A Kohen Gadol, says our Mishnah, can both judge and be judged. He can perform Chalitzah and his wife is subject to Chalitzah. Although his brother may perform Yibum with his wife, he cannot perform Yibum with his brother's wife. Why is that?
(b)
According to Rebbi Meir, he is permitted to attend the Lavayah of his wife. What procedure must he however, follow? How far is he permitted to go?
(c)
And what must he do when the coffin reaches the city gates?
(d)
What does Rebbi Yehudah learn from the Pasuk in Emor "u'Min ha'Mikdash Lo Yeitzei"?
(e)
How does Rebbi Meir interpret the Pasuk?
1)
(a)
A Kohen Gadol, says our Mishnah, can both judge and be judged. He can perform Chalitzah and his wife is subject to Chalitzah. Although his brother may perform Yibum with his wife, he cannot perform Yibum with his brother's wife - because he is forbidden (via an Asei and a Lo Sa'aseh) to marry an Almanah.
(b)
According to Rebbi Meir, he is permitted to attend the Lavayah of his wife. To avoid rendering himself Tamei however - he must remain out of sight of the coffin. He only enters a street after the pall-bearers have left it, and the moment they enter a street where he is, he must leave it.
(c)
When the coffin reaches the city gates - he must turn back and return to the Avodah.
(d)
Rebbi Yehudah interprets the Pasuk in Emor "u'Min ha'Mikdash Lo Yeitzei" literally to mean that - the Kohen Gadol may not even leave the Beis-Hamikdash, but continues with the Avodah as if nothing has happened.
(e)
Rebbi Meir interprets the Pasuk to mean that - he is not permitted to forsake (to contravene) his Kedushas Kehunah, by becoming Tamei Meis.
2)
(a)
How did the Shurah (the row, following the burial) differ in the days of the Mishnah from the prevalent Minhag today?
(b)
And in what way did a Kohen Gadol comforting mourners differ from other comforters?
(c)
If he was the Aveil, what would ...
1.
... the people say to him?
2.
... he respond?
(d)
How did the Se'udas Havra'ah (the first meal after the burial) of the Kohen Gadol differ from a regular one?
2)
(a)
The Shurah (the row, following the burial) differed in the days of the Mishnah from the prevalent Minhag today - inasmuch as the people would file past the Aveilim, and not vice-versa.
(b)
And a Kohen Gadol comforting mourners differed from other comforters - inasmuch as the Memuneh (the deputy Kohen-Gadol) would walk on his right as he walked past the Aveil, who was standing on his left.
(c)
If he was the Aveil ...
1.
... the people would say to him - 'We are your atonement' (meaning that they were willing to accept all misfortunes that were due to come upon him.
2.
... to which he would respond - 'May you be blessed'.
(d)
The Se'udas Havra'ah (the first meal after the burial) of the Kohen Gadol differed from a regular one - inasmuch as the people sat on the floor, whilst the Kohen Gadol himself sat on a bench (or a chair).
3)
(a)
In what way does the Din of a king differ from that of a Kohen Gadol with regard to judging, Chalitzah and Yibum?
(b)
Why is the king not permitted to perform ...
1.
... Yibum?
2.
... Chalitzah?
(c)
This is the opinion of the Tana Kama. In which points does Rebbi Yehudah disagree with him?
(d)
And why may the king's brother not perform Yibum or Chalitzah with the king's Almanah?
3)
(a)
The Din of king differs from that of a Kohen Gadol with regard to judging, Chalitzah and Yibum - inasmuch as the former can neither judge nor be judged, perform Chalitzah or Yibum, nor may his brother perform Chalitzah or Yibum with his Almanah.
(b)
The king is not permitted to perform ...
1.
... Yibum - because it is undignified for him to stand in for his brother.
2.
... Chalitzah - because it is undignified for a king to be spat at.
(c)
This is the opinion of the Tana Kama. Rebbi Yehudah maintains that - a king who permits Chalitzah or Yibum is praiseworthy.
(d)
And the reason that the king's brother may not perform Yibum with his Almanah is - because she is not permitted to remarry (and a woman who cannot marry is not subject to Chalitzah either).
4)
(a)
Rebbi Yehudah also disagrees with the Tana Kama, who forbids anyone (even a king) to marry the widow of a king. How does he prove otherwise from a Pasuk in Shmuel? What did the Navi say to David?
4)
(a)
Rebbi Yehudah also disagrees with the Tana Kama, who forbids anyone (even a king) to marry the widow of a king. He proves otherwise from the Pasuk, where the Navi said to David - "And I shall give you your master (Shaul)'s house, and your master's wives in your bosom".
5)
(a)
We refute the initial suggestion that the Tana permits a 'Kohen Gadol to judge (which is not a Chidush), because of 'Danin oso' (which is), based on the Pasuk in Tzefanyah "Hiskosh'shu ve'Koshu". What principle does Resh Lakish learn from there?
