1)

(a)It was strange that the Sh'tar that appeared in Beis-Din written in the language of Beis-Din - had only two signatures, without a comment to the effect that they had begun with three, but one of them had died.

(b)Ravina nevertheless wanted to validate it - based on Resh Lakish's Chazakah, that witnesses only sign on a Sh'tar that is above board (as we just learned).

(c)Rav Nasan bar Ami, on the other hand, quoting Rava, objected - on the grounds that in the case of such a blatant discrepancy, we suspect even Beis-Din of having erred.

(d)According to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, they could have avoided the problem - by inserting 'Bei Dina' in the Sh'tar, making it clear that they were indeed a Beis-Din of three.

2)

(a)We query Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's suggestion however, due to Shmuel - who validates a Beis-Din of two (even though he calls them a 'Beis-Din Chatzuf'). Consequently, who is to know that this Beis-Din did not follow Shmuel's opinion (which is not Halachah, see also Tosfos DH 've'Dilma')?

(b)They could however, have ovoided this problem too by adding (not just 'Bei-Dina', but) 'Bei-Dina de'Rabana Ashi' (which would have been unlikely to have made such a mistake).

(c)And even if we suspect that they might have done - they could have removed that suspicion too - by adding 've'Amar Lan Rabana Ashi' (who is above suspicion).

3)

(a)In a case where someone tells the Yorshin how he saw their father hiding money in a large box of sorts and declared that it belonged to so-and-so, or was Ma'aser-SHeini money, the Beraisa draws a distinction between whether the box was in a field - in which case he is believed, or in the house - in which case he is not ...

(b)... because - in the case of the field, he is believed with a 'Mi'un' (since he could have taken the money from there himself and given it to the person concerned [though it is not clear how the 'Migu' will work with regard to Ma'aser SHeini), whereas in the house (to which he has no access), he has no 'Migu' and is therefore not believed.

(c)In the same case, but where the father made the same declaration as his sons watched him hiding the money, it depends upon - the manner in which he issued the instructions. If his tone of voice was sincere, then they must follow his instructions, but if he conveyed the impression that he was only trying to prevent them from taking the money in his lifetime or that he was merely trying to hide the fact that he was a wealthy man, then they may ignore the instructions and keep the money.

(d)And in a case where a person's deceased father appears to him in a dream telling him where he will find a sum of money, adding that it belongs to so-and-so or to Ma'aser SHeini, the Tana rules - 'Divrei Chalomos Lo Ma'alin ve'Lo Moridin' (dreams cannot determine Halachos). Consequently, should he find the money, he is permitted to keep it.

4)

(a)According to Rebbi Yochanan, in the case in our Mishnah, where two judges rule 'Zakai', and the third one 'Chayav', the Sofrim write 'P'loni Zakai' (or 'Chayav', in the reverse case). According to Resh Lakish - they write 'P'loni u'P'loni Mezakin' (or 'Mechayvin').

(b)We reject our initial interpretation of the Machlokes, whether, in the event that they become obligated to pay, the third judge has to pay too (Rebbi Yochanan) or not (Resh Lakish) on the grounds - that had it been up to him, they would have ruled Chayav, so why would Rebbi Yochanan obligate him to pay?

5)

(a)We then reject the suggestion that they are arguing over whether the two judges need to pay the portion of the third judge (Rebbi Yochanan) or not (Resh Lakish) on the grounds - that without his participation, there would have been no ruling, so why should they pay his portion?

(b)We finally attribute Rebbi Yochanan to the La'v of "Lo Seilech Rachil be'Amecha" (which forbids informing the litigants what each individual judges ruled). Resh Lakish's, on the other hand holds - that to suggest that all three judges declared the one party Zakai would be 'Mechzi ke'Shikra' (appears false [ruling out the above interpretation of the above La'v).

(c)According to Rebbi Elazar, they write 'mi'Divreihen Nizdakeh P'loni' - in an effort to circumvent both "Lo Seilech Rachil" and 'Mechzi ke'Shikra'.

(d)It is necessary to write this - since it implies that the Beis-Din arrived at their decision folowing a division of opinion.

6)

(a)Our Mishnah states 'Gamru es ha'Davar, Machnisin Osan'. This refers - either to the litigants or to the witnesses.

(b)Initially, we do not want to ascribe it to the litigants - because our Mishnah has said nothing about sending them out in the first place.

(c)The Tana Kama of the Beraisa requires the two witnesses to have witnessed the scene simultaneously. According to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah - it does not matter if they witnessed it at different times (as we will explain shortly).

