1)

(a)Initially, we establish the Nehardai, who even accept a discrepancy in the testimony of the two witnesses concerning a black Manah and a white one - like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korcha.

(b)We reject that however, on the grounds that - even Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah only accepts two independent witnesses as long as they do not contradict each other.

(c)So we establish the Nehardai like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says in a Beraisa - that if one out of a pair of witnesses testifies that Reuven lent Shimon a Manah, and the other, that he lent him two, their testimony ...

1. ... is void - according to Beis Shamai.

2. ... is valid - according to Beis Hillel, and we accept the testimony of the lesser one ...

(d)... because 'Yesh bi'Chelal Masayim Manah' (two Manah incorporates one), seeing as they both agree on the one Manah.

(e)In the same case, only where one pair of witnesses says one Manah, and the other pair says two - he maintains that Beis Shamai agrees with Beis Hillel (that 'Yesh bi'Chelal Masayim Manah').

2)

(a)In a case where one witness testified that Reuven owes Shimon a barrel of wine, and the other one, that he owes him a barrel of oil - Rebbi Ami ruled that Reuven was Chayav to pay for a barrel of wine (the lesser of the two) out of the barrel of oil (which is costlier than wine).

(b)Even after establishing it like Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar however, we query this - since even according to Rebbi Shimon ben Elazar, a barrel of wine does not incorporate a barrel of oil, or vice-versa,

(c)And we answer that - by establishing the case (not by a barrel of wine and a barrel of oil, as we thought until now, but) by the value of a barrel of wine and of a barrel of oil.

(d)Rebbi combined the testimonies of one witness who testified that Reuven lent Shimon a Manah in the upper-attic, and the other witness, who testified that he lent him a Manah in the lower-attic - because he held like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah.

3)

(a)The Beraisa quotes the Pasuk in Mishlei "Holech Rachil Megaleh Sod" - with regard to the Din in our Mishnah (as well as the Pasuk "Lo Seichel Rachil be'Amecha" quoted in our Mishnah) - forbidding the judges to divulge their individual opinions.

(b)Rebbi Ami expelled a certain Talmid from the Beis-Hamedrash, coupled with the announcement 'Dein Galya Raza!' - for divulging something secret that had been discussed in the Beis-Hamedrash ...

(c)... twenty-two years earlier.

4)

(a)When our Mishnah says 'Kol Zman she'Meivi Re'ayah, Soser es ha'Din', it means that - even after losing his case, he can still bring fresh evidence to overturn the Beis-Din's previous ruling.

(b)According to the Tana Kama, if Beis-Din order a litigant to present all his proofs within thirty days, then he must do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel however, maintains that - seeing as it is not always possible to lay his hands on the testimony so fast, proofs that he presents later are also acceptable.

(c)The Tana Kama and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel also argue over a case - where one litigant, after declaring that he has no more witnesses or proofs, turns up in Beis-Din with fresh witnesses or evidence.

(d)Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that the litigant is not believed, in a case where - the litigant, who is losing his case, suddenly produces two witnesses, or pulls out documentary evidence from his belt.

5)

(a)Rabah bar Rav Huna rules like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel - in the first case in our Mishnah (where Beis-Din ordered him to bring all his proofs within thirty days) ...

(b)... and he adds that the Halachah is not like the Chachamim to teach us that - even if Bedi'eved, Beis-Din ruled like the Chachamim, they must rescind their verdict.

6)

(a)With regard to the second Machlokes between the Chachamim and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (where after declaring that he has no more witnesses or proofs, the litigant turns up in Beis-Din with fresh witnesses or evidence), Rabah bar Rav Huna quoting Rebbi Yochanan - issues the same dual ruling, but this time, in favor of the Chachamim.

(b)There too, we ask why Rabah bar Rav Huna finds it necessary to add 'Ein Halachah ke'Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel'. But this time we answer - that it is in this case (of 'Re'ayah Acharonah') exclusively, that he rules not like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, to exclude the cases of 'Areiv' and 'Tzidon' (as we learned in Bava Basra), which Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan adds to the list.

