What does Rav Yehudah mean when he says 'Danin ve'Chovshin, Danin ve'Chovshin'?
(b)
Why does he say that?
(c)
On what basis does Ula disagree with him?
(d)
What does he therefore say?
1)
(a)
When Rav Yehudah says 'Danin ve'Chovshin, Danin ve'Chovshin', he means - that they would judge the sinners of an Ir ha'Nidachas in small groups and sentence them to Sekilah, but place them in jail without actually stoning them ...
(b)
... because, initially, one does not know whether those who have been sentenced will indeed be Chayav Sekilah, or whether the majority of the town will not turn out to be guilty, in which case, they will receive Sayaf (so how can one give them Sekilah?).
(c)
Ula disagrees with him - on the basis of 'Me'aneh es Dino' (the prohibition of leaving a sentenced man overnight without killing him).
(d)
According to him therefore - they judge each case that comes before them for Sekilah, and carry out the sentence, until the number of those who transgressed reaches a majority. Then they switch to Sayaf.
2)
(a)
Rebbi Yochanan, holds like Ula. According to Resh Lakish however, they would set up many Batei-Dinim. Why can the reason for this not be because of the prohibition to judge two cases on the same day?
(b)
Then what is the reason?
(c)
What does Rav Chama bar Yossi Amar Rebbi Oshaya learn from the Pasuk in Shoftim "Vehotzeisa es ha'Ish ha'Hu O es ha'Ishah ha'Hi"?
(d)
How do we reconcile Resh Lakish with this ruling?
2)
(a)
Rebbi Yochanan, holds like Ula. According to Resh Lakish, they would set up many Batei-Dinim, not because of the prohibition of judging two cases on the same day - since that only applies to different Misos, but not to the same Misah ...
(b)
... but because it would be impossible to cross-examine the numerous witnesses on one day in one Beis-Din.
(c)
Rav Chama bar Yossi Amar Rebbi Oshaya learns from the Pasuk in Shoftim "Vehotzeisa es ha'Ish ha'Hu O es ha'Ishah ha'Hi" - that it is only an individual man or woman who is judged in a Sanhedrin Ketanah; an Ir ha'Nidachas can only be judged by the Sanhedrin ha'Gedolah.
(d)
We reconcile Resh Lakish with this ruling - by opening the proceedings in the Sanhedrin ha'Ketanah, who will establish whether it is a majority who are guilty or a minority. And if it turns out that it is a majority that sinned, the sinners are then teansferred to the Beis-Din ha'Gadol.
3)
(a)
According to the Mishnah in Bava Basra, how long must one live in a town to be considered a resident?
(b)
How will we reconcile this with the Beraisa, which considers a passing caravan members of the town with regard to making it an Ir ha'Nidachas after thirty days, as we learned in our Mishnah?
(c)
How does another Beraisa draw the same distinction with regard to the Din of Neder?
3)
(a)
According to the Mishnah in Bava Basra - one must live in a town for twelve months to be considered a resident of the town.
(b)
The Beraisa considers a passing caravan members of the town with regard to making it an Ir ha'Nidachas after only thirty days, as we learned in our Mishnah - because regarding the Din of Ir ha'Nidachas, the Torah writes "Yoshvei ha'Ir ha'Hi'', and one is considered a Toshav (a temporary resident) after thirty days.
(c)
Another Beraisa draws the same distinction with regard to the Din of Neder - inasmuch as if one made a Neder not to have benefit from the 'B'nei ha'Ir, he is forbidden to derive benefit only from people who have been living there for at least twelve months, whereas if he referred to 'Yoshvei ha'Ir', he is forbidden to benefit from anyone who lived even for thirty days.
4)
(a)
What do we learn with regard to the property of Tzadikim from the Pasuk ...
1.
... "Hacharem Osah"?
2.
... 've'es Kol Asher Bah"?
(b)
If "Sh'lalah" comes to exclude 'Sh'lal Shamayim', as we learned in our Mishnah, what does "ve'es Kol Sh'lalah come to include?
(c)
What reason does Rebbi Shimon give for the Halachah that the property of Tzadikim that is in the town must be burned?
(d)
We just learned that the property of Resha'im must be burned even if it is not in the town. In which case ...
1.
... does Rav Chisda teach us that it is not?
2.
... will this ruling not apply at all, even if it possible to bring the property into the town-square in good time?
4)
(a)
We learn from the Pasuk ...
1.
... "Hacharem Osah" - that the property of Tzadikim that is not in the town is saved.
