OPINIONS: The Mishnah (36b) teaches that when a woman has labor pains and then gives birth, she is not considered to be a Zavah, because her bleeding is attributed to labor. The Mishnah records a number of opinions regarding how long before birth is bleeding assumed to be due to labor, when labor-like pains continue afterwards until the birth.

What is the Halachah in practice?

(a) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Isurei Bi'ah 7:1) rules that the longest period of time prior to birth during which a woman's bleeding is assumed to be due to labor is two weeks. Bleeding for more than two weeks before birth is not attributed to labor and the woman is considered a Zavah.

(b) The RITVA points out that this Halachah does not apply today. He explains that labor prevents a woman only from becoming a Zavah, but it does not prevent her from becoming a Nidah. During the time of the Gemara, women were aware of whether they were Nidos or Zavos. Today, however, every woman who sees blood observes the stringencies of both Zavah and Nidah, and therefore the fact that the bleeding was preceded by labor pains will not make her Tehorah.

OPINIONS: Rebbi Yehudah applies the law of "Dayah Chodshah" to a pregnant woman who sees blood, because "Shifura Garim." What does "Shifura Garim" mean?

(a) RASHI, TOSFOS, and the RASHBA explain that "Shifura Garim" means that the Shofar blown on Rosh Chodesh to herald the new month is the cause of birth (for all pregnant women in their ninth month of pregnancy). The new moon causes a change in natural occurrences in the world, including the birth process. Therefore, at the beginning of the new month we may assume that the blood that she sees is a result of labor and not Dam Nidah.

According to their explanation, the blood that the woman sees at the beginning of the month (Rosh Chodesh) has nothing to do with the actual ninth month of her pregnancy. Tosfos proves this from the implication of the word "Chodshah," which implies that the fact that this is the beginning of the month is known to all. This obviously refers to Rosh Chodesh, which is public knowledge, while the ninth month of the woman's pregnancy is not known to all. Moreover, "Chodshah" implies even when she sees blood on the first day of the month. This seems to be based on the principle that "Yom Echad b'Chodesh Harei Zeh k'Chodesh." This makes more sense if "Chodshah" refers to the constant months of the year, as opposed to the personal months of pregnancy. Finally, Tosfos asserts that it cannot refer to the start of her ninth month of pregnancy started, because we do not know with certainty when the ninth month started.

(b) The RITVA writes in the name of Rashi that "Shifura Garim" means that the ninth month of pregnancy is the cause of birth, and not the cessation of labor pains. The Ritva argues that it is not logical to say that a pregnant woman's labor depends on a fixed lunar cycle and not on her own personal count of months.

OPINIONS: The Beraisa (end of 38a) relates that the Chasidim ha'Rishonim were aware that a pregnancy can last for 271, 272, or 273 days. They therefore abstained from their wives during the early part of the week in order to avoid conceiving a child whose birth would be on Shabbos, which would result in Chilul Shabbos.

What exactly was the Chilul Shabbos that the Chasidim ha'Rishonim sought to avoid?

(a) RASHI (DH l'Yedei Chilul Shabbos) explains that they were concerned that their wives would give birth on Shabbos, and as a result Jews would have to desecrate Shabbos to facilitate the birth. Relations during the latter part of the week would not result in a birth on Shabbos.

(b) The RAN adds that they were concerned about an additional aspect of Chilul Shabbos. They were worried that the baby might be born less than three days before Shabbos. The Halachah is that one is permitted to desecrate Shabbos for a Yoledes within three days after she gives birth. This would include Shabbos in the event that the baby was born within three days before Shabbos.

The Ran asks that the Zera is not always Niklat within three days, and therefore the Chasidim ha'Rishonim still would have no assurance that their wives would not give birth within three days before Shabbos, even if the relations occurred during the latter half of the week. The Ran answers that the Chasidim ha'Rishonim were not worried about this possibility, because most of the time the Zera is Niklat almost immediately.

The MAHARI SHAPIRA points out that the wording of the Gemara supports the explanation of the Ran. After the Gemara mentions that the Chasidim ha'Rishonim had relations only on Wednesday (Tuesday night) due to their concern, the Gemara asks, "On Wednesday and no more?" According to Rashi, the Gemara's question is that they should be able to have relations from Wednesday until the end of the week, because only relations during the first three days of the week (Motza'i Shabbos, Sunday, and Monday nights) can result in a baby being born on Shabbos.

