The Mishnah in Bechoros rules that if a judge declares the innocent party, guilty, and the guilty party, innocent - his ruling remains intact and the judge must reimburse the litigant whose loss he caused.

Rav Yosef reconciles this ruling with our Mishnah ('Dinei Mamonos Machzirin') - by establishing the t by a case of he latter by a qualified judge (who has the power to enforce his final ruling), whereas the Mishnah in Bechoros is speaking about a layman.

Rav Nachman then reconciles our Mishnah with the Mishnah there 've'Im Hayah Mumcheh le'Beis-Din, Patur' (implying 'Ein Machzirin') by differentiating between where there is someone who is greater than them in wisdom and years (who supports the second ruling, and who will force the second litigant to retract [the Mishnah there]) and where there is not (in which case, on the basis of his first ruling, the winning litigant will refuse to accept his retraction [our Mishnah]).

Rav Sheishes establishes our Mishnah by an error in a D'var Mishnah, whereas the Mishnah in Bechoros speaks - by an error in Shikul ha'Da'as (both of which will be explained shortly).

According to Rav Yosef and Rav Nachman too, our Mishnah speaks - by Shikul ha'Da'as.

The basis for the difference between Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah and Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as is the fact that - whereas the former is definitely an error, the latter is basically a matter of opinion (and both opinions are, in fact, Halachically acceptable).

Ravina asked Rav Ashi whether 'Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah' incorporates an error in Rebbi Chiya and Rebbi Oshaya - because it is possible that 'Dvar Mishnah' is meant literally, due to the fact that Rebbi was that much greater than all those who came after him.

When (since basically, in spite of Rebbi's greatness, the status of the Beraisos is on a par with that of the Mishnayos) Rav Ashi answered in the affirmative, Ravina found it necessary to ask whether it also incorporates an error in Rav and Shmuel - since they were no longer quoting the opinions of the Tana'im (which enjoy a higher status than those of the Amora'im), but were stating their own opinions, and he therefore thought that perhaps they might fall under the category of Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as.

And when Ravina then asked him whether it even incorporates someone who errs even in their (Ravina and Rav Ashi's) rulings - he replied that they could hardly be considered people who 'destroyed canes on the meadow' (meaning that they too, were Halachic authorities, whose opinions had to be contended with, no less than Rav and Shmuel in their generation).

Rav Papa finally defines 'Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as' as - two Tana'im or Amora'im who dispute a certain point, where the Halachah is not fixed like either of them, though one of the opinions is generally the accepted one. 'Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as' is where someone then rules like the other opinion.

When Rebbi Tarfon was asked to determine the Kashrus of a cow, he fed it to the dogs - because its womb had been removed and he thought that it was a T'reifah.

He subsequently bemoaned the loss of his donkey (which he believed he would now be forced to sell, in order to pay for the cow) - when the Chachamim in Yavneh cited Todos the doctor, who explained that no cow or pig was allowed to leave Egypt before its womb was removed (to prevent it from having children), because it raised their value.

Rebbi Akiva pointed out that, since he was a qualified Dayan and therefore authorized to retract, he was Patur from paying. According to Rav Hamnuna, he should rather have queried him as to why he was not Patur because he was a To'eh bi'Dvar Mishnah (seeing as this is a Stam Mishnah in Chulin).

We answer Rav Hamnuna's Kashya - by establishing Rebbi Akiva in the form of 'Chada ve'Od', meaning that taking for granted the Kashya from Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah, one could also add that he was Patur from paying in his capacity as a qualified Dayan.

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asks how Rav Hamnuna could possibly query Rebbi Tarfon on the grounds that he could become Patur by retracting - seeing as he had already fed the cow to the dogs.

To answer this Kashya, we explain that what Rav Hamnuna really meant to ask was - if Ta'ah bi'Dvar Mishnah is Patur, then the judge's ruling was invalid, and he ought to be Patur, because if (as we currently believe, it was the owner who threw it to the dogs, then it is basically his own fault (for acting so hastily), since Rebbi Tarfon still had the option of retracting.

When Rav Chisda answered 'Ka'an she'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad ... ', he was referring to the original Kashya from the Beraisa of 'Dan es ha'Din ... Mah she'Asah Asuy' on our Mishnah (though it answers Rav Hamnuna's Kashya as well), which rules 'Machzirin', and, establishing them both by Ta'ah be'Shikul ha'Da'as, he differentiates between whether the judge actually took the money from one litigant and handed it to the other party (the Beraisa) or not (our Mishnah).

'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' may not apply technically to 'Zikah es ha'Chayav' (in our Mishnah). Halachically however - declaring someone who is Chayav, Patur, is automatically considered as if he had handed over the money, because (unlike 'Chiyev es ha'Zakai', which still needs to be paid) it requires no further act.

This creates a problem with our Mishnah however - because how will we then interpret 'Machzirin ... Bbein le'Chovah' (implying that he initially declared him Patur), seeing as on the one hand, this falls under the category of 'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' (as we just explained), whilst on the other, our Mishnah specifically speaks where the judge was not 'Nasa ve'Nasan be'Yad' (as we explained earlier).

When we answer 'Chada Katani', we mean that - the Tana is actually speaking about one case only, that of 'Machzirin li'Zechus she'Hi Chovah', which means when he first declared him Chayav and then Patur (and not about the reverse case).

The problem now is how we will explain the equivalent case of 'Ein Machzirin le'Chovah' in the Seifa - because if we are speaking about 'Z'chus she'Hi Chovah', who would stand to lose by declaring the defendant innocent?

We reject the answer 'Chovseih de'Go'el ha'Dam'' (that the next of kin of the murdered man, who demands justice, stands to lose) - because that would not be a reason to sentence the defendant to death.

