitted her to her husband, despite the Torah's prohibition, seeing as they have the right to make Takanos when there is good reason to) is - that this right is confined to 'Shev v'Al Ta'aseh' (Takanos that stop one from fulfilling Mitzvos Aseh), but do not extend to 'Kum va'Aseh' (Takanos that permit contravening Mitzvos Lo Sa'aseh).

(d)Chazal do have the authority to enact positive Takanos, even though they entail contravening a Lav - provided it is on a once only basis (like Eliyahu, who built a Bamah on Har ha'Karmel, even though the Beis-ha'Mikdash was standing and Bamos were prohibited).

11)

(a)We also suggest that the woman is permitted due to fact that the Rabanan uprooted the initial Kidushin, which they have the authority to do - because every betrothal is performed on the condition that Chazal sanction it.

(b)We reject this suggestion however - on the grounds that, if it was correct, then it should be confined to when she claims that the rape was performed by a Kasher person (but not when it was performed by someone who is Pasul, such as a Nasin or a Mamzer, since then she would still be forbidden to her Kohen husband), a distinction that is not even hinted at in the Sugya.

12)

(a)They asked a She'eilah whether the wife of a Kohen who claims that she was raped is permitted to continue eating Terumah. Rav Sheshes permits her to do so - on the grounds that otherwise, people will think that she must really be guilty, and the rumor will spread that children that she subsequently bears from him are Pasul.

(b)Rava counters Rav Sheshes' argument - by pointing out that what they will really think is that she is not eating Terumah because she does not possess any, only Chulin.

(c)Even Rav Sheshes will concede however, that once she is widowed or divorced (having had children from her husband), she may no longer eat Terumah - because people will think that the rape only occurred after she attained her new status, and the compelling reason permitting it no longer applies.