However, according to the Ran, the question of the Gemara is different. The Gemara is asking whether it is possible that the entire week is forbidden to the Chasidim ha'Rishonim other than Tuesday night. If the Chasidim would be with their wives on Thursday (Wednesday night), and the Zera would be Niklat three days later, then the baby would be born on Thursday, which is three days before Shabbos. The same problem can arise with Friday and Shabbos. Is it possible that the Chasidim would be with their wives only on Wednesdays? The answer of the Gemara is that the Chasidim did not suspect that the Zera would not be Niklat immediately, and therefore they maintained that they were allowed to be with their wives from Wednesday until the end of the week. According to the Ran, this is why the Gemara asks, "On Wednesday and no more?" The Gemara assumes that according to the logic of the Chasidim ha'Rishonim, only Wednesday was permissible. (Y. MONTROSE)

The Gemara relates that there is a set range of length of the human gestation period. The Chasidim ha'Rishonim, who were aware that a pregnancy can last for 271, 272, or 273 days, abstained from their wives during the early part of the week in order to avoid conceiving a child whose birth would be on Shabbos and result in Chilul Shabbos.

Based on this Gemara, the MAHARSHA suggests an original interpretation of the Gemara in Shabbos (118b) which teaches that "if the Jewish people would observe two Shabbosos properly, they would immediately be redeemed." The Gemara derives this from the verses in Yeshayah (56:4 and 7): "Thus says Hash-m to the Sarisim (eunuchs) who observe My Shabbosos.... I will bring them to My holy mountain, and make them joyful in My house of prayer...."

Why does the verse say that Hash-m speaks specifically to "Sarisim," eunuchs? Also, why does the Gemara there cite an earlier verse (verse 4), and not verse 6 which immediately precedes the promise of the redemption (verse 7), "All who guard My Shabbosos from profaning it... I will bring them to My holy mountain..."?

The Maharsha suggests that the Gemara is hinting to us that if a husband abstains from his wife on particular days of the week (that is, he conducts himself like a eunuch) in order to avoid having a child born on Shabbos, he thereby prevents the desecration of two Shabbosos (the day when the child is born, and the day of the child's Bris Milah a week later). Through his concern for the observance of Shabbos, he will merit the coming of the final redemption. (See also Insights to Shabbos 118:2.)

OPINION: The Beraisa (end of 38a) relates that the Chasidim ha'Rishonim were aware that a pregnancy can last for 271, 272, or 273 days. They therefore abstained from their wives during the early part of the week in order to avoid conceiving a child whose birth would be on Shabbos and result in Chilul Shabbos.

Is there a Halachic obligation to refrain from acts that might lead to the necessity to desecrate Shabbos for the sake of saving a life, "Piku'ach Nefesh"?

(a) The Gemara in Shabbos (19a) rules that one may not embark on a sea-voyage within three days before Shabbos. The BA'AL HA'ME'OR explains that the reason for this prohibition is that dangerous conditions commonly arise at sea which may necessitate the desecration of Shabbos for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh. Even though Piku'ach Nefesh overrides the laws of Shabbos, one may not purposefully enter a situation which may lead to the necessity to desecrate Shabbos.

(b) The RAMBAN disagrees with the Ba'al ha'Me'or and maintains that one is not forbidden from entering a situation which may necessitate the desecration of Shabbos for Piku'ach Nefesh. Since one is doing no Melachah at the present moment, he is permitted to board the ship. If later it becomes necessary to desecrate Shabbos for Piku'ach Nefesh, it will be permitted. Rather, the reason why one may not embark on a journey prior to Shabbos is that the Nochri captain will be doing Melachah for the Jew on Shabbos when he ties up the sails and performs the other acts involved with operating a boat.

The argument between the Ba'al ha'Me'or and the Ramban seems to be based on whether one may intentionally enter a situation that might lead to the necessity to desecrate Shabbos for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh. The commentaries suggest (see MISHNAH BERURAH OC 328:39) that their argument depends on the nature of why one may desecrate Shabbos for Piku'ach Nefesh. If Shabbos is only "Dechuyah" in the event of Piku'ach Nefesh (literally, it is "pushed off"; that is, the prohibition of Chilul Shabbos is still present, but it is overridden by the necessity for Piku'ach Nefesh; see RAMBAM, Hilchos Shabbos 2:1), then the ruling of the Ba'al ha'Me'or is logical; Chilul Shabbos even for Piku'ach Nefesh must be avoided if possible. If, however, Shabbos is "Hutrah" in the event of Piku'ach Nefesh (literally, it is "permitted"; that is, the prohibition of Chilul Shabbos does not apply at all in situations of Piku'ach Nefesh, and, therefore, when one does a Melachah for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh he does no Chilul Shabbos whatsoever; see BI'UR HALACHAH who cites the ROSH and MAHARAM MI'ROTENBURG who ascribe to this view), then the ruling of the Ramban is logical.

The practice of the Chasidim ha'Rishonim seems difficult to understand according to both the Ba'al ha'Me'or and the Ramban. According to the Ba'al ha'Me'or, the practice of the Chasidim ha'Rishonim should be a Halachic obligation and not merely a praiseworthy practice of the Chasidim. According to the Ramban, not only is there no obligation to abstain from relations on certain days of the week, but there is also no basis whatsoever for being stringent, because one is permitted to enter a situation which might eventually lead to the need to desecrate Shabbos for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh!

