Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the Gemara thinks that this is referring to the (floor of the) entranceway to an alley that one is permitted to carry in, as it has a Lechi.

Question: This does not appear to be correct, since the Gemara later says that this is referring to the entranceway of a house.

Explanation #2: Rather, it appears that this is referring to any entranceway, whether it is for an alley, house, or courtyard.

Implied Question: The Gemara said, "Even though it does not have a Lechi." (This implies it is only referring to a case of an alley, as this is where a Lechi is used!)

Answer #1: This is indeed because of a case in an alley (but does not mean the case is only regarding an alley), as a house and courtyard do not become permitted through a Lechi or Korah, but rather through Pasim (thick blocks of wood).

Answer #2: Alternatively, it says Lechi because a house or courtyard can also technically become permitted through having a Lechi on each side. The case would be where the entranceway is opposite the thickness of the wall, meaning between the two Lechis, which is in the entranceway. The door is standing by the thickness of the wall towards the inside.

Explanation #2 (cont.): This is why the open doorway is like the inside of the private domain, as the thickness surrounding the entranceway is totally part of the private domain as it has three walls. Two of these walls are the thickness of the walls on the sides of the entranceway, and the third is the inside of the private domain. This is despite the fact that the fourth side is totally open to the public domain. Since the door is open the thickness is nullified to what is inside, which are four walls (i.e. a private domain).

Explanation #2 (cont.): A locked door is like what is outside. Since it is locked it is not nullified to what is inside, and it is like it is totally open to a place that is forbidden.

Implied Question: It is not necessarily like what is outside of it, as it is a private domain according to Torah law since it has three walls. It is forbidden to carry from there to the public domain. (What, then, is meant by "it is like what is outside of it?")

Answer #1: However, it is categorized as outside because it is not like it is inside. It is therefore forbidden to carry from inside to the thickness of the entranceway through a hole, if there is one in the door.

Answer #2: Alternatively, it is possible to answer that "it is like what is outside of it" is true in a case where it is open to a Karmelis. However, we cannot say that the case is where the entire entranceway is in the public domain besides for the thickness of the wall.

Answer #2 (cont.): If it would not be three Tefachim tall, even an open door would be considered like what is outside which is the public domain. If it is three Tefachim tall and four Tefachim wide it is a Karmelis, and it is not like what is outside or what is inside. If it is not four Tefachim wide, it is a Makom Petur. It is always like what is inside and outside. If it is totally inside, it is like what is inside.

Question: Since we are also discussing the entranceway of a house, why does the Gemara ask, "Even if there is no Lechi?" The entranceway of a house presumably has a roof, and we can therefore say "Pi Tikrah Yored v'Sosem" - "the lip of the roof goes down and closes the area (as if there was a wall there)!"

Answer: The Ri says that it must be that the entranceway does not have a roof, as if it would have a roof it would be considered like what is inside, even if it is locked.

Question: According to Rava who says in Eiruvin (9a) that this is only if it is open to a Karmelis, since each area found a similar domain and it becomes mixed up, why don't we say that the case in our Gemara is if it was open to the public domain?

Question (cont.): According to Abaye as well who does not differentiate between whether it is open to a Karmelis or a private domain, we should say that the case is where the entranceway is three Tefachim tall.

Question (cont.): This is evident from the Gemara in Eiruvin (ibid.) where Abaye states that we only require another Lechi to permit it when the Askupah is not four Tefachim wide or where there is no Askupah. Why, then, does Rav force a difficult answer in a different vein?

Answer: We cannot give this answer. If so, even if it would be locked it would be considered as if it is part of the inside. When the Gemara says, "And if you will say that it is not four Tefachim" the Gemara would be able to ask that this should even be if it is locked.

Explanation: Rav Yehudah says this specifically regarding the entranceway of an alley that if the door is open it is considered like what is inside. This is because the beam on top can permit the alley. Even though the alley does not need a beam because it has four walls, with the door and entranceway being the fourth side, since the beam could permit the alley if it was needed to, it combines and acts as if it has four Tefachim with a roof over it.

Explanation (cont.): However, regarding the entranceway of a courtyard or house, since the beam is not fitting to permit them, even if the door is open they are considered like what is outside since only half of it is roofed.

