Ruling #1: Rabeinu Tam explains that by studying our Talmud (Bavli), we exempt ourselves from what the Chachamim say in Avodah-Zarah, 19a that one should divide one's years into three - a third T'nach, a third Mishnah and a third, Gemara.

Ruling #2: Nevertheless, we read every day Parshas ha'Tamid, then we learn the Perek Mishnayos 'Eizehu Mekoman' and conclude with the Beraisa of 'R. Yishmael Omer; bi'Shelosh-Esrei Midos ... ' (Chumash, MIshnah and Gemara [Beraisa]).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that nevertheless, R. Meir permits him to retract.

Refutation: But that is not correct; because, if it was coming to teach a Chidush, then what the Gemara ought to have said is 'Lo Tzericha ... ' ('No, we need to say ... '). Now that is says 'K'gon ... ', it implies that it is coming to establish the Mishnah specifically in this case (as we will now explain).

Explanation #2: It therefore seems that it refers to the opinion of the Rabanan - that it is specifically where he accepted his father as one Dayan, which is only one fault (as we explained at the beginning of the previous Amud) that the Rabanan forbid him to retract; but if he were to accept him as two Dayanim, he would be permitted to retract even according to them.

Implied Question: Why can we not answer that he holds like Resh Lakish's interpretation of R. Meir?

Answer #1: Firstly, because we cannot say that he would leave the Rabbanan and rule like R. Meir, as Rashi explains.

Answer #2: And secondly, because here R. Yochanan argues with Resh Lakish in this matter; and Rava in Perek ha'Choletz (Yevamos, 36a) rules like Resh Lakish in only three cases in Shas, implying that in all other cases (including here), we rule like R. Yochanan.

Implied Question: Why can we not then say that Rava is simply making his own statement here, like we answered earlier?

Answer: Because he is not referring here to the Machlokes in the Mishnah earlier (which is the reason that we answered that there), but here, where he does not, we cannot say it.

Question: Here it seems that the Machlokes Tana'im pertains to after the G'mar-Din, but before, one is unanimously permitted to retract,. Whereas in 'Yesh Nochlin' (in Bava Basra, 128a and 128b), we rule that if Reuvern says to Shimon 'You stole my Eved or my ox and Shimon retorts 'You sold or gave him/it to me as a gift; If you want, swear and take it', he swears and is not permitted to retract! Implying that as soon as he says 'Swear and take', his friend may do so, and he cannot retract, a proof that even before the G'mar-Din, he cannot retract?

Answer: Therefore, Rabeinu Tam amends the Gemara in 'Yesh Nochlin' to read (not ' ... he swears and is not permitted ... , but) 'if he swore, he is not permitted to retract', meaning that it is only after he swore that he is not able to retract, because since he already swore, it is after the G'mar-Din, and we say that after the G'mar-Din the Halachah is like the Chachamim.

Explanation #1: Some commentaries include 'Avadim in the Mishnah, because they maintain that the Mishnah is discussing both Pesulim de'Rabbanan and Pesulim d'Oraysa.

Refutation: But this is not correct, seeing as the Tana only includes Pesulim that are de'Rabbanan (as we will now proceed to prove).

Proof #1: 'Playing with dice' - even according to those who consider it Asmachta (and 'Asmachta is not Koneh), is only mi'de'Rabbanan, since people do not consider this an Isur (which is a major criterion that determines a P'sul d'Oraysa).

Proof #2: And according to those who invalidate it because it is not 'Yishuvo shel Olam', it is certainly only mi'de'Rabbanan.

Proof #3: 'Those who lend on interest - speaks about Ribis that is not Ketzutzah (fixed, which is only mi'de'Rabbanan); and even if it speaks about Ribis Ketzutzah, this too, people do not consider an Isur, seeing as the debtor gives the money of his own freewill, in which case he (the creditor) is only Pasul from testifying mi'de'Rabbanan.