2.
... 've'es Kol Asher Bah" - that the property of Tzadikim that is in the town must be burned.
(b)
"Sh'lalah" comes to exclude 'Sh'lal Shamayim", as we learned in our Mishnah; "ve'es Kol Sh'lalah - comes to include the property of Resha'im that is not in the town at the Din of burning.
(c)
The reason that Rebbi Shimon (who always Darshens the Torah's reasons) gives for the Halachah that the property of Tzadikim that is in the town must be burned is - because the Tzadikim only lived in that wicked town because of their property.
(d)
We just learned that the property of Resha'im must be burned even if it is not in the town. However ...
1.
... Rav Chisda teaches us that - this only applies to property that one can get to the town-square in time for the burning. if not, then even the property belonging to Resha'im, is saved.
2.
... this ruling will not apply at all, even if it possible to bring the property into the town-square in good time - if it had never been in the town in the first place.
5)
(a)
Rav Chisda rules that the Pikdonos (securities or deposits) of an Ir ha'Nidachas are permitted. On what grounds do we reject the suggestion that Rav Chisda is referring to Pikdonos ...
1.
... of others that are being looked after in the Ir ha'Nidachas?
2.
... of the Ir ha'Nidachas in the hands of others, assuming they are gathered in the town? ...
3.
... assuming they are not?
(b)
We conclude that Rav Chisda is referring to Pikdonos of others that are being looked after in the Ir ha'Nidachas. What is then the case? What is the Chidush?
(c)
What does Rav Chisda say about ...
1.
... an animal that is jointly owned by the Ir ha'Nidachas and others?
2.
... a dough that is jointly owned by the Ir ha'Nidachas and others?
(d)
Why the difference?
5)
(a)
Rav Chisda rules that the Pikdonos (securities or deposits) of an Ir ha'Nidachas are permitted. We reject the suggestion that Rav Chisda is referring to Pikdonos ...
1.
... of others that are being looked after in the Ir ha'Nidachas on the grounds - that it is obvious (seeing as they do not fall under the category of "Sh'lalah").
2.
... of the Ir ha'Nidachas in the hands of others, assuming they are gathered in the town - since Rav Chisda himself just ruled that they too, must be burned.
3.
... assuming they are not - because that too, is obvious (seeing as Rav Chisda just said so).
(b)
We conclude that Rav Chisda is referring to Pikdonos of others that are being looked after in the Ir ha'Nidachas, and he is speaking - where the members of the Ir ha'Nidachas took responsibility for the article, which ought to render them partial owners (it which case it should then fall under the category of 'Sh'lalah').
(c)
Rav Chisda states that ...
1.
... an animal that is jointly owned by the Ir ha'Nidachas and others - must be killed.
2.
... a dough that is jointly owned by the Ir ha'Nidachas is divided in two, half of which must be given to the other owners.
(d)
The difference is based on the fact - that a dough can be divided into two at any time, whereas an animal must be jointly Shechted before it can be eaten (and killing it, even via Shechitah does not even permit the animal be'Hana'ah, let alone Shechitah).
6)
(a)
Rav Chisda also poses a She'eilah whether Shechitah renders an animal of an Ir ha'Nidachas Tahor or not. On what grounds might the animal remain Tamei in spite of the fact that it has been Shechted?
(b)
Assuming that Shechitah renders the animal Tahor, is it also permitted ...
1.
... to eat?
2.
... to derive benefit from?
(c)
What is the outcome of the She'eilah?
6)
(a)
Rav Chisda also poses a She'eilah whether Shechitah renders an animal of an Ir ha'Nidachas Tahor or not. The animal might remain Tamei in spite of the fact that it has been Shechted - because "l'Fi Charev" does not differentiate between Shechitah and any other form of killing (see Rashash).
(b)
Assuming that Shechitah renders the animal Tahor, does not mean that it is also permitted ...
1.
... to eat, or even ...
2.
... to derive benefit from it (as we just explained).
(c)
The outcome of the She'eilah is 'Teiku'.
7)
(a)
Rav Yosef asked whether the hair of the righteous women of an Ir ha'Nidachas needs to be burned. What objection does Rava raise to the She'eilah, based on the Pasuk "Tikbotz ve'Sarafta"?
(b)
So how does Rava amend the She'eilah?
(c)
Why would there no She'eilah in the case of wigs that the women are wearing? What is the Din regarding the clothes that Tzadikim are wearing?