(b)
How does this apply to our case?
(c)
Then why does the Tana find it necessary to permit a Kohen Gadol to judge?
5)
(a)
We refute the initial suggestion that the Tana permits a 'Kohen Gadol to judge (which is not a Chidush), because of 'Danin oso' (which is) - on the basis of the Pasuk "Hiskosh'shu ve'Koshu", from which Resh Lakish learns that a person must rectify himself before he can rectify others ('Practice what you preach!').
(b)
By the same token - a person can only judge others if he is himself able to be judged.
(c)
And the reason that the Tana finds it necessary to permit a Kohen Gadol to judge is - to point out the difference between him and a king.
6)
(a)
Alternatively, the Chidush lies in a Beraisa. What does the Tana say happens to a Kohen Gadol who kills ...
1.
... on purpose?
2.
... inadvertently?
(b)
What is the Chidush there? Why might we have otherwise thought that a Kohen Gadol does not go into Galus?
(c)
Who else besides a Kohen Gadol who kills someone inadvertently, does the Mishnah in Makos deny the right ever to go free?
(d)
From which Pasuk in Shoftim do we learn that a Kohen Gadol goes into Galus?
6)
(a)
Alternatively, the Chidush lies in a Beraisa. The Tana rules there that a Kohen Gadol who kills ...
1.
... on purpose - is sentenced to death.
2.
... inadvertently - has to run to a city of refuge.
(b)
The Chidush in this Beraisa is - that we might have otherwise thought that a Kohen Gadol does not need to go into Galus - since once there, he will never be able to go free.
(c)
Besides a Kohen Gadol who kills someone inadvertently, the Mishnah in Makos denies - someone who kills a Kohen Gadol the right ever to go free.
(d)
We learn that a Kohen Gadol goes into Galus - from the word "Kol" (in the Pasuk in Shoftim "la'Nus shamah Kol Rotze'ach").
18b----------------------------------------18b
7)
(a)
What does the Beraisa mean when it says (in connection with a Kohen 'Over al Asei ve'al Lo Sa'aseh'?
(b)
What is the Chidush? What might we otherwise have thought?
(c)
Based on Rav Ada bar Ahavah, who Darshens "Kol ha'Davar ha'Gadol Yavi'u Eilecha", 'Kol Devarav shel Gadol' (as we learned earlier), why do we not Darshen that, too?
7)
(a)
When the Beraisa says (in connection with a Kohen Gadol who goes into Galus) 'Over al Asei ve'al Lo Sa'aseh', it means that - if he did transgress an Asei (see Aruch la'Ner) or a Lo Sa'aseh, he is judged for Malkos by a Beis-Din of three (and not of seventy-one).
(b)
We might otherwise have Darshened 'Kol Devarav shel Gadol' (See next question), to require a Beis-Din of seventy-one for all rulings that concern a Kohen Gadol.
(c)
Based on Rav Ada bar Ahavah, who Darshens "Kol ha'Davar ha'Gadol Yavi'u Eilecha", 'Kol Devarav shel Gadol' (as we learned earlier), we do not Darshen that, too - because the Torah writes "Davar ha'Gadol" and not "Divrei ha'Gadol", insinuating that it is only major rulings that require the Beis-Din ha'Gadol (that concern capital punishment), but not minor ones (corporal punishment).
8)
(a)
What does the Beraisa learn from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei (in connection with the Mitzvah of 'Hashavas Aveidah') "ve'His'alamta Meihem"?
(b)
What problem does this create with our Mishnah, which obligates a Kohen Gadol to testify?
(c)
Why can we not establish the case with regard to testifying for ...
1.
... a king?
2.
... the son of a king?
(d)
We conclude that the Tana is indeed referring to testifying in front of a king. How do we reconcile this with our Mishnah, which forbids a king to judge?
8)
(a)
The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "ve'His'alamta Meihem" - that sometimes a person is exempt from the Mitzvah of 'Hashavas Aveidah'. Among other cases, this pertains to a 'Zakein ve'Eino L'fi Kevodo' (an elder for whom returning it is undignified), into which category a Kohen Gadol falls.
(b)
The problem this creates with our Mishnah, which obligates a Kohen Gadol to testify, is - why, by the same token, he should not be exempt from appearing in court (seeing as both the litigants and the judges are of a lower status than he is).
(c)
We cannot establish the case with regard to testifying for ...
1.
... a king - because we learned in our Mishnah that a king may neither be judged nor may one judge him.
2.
... the son of a king - because, status-wise, the son of a king is no different than anybody else.
(d)
We conclude that the Tana is indeed referring to testifying in front of a king - inasmuch as the king would be asked to attend the court-hearing, to obligate the Kohen Gadol to testify, following which, he would go home and Beis-Din would proceed to discuss the case.
9)
(a)
Why can a king not sit on the Sanhedrin?
(b)
Why does the Beraisa also forbid the seven judges who decide Ibur Shanah to include ...
1.
... a king?
2.
... a Kohen Gadol?
(c)
Rav Papa extrapolates from here that 'Shata Basar Yarcha Azil'. What does this mean?
9)
(a)
A king cannot sit on the Sanhedrin - because since he is greater than all the other members of the Sanhedrin, they would not be able to contradict his opinion, seeing as the Torah writes "ve'Lo Sa'aneh al Riv" (which we explain to mean 've'Lo Sa'aneh al Rav' [meaning that a member of Beis-Din is not permitted to argue with his superior]). Consequently, once the king declares someone guilty, no-one would be able to proclaim him innocent, and vice-versa.
(b)
The Beraisa also forbids the seven judges who decide Ibur Shanah to include ...
1.
... a king - because a king tends to pay his soldiers on an annual basis, in which case he has a vested interest in declaring every year a leap-year (so that he gains a month [and a person who is prejudiced cannot be a judge]).
2.
... a Kohen Gadol - because he is prejudiced the other way, due to the fact that he Tovels in a cold Mikveh on Yom-Kipur, and would therefore prefer it to fall earlier in the year, when the weather is warmer.
(c)
Rav Papa extrapolates from here that 'Shata Basar Yarcha Azil', which means that - the seasons follow the original months, and therefore change with the leap-year (so that, following a leap-year, the cold of Mar-Cheshvan will occur in Tishri).
10)
(a)
We query Rav Papa's statement however, from 'those three cowhands'. What did they overhear the Chachamim say with regard to ...
1.
... the early seeds and the late seeds? What is the significance of these two terms?
2.
... the ox in the cold of the morning and the heat of the midday sun?
3.
... blowing into the south wind?
(b)
What can we learn from there that clashes with Rav Papa's statement?
(c)
Why can we not take the cowhands testimony too seriously anyway?
(d)
So why did the Chachamim declare a leap-year following their testimony?
10)
(a)
We query Rav Papa's statement however, from 'those three cowhands', who overheard the Chachamim say that if the ground is sufficiently warm ...
1.
... to cause both the early seeds (the wheat that is planted at the beginning of Adar) and the late seeds (the barley that is only planted at the end of the month) to grow together - then it is really Adar; if not, it should have been Sh'vat (and it will be necessary to declare Adar Sheini).
2.
... for the ox to die of cold in the morning due to the snow, and yet it needs to seek shade from the heat of the midday sun - then it is really Adar ... .
3.
... for a person's breath to dispel the cold of the east wind - then it is indeed Adar ... .
(b)
We learn from there that - the seasons follow the leap-year (and not the original months, as Rav Papa explained).
(c)
We cannot however, take the cowhands testimony too seriously anyway - since they are not the most reliable of people ...
(d)
... and the reason that the Chachamim declared a leap-year following their testimony was - because according to their reckoning, it was due to be a leap-year anyway, and the leap-year just happened to coincide with the seasons too (though this is not usually the case).
11)
(a)
We establish the ruling of our Mishnah prohibiting the Kohen Gadol to perform Yibum, irrespective of whether the Yevamah fell to him from his brother's marriage to her or from their betrothal. On what grounds is this prohibition easily understood in respect of the former, but not of the latter?
(b)
How do we resolve this Kashya? On what basis would the Kohen Gadol be forbidden to perform Yibum even to a Yevamah from the betrothal?
(c)
What does the Beraisa say regarding Bi'ah Rishonah and Bi'ah Sheniyah that bears this out?
11)
(a)
We establish the ruling of our Mishnah prohibiting the Kohen Gadol to perform Yibum, irrespective of whether the Yevamah fell to him from his brother's marriage to her or from their betrothal. This prohibition is easily understood in respect of the former, which constitutes an Asei ("ki-Im Besulah me'Amav Yikach Ishah") and a Lo Sa'aseh ("Almanah Lo Yikach" [which cannot override the Asei of "Yevamah Yavo Alehah"), but not of the latter - which is only a Lo Sa'aseh, and which the Asei of Yibum ought therefore to override.
(b)
We resolve this Kashya however - by establishing the La'av as a Rabbinical prohibition, who forbade the first Bi'ah (which acquires the Yevamah) on account of the second Bi'ah, which is forbidden min ha'Torah (even in the case of 'Asei Docheh Lo Sa'aseh' only).
(c)
The Beraisa rules that - if the Kohen Gadol performed Yibum (Bi'ah Rishonah) with an Almanah from the betrothal, he will have acquired her, but he is not permitted to perform Bi'ah Sheniyah with her, bearing out Rav Papa's ruling.