Proof #4: 'Dove-racers' - too are Pasul mi'de'Rabbanan, since this is merely a branch of Asmachta; and according to those who interpret 'Mafrichei Yonim' as 'Ara' (doves that are trained to bring back other doves to one's nest), this is forbidden only on account of Darkei Shalom.

Proof #5: 'People who deal with Sh'mitah-produce' - which speaks about Shevi'is nowadays, which is only Asur mi'de'Rabbanan; and even if it is speaking about Shevi'is d'Oraysa, people do not consider it an Isur, since they are availing money to the poor.

Proof #5: But 'Avadim' are Pasul min ha'Torah, 'Kal ve'Chomer' from a woman - who is eligible to marry into the congregation of Yisrael, yet she is Pasul to testify, how much more so an Eved, who is not eligible to marry into the congregation of Yisrael.

Explanation #2: It is therefore clear that we do not read 'Avadim' in the text, since the Mishnah is speaking exclusively about Pesulim mi'de'Rabbanan.

Explanation #1 (Part 1): Rashi explains that Asmachta is a case such as 'If I leave the land fallow and do not work it, I will pay you from the best of my lands'; and likewise the case in 'Get Pashut', Bava Basra, Daf 168a & 169a) of 'Mashlish es Sh'taro' (where, after paying half the debt, the debtor hands the Sh'tar over to a third party and declares that if he does not pay the balance within a given space of time, the Sh'tar should be returned to the creditor and he will pay the full amount of the debt.

Reason (Part 1): Because in all these cases, he relies on his own mind, inasmuch as he thinks that he will be able to fulfill his condition. And when he initially makes it, he does so with the intention of not having to give the other party, because he thinks that it will never come to that.

Reason (Part 2): Whereas in the current case, the outcome is not in his hands and there is nothing for him to rely on, seeing as he doesn't know whether he will win or not.

Printer's Error: That what Rashi explains however, that 'Im Ovir ve'Lo A'avid Ashalem mi'Meitva' is an Asmachta, is a printer's error; In fact, Rashi never said that, because, as the Gemara says in 'Eizehu Neshech', Bava Metzi'a, 74a - that is not a case of Asmachta. What Rashi must have been referring to is the case of 'Im Ovir ve'Lo A'avid Ashalem Alfa Zuzi', which is 'Asmachta', as the Gemara states in Perek ha'Mekabel (ibid. 104a).

Cause of Error: Rashi, it seems, had written 'Im Ovir ' on its own, as a result of which the Sofrim cited the wrong case.

Question (Part 1): Rabeinu Tam however, queries Rashi in that, according to his explanation, it seems that whenever something lies in one's control to achieve it is more of an Asmachta than when it doesn't, whereas in Perek Eizehu Neshech, 74a & 74b - it implies the opposite?

Question (Part 2): For the Gemara there, in a case where someone receives money from his friend to purchase wine on his behalf, but who carelessly fails to do so, rules that he is obligated to recompensate him for his loss according to the price of wine in 'Aparvasa de'Zulshfat' (where wine is sold cheaply). The Gemara concludes however, that it is an Asmachta. It then queries that from 'Im Ovir ve'Lo A'avid, Ashalem be'Meitva', and answers that the latter case is not Asmachta because it is 'be'Yado', whereas the case there is not. So we see, that the more it is not be'Yado, the more it is Asmachta?

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that 'Kol ki Hai Gavna La'av Asmachta' is because Asmachta only applies there where there is nothing to gain, such as the case (in 'Get Pashut', Bava Basra, 168a) of ha'Mashlish es Sh'taro'; Whereas here, since there are two people, each one is Makneh to his friend. This is because since if he wins, he certainly wants to acquire it, and with that Hana'ah, he is Makneh to his friend should he win.

Inference: By the same token, all promises made by Shiduchin are not Asmachta either, seeing as each one wants to acquire for himself, he is also Makneh to the other party.