(d)
What then is the She'eilah? Why might the wig be any different than other Metaltelin belonging to Tzadikim?
7)
(a)
Rav Yosef asked whether the hair of the righteous women of an Ir ha'Nidachas needs to be burned. Rava's objection, based on the Pasuk "Tikbotz ve'Sarafta" is - even the hair Of the Resha'im does not need to be burned, since, besides gathering and burning, it also requires cutting (and is not therefore included in the the Mitzvah of Sereifah.
(b)
Rava therefore amends the She'eilah to - whether the wigs of righteous women must be burned or not.
(c)
There would be no She'eilah in the case of wigs that the women were wearing - which would be no different than the clothes that the Tzadikim were wearing, and which are not subject to burning,
(d)
The She'eilah therefore pertains to wigs that are not currently being worn, which might differ from other Metaltelin belonging to Tzadikim - inasmuch as, since she would wear it regularly, it is considered part of her even when she is not actually wearing it.
8)
(a)
We learned in our Mishnah that if an Ir ha'Dichas does not have a town-square, then Beis-Din must make one. That is the opinion of Rebbi Akiva. What does Rebbi Yishmael say?
(b)
What is the basis of their Machlokes, based on the Pasuk "Tikbotz el Toch Rechovah"?
8)
(a)
We learned in our Mishnah that if an Ir ha'Nidachas does not have a town-square, then Beis-Din must make one. That is the opinion of Rebbi Akiva. According to Rebbi Yishmael - a town without a square is not subject to the Din of Ir ha'Nidachas ...
(b)
... because "Tikbotz el Toch Rechovah" implies that the town-square that is there already; whereas according to Rebbi Akiva, it incorporates one that they only make later.
112b----------------------------------------112b
9)
(a)
The Beraisa rules that the Kodshei Mizbe'ach of an Ir ha'Nidachas must die. How do they die?
(b)
Seeing as they are not included in the Din of "Sh'lalah" we ask, why do we not apply the principle of 'Yir'u ad she'Yista'avu ... '. What does this mean?
(c)
Rebbi Yochanan answers with a Pasuk in Mishlei. Which Pasuk?
(d)
Resh Lakish establishes the Beraisa by Mamon Ba'alim. What does he mean by that? Who will then be the author of the Beraisa?
9)
(a)
The Beraisa rules that the Kodshei Mizbe'ach of an Ir ha'Nidachas must die - by being placed in a Kifah (a small room) and fed on barley until their stomachs split.
(b)
Seeing as they are not included in the Din of "She'lalah" we ask, why we do not apply the principle of 'Yir'u ad she'Yista'avu ... ' meaning - that they are sent into a field to graze until they obtain a blemish, at which point they can be redeemed.
(c)
Rebbi Yochanan answers with the Pasuk in Mishlei - "Zevach Resha'im To'evah" (pertaining both to the animal itself, and to the proceeds of its sale should they become blemished).
(d)
Resh Lakish establishes the Beraisa by Mamon Ba'alim, by which he means - Kodshim for which the owners took responsibility (i.e. Nedarim [as opposed to Nedavos]), and according to Rebbi Shimon, in whose opinion responsibility constitutes ownership.
10)
(a)
What forces us to re-establish the Reisha of the Beraisa like Rebbi Yossi Hagelili rather then like Rebbi Shimon?
(b)
What does Rebbi Yossi Hagelili say?
(c)
What will the Din then be by Kodshei Kodshim?
(d)
In that case, why did the Beraisa not insert the clause that by Kodshei Kodshim, the Din will be 'Yir'u ad she'Yista'avu'?
(e)
Rebbi Yochanan disagrees with Resh Lakish, because "Zevach Resha'im To'evah" extends even to animals that are not considered to be in the owner's domain. On what grounds does Resh Lakish disagree with Rebbi Yochanan?
10)
(a)
What forces us to re-establish the Reisha of the Beraisa like Rebbi Yossi Hagelili rather then like Rebbi Shimon is - that if the author of the Seifa is Rebbi Shimon, then he cannot be the aothor of the Reisha too.
(b)
He must also establish it like Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili, because he is the one who holds - that an animal of Kodshim Kalim belongs to its owner.
(c)
Kodshei Kodshim on the other hand - never belong to their owner, in which case - the Din of 'Yir'u ad she'Yista'avu' will apply.
