QUESTION: The Mishnah states that one may feed Chametz to a Behemah (domesticated animal) and to a Chayah (wild animal) immediately prior to the time that Chametz becomes forbidden.

The Gemara explains that it was necessary for the Mishnah to mention both Behemah and Chayah. If the Mishnah had said only that one may give Chametz to a Behemah, we might have thought that one may not give Chametz to a Chayah, because a Chayah has a tendency to store and hide away some of its food. If it hides away some of the Chametz, one will not be able to destroy it and will transgress the prohibition against having Chametz in his possession on Pesach (or he will find it and be tempted to eat it). If, on the other hand, the Mishnah had said only that one may give Chametz to a Chayah, we might have thought that one may feed Chametz to a Chayah immediately before Pesach because it hides away whatever it leaves over, while a Behemah does not hide whatever it leaves over.

The first statement of the Gemara is clear. If the Chayah tends to leave over and hide its food, then one will transgress Bal Yimatzei by having Chametz in his possession. What, though, is the meaning of the Gemara's second statement, that one may give Chametz to a Chayah because it hides away the Chametz that it leaves over? Why is that a reason to permit one to give Chametz to a Chayah more than to a Behemah? This seems to be a reason to prohibit giving Chametz to a Chayah, since the owner of the Chametz will transgress the prohibition of Bal Yimatzei.

(a) TOSFOS and other Rishonim explain that one who does not know the whereabouts of Chametz in his possession does not transgress Bal Yimatzei. The prohibition applies only to one who knows, or suspects, that he has Chametz in his possession in a certain place.

The Gemara suggests that perhaps when one feeds Chametz to a Chayah, one does not expect the animal to leave anything over, and even if the Chayah leaves some Chametz over, it hides it away and one is not aware of it. For this reason, one does not transgress Bal Yimatzei.

In contrast, although one does not expect a Behemah to leave over any Chametz, if it does leave some over, it tends to leave it out in the open and does not hide it. Since the Chametz will be seen, the owner transgresses Bal Yimatzei when he finds out about it (when he sees it) if he fails to destroy it before Pesach.

(The Gemara earlier (4b) says that the obligation of Bedikas Chametz is mid'Oraisa when one has not done Bitul, even though he does not know if there is any Chametz in his possession or where the Chametz is. However, the obligation mid'Oraisa of Bedikas Chametz applies only to a place where it is very likely that Chametz is there, a "Makom she'Machnisim Bo Chametz." If Chametz is left there, it is as if one knows the whereabouts of the Chametz.)

(b) RABEINU DAVID explains that the Gemara refers to a case in which the person was Mevatel his Chametz. Bitul, however, works only for Chametz that one has not seen and does not know where it might be. Bitul does not work for Chametz that one has seen and expects to be in its place. The Gemara suggests that if the Chayah hides it away, although one does not fulfill the requirement to get the Chametz out of his house, he does not transgress the Isur d'Oraisa of having Chametz in his possession, because he was Mevatel it. This does not apply to the Chametz left over by a Behemah. Since a Behemah leaves its food in its place, if one forgets to clean up after the Behemah, Bitul will not save him from transgressing Bal Yera'eh, because he knows where the Chametz is located.

(c) According to a variant text of RASHI, cited in the margin of the Gemara, even when Chametz is hidden away by a Chayah one transgresses Bal Yimatzei. However, he does not transgress Bal Yera'eh, because the Chayah hides it away and it cannot be "seen." A Behemah, on the other hand, leaves its Chametz out in the open, and thus one transgresses both Bal Yimatzei and Bal Yera'eh if he forgets to clean up after the Behemah.

(The question of whether or not Bal Yera'eh applies to Chametz that is hidden, or "Tamun," is debated by the Rishonim earlier in Pesachim. Rabeinu David, a disciple of the Ramban, cites the Beraisa on 5b which prohibits "Chametz Tamun" even when it is not in a person's house but in his "area" ("bi'Gevulecha"). He then discusses whether this prohibition is derived solely from the verse which alludes to "Tamun" ("Lo Yimatzei"), or whether that verse reveals that even the prohibition of Lo Yera'eh also applies to "Tamun." The marginal note on Rashi follows the former opinion, as well as the Rambam and others who count Lo Yera'eh and Lo Yimatzei as two separate prohibitions, and not as a reiteration of the same prohibition . See SEFER HA'MITZVOS, Lo Ta'aseh #200-201.)

