Explanation #1: We cannot say that the Mashu'ach she'Avar is the Memuneh, since it it is obvious that he is not.

Explanation #2: R. Ya'akov b'R. Yehotzadak learns it from our Mishnah, which implies that even if the Kohen Gadol is being comforted by others, the Memuneh stands in between him and the people, and adds to the people's words. Whereas the Beraisa statees that the Mashu'ach she'Avar does not comfort him at all.

Clarification: We learn it from the Mishnah, which states that the Memuneh stands in between him and the people (as we explained); and the Beraisa then states that the head of the Beis-Av, the mourners and all the people stand on Kohen Gadol, in which case, the mourners must have been on the outside, on the left of the people.

Question: How can he possibly judge, seeing as we learned above that, based on the Pasuk "Lo Sa'aneh al Riv", a king may not be appointed on the Sanhedrin?

Answer: Here we are speaking exclusively about judging money matters, where disagreeing with him is not an issue, as we will learn later 'In Dinei Mamonos (later on Daf 32b) - 'Regarding money-matter, one begins with the senior judge'.

Question: We find however, that David judged even Dinei Nefashos, as the Pasuk writes in Shmuel (Shuel 1, 25:13) "And David too girded his sword" - from which the Gemara will learn later (on 36b) that one begins Dinei Nefashos from the junior Dayanim. But since David considered himself king, how did he sit with them in judgement?

Answer: Because, since that particular judgement concerned his honor, seeing as Naval had rebelled against him, it was not shameful for others to speak before him. Other kings of his dynasty however, are definitely forbidden to judge Dinei Nefashos, as we explained.

Question (Part 1): We say there (in the same Sugya) that even a Talmid-Chacham is not required to stand, since this is an Asei and that is an Asei', and the Asei of Kavod Torah is stronger, as the Gemara explains in Perek Shevu'as ha'Eidus (Daf 30b & 31a).

Question (Part 2): Now if a Chacham does not need to stand, how much more so a king, whose honor exceeds that of a Talmid-Chacham?

Source: ... because, even according to the opinion that permits a Rav to forego his honor, a king is not permitted to do so, based on the Pasuk "Som Tasim Alecha Melech".

Answer: The fact is that the Asei of Kavod Torah is stronger than that of Kavod Melech. Consequently, even though a Talmid-Chacham is not obligated to stand, a king is.

Observation: And the reason that a Talmid-Chacham is able to forego his Kavod, whereas a king is not, is not because the Kavod of the latter is superior than that of the former, but because the Torah writes (in connection wit a king) "Som!" - implying that his fear shall be upon you; His honor therefore is not the result of his own importance, but because it is a command of Hash-m, something which he cannot remove. The Torah of a Talmid-Chacham on the other hand, belongs to him, so he is permitted to forego the Kavod that is intrinsically his ...

Source: As we say in Avodah-Zarah, 19a 'At first it is called after the name of Hash-m, but in the end, it is called after himself, as it is written (in Tehilim) "But his desire is in the Torah of Hash-m, and in his (own) Torah he meditates day and night".

Question: ... and that what say in Perek Shevu'as ha'Eidus (Daf 30a & 330b) that if they want to seat both litigants, they are permitted to do so, since the prohibition is confined to where one stands and the other sits. That being the case, it was not necessary for the king to stand, as long as the second litigant was seated as well?

Answer #1: Dinei Nefashos is different (both litigants are obligated to stand).

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Gemara here is speaking about Kabalas Eidus - aCcepting the witnesses - which has the status of G'mar-Din (the reading of the final verdict). And the Gemar states in Perek Shevu'as ha'Eidus (Daf 30b and 31a) that, according to all opinions, the Dayanim must be seated and the litigants must stand.

Halachah: And since that is the case, Beis-Din should be careful when seating the litigants, not to do so during the Kabalas Eidus or during the G'mar-Din, since, as we just explained, Kabalas Eidus is like G'mar-Din in this regard.

Question: The Gemara in 'ha'Ishah she'Nis'armelah', querying the ruling that the king moves aside to make way for a passing Kalah, answers that 'a crossroads is different'. Why did it not answer there that a Mitzvah is different, like it answers here?

Answer: Because the Mitzvah there concerns 'Kavod Chasan', and considering that Kavod ha'Melech exceeds Kavod Chasan, it is not considered a Mitzvah; whereas here regarding Yibum, it is a genuine Mitzvah.

Explanation #1: according to Rashi, this refers to the rearing of the twelve tribes.

Refutation #1: This is not correct however; firstly, because that is considered joy, not pain ...

Proof: ... like the Gemara states in B'rachos, 63a with regard to Oved Edom, whom Hash-m blessed with many children on the merit of the Aron.

Refutation #2: And besides, Avraham had sons from Keturah?

Explanation #2: We must therefore say that what Hash-m exempted him from was the pain of (the Machlokes between) Yosef and his brothers, and the events that led to going down to Egypt.