Explanation (cont.): Rav Yehudah specifically said here that half of it is roofed, as if it is all roofed even if it is locked it is considered like the inside. This is because most floors of entranceways that are in the doorway are four Tefachim wide.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that we say that the entranceway referred to by the Tana Kama is not wide four Tefachim. (How can we say this if the normal entranceway is four Tefachim?)

Answer: The case of the Tana Kama is when the entranceway is outside of the thickness of the doorway (in which case it may not be four Tefachim).

Explanation (cont.): This is specifically if the roof is towards the inside area. However if it is towards the outside, even if it is locked, it is like the inside. This is because Rav holds that the outside edge of the roof goes down and acts as a wall, as he concludes in Eiruvin (8b).

Observation: The Gemara also could have said that the case is where one Tefach is roofed but it is in the middle of the entranceway, as it will then be less than four Tefachim from the outer edge until the doorway.

Explanation: The Ri says that Rebbi Meir did not forbid carrying from the (downstairs of a) house to the attic, as one would not come to carry in this fashion from the public domain to an attic. This is because its walls are clear, and people will not make such a mistake. Rather, he only made this decree regarding a pile in the private domain because of such a pile in the public domain where there are no walls.

Explanation (cont.): In Eiruvin (89b), the Gemara explains that Rebbi Meir only said this regarding a pillar and the base of a mill that is set in its place. However, he did not say this regarding the grindstone and other movable objects.

Opinion: The Ri says that even though we generally rule like the decrees of Rebbi Meir, even when they are opposite the primary opinion as is apparent from the Gemara in Kesuvos (57a) where Rebbi Meir decrees that one is not allowed to be with his wife for even an hour without a Kesuvah, here the law does not follow Rebbi Meir.

Proof: In Eiruvin (91a), we rule clearly that the law is like Rebbi Shimon who argues on Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Shimon says that roofs, courtyards, and Karfeifs (loosely defined as "open spaces") are one domain regarding vessels that stayed there from before Shabbos. Rebbi Shimon clearly permits carrying from the roof to the yard (unlike Rebbi Meir here).

Implied Question: The Gemara in Pesachim (99b) states that one should not eat on Erev Shabbos or Erev Yom Tov until it gets dark.

Answer: This means that even if one already Davened he should not eat, as explained there, in order that he should enter Shabbos when he is hungry. However, if he did not Daven, he cannot even do this on a regular weekday as stated here.

Explanation: This is even if they started when they were prohibited from doing so.

Proof #1: This is apparent from the Gemara in Sukah (38a) regarding the Mishnah there that states that if someone came from the road and he did not have a Lulav (when on the road), he takes it when he arrives at his table. The Gemara asks, this implies that he must stop what he is doing! Doesn't the Mishnah say that if they started, they do not stop?

Proof #1 (cont.): The Gemara does not answer that in our Mishnah they started when they were permitted to do so, as opposed to Lulav where he started traveling when he was not supposed to, as he is supposed to do this in the morning (before traveling).

Proof #2: This is also implied by our Gemara that says that since he took off his belt, we do not make him do so (even though he should not have done so).

Proof #3: This (if it was true that there was a difference between starting when one is not allowed to and starting when allowed to) also would be an answer for the Gemara's question on Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi. (This is because Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi is discussing a case when the starting was prohibited. Since the Gemara does not answer the question in this fashion, it indicates that there is no difference whether one started when permitted to do so or not.)

Explanation: This is specifically when there is still time left during the day to Daven, as is implied by the Gemara when it says that it is uncommon to be drunk in the afternoon. This implies that he should make sure not to lose the ability to say Minchah.

Proof: In Sukah (38a), the Gemara explicitly establishes our Mishnah as referring to when there is still time to Daven, as it answers the question quoted previously (see previous Tosfos) by saying, "One case is where there is still time to Daven, and one case is when there is no longer going to be time to Daven."

Observation: The Gemara understands that even if he started he must stop, as it says that one cannot taste.

Question: Why don't we establish the Mishnah as discussing a case where he started when he was permitted to do so?