(d)
Nevertheless, the Beraisa did not insert the clause that in the case of Kodshei Kodshim, the Din will be 'Yir'u ad she'Yista'avu' - because even though this may well apply to Ashamos, it will not apply to Chata'os, which, due to the fact that their owners are no longer alive, must die ('Halachah le'Moshe mi'Sinai').
(e)
Rebbi Yochanan disagrees with Resh Lakish, because "Zevach Resha'im To'evah" includes even animals that are not considered in the owner's domain. Resh Lakish on the other hand, disagrees with Rebbi Yochanan - because, in his opinion, it only applies to the animal itself, but not to the proceeds of the sale (should they become blemished).
11)
(a)
Rebbi Shimon in a Beraisa, learns from the word 'Behemt'cha", to preclude animals of B'chor and Ma'aser'. Why can he not be referring to unblemished animals?
(b)
And what is the problem with establishing his ruling by where they are blemished?
(c)
How does Ravina resolve this problem? What does he mean when he says 'Yatz'u Eilu she'Ein Ne'echalin be'Toras Behemt'cha ... '?
11)
(a)
Rebbi Shimon in the Beraisa learns from the word 'Behemt'cha", to preclude animals of B'chor and Ma'aser'. He cannot be referring to unblemished animals - because they are already precluded from "Sh'lalah", 've'Lo Sh'lal Shamayim'.
(b)
And the problem with establishing his ruling by when that they are blemished is - why they are not then included in "Sh'lalah"?
(c)
Ravina resolve this problem by confining "Sh'lalah" to regular Chulin, which are called 'Beheimas Ir ha'Nidachas', to exclude B'chor u'Ma'aser' that have been redeemed, which are called 'Behemas B'chor u'Ma'aser'.
12)
(a)
Shmuel disagrees with Ravina's explanation. He holds 'ha'Kol Karev ve'ha'Kol Nifdeh', which we amend. What is he referring to when he mentions ...
1.
... 'Kol she'Karev ke'she'Hu Tam ve'Nifdeh ke'she'Hu Ba'al Mum'?
2.
... 'Kol she'Karev ke'she'Hu Tam ve'Eino Nifdeh ke'she'Hu Ba'al-Mum'?
(b)
If Rebbi Shimon now precludes the former from "Sh'lalah", in which point will he then argue with the Tana Kama?
(c)
From where does Rebbi Shimon (who considers B'chor and Ma'aser to be "Sh'lalah") then preclude them from the Din of Ir ha'Nidachas?
(d)
How does Shmuel's interpretation of Rebbi Shimon now differ from Ravina's?
12)
(a)
Shmuel disagrees with Ravina's explanation. He holds 'ha'Kol Karev ve'ha'Kol Nifdeh', which we amend. When he mentions ...
1.
... 'Kol she'Karev ke'she'Hu Tam ve'Nifdeh ke'she'Hu Ba'al-Mum', he is referring to - other Kodshim Kalim (e.g. Shelamim and Todah), which can be eaten with a blemish only after they have been redeemed.
2.
... 'Kol she'Karev ke'she'Hu Tam ve'Eino Nifdeh ke'she'Hu Ba'al-Mum' he is referring to - B'chor and Ma'aser, which can be eaten with a blemish, even without being redeemed.
(b)
If Rebbi Shimon now precludes the former from "Shlalah", he will he arguing with the Tana Kama, who considers Kodshim Kalim to be Mamon Ba'alim (like Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili, as we explained earlier).
(c)
Rebbi Shimon (who considers B'chor and Ma'aser to be "Sh'lalah") precludes them from the Din of Ir ha'Nidachas - from "Behemtah".
(d)
Shmuel's interpretation of Rebbi Shimon now differs from Ravina's - inasmuch as he establishes B'chor and Ma'aser by Temimim, because, if they would be blemished, they would be considered "Behemtah", too.
13)
(a)
Rav Chisda qualifies the Din in our Mishnah 'Terumos Yerakevu', confining it to Terumah in the hands of a Yisrael. What does he say with regard to Terumah in the hands of a Kohen?
(b)
What does Rav Yosef query this from the Din of Ma'aser Sheini in our Mishnah?
(c)
So Rav Yosef confines the Din in our Mishnah to Terumah in the hands of a Kohen. What does he then say about Terumah in the hands of a Yisrael?
13)
(a)
Rav Chisda qualifies the Din in our Mishnah 'Terumos Yerakevu', confining it to Terumah in the hands if a Yisrael. Terumah in the hands of a Kohen he maintains - is permitted.
