Implied Question: But have we not learned in the Tosefta (cited in Perek Nigmar ha'Din) that one is not permitted to judge two people on the same day, even an adulterer and an adulteress?

Answer: We establish that case by a bas Kohen and the man with whom she committed adultery, where she receives Sereifah, whereas he receives Chenek.

Explanation #1: Like we learned in 'Shor she'Nagach es ha'Parah', Rashi explains - 'From where do we know that one first attends to the claim of the claimant' - for example, there where Reuven claims that Shimon owes him a Manah, and Shimon replies that Reuven had a Mashkon (security) of his which was destroyed or lost. We first settle Reuven's claim, and it is only when Reuven has his debt safely in his hands that we open Shimon's case.

Clarification (Part 2): We also need to say that Reuven is holding a Sh'tar; since otherwise, we would believe Shimon, with a 'Migu' that he could have claimed that he paid (seeing as it is not necessary to pay off one's debt in the presence of witnesses.

Implied Question: But do we not have a principle that one does not trouble Beis-Din twice (where it is possible to conclude the entire case in one sitting).

Answer: That only applies there, as the Gemara there concludes, because it was something that was destined to become revealed; whereas here, where the debtor only seems to be trying to get out of paying, we do not allow him to stop him Beis-Din from taking away from him what he owes (see Maharam).

Question #1: How are we speaking? If the borrower has witnesses handy, or he argues that witnesses will arrive within thirty days, then we wait until they come (since even if he asks for extra time to pay, we allow him thirty days [as we learned in Bava Metzi'a])? Whereas if he claims that he will bring witnesses after thirty days, we would not listen to him even if there was no Pasuk?

Question #2: The Gemara says there that if the defendant's property is dropping in price, one first deals with his claim. Why is that? Does this mean that one even waits for a year or two (see Tosfos ha'Rosh)?

Answer: We must therefore say (be'Dochek) that he claims that so-and-so were there, and know that he is right, and it is known that this is true. (The Tosfos ha'Rosh adds that nevertheless, we only wait for them for thirty days).

Explanation #2 (Part 1): The Riva explains that 'one first attends to the claim of the claimant' means that one first accepts his witnesses before those of the defendant.

Explanation #2 (Part 2): The ramifications of this ruling will be there where the defendant's witnesses die in the meantime or travel overseas.

Question: On what grounds is this any different to where the defendant's property is dropping in price, where we give his claim precedence?

Explanation #3: Yet others establish the case where Reuven claims that Shimon wounded him, and where Shimon counters that he will bring witnesses in a day or two regarding claims that he has against Reuven. This is where we first dfeal with the claimant, because as we learned in Perek ha'Chovel 'One does not fix a date for claims regarding wounds, but judges them immediately.

Implied Question: But did we not learn in Perek Mashilin 'These are forbidden because they fall under the category of 'R'shus (close to a Mitzvah)' ... one is forbidden to judge'?

Answer: That pertains specifically to money-matters, which are forbidden due to a decree that one may come to write; but not to matters of life and death, where the arguments of those who say Patur and those who say Chayav were already recorded the day before.

Clarification (Part 1): Regarding Sereifah, it is clear why, even according to those who hold that burning that is purely destructive is Patur, it constitutes Chilul Shabbos) due to the cooking of the thread of lead (as the Gemara declares in Yevamos "What difference does it make whether one cooks a lead thread or dyes?'

Clarification (Part 2): And by the remaining Chayvei Misos too, even according to those who hold (in Kesuvos) that wounding that is purely destructive is Patur, here it is considered a Tikun (constructive), since the sentenced person receives an atonement.

Clarification: We learn from "Imo" that even someone who is a Kohen and a Nazir must be Metamei himself for a Meis Mitzvah.

Question: Despite the fact that a Nazir is more stringent in that he is forbidden to render himself Tamei for relatives, whereas a Kohen Hedyot is not (so what is to be gained by adding Kohen Hedyot)?

Answer #1: We would nevertheless have thought that the fact that there are now two prohibitions, ought to make it prohibited.

Answer #2: And besides, a Kohen Hedyot has a stringency over Nazir, in that his Kedushah is permanent, whereas that of a Nazir is not - as the Gemara states in Nazir.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the Tana is talking about a Kohen Gadol who is also a Nazir who is going to Shecht his Korban Pesach.

Question: However, the Gemara in Zevachim asks from this Beraisa on the case there where Yosef ha'Kohen's wife died on Erev Pesach, and they forced him to bury her. According to Rashi, what is the Kashya, seeing as the Beraisa is talking about where there are a number of 'Mitzvos' (i.e. prohibitions), whereas there, there was only one.

Explanation #2: It therefore seems that the Tana is tspeaking where the person who is going to Shecht his Pesach or to circumcise his son is neither a Kohen Gadol nor a Nazir.

Proof: And so it would seem - since the Tana does not mention the fact that he was, as it does in the other cases that we quote.

Implied Question: Why, one may well ask, does he suggest that 'perhaps he ought not to be permitted to render himself Tamei?

Answer: That is because the Asei of rendering oneself Tamei for relatives cannot override the Asei of Pesach or Milah which are subject to Kareis.