Question 1#: There is a Kashya on Rabeinu Tam however, from the Gemara in Perek ha'Zahav (Bava Metzi'a, 48b & 49a) - in a case where Reuven gives Shimon a security and stipulates that should he retract, he will forego it, whilst Shimon stipulates that in the event that he retracts, he will pay Reuven double the value of the security, R. Yossi validates the conditions, whereas R. Yehudah considers it an Asmachta. So we see that, even when there are two people, it is considered an Asmachta, and we do not say that since the one wants to acquire the security should his friend retract, he is Makneh the security to his friend should he retract?

Question #2: And this is also implied further later in connection with the Tzerichose concerning 'Mafrichei Yonim', where the Gemara maintain that the more one thinks that the matter lies in one's control the more it is Asmachta?

Reverting to Explanation #1: Therefore the Ri agrees with Rashi's explanation.

Answer to Question (Tosfos Part 1): And the answer to the Kashya from 'Eizehu Neshech' that we asked earlier is - that that case is different - firstly, because there (in the case of 'Im Ovir ve'Lo I'avid ... ') it lies completely in his control to work the field and secondly, becusse he does not exaggerate, he thinks that this is what his friend lost and that he is obligated to make up that loss (for example where he says 'I will pay from the best!'), and he really means what he says with a full heart and it is not an Asmachta, since he genuinely thinks that e is obligated to pay for what he should have done but didn't.

Answer to Question (Tosfos Part 1, [Part 2]): But there where he exaggerates, even though it lies totally in his control - for example, where he says 'Im Ovir ve'Lo I'avid, Ashalem Alfa Zuzi', the mere fact that he is exaggerating turns it into an Asmachta, because if someone volunteers to pay a thousand Zuz for a regular field demonstrates that he is exaggerating, and does not really mean what he says.

Question: The Kashya remains however, how to reconcile the Gemara here, which implies that something that is outside his control (such as 'Mesachek be'Kuvya' is not an Asmachta, even though he is exaggerating (seeing as he owes him nothing) with the Gemara in Bava Metzi'a, which considers the case of 'Chamra (Aparvasa) de'Zulshefot' (that we cited earlier) an Asmachta for this very reason?

Answer (Part 1): This is not a Kashya however, since the reason that it is an Asmachta there is because the owner relied on him to purchase, which, granted, was seemingly available, and moreover, was not based on an exaggerated request, yet there was no guarantee that the sellers would be willing to sell him what he asked for. Consequently, since it was not completely 'be'Yado', it is considered an Asmachta, since the owner is not Makneh him the money with a full heart.

Answer (Part 2): Whereas here, by Mesachek be'Kuvya, which is completely outside his control, despite the fact that there is an element of exaggeration (since he does not owe him anything) in the game that he is playing, he is nevertheless Makneh to his friend with a full heart - because he knows that, on the one hand, it does not lie in his control to win, whilst on the other, one of them is bound to win, in which case he certainly doesn't expect his friend to rely on some non-existant factor to win, but is Makneh the money to him with a full heart, should he win. And that is certainly not an Asmachta.

Answer (Part 3): In contrast, in the case of 'Ashalem lach Alfa Zuzi'; where a. he exaggerates and b. it lies within his control to fulfil his condition, we have to say that he intended to coerce his friend to rely on his assurance to pay, and the thousand Zuz is an Asmachta, in that it was no more than an exaggeration, and he was not Makneh it to him with a full heart. We can assume that he only exaggerated because he was certain that he would work the field. And in addition, it was totally 'be'Yado'.

Conclusion: And the reason that we declare 'Mesachek be'Kuvya' eligible to testify is because we rule like R. Yehudah further on, who declares him Kasher provided he has another occupation.

Ruling: And when we rule that 'Mesachek be'Kuvya' is basically Koneh, this pertains specifically to where both the participants' money is lying on the board, since the board together with the place on which it is lying both belong to the winner, so that the winner acquires the money that is lying on it. But if one plays with the dice 'on faith' the winner is not Koneh, even if they made a Kinyan, unless the Kinyan was made in a Beis-Din Chashuv - as the Gemara rules in Nedrim, 27b.