Question: How could the Chachamim permit the Isur of plowing and planting in the Sh'mitah, an Isur d'Oraysa, because of Arnona?

Answer #1: The Gemara is talking about Shevi'is nowadays, which is only de'Rabbanan.

Answer #2: Alternatively, they permitted it because it contained an element of 'Piku'ach Nefesh' (life-danger). That was because, if they were unable to pay the tax, the king would sieze them and place them in jail, where they would languish until they died.

Proof: This is in fact, what the Yerushalmi says specifically.

Question: How could they possibly declare a leap-year in Asya, which was outside Eretz Yisrael, as the Gemara explains in 'Chezkas ha'Batim' (Bava Basra, 56a & 56b) (and Ibur Shanah can only be performed in Eretz Yisrael)?

Answer: 'Le'aber' in this case means (not to declare a leap-year, but) to reckon (whether to declare a leap-year or not).

Proof: ... and this is evident, since the Gemara says (in this context) 'a Kohen who is plowing in the Sh'mitah-year!', implying that we are talking about a Sh'mitah-year, and one cannot declare a leap-year in the Sh'mitah (as we learned above on Daf 12a).

Explanation #1: In the first Lashon, Rashi explains 'I am a laborer in the field, which belongs to a Nochri'.

Refutation: But this is incorrect, since we learned in Gitin, on Daf 62a & 62b that 'one is not permitted to dig together with a Nochri in the Sh'mitah?

Explanation #2: Therefore, Rashi's second Lashon is the correct one, where he says that the owner hired him to plow in the field on account of Arnona (see Maharsha and Tosfos ha'Rosh).

Question: So what if he did? The fact is that pruning the vines improved the vine-yard, as the Gemara explains in 'K'lal Gadol, (Shabbos, 73b & 74a) 'Someone who prunes because he needs the wood, transgresses two La'avi - becuse of 'Kotzeer' and b ecause of 'Note'a' - So here too, he ought to be Chayav becuse of Note'a?

Answer: He pruned it in such a way that it was harmful to the land, in which case, he is not Chayav on account of 'Note'a' (planting).

Implied Quesion: Then why would he be Chayav for doing exactly the same thing on Shabbos?

Answer: Because Shabbos is different, inasmuch as the Torah forbids "Meleches Machsheves" (any case where one's intentions are fulfilled), and with regard to Shabbos, his intention was indeed fulfilled. Whereas with regard to Shevi'is, only an act that improves the land is forbidden, so that in our case, where it is harmful to the land (as we explained), it is permitted.

Question: But is it not forbidden to trade Sh'mitah-fruit ('S'chorah') with the fruit of Sh'mitah, as the Gemara states in Avodah Zarah, 62a - "le'Achlah", 've'Lo li'Sechorah'?

Answer: The definition of 'trading' is - selling it in the market, which is akin to selling it in a shop; but a once-off casual sale does not fall under the category of S'chorah

Translation #1: Rashi translates 'ka'Dur' as 'Like a row (an un-broken chain), the soldiers will surround you ... ".

Translation #2: Others translate it as 'Like a Ger (who dwells with you)' - a Lashon of dwelling (as in the Pasuk in Tehilim, 84:11) " ... mi'Dur be'Ohalei Resha").

Translation #3: And a third Lashon translates "ke'Dur" as if it was written 'ke'Kadur' (like a ball).

Implied Question: Even though the Pasuk does not say 'ke'Kadur' ...

Answer: ... we have a precedent for this in the Pasuk in Koheles, 112:11 "Divrei Chachamim ke'Dorbanos", on which the Yerushalmi comments 'Like a girls' ball which they throw to one another, so does one man transmit words of Torah to his friend and to his Talmidim, from one to the other), and they gain wisdom from one another. Even though there too, the Pasuk writes (not 'ki'Kedarbanos', but) "ke'Dorbanos".

Explanation #1: The Riva explains this to mean that the worrying thoughts in the heart of man concerning his livelihood are effective against (they override - all other thoughts) - even thoughts of Torah, as the Pasuk writes in Iyov 5:12 "Meifer Machsh'vos Arumim"; and the Pasuk refers to what he wrote in the previous Pasuk "ve'Shole'ach Mayim al-P'nei Chutzos"".

Explanation #2: Others translate 'Mo'eles' as 'false', and what the Gemara means is that somebody who thinks about wealth and about Torah, the former falsifies (overrides) the latter, unless he learns Torah li'Shemah (as the Gemara concludes).

Clarification: Who validates 'Mesachek be'Kuvya', as long as one has another profession as well.

Ruling: And this is the Halachah - that 'Mesachek be'Kuvya' is not considered an Asmachta.

Restriction: This ruling is restricted however, to where the money of both participants is lying on the board, since the board is 'Kanuy' to the one who wins the money. But if one plays with the dice 'on faith' the winner is not Koneh, even if they made a joint Kinyan, since this is a real case of 'Asmachta', by which a Kinyan is not effective.

Clarification: 'Ochlei Davar Acher' cannot refer to people who eat Chazir, because if it did, on what basis would the Gemara draw a distinction between 'discreetly' and 'in public'?

Explanation: It must therefore refer to people who accept charity from Nochrim, as Rashi explains.

Question: Why is this different than someone who eats Neveilos for pleasure and someone who claims that so-and-so raped him with his consent, who are both Pasul from testifying.

Answer #1: The Gemara is speaking here about a person who is merely suspected of committing adultery (and not about someone who has been proven to have done so).

Implied Question: On what basis does one sentence a person who is merely suspected of sinning to Malkos?

Answer: We learned in Kidushin that 'Someone who behaves in a way that causes rumors to spread receives Malkos.

Answer #2 (to first question): Alternatively, the reason that he is Kasher le'Eidus is because he is overcome by his Yeitzer ha'Ra, and is therefore not comparable to eating Neveilah and being raped, where the Yeitzer-ha'Ra does not grip him to the same extent as Ervah.