The Ba'al ha'Me'or himself asks this question and explains that the reason why embarking on a sea-voyage within three days of Shabbos is forbidden is that the days between Wednesday and Shabbos are considered one long Erev Shabbos (Pesachim 106a). One is obligated to make plans to avoid desecrating Shabbos for Piku'ach Nefesh only during those three days that precede Shabbos, but not more than those three days. This is why it was only a Midas Chasidus for the Chasidim ha'Rishonim to abstain from their wives 270 days before the Shabbos that would be desecrated.

To answer the question on the view of the Ramban, we may suggest that there is a difference between the conduct of the Chasidim ha'Rishonim and the case of the sea-voyage. The Mishnah Berurah (330:5) rules that when one must desecrate Shabbos for the sake of a woman giving birth, one should do so with a Shinuy (a change in the normal manner of doing that act) if possible. However, in all other situations of Piku'ach Nefesh there is no requirement to do the act with a Shinuy (on the contrary, one should do the act as fast and efficiently as possible). The Mishnah Berurah explains that giving birth is a lesser form of danger because it is a naturally occurring and common situation that normally does not result in death.

Accordingly, the Ramban might understand that although there is no requirement to avoid a situation that might require Chilul Shabbos for the sake of Piku'ach Nefesh, the Chasidim ha'Rishonim avoided having children on Shabbos because giving birth is a lesser degree of Piku'ach Nefesh. (That is, the Ramban might agree that Shabbos is only "Dechuyah" when it comes to giving birth.) (See also Insights to Shabbos 19:2 and 134:1.)

QUESTION: The Chachamim in the Mishnah rule that when a woman is Mekashah during the eighty-day period of Yemei Tohar, she remains Tahor. RASHI (DH ha'Mekashah) gives two explanations for this case. The first explanation is that the woman gave birth and became pregnant again within her Yemei Tohar. The second explanation is that the woman was pregnant with two babies, and the labor of the second one started within the Yemei Tohar of the first.

What is problematic with the second explanation that requires Rashi to give the first? (These labor pains should not be considered Kishuy, since they are for a Nefel.)

ANSWER: The RAN introduces his answer with a different question. Why does the Mishnah specifically mention a case in which the woman experienced Kishuy within the Yemei Tohar of eighty days? The Mishnah could have said simply that she had Kishuy within Yemei Tohar, without mentioning eighty days.

The Ran explains that it is this question that compels Rashi to explain that the Mishnah is discussing a case of a new pregnancy. A new pregnancy would not be possible within forty days, because prior to forty days the pregnancy is not considered an embryo with regard to the ability to cause Tum'ah.

(The RAN adds that the Tana'im of the Mishnah obviously maintain that there is Kishuy even for a Nefel.) (See CHESHEK SHLOMO.)

QUESTION: The Rabanan prove from a Kal va'Chomer that a woman who experiences Kishuy during Yemei Tohar is Tahor. Rebbi Eliezer questions their Kal va'Chomer from the principle of "Dayo la'Ba Min ha'Din Liheyos ka'Nidon" -- it is sufficient to give the Halachah derived from a Kal va'Chomer the exact status of the Halachah from which it was derived.

The Rabanan seem to be Metaher both Yemei Nidah and Yemei Zivah during Yemei Tohar, while Rebbi Eliezer is Metamei both. Why are the Rabanan Metaher in both cases if there is a question on the Kal va'Chomer from which they derive that Yemei Nidah are Tahor during Yemei Tohar?

(a) TOSFOS explains that once the Rabanan learn that she is Tahor during Yemei Zivah that occur during Yemei Tohar, they learn from the word "Teshev" that the same law applies to both Zivah and Nidah ("Yeshivah Achas l'Kulam"), and since Yemei Zivah is Tahor, Yemei Nidah is also Tahor.

(b) The RITVA answers that the actual source for the Rabanan's ruling is that since the Torah establishes that these days are Yemei Tohar, any blood seen during this period is Tahor until it is proven to be Tamei. They mention the Kal va'Chomer only "b'Derech Pilpul" but not as the primary reason to be Metaher the woman.

(c) The Ritva suggests another answer. The Mishnah initially makes a Kal va'Chomer from Dam Kishuy that occurs during the Yemei Tum'ah to Dam Kishuy of Yemei Tohar. The Beraisa suggests that the Rabanan then altered their derivation from the Kal va'Chomer and derived Dam Kishuy from Dam Shofi. In the second manner of making the Kal va'Chomer, the question from "Dayo" applies to the logic of the Kal va'Chomer and not to the law derived from the Kal va'Chomer. The Rabanan maintain that in such a case "Dayo" does not apply.

(d) The RAMBAM (in Perush ha'Mishnayos) explains that the Rabanan accept Rebbi Eliezer's logic of "Dayo" and they agree that Dam Koshi during Yemei Nidah of Yemei Tohar is Metamei. The Machlokes involves the status of Dam Kishuy during Yemei Zivah. The Rabanan rule that it is Tahor, and Rebbi Eliezer rules that it is Metamei like a Nidah.