(b)
Rav Yosef queries this from the Din of Ma'aser Sheini in our Mishnah, which must be placed in Genizah, even though (like Terumah in the hands of the Kohen) it is already in the hands of the owner.
(c)
So Rav Yosef confines the Din in our Mishnah to Terumah in the hands of a Kohen, but Terumah in the hands of a Yisrael - must be given to a Kohen from a different town.
14)
(a)
Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa exempts a dough of Ma'aser Sheini from Chalah. What do the Rabbanan say?
(b)
What is the basis of their Machlokes?
(c)
Rav Chisda confines the Machlokes to Ma'aser Sheini in Yerushalayim. What does he say about Ma'aser Sheini outside Yerushalayim?
(d)
The reason for this may be because it cannot be eaten there without first being redeemed (and is therefore considered Mamon Gavohah). What other reason might there be to explain it?
14)
(a)
Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa exempts a dough of Ma'aser Sheini from Chalah. The Rabbanan - obligate it.
(b)
The basis of their Machlokes is - whether Ma'aser Sheini is Mamon Gavohah (Rebbi Meir) or Mamon Hedyot (the Rabbanan).
(c)
Rav Chisda confines the Machlokes to Ma'aser Sheini in Yerushalayim. As long as it is outside Yerushalayim, he says - the Rabbanan will concede that it is exempt from Chalah ...
(d)
... either beacuse Ma'aser Sheini cannot be eaten there without first being redeemed (and is therefore considered Mamon Gavohah) - or because at the time of kneading, it cannot be eaten, in which case it does fallen under the category of "Reishis Arisoseicahem".
15)
(a)
Rav Yosef queries Rav Chisda from our Mishnah 'Ma'aser Sheini ve'Kisvei ha'Kodesh Yiganezu'. Why can this not be referring to the Ma'aser Sheini of Yerushlayim that became an Ir ha'Nidachas. Why not?
(b)
Why can the Tana then not be referring to the Ma'aser Sheini of another town that was taken into Yerushalayim before the former town was declared an Ir ha'Nidachas?
(c)
So what does Rav Yosef think that he must he be referring to? Why is this a Kashya on Rav Chisda?
15)
(a)
Rav Yosef queries Rav Chisda from our Mishnah 'Ma'aser Sheini ve'Kisvei ha'Kodesh Yiganezu'. This cannot be speaking about the Ma'aser Sheini of Yerushalayim that became an Ir ha'Nidachas - because Yerushalayim cannot become an Ir ha'Nidachas (as we learn in a Beraisa).
(b)
Neither can the Tana be referring to the Ma'aser Sheini of another town that was taken into Yerushalayim before the former was declared an Ir ha'Nidachas - because once Ma'aser enters Yerushalayim, it becomes permitted to eat, and there is no reason to subsequently forbid it.
(c)
So Rav Yosef thinks that he must be referring to - Ma'aser Sheini of another town that became an Ir ha'Nidachas, and yet the Tana says 'Yerakeivu', a Kashya on Rav Chisda who permits it because it is Mamon Gavohah.
16)
(a)
We try to establish our Mishnah by Ma'aser Sheini of another town that was taken into Yerushalayim before that town was declared an Ir ha'Nidachas, and it cannot be eaten because it then became Tamei. We refute this however, from Rebbi Elazar. What does Rebbi Elazar say about Ma'aser Sheini that became Tamei?
(b)
He learns this from the Pasuk in Re'ei "Ki Lo Suchal Se'eiso" (which means literally "because you are unable to carry it"). What else might it mean?
(c)
And we answer by restricting our Mishnah further to a case of 'Laku'ach'. What does this mean?
(d)
How does this answer the Kashya?
16)
(a)
We try to establish our Mishnah by Ma'aser Sheini of another town that was taken into Yerushalayim before that town was declared an Ir ha'Nidachas, and it cannot be eaten because it then became Tamei. We refute this however, from Rebbi Elazar, who maintains - that Ma'aser Sheini that became Tamei can be redeemed (and then eaten) even in Yerushalayim.
(b)
He learns this from the Pasuk in Re'ei "Ki Lo Suchal Se'eiso" (which means literally "because you are unable to carry it"), but which can also mean - "because you are unable to eat it (i.e. due to the fact that it became Tamei)".
(c)
And we answer by restricting our Mishnah further to a case of 'Laku'ach', which means - that the Ma'aser Sheini referred to is food that was purchased with Ma'aser Sheini money ...
(d)
... and which is not subject to a second be redemption.
