QUESTION: The Gemara discusses the prophecies of Eldad and Meidad who reached a high level of prophecy after they were not accepted as part of the seventy elders during the Jewish people's sojourn in the desert. One opinion says that they prophesied that "Moshe will die and Yehoshua will lead Yisrael into Eretz Yisrael." Another opinion says that they prophesied about the incident of the Slav (the birds which Hash-m sent when the Jewish people complained about the lack of meat). A third opinion says that they were foretelling what would happen at the end of days, during the war of Gog and Magog.

The Gemara asks that according to the latter two opinions, it is clear why Moshe Rabeinu joyfully said, "If only all of Hash-m's nation would be prophets!" (Bamidbar 11:29), when he heard that they were prophesying. According to the first opinion, however, which says that their prophecy was an inauspicious one for the fate of Moshe, why did Moshe exclaim that everyone should have such prophecy? The Gemara answers that when the prophecy of Eldad and Meidad was reported to Moshe, "they did not complete it in front of him," implying that the report omitted the part about Moshe's death.

How could the report have omitted the part about Moshe's death, if that was the very first part of their prophecy? How does the Gemara answer its question by saying that "they did not complete it in front of him"?

Accordingly, when Moshe was informed of the first part of the prophecy of Eldad and Meidad -- that he was going to die -- he was not concerned with that information, because he expected that he would die in the near future. However, those who brought him the report did not tell him about the second part of the prophecy -- that Yehoshua would lead the nation into Eretz Yisrael. It was that second part of the prophecy that would have caused Moshe great anguish due to his yearning to fulfill all of the Mitzvos. This is what the Gemara means when it answers that "they did not complete" the prophecy in front of Moshe. Since they made no mention of the part of the prophecy that said that Moshe would not enter Eretz Yisrael, Moshe had no reason to feel distressed about their prophecy.

QUESTION: Rav Kahana states that when all of the judges of the Beis Din unanimously decide that the defendant is guilty in a case of capital punishment, he is automatically exonerated from punishment ("Potrin Oso"). The Gemara explains that the reason for this is that Beis Din is required to delay the final verdict until the next day so that the judges will be able to think of reasons to exonerate the defendant. In this case, however, none of the judges will be able to find a way to exonerate him, since they all ruled that he is guilty, and therefore the requirement to wait until the next day cannot be fulfilled.

Why, though, does the punishment of the perpetrator depend on fulfilling this condition? The purpose of waiting until the next day is to give more time to the judges to find a reason to exonerate him. If there clearly is no reason to exonerate him, then why does the lack of ability to wait until the next day invalidate the Beis Din's authority to put him to death?

What does this mean? If all of the greatest Sages agree on a certain matter, then it should be clear that this is the truth. The MAHARAL explains that a judgment must be a totally pure and straight matter. If all of the judges see that they and their colleagues have decided already that the person is guilty, than no one that night will make a serious attempt to find a way to prove the defendant's innocence. If the Torah asserts that it really cannot be clear to a human judge unless he deliberates the matter overnight, then this deliberation must take place, and when it cannot take place the defendant is exonerated. If he indeed is guilty, the Maharal adds, then the Judge of the world will deal with him appropriately.

OPINIONS: Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav says that a Sanhedrin (a Beis Din of twenty-three judges) may not be established in "any city which does not have two people to speak and one person to hear." What does this mean?

The RAN explains that Rashi means that there must be at least three judges who are able to hear testimony from witnesses in whatever language the witnesses might speak.

The RAN himself questions Rashi's explanation. He says that Rashi seems to maintain that not all of the judges in a Beis Din of twenty-three need to hear the testimony of witnesses themselves. Rather, it suffices if only three judges hear the testimony, even in a case of capital punishment. However, there is a rule that all of the judges are required to hear (and understand) the testimony directly from the witnesses. If the other judges hear the testimony only from the three judges who understood it, then that is considered "Ed mi'Pi Ed," hearing the testimony from a secondary source, and it does not qualify as testimony.

The MARGOLIYOS HA'YAM answers the Ran's question on Rashi's explanation by proposing that Rashi maintains that there is no problem of "Ed mi'Pi Ed" when a proper Beis Din (of three judges) hears the testimony directly from the witnesses. He says that this is also the opinion of RAV SA'ADYAH GA'ON (see RAMBAN to Devarim 19:15). It is not clear, though, how this approach answers the question on Rashi. Even if "Kabalas Edus," hearing the testimony of witnesses, suffices with three of the judges, the other judges still need to be informed of the testimony in order to be able to judge the case. When the three judges tell them the testimony, although it may not be a problem of "Ed mi'Pi Ed" (since the testimony was already accepted by the three judges on behalf of the entire Beis Din and it does not need to be formally repeated as Edus), the judges who heard the testimony are now serving as witnesses when they convey the information to the other judges, and thus they should not be able to serve as judges ("Ein Ed Na'aseh Dayan")!

The KEHILOS YAKOV (#12) explains that when the three judges convey the testimony to the rest of the court, they do so by first issuing a Psak Din, a formal ruling, about the testimony that they heard from the witnesses. The rest of the court (including the three judges who heard the testimony) then judge the case based on this Psak Din. This is derived from the Gemara in Bava Basra (165b) which discusses a case in which one witness testifies in front of one Beis Din, and a second witness testifies in front of another Beis Din. The Gemara says that the two courts may come together and judge the case. Why may the two courts come together and judge the case if each court needs to relate to the other court the testimony that it heard from one witness? The fact that the judges of each court now have to convey that information to the other court should create a problem of "Ein Ed Na'aseh Dayan," even though the "Kabalas Edus" of the testimony of each witness was done properly (by a court of three judges). RABEINU YONAH (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes there) explains that each Beis Din issues a Psak Din stating the details of the "Kabalas Edus" that it performed. When the two courts then come together, neither court is judging the case based on the testimony that it hears from the other court, but rather each court is judging the case based on the Psak Din of the other court that there was a witness who testified with such-and-such testimony. Accordingly, it is considered as though each Beis Din has received the testimony of the two witnesses. (For further discussion on the issue of how many judges may hear the testimony in a capital case, see OR SAME'ACH, Hilchos Sanhedrin 13:7. See also AVI EZRI of Rav Shach zt'l, Hilchos Edus 4:4, for an entirely different approach to explaining the view of Rashi.)