QUESTIONS: Rebbi Avahu and Chizkiyah argue about the source for the prohibition against deriving benefit (Hana'ah) from Chametz on Pesach. Rebbi Avahu says that the verse, "Do not eat Chametz," includes both a prohibition against eating and against deriving benefit from Chametz. Rebbi Avahu maintains that every prohibition against eating in the Torah ("Do not eat...") includes a prohibition against deriving benefit as well (he derives this principle from the verses that prohibit Neveilah).

Chizkiyah argues and maintains that, normally, when the Torah says, "Do not eat...," it forbids only eating and not Hana'ah. With regard to Chametz, though, the Torah alters its normal phraseology and says "Lo Ye'achel" -- "Chametz shall not be eaten," instead of, "Lo Tochlu" -- "you shall not eat Chametz." This change in terminology implies an additional prohibition, that against deriving benefit from Chametz. (The Gemara concludes that Chizkiyah's source for this way of understanding the verse is another verse which discusses the prohibition against eating Sheratzim, as mentioned on 23a).

The Gemara explains at length the sources for each opinion and why they disagree with each other. However, two important points seem to be left unaddressed.

(a) The Gemara cites an argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah in order to demonstrate the source for Rebbi Avahu's principle. Rebbi Meir says that any type of benefit may be derived from a Neveilah (that is, it may even be sold in exchange for money, as well as given to a Ger Toshav (who does not worship idols) or to a Nochri (who does worship idols)). The verse that permits one to derive benefit from a Neveilah is unnecessary (because we would have known, without a verse, that one may derive benefit from Neveilah, since no verse forbids it). The Gemara explains that according to Rebbi Avahu, the verse teaches that one is permitted to have benefit only from Neveilah, but not from any other item which is forbidden to be eaten.

According to Chizkiyah, who disagrees with this premise and maintains that one is not forbidden from deriving benefit from any item that he may not eat, why is the verse (that permits one to derive benefit from Neveilah) necessary according to Rebbi Meir?

(b) Chizkiyah derives the Isur Hana'ah of Chametz from the fact that the Torah uses an unusual terminology. According to Rebbi Avahu, why does the Torah alter its normal terminology in the case of Chametz? There are other places where Halachos are derived from similar changes (see Chagigah 3a, "Yir'eh" and "Yera'eh") and no one argues.

(a) RASHI and TOSFOS disagree about how Chizkiyah understands the view of Rebbi Meir.

1. RASHI (22b, DH l'Mai) explains that according to Chizkiyah, the verse that Rebbi Meir cites teaches that it is preferable to give the Neveilah to a Ger than to sell it to a Nochri. Accordingly, the verse is necessary to teach the order of preference (and not that one is permitted to derive benefit from Neveilah, which we would know without the verse).

2. TOSFOS (21b, DH b'Shleima) disagrees with Rashi, because Rebbi Avahu also agrees that Rebbi Meir derives the order of preference from the verse. If Rebbi Avahu also learns the order of preference from the verse (and he still uses the verse to teach that only Hana'ah of Neveilah is permitted, but not Hana'ah of other forbidden items), then the order of preference apparently does not entirely "use up" the verse, so to speak. Consequently, Rashi's answer does not suffice to explain why the verse is necessary according to Chizkiyah.

Therefore, Tosfos (22a, DH Rebbi Shimon) suggests that Chizkiyah admits that Rebbi Meir follows the opinion of Rebbi Avahu and maintains that every prohibition against eating an object includes a prohibition against deriving benefit from that object as well. Chizkiyah, however, argues about what Rebbi Yehudah holds. Rebbi Avahu asserts that even Rebbi Yehudah agrees with his principle that whenever the Torah says, "Do not eat," it also intends to prohibit Hana'ah, while Chizkiyah claims that Rebbi Yehudah learns the prohibition of Hana'ah of Chametz from the word "Ye'achel."

(b) The answer to the second question may be as follows. Other teachings that are derived from a change that the Torah makes in a certain phrase are subject to unanimity, because in those cases (such as "Yir'eh" and "Yera'eh" in Chagigah), both words use the same number of letters. The fact that the Torah uses one word and not the other indicates its intention to teach a new Halachah. Here, however, the standard terminology ("Lo Tochlu") requires an extra letter, and therefore Rebbi Avahu asserts that the Torah uses the phrase "Lo Ye'achel" in order to shorten the word and not to indicate any new Halachah. (M. KORNFELD)