According to Abaye, an Eid Zomem becomes Pasul retroactively meaning that - any other testimony that he testified between the false testimony and the time that he is declared an Eid Zomem is void.

He learns this from the Pasuk "Al Ta'shes Yadcha Rasha", disqualifying a Rasha from testifying, and - seeing as he was a Rasha from the moment that he testified, all his subsequent testimonies are automatically invalid.

Rava's reason for saying that he only becomes Pasul from the time that he becomes a Zomem is - the fact that Eid Zomem is a Chidush to begin with, and we follow the principle 'Ein l'cha bo Ela Chidusho' (we take the Chidush at its minimum, without extending it further).

What makes Eid Zomem a Chidush is - the fact that we believe the word of the second set of witnesses against the word of the first ones.

In the second Lashon, Rava agrees with Abaye in principle. Nevertheless, the Rabbanan validate all his testimonies up to the time that he becomes an Eid Zomem - to spare the losses of those who may in the interim, have purchased fields on which the Eid Zomem signed, and who now stand to lose them (without having had any way of protecting themselves).

One difference between the two Leshonos will be in a case where each of the two witnesses was declared a Zomem by two witnesses - removing the aspect of Chidush. Consequently, according to the first Lashon, the witnesses will indeed be Pasul retroactively; whereas according to the second Lashon, they will still be Pasul only from now on, in order to safeguard the interests of the purchasers.

The second difference between the two Leshonos is - there were the second set of witnesses did not declare the first set Zom'min, but testified that they were Pasul because they had stolen. Here too, it would not be a Chidush to believe them (since the second set could not possibly be believed to vindicate themselves), yet the interest of the purchasers would still need to be protected.

Rebbi Yirmiyah mi'Difti cites Rav Papi, who rules like Rava, Rav Ashi, like Abaye. The Halachah is - like Abaye, as it is in the other five cases of 'Y.(A).L.K.G.M'.

A Mumar who eats Neveilos for pleasure (including monetary gain [because it costs less]) is definitely Pasul from testifying. Abaye and Rava argue over a Mumar who sins to anger Hash-m (incorporating one who just doesn't care). Rava's reason for validating such a person's testimony is - because it is not a Rasha de'Chamas (he does not sin specifically in order to gain anything, and is therefore not suspected of lying).

We query Rava from a Beraisa, which disqualifies someone who makes false Shevu'os. We presume that this incorporates ...

... Shevu'os Shav - where someone swears that a pillar of stone is made of stone.\ and ...

... a Shevu'os Sheker - where he swears that a pillar of stone is made of gold.

What makes us think that the Tana incorporates such a Shevu'ah (and is not confined to a Shevu'ah that concerns money) is - the fact that he says "u'Mo'alin bi'Shevu'os" in the plural (incorporating Shevu'os Mamon and Shevu'as Shav [or Sheker]), a Kashya on Rava?

Rava refutes the Kashya, inasmuch as, according to him - the Tana is speaking about Shevu'os Mamon exclusively ...

... and he says 'Shevu'os' in the plural, because he is speaking about the public at large (and not because he is referring to different kinds of Shevu'os).

We prove from the Beraisa which lists only Gazlanin u'Malvei be'Ribis among the Pesulim of "Al Ta'shes Yadcha Eid, Al Tashes Chamas Eid" that - the Tana requires specifically a Shevu'ah concerning Mamon in order to invalidate a person from being an Eid (like Rava).

This does not mean that Ochel Neveilos le'Te'avon is not disqualified either - because since he sins for pleasure, there is no difference between it and Gazlanin and Malvei be'Ribis.

Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa disqualifies an Eid Zomem from testifying at all. Rebbi Yossi restricts this to an Eid Zomem in Diynei Nefashos, but an Eid Zomem in Diynei Mamonos is not disqualified from testifying in cases of Diynei Nefashos (which are more stringent than Diynei Mamonos [and the witness is therefore not suspected of lying there as well]).

We attempt to equate ...