(d)The Tana Kama also requires them to testify together in Beis-Din, whereas according to Rebbi Nasan - it does not matter if one testifies today, and the other, tomorrow.

7)

(a)If we now establish 'Machnisin Osan' with regard to the witnesses, the author of the Mishnah, which requires the two witnesses to appear in Beis-Din simultaneously, will have to be - the Tana Kama of Rebbi Nasan.

(b)We counter this however, by establishing it with regard to the litigants, and the author is Rebbi Nechemyah in a Beraisa, who cites the custom of the refined people of Yerushalayim. They used to - send the litigants (as well as the witnesses) out of the courtroom whilst the Dayanim were debating the issue, and call them back in before announcing their decision.

(c)We query this explanation however, from a Beraisa which explicitly states 'Machnisin es ha'Eidim' - and we therefore concede that the author of this Beraisa is certainly the Tana Kama of Rebbi Nasan.

8)

(a)Assuming that the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah argue over a S'vara, the case over which they are arguing must be - where one witness saw the loan of a Manah on a certain day, and the other one saw the loan of a Manah on another day ...

(b)...Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah is not worried about combining two witnesses testifying on different transactions - since they are both testifying that Reuven owes Shimon a Manah.

(c)If on the other hand, their argument is based on the Pasuk in Vayikra (in connection with a Korban Shevu'as ha'Eidus) "Lo Yakum Eid Echad", the Tana Kama will explain that the Torah ...

1. ...adds the word "Echad" - to teach us that wherever the word "Eid" appears (without "Echad"), it means two witnesses.

2. ... writes "Eid" and not "Eidim" - to teach us that, in our case, the witnesses must view the transaction simultaneously (as if they were one).

(d)Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah counters this, by citing the continuation of the Pasuk "O Ra'ah O Yada" - which implies that their testimony is acceptable under any circumstances, even if they witnessed the events at two different times.

9)

(a)Similarly, the Tana Kama and Rebbi Nasan might argue over a S'vara or Pasuk. The Tana Kama's S'vara lies in the fact - that the testimony of a single witness is eligible only to obligate the defendant to swear, but not to establish a transaction.

(b)Rebbi Nasan counters this argument - by pointing out that even if the witnesses were to arrive in Beis-Din simultaneously, they would only testify one after the other, so what is the point of making them arrive together?

(c)The Pasuk they argue over is the continuation of the same Pasuk in Vayikra "Im Lo Yagid ve'Nasa Avono", and the basis of their Machlokes is - whether we learn 'Hagadah' (the actual testimonial) here from 'Re'iyah' (witnessing the event [the Tana Kama]) in the previous phrase, or not (Rebbi Nasan).

(d)With regard to the previous Machlokes, both Tana'im must hold - like the Tana Kama of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah (that they witnessed the events simultaneously).

10)

(a)Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim was trying - to give Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina Semichah.

(b)He eventually got Rebbi Yochanan to succeed where he had failed - by telling him that Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina had the information (whether the Halachah was like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah or not) that he (Rebbi Yochanan) was looking for.

(c)Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina actually told Rebbi Yochanan that he had heard - how Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah agreed with Rebbi Nasan (that even the actual testimony may be delivered at different times).

(d)Rebbi Yochanan was not impressed however - because, as he remarked, if Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah does not require the two witnesses to view their testimony simultaneously, then it is obvious that they do not need to present it simultaneously (see Rabeinu Chananel).

(e)He nevertheless gave his Semichah - because Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim insisted that he give him Semichah before Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina supplied the information.

11)

(a)Rebbi Zeira extrapolated from the fact that Rebbi Yochanan did not withdraw the Semichah - that once someone who is fit to receive Semichah does in fact receive it, the Semichah stands (see Hagahos Maharshal).

(b)Rebbi Chiya bar Avin Amar Rav rules like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah both by Karka'os and by Metaltelin. The case by ...

1. ... Karka'os is - where the two witnesses testify that a certain piece of land belongs to so-and-so.

2. ... Metaltelin - where they testify that Reuven admitted that certain Metaltelin belong to Shimon.

(c)Ula disagrees, He rules like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah - only by Karka, but not by Metaltelin.

(d)We reconcile Ula's statement (implying that the Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah even by Karka'os), with Rebbi Aba Amar Rav Huna Amar Rav and others, who maintain restrict the Rabbanan's opinion to Metaltelin - by applying the principle 'Gavra a'Gavra ka'Ramis' (how can one ask from one Amora on another (i.e. Ula argues with Rebbi Aba Amar Rav Huna Amar Rav in that point too).