(c)We could not give the same answer as we gave previously (regarding Bedi'eved) - because having ruled like the Chachamim, it is obvious that this applies even Bedi'eved (due to the principle 'Yachid ve'Rabim, Halachah ke'Rabim').

7)

(a)When Rav Nachman asked that child in court (see Tosfos DH 'Chayveih') whether he had any witnesses or proofs - he replied in the negative.

(b)After Rav Nachman obligated him to pay - he left the courtroom in tears, and people who saw him volunteered information of which the child had been unaware.

(c)Rav Nachman relented in spite of Rebbi Yochanan's previous ruling - because even the Chachamim will agree that it is common for a child not to be conversant with his father's affairs.

8)

(a)A woman who claimed that the Sh'tar had been paid - was holding it for safe-keeping.

(b)When Rav Nachman believed her, Rava suggested that this was because he held like Rebbi - who holds 'Osiyos Niknos bi'Mesirah' (in which case he believed the woman because she could have claimed that the Sh'tar (had been given to her and) was hers).

(c)Rav Nachman rejected Rava's suggestion, on the grounds that even according to the Chachamim of Rebbi he would have believed her - with a 'Migu' that she could have burned it ('I Ba'i Kalsah').

(d)According to the second Lashon, Rav Nachman did not believe her (like the Chachamim of Rebbi). Nor did she have a 'Migu de'I Ba'i Kalsah' - because a 'Migu' does not help against a Sh'tar that has been substantiated by Beis-Din.

9)

(a)Rava queried Rav Nachman from a Beraisa that discusses various Halachos concerning a Simpon - a receipt.

(b)The Beraisa rules that if a Simpon is produced by ...

1. ... the debtor - it is Kasher, provided he verifies the signatures.

2. ... a third party (unsigned) or if it appears after the signatures on the Sh'tar-Chov itself - it is Kasher.

(c)The reason for this latter ruling is - because, seeing as it is the creditor who holds the Sh'tar, he would never have allowed a receipt to be written on it, unless the debt was paid.

(d)So we see that a third party is believed to validate (or to invalidate) a Sh'tar that he is holding (a Kashya on Rav Nachman's second Lashon).

(e)Rav Nachman did not have an answer (and we remain with a Kashya on him).

10)

(a)When Rav Dimi Amar Rebbi Yochanan ...

1. ... permits a litigant to bring proofs or to withdraw 'ad she'Yistatem Ta'anosav', he appears to mean that - he is believed only until he says 'Ein li Re'ayah ... ', like the Tana Kama of our Mishnah.

2. ... then adds 've'Yomar Kirvu Ish P'loni u'Peloni ve'Ye'iduni', he appears to mean that - he is not believed only if the witnesses were available at the time that he said 'Ein li Eidim', but that if he brought in fresh witnesses later, they would be accepted, like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

(b)We try and solve the discrepancy by establishing the entire Beraisa like - Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and by explaining the Seifa ('ad she'Yomar Kirvu P'loni u'Peloni') as the interpretation of the Reisha ('ad she'Yistatem Ta'anosav').

(c)And we refute this suggestion, which would establish Rebbi Yochanan like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, by citing Rabah bar bar Chanah Amar Rebbi Yochanan who said - 'Kol Makom she'Shanah Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu Halachah Kamoso, Chutz ... ve'Re'ayah Acharonah'.

(d)So Rav Shmuel bar Yehudah re-quotes Rebbi Yochanan. Assuming that the litigant said 'Ein li Eidim, Ein li Re'ayah', Rebbi Yochanan will nevertheless accept ...

1. ... witnesses - provided they came from overseas, on their own initiative.

2. ... documentary evidence - provided the leather sack containing them is produced by a third party (since in both cases, it is feasible that the litigant was previously unaware of their existence, and even the Chachamim will accept them).