Question (cont.): We find regarding Havdalah in Pesachim (107a) that the Gemara also says, "it is forbidden to taste anything before making Havdalah." Even so, it implies that if they started when they were allowed to do so they do not have to stop. The Gemara there quotes Rav as saying that Havdalah (i.e. when the time arrives when one can make Havdalah) does not mandate people to stop their meal and make Havdalah as long as they are in the middle of their meal. However, it makes them unable to start a meal.

Answer: It is possible to answer that, "if they started they do not have to stop" implies that even if they started when they were prohibited from doing so they do not have to stop, as I explained in the (Tosfos regarding the) Mishnah.

Opinion: It appears that this is the Halachah. Therefore, it is permitted to have a small meal once the time of Minchah Gedolah arrives (six and a half hours into the day) until the time one Davens.

Opinion (cont.): Specifically a large meal, such as an engagement meal, wedding meal, or Bris meal is forbidden. This is unlike the opinion of Rav Acha bar Yaakov who forbids even a small meal when it is almost time for Minchah Gedolah.

Proof: This is because the law follows the first version recorded by the Gemara, and Rav Ashi, who is a later Amora, was the one who arranged the Gemara to have this opinion recorded first (showing it is the law). We rule like Rav Ashi against the opinion of Rav Acha bar Yaakov.

Implied Question: When the Gemara later says, "When is the start of the judgement?" it is not proof that the Mishnah is specifically discussing the beginning of the judgment, unlike the opinion of Rav Acha. (Why not?)

Answer: It is possible to answer that it is referring to, "if they started they do not have to stop."

Opinion (cont): However, close to Minchah Ketanah (nine and a half hours into the day) it is even forbidden to have a small meal. If people started such a meal they must stop.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Gemara would not have established the Mishnah as referring to a small meal close to Minchah Ketanah, and that if they started they do not have to stop, were it not for the opinion of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi. We do not rule like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi, as is apparent from the Gemara in Berachos (28b). (Why, then, do we remain with an interpretation of the Mishnah forced by an opinion we do not consider as Halachah?)

Answer: Even so, since the Gemara concludes this way in general (without saying it is the opinion of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi), it implies that regarding the law that if they started they must stop we do hold like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi. We only do not hold like him regarding his statement that one cannot even taste fruit (at this time).

Explanation: Rashi explains that the people of Bavel would tie their belt tightly.

Proof: This is also implied from the Gemara later that says, "These friends from Bavel, according to the opinion that Ma'ariv is optional, do not have to bother to Daven if they have already taken off their belt." Rebbi Chanina, who was from Eretz Yisrael, would say this to his students who were from Bavel.

Proof (cont.): Rav, who was from Bavel, would say this ("from Netilas Yadayim") to his students who were from Eretz Yisrael, as it was normal for them to travel far away (to Bavel) because they would not be able to learn much Torah if they stayed in Eretz Yisrael.

Question: This is difficult, as in Berachos (end of 44a) Rav Chisda says that the correct blessing for fruits of the seven species is "Al ha'Aretz v'Al Peirosehah." Rebbi Yochanan says it is, "Al ha'Aretz v'Al ha'Peiros." The Gemara there says that there is no argument between the two, as one is regarding us and one is regarding them.

Question (cont.): Rav Nachman asked Rav Chisda, "they eat, and we should bless?!" What is the question? Why didn't Rav Chisda answer that he was saying this to his students who were from Eretz Yisrael?

Answer: Rav Nachman knew that at that time Rav Chisda did not have any students from Eretz Yisrael.

Question: Why shouldn't he be required to Daven due to his obligation to say Kriyas Shema at night?

Answer: It must be that he already read Kriyas Shema.

Opinion: The Ri understands that even according to the opinion that Ma'ariv is "optional," one should not skip it without reason, but rather only if he has a pressing need such as his having already taken off his belt or if he has another Mitzvah to do even if it can wait. In such a case, he may do the Mitzvah and not Daven Ma'ariv, even though the Mitzvah could have been pushed off to a different time. However, one should not skip Ma'ariv for no reason at all.

Proof #1: This is apparent from the fact that it was instituted by Yaakov Avinu. Why would one ignore this and skip it without reason?

Proof #2: Additionally, we say in Berachos (26b) that it corresponds to the burning of the limbs of the sacrifices that were done the entire night that were not needed to atone, but were still a Mitzvah. So too, Davening Ma'ariv is a Mitzvah. There is no need to discuss this at length.