Answer to initial Question: It is also possible to resolve the Kashya on Rashi, in that if there where he is going to Shecht his Pesach exclusively, we do not stop him from making himself Tamei, then the fact that he is also

Question: R. Ya'akov from Orleans asks why we don't apply the principle 'Dayo here, inasmuch as just as the Avodah is only pushed away by means of a 'Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh' (not serving in the Beis-Hamikdash), so too can Shabbos only be pushed away by means of 'Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh', but not by performing an Avodah (i.e. burying a dead person) on Shabbos?

Limiting Question: According to those in Bava Kama who hold that we don't say 'Dayo' if it means breaking the 'Kal-va'Chomer', the question falls away.

Answer: Even with 'Dayo', the 'Kal-va'Chomer' remains, in that now that Avodah, which is lighter, overrides Shabbos, burying a Meis Mitzvah, which is more stringent, should certainly override Shabbos (even by means of a 'Kum va'Asei'), since in any event, it cannot be less effective than Avodah.

Implied Question (Part 1): The Gemara asks in Perek Keitzad ha'Regel that if there where the Torah is lenient with Shein ve'Regel (i.e. in the Reshus ha'Rabim, where they are Patur), it is strict with them in the Reshus ha'Nizak, to pay full damage; there where it is strict with Keren (i.e. in the Reshus ha'Rabim, where it is Chayav), ought it not to be stringent in the Reshus ha'Nizak to pay full damage?

Implied Question (Part 2): And the Gemara replies by applying 'Dayo', inasmuch as just in the Reshus ha'Rabim he pays only half-damages, so too, in the Reshus ha'Nizak. Why do we not say there too 'But Shein ve'Regel which are lenient in the Reshus ha'Rabim, yet they pay in the Reshus ha'Nizak full damages, so too, should Keren' (like we do here)?

Answer: It is different here, because, since the core of the Avodah is pushed away before a Meis Mitzvah, it is not logical to say that it (Avodah) should be more stringent than it under any circumstances.

Question: Why do we not learn a 'Kal va'Chomer from Milah, in which case one will not be able to ask a Kashya from Retzichah?

Answer: The fact is that one could still have asked from Retzichah - in that, just as Retzichah does not override Shabbos, even though it overrides Avodah which overrides Shabbos, then so should Meis Mitzvah not override Shabbos, despite the fact that it overrides Milah which overrides Shabbos.

Clarification: Retzichah overrides the Avodah, even if there is no other Kohen available who is fit to perform the Avodah.

Question: The fact that Retzichah overrides the Avodah is not intrinsically because it overrides it, but rather, because it the sinner is unfit to serve, as we learned in Brachos, where, based on the Pasuk in Yeshayah "Your hands are full of blood", the Geara rules that a Kohen who murdered is not eligible to Duchen - how much more so perform the Avodah?

Answer #1: We have to admit that in fact, he is fit to perform the Avodah, since he does desecrate it; and the ruling prohibiting him from Duchening, is merely a Chumra.

Answer #2: Furthermore, one can say that, based on the principle 'A prosecutor cannot act as a defendant', it is specifically Duchening ('which entails raising his hands') from which he is disqualified, seeing as he murdered with his hands, as the Pasuk there hints when it writes "And when you spread out your hands, I will hide My Eyes from you ... !"

Implied Question: But does the Gemara in Shabos not Darshen from "be'Chol Moshvoseichem" that the prohibition of making as fire is confined to one's private dwellings, but does not extend to the Beis-Hasmikdash?

Answer: That is only because the Torah writes "Moshvoseichem" (and not just 'Moshvos').

Implied Question: Perhaps the entire word comes to teach us that D'rashah?

Answer: In that case, the Torah ought to have written 'be'Chol Gevulchem'. And since it chose to use the word 'Moshvos', it must come to include Beis-Din in the prohibition.

Question: Perhaps we need the entire word to teach us Beis-Din and the D'rashah mentioned in Shabbos? How does R. Yossi learn a La'av and R. Nasan 'Lechaleik' from there?

Answer: They learn their respective D'rashos from the fact that the Torah writes "Lo Seva'aru ... ", rather than 'Lo Sa'asu Melachah be'Chol Moshvoseichem', from which we would have known the two aforementioned Dinim.

Question: According to Abaye, why can we not learn Meis Mitzvah from the 'Kal va'Chomer' of Resh Lakish, seeing as we cannot counter 'Retzichah Tochi'ach!'?

Answer: That is what Abaye means when he says 'Why is it obvious to Rebbi Yochanan to say "Retzichah Tochi'ach, because it pushes away the Avodah?", seeing as it is possible to say that, due to the Kal-va'Chomer, it does not. Because that being the case, the Kashya of Resh Lakish returns?

Question: Let us say 'Dayo' - Just as Retzichah does not override Shabbos with a Kum va'Asei, so too, should Avodah not do so, only with a Shev ve'Al Ta'aseh?

Answer: According to those who hold that we don't say 'Dayo' if it means breaking the 'Kal-va'Chomer', the question falls away (in the same way as we explained above).

Implied Question: Rava also agrees that one cannot say this, because if we did, then we would be unable to explain "me'Im Mizb'chi".

Answer: Only the Gemara is saying that, according to Abaye, if we adopt the 'Kal-va'Chomer' to query R. Yochanan, and take the Pasuk out of the Din of Korban Tzibur, then it will not work by a Korban Yachid either. Consequently, we cannot Darshen the 'Kal-va'Chomer'.