We also refute the current explanation on the basis of the Lashon 'Bein li'Zechus, Bein le'Chovah' in the Reisha - because it implies that the Tana is speaking about two cases, and not just one (as we just tried to explain).

Ravina dispenses with the Kashyos on Rav Chisda by establishing 'Zikah es ha'Chayav' (in the Beraisa) where the judge actually took a security from the creditor and handed it to the debtor (otherwise, he would be able to retract, like we initially thought). And he explains ...

... 'Timei es ha'Tahor' - where he actually picked up a Sheretz, and to prove his point, threw it on the Taharos in question.

... 'Tiher es ha'Tamei' - where, to demonstrate his ruling, he took the Tamei fruit and mixed it with other Tahor fruit belonging to the owner. And that explains why 'Mah she'Asah, Asuy'.

The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Mishpatim ...

... "ve'Naki Al Taharog" that - if, after a person is proclaimed guilty, someone announces that he has fresh evidence to prove him innocent, he is brought back to court to hear the fresh evidence.

... "ve'Tzadik Al Taharog" - that once a man has been declared innocent, he cannot be returned, even if someone claims to have evidence to prove him guilty.

When it comes to a Meisis (who talks someone into worshipping idols) ...

... Rav Shimi bar Ashi learns from the Pasuk in Re'ei "Lo Sachmol ve'Lo Sechaseh alav" that - the reverse is applicable (that once he has been proclaimed guilty, he may not be returned to hear evidence proving his innocence, whereas once he is declared innocent, he may be brought back to hear evidence proving him guilty.

... Rav Kahana learns from the Pasuk there "ki Harog Tahargenu" - the very same thing (since it is a Mitzvah to eliminate him at all costs).

Rebbi Zeira asked Rav Sheishes - whether in cases of Chayvei Galuyos and Chayvei Malkos, Beis-Din follow the same lenient procedure as Chayavei Misos or not.

He resolved ...

... the first She'eilah from a Gezeirah-Shavah from "Rotze'ach" "Rotze'ach" ("Yumos ha'Rotze'ach" [written by Chayvei Misos) "Rotze'ach" ("Lanus Shamah Rotze'ach" [written by Chayvei Galuyos]) that the leniencies that apply to Chayvei Misah apply to Chayvei Galus.

... the second She'eilah from "Rasha" ("asher Hu Rasha La'mus", from Dinei Nefashos) "Rasha" ("Vehayah Im bin ha'Rasha") - that the leniencies that apply to Chayavei Misah apply also to Chayavei Malkus.

And we substantiate these D'rashos - by citing a Beraisa that supports them.

Rebbi Chiya bar Aba Amar Rebbi Yochanan qualifies the ruling in our Mishnah, that we do not return a defendant to hear fresh evidence that he is guilty - by restricting the error to one with which the Tzedokim would not agree (because it is not clearly written in the Torah); but if the error is so stark that even the Tzedokim would agree with ir, then our Tana will concede that we will bring him back, even after having declared him innocent.

Rebbi Chiya bar Aba asked Rebbi Yochanan about such a situation with regard to a case of adultery - where in the majority of cases, the Torah's rulings are clear-cut, in which case we might always bring him back to court to hear fresh evidence, even to prove him guilty.

Murder cases are less clear-cut than adultery, as we find for example, with regard to the size of the stone, the warning coming from the mouth of the victim or if the murderer actrf in self-defense, but could have saved himself by striking one of his attacker's limbs, rather than killing him (all of which are not stated specifically in the Torah).

Rebbi Yochanan replied with the words 'a'de'Mokdach Yakid, Zil Kotz Kari ve'Tzali', which means that - as long as the fire is burning, one should quickly cut a pumpkin and roast it.

What Rebbi Yochanan meant to say was that - Rebbi Chiya bar Aba should take the opportunity whilst it presented itself. Seeing as Rebbi Yochanan had just told him that the criterion for calling the defendant back or not, was if the Tzedokim would concede that an error had been made or not. So he should work out for himself that by cases of adultery, where generally, the Tzedokim would agree that it had, we will accept fresh evidence even le'Chovah.

What forces us to nevertheless presume that our Mishnah speaks in a case of adultery too - is the open Lashon 'Dinei Nefashos Ein Machzirin' without making reference to cases of murder any more than to cases of adultery.

And we establish the case by sodomy - where the Tzedokim would not agree, since the Torah does not specifically incorporate it in the list of Chayvei Misah (only we learn it from "Mishkevei Ishah").

Our Tana permits anyone to testify li'Zechus by Dinei Nefashos. Initially, we think that this comes to include - the witnesses.

The Tana Kama in a Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "ve'Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh" - that a witness is forbidden to present evidence to prove either the defendant's innocence or his guilt.

Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah - permits them to bring proofs that he is innocent.

To reconcile 'anyone' in our Mishnah with the Rabbanan of Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah, Rav Papa attributes the former exclusively - to one of the Talmidim who sits before the Beis-Din (as we will see in the next Mishnah).

Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah extrapolates from the Pasuk in Mas'ei "Eid Echad Lo Ya'aneh be'Nefesh La'mus'' - that a witness may present evidence to prove the defendant's innocence ('Lamus Hu de'Eino Oneh, Aval Lezakos Oneh').

Resh Lakish explains that the Rabbanan disagree with Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Yehudah - on the basis of the witnesses prejudice. Should other witnesses arrive after the defendant has been sentenced, and declare the first witnesses Zom'min, they will be sentenced to death. Consequently, (seeing as they are unable to retract from their initial evidence) it will suit them for the defendant to be proclaimed innocent.

The Rabbanan learn from the Pasuk - that even the Talmidim who are sitting in Beis-Din are nor permitted to present evidence to prove the defendant's innocence.