Implied Question: Rabah says earlier (43a) that Tevel is considered "prepared" for Shabbos, as if a person transgressed and took off Terumos and Ma'aseros, it is valid. (How can he say this if our Mishnah seems to say it is Muktzah?)

Answer: Rabah's statement was regarding removing a vessel from its purpose of being used, as they were not stringent regarding this prohibition like they were regarding the carrying of Muktzah.

Observation: By the Gemara saying that the case is redeeming Ma'aser Sheini on a token, it is excluding the opinion of Rebbi Dosa in Bava Metzia (47b, who says this is permitted).

Implied Question: It could have said the case is regarding coins that are giving as a sign that one paid in the bathhouse, and this would be according to everyone. (Why didn't it say this?)

Answer: However, if this is the case there is no novelty to the case. Now that it is regarding a token the novelty is that we rule according to the Rabbanan (and unlike Rebbi Dosa).

Implied Question: The Pasuk does not actually say these words, rather it says, "And he will add a fifth of its value in silver and it will be established for him" (Vayikra 27:19). (Why does it quote the Pasuk differently?)

Answer: The way of the Gemara is to shorten the Pasuk and to say it in a different and shorter way.

Proof: This is as we find in Eiruvin (65a) that Rebbi Chanina did not pray on a day that he got angry, as the Pasuk says, "in pain he should not pray." (See Tosfos in Eiruvin 65a, DH "ba'Tzar" who presents different possibilities to explain this quote, with one being that it refers to the Pasuk in Iyov 36:19.) A similar Gemara is found in Berachos (55b) regarding all dreams being dependent on how they are interpreted.

Question: The Ri asks, why don