11)

(a)The 'Makom ha'Va'ad' is - the place where the Talmidei-Chachamim meet to discuss Halachah (which is where the Beis-Din sit [Rashi end of Perek]).

(b)The advantage of having one's case judged there is that - a tough litigant will be subdued in the presence of so many Talmidei-Chachamim, and will obey the court ruling without a fuss.

(c)Rebbi Elazar objected to Rav Dimi quoting Rabbi Yochanan that one litigant can force the other (who is causing trouble) to take their case to the Makom ha'Va'ad - because it makes no sense to force one litigant to spend a Manah in travel expenses, in order to retrieve the Manah that he lent the debtor.

(d)Rav Safra agreed with Rebbi Elazar. They both agreed however - that one litigant can force the other to judge in their home town.

(e)Should ...

1. ... Beis-Din encounter difficulties with regard to the Halachah - they then send them to the Makom ha'Va'ad in writing for a solution.

2. ... the litigant request their reason for having obligated him, in writing - then they must comply.

12)

(a)In a case of a Yavam and a Yevamah - it is the Yevamah who goes to the town of the Yavam (and not vice-versa).

(b)Rebbi Ami adds 'Afilu mi'Teverya le'Tzipori' - meaning that this is the Din even though the town of the Yevamah is more prominent than that of the Yavam (like Teverya vis-a-vis Tzipori).

(c)Rav Kahana extrapolate this from the Pasuk in Ki Seitzei "ve'Kar'u lo Ziknei Iro" - which he Darshens "Iyro", 've'Lo Iyrah'.

(d)To reconcile his ruling 'Hilch'sa, Kofin oso ve'Dan be'Makom ha'Va'ad' with that of Rebbi Elazar (who just ruled 'Kofin oso ve'Dan be'Iyro'), Ameimar told Rav Ashi that whereas he was referring to the creditor, Rebbi Elazar is speaking about the debtor ...

(e)... who is bound to submit to the wishes of the creditor, based on the principle 'Eved Loveh le'Ish Malveh' (the debtor is subservient to the creditor) .

13)

(a)When they referred to Mar Ukva the Dayan as 'li'de'Ziv leih ke'bar Bisya', they may have meant that his face shone like that of Moshe Rabeinu, who was brought up by Bisyah, the daughter of Par'oh. They might also have meant to say (not 'ke'bar Bisya', but) - 'ke'bar Beiseih', meaning like Moshe about whom the Torah writes "be'Chol Beisi Ne'eman Hu" (and it is about people of that caliber that the Pasuk writes in Koheles "Chachmas Adam Ta'ir Panav").

(b)Mar Ukva's face might have shone as a result of his wisdom. According to Sefer Hagadah however, the shine was a form of halo in he shape of a Menorah. This in turn, he merited following the episode where he once became ill from longing for a married woman with whom he had fallen in love. Now it once happened that she needed to borrow money from him, and as a result, she landed at his mercy, and she actually acceded to his request to be intimate with him ...

(c)... and it was after he controlled himself and let her go in peace that he recovered and the halo appeared.

14)

(a)The gist of Mar Ukva's complaint against his brother Yirmiyah was - either that he had castrated him or that he had somehow caused him harm monetarily (see also Rabeinu Chananel).

(b)The problem with the Beis-Din's wording was - that 'Imru lo' suggests that the Beis-Din of Bavel (where Mar Ukva lived) should judge the case, whereas 'Hisi'uhu ve'Yir'eh Paneinu bi'Teverya' was a clear call for the litigants to travel to Eretz Yisrael.

(c)In fact, it was necessary to call Mar Ukva and his brother to come to them - because the claim involved Dinei K'nasos, which can only be enforced in Eretz Yisrael.

(d)Yet they first asked the Beis-Din in Bavel to deal with the case - in the hope that Yirmiyah would accept their ruling [Rabeinu Chananel]), in deference to Mar Ukva.