12)

(a)'Tani Rav Idi bar Avin be'Nizakin de'Bei Karna' (one of those who agree with Rebbi Aba Amar Rav Huna Amar Rav), adds that the Rabbanan also concede to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah by Eidus B'chor, Eidus Chazakah and she'be'Ben ve'she'be'Bas. 'she'be'Ben ve'she'be'Bas' refers to the two hairs that a Katan requires to become a Gadol. In this context ...

1. ... 'Eidus B'chor' is - where one witness testifies that the B'chor brought in by the Kohen sustained one of its two blemishes automatically, and the other witness said the same about the other blemish.

2. ... 'Eidus Chazakah' - where one witness testifies that the Machzik ate the fruit of the field for the first three years of the Sh'mitah cycle, and the other, that he ate the fruit for the second three years.

(b)'Eidus B'chor' cannot be speaking when each witness testifies independently that a Chacham permitted the B'chor - because, based on the principle 'Eid Echad Ne'eman be'Isurin', even one witness would be believed in such a case, and what's more, even the Kohen himself, because of the principle that 'a person will not lie with regard to something that stands to be revealed'.

(c)Even though the Rabbanan agree with Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah in these three cases, they argue in our case (of a loan of a Manah) - because by the latter, each witness is testifying on a different Manah, as we explained earlier.

(d)In the case of she'be'Ben ve'she'be'Bas, Tani Rav Idi bar Avin cannot be speaking where one witness testifies that he saw a hair on the back of the child's hand (or on the lower back), and the second witness, on his stomach - because seeing as one hair is not a sign of Gadlus, that would constitute not only Chatzi Eidus, but Chatzi Davar as well.

(e)The case must therefore be - where each witness testifies that he saw two hairs in their respective locations.

13)

(a)The Rabbanan who came from Mechuza quoting Rebbi Zeira in the name of Rav rule like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah by Karka, but not by Metaltelin. Rav is merely following his own reasoning, Ula declares, since Rav already said ...

1. ... 'Hoda'ah Achar Hoda'ah or Hoda'ah Achar Halva'ah - Mitztarfi' (the two witnesses combine).

2. ... 'Halva'ah Achar Halva'ah or Halva'ah Achar Hoda'ah - Lo Mitztarfi'.

(b)The reason for the difference between the two sets of cases is - that whereas the former might well pertain to the same loan, the latter definitely don't.

(c)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asked Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua ...

1. ... initially - that perhaps Hoda'ah Achar Hoda'ah also pertains to two separate loans, seeing as no-one informed the witnesses to the contrary.

2. ... that, even if the debtor did inform the second witness that he is admitting to the same Manah as he admitted to the first - how does the first witness know that he and the second witness are testifying on the same Manah?

14)

(a)Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua resolved the problem - by requiring the debtor to inform the first witness that the Manah that he is about to admit in the presence of the second witness is the same one that he admitted in his presence.

(b)When Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak thanked him for putting his mind at rest - he cited Rava (or Rav Sheishes) who placed a spoke in the wheel, inasmuch as if that was the case, Hoda'ah Achar Hoda'ah would be synonymous with Hoda'ah Achar Halva'ah (which must also speak in the same circumstances), so why did Rav need to mention it?

(c)When Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak told Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua that he now understood why he had heard him described as someone who bends date-palms and straightens them again, he meant - that he apparently had the strange habit of bringing proofs and then refuting them.

(d)The Neherda'i combine the witnesses in all four of the above cases - because they rule like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah himself, who combines the witnesses even by Metaltelin.

15)

(a)With regard to Eidus Mamon, Rav Yehudah validates the testimony of two witnesses who contradict each other in the Bedikos - details concerning the case, but which are not connected to the time or the place which might caused the witnesses to become Zom'min.

(b)Rava restricts Rav Yehudah's ruling to where one of the witnesses refers to a black purse, and the other, a white one - to preclude where one witness refers to a black Manah, and the other, a white Manah (which concerns the intrinsic testimony.

(c)Rav Chisda maintained that although a discrepancy in the type of weapon used by the murderer does not fall under the category of "Nachon ha'Davar" prescribed by the Torah in Re'ei, a discrepancy in the color clothes that he or the murdered man wore, does.

(d)Certainly, Rava (explaining Rav Yehudah) just stated that a discrepancy in Bedikos is only acceptable by cases of Mamon, and not by cases of Nefashos - but Rav Chisda disagrees with Rava ('Gavra a'Gavra ka'Ramis').