... Abaye (who disqualifies a Mumar Ochel Neveilos le'Hach'is) with Rebbi Meir, since like Rebbi Meir, who disqualifies him from a more lenient testimony to a more stringent one, as we just explained, so too, does Abaye disqualify a Mumar Ochel Neveilos le'Hach'is (who only perpetrates evil against Hash-m) from testifying in money-matters, where he is perpetrating evil against man as well as Hash-m.

... Rava with Rebbi Yossi - since both permit a witness who has permitted a smaller evil, to testify in a case where false testimony would entail a larger one.

We decline to equate the two Machlokos completely, as we just suggested, though we do concede that Abaye cannot hold like Rebbi Yossi. Rava however, could hold like Rebbi Meir as well because - since (unlike his own case, where an Eid Zomem of money is both evil to Hash-m and evil to man [which he considers the main criterion]) a Mumar Ochel Neveilos le'Hach'is is only evil to Hash-m, but not to man (in which case, Rebbi Meir might well agree that he is not Pasul.

Like in the previous case (of 'Eid Zomem le'Mafre'a Hu Nifsal') we rule like Abaye, and as for the Beraisa which we just cited to disprove Abaye (since it does not include Ochel Neveilos le'Hach'is among the Pesulim) - we are now able to establish its author as Rebbi Yossi, who does not disqualify witnesses from a more lenient case to a more stringent one, whereas Abaye holds like Rebbi Meir, as we just explained.

And we reconcile this with the principle 'Rebbi Meir ve'Rebbi Yossi, Halachah ke'Rebbi Yossi' - by confining that principle to where there is no S'tam Mishnah like Rebbi Meir, as there is here (as we shall soon see).

bar Chama committed - either murder or manslaughter.

When the Resh Galusa instructed Rebbi Acha bar Ya'akov (Rabeinu Chananel) to verify the facts, and that if he was convinced of his guilt, he should poke out his eyes - he meant this literally (due to the principle 'Beis-Din Makin ve'Onshin she'Lo min ha'Din'.

Alternatively, he might have meant that - they take his money to pay the Yorshin, or that they place him in Cherem.

Resh Galusa did not order the death-sentence - because it was no longer practiced (since the Sanhedrin moved from the Lishkas ha'Gazis forty years before the Churban of the second Beis-Hamikdash).

bar Chama countered the two witnesses who testified that he did indeed kill someone - by bringing two witnessed who testified that one of them had stolen in their presence (though independently, in front of one of them, a Kav of barley and in front of the other, the handle of a spear).

Rav Aba bar Ya'akov prepared to punish bar Chama (according to the instructions of the Resh Galusa) in spite of the fact that Rebbi Meir invalidates witnesses from a more lenient sin to a more stringent one - because Rebbi Yossi validates them.

Rav Papi objected to Rav Aba bar Ya'akov's intended ruling - on the grounds that this case was different, because Rebbi had learned a S'tam Mishnah in favor of Rebbi Meir (which we will now set about identifying).

We cite the Mishnah in Nidah 'Kol ha'Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Nefashos Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Mamonos'. The Tana must be speaking - where the person concerned is suspect because he already testified falsely in Diynei Mamonos.

The author cannot be Rebbi Yossi - because according to him, an Eid Zomem in money-matters is eligible to judge Diynei Nefashos, but not Diynei Mamonos.

We nevertheless establish him as the possible author - by confining the Mishnah to cases of P'sul Yuchsin (such as in the Mishnah that we will learn shortly). We even prove this from the Seifa 'Yesh Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Mamonos ve'Ein Ra'uy la'Dun Diynei Nefashos', which must be speaking about Pesulei Yuchsin, because if it was speaking about someone who is suspect - he must be referring to someone who became an Eid Zomem in Diynei Nefashos, but surely there, everyone agrees that he is Pasul to judge Diynei Mamonos (so how can the Tana say otherwise).

So we cite our Mishnah (which is more detailed in Rosh Hashanah) 'Eilu Hein ha'Pesulin, ha'Mesachek be'Kuvya ... Zeh ha'Kelal - Kol Eidus she'Ein ha'Ishah Kesheirah lah, Af Hein Ein Kesheirin lah'.

The author of that Mishnah cannot therefore be Rebbi Yossi - because according to him, they are eligible to judge Diynei Nefashos even though a woman is not.

So we now have a S'tam Mishnah like Rebbi Meir - a proof that the Halachah is like him, even though he argues with Rebbi Yossi.

bar Chama reacted to Rav Papi's proof - by kissing Rav Papi'a feet and paying his head-tax for a whole year.

Our Mishnah then lists the relatives that are disqualified from testifying. These include a brother and both a paternal and a maternal uncle - as well as ...

... one's sister's husband and the husband of his father's sister ...

... the husband of one's mother's sister and ...

... his father, father-in-law and brother-in-law.

The Tana includes a sister's husband in the list - because of the principle 'Ba'al ke'Ishto' (which renders him on a par with his own brother).

This Tana draws no distinction between the relatives of one's father and those of one's mother, as we just saw.

He also includes Giso ...

... the husband of one's wife's sister, and ...

... 'Chorgo' - a stepson.

The difference between Chorgo and the relations mentioned earlier is that - whereas in the case of the latter, their sons and sons-in-law are also disqualified, Chorgo alone is forbidden.

Having taught Ba'al Imo, the Tana nevertheless mentions Chorgo, which is the same relationship in reverse - because that is the style he follows in the vast majority of cases in this Mishnah.

The Tana also incudes both Achi Aviv and ben Achiv and most other dual relationships of this nature. The distinction that 'ben Achi Ishto' and 'Chasno' share in common is that - they are the only two cases that the Tana omits, in spite of having mentioned their opposite numbers (the husband of his father's sister and his father-in-law, respectively).

Rebbi Yossi ascribes the above to Rebbi Akiva. The Mishnah Rishonah however, disqualifies Dodo and ben Dodo, because they are fit to inherit him. The Mishnah Rishonah disagrees with Rebbi Akiva - regarding the mother's relatives (such as Achi Imo and Ba'al Achoso), who are not fit to inherit him.

This does not mean however, that he is permitted to testify on behalf of his mother's brother, bearing in mind that (although the latter is not fit to inherit him) he is fit to inherit the latter (as we learned in Bava Basra).

The Tana - permits an ex-son-in-law, say, whose wife died before he witnessed the incident that he wants to testify on, to testify for or against his ex-father-in-law.

Rebbi Yehudah considers a son-in-law, whose wife died, leaving behind children - like a current son-in-law with regard to testifying and judging.

He also disqualifies a witness who loves or hates the litigant, from testifying. Regarding the former, the Tana cites a best man. For the latter, he gives the example - of one person who did not speak to the other for three days, out of hatred.

The Rabbanan say that - a Yisrael is not suspect of giving false testimony due to like or dislike.

The Rabbanan will concede though - that when it comes to judging, someone who loves or hates one of the litigants, is disqualified from judging him.

The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk ...

... "Ish be'Chet'o Yamus" that - each person dies for his own sins, and not for the sins of his fathers or children.

... "Lo Yumsu Avos al Banim" that - fathers cannot die by the testimony of their sons, or vice-versa.

... "u'Vanim Lo Yumsu al Avos" - to include in the the prohibition uncles and nephews, and vice-versa.

We reconcile "Ish be'Chet'o Yamus" with the Pasuk in Ki Sisa "Poked Avos al Banim" - by establishing the latter where the children continue in the ways of their sinful fathers.

From the Pasuk "ve'Chashlu Ish be'Achiv" we learn that - one man stumbles over the sins of the other, which teaches us the principle 'Kol Yisrael Areivim Zeh ba'Zeh' (All Jews are responsible for one another.

We reconcile this with "Ish be'Chet'o Yamus" - by establishing the latter where they are not able to stop one another from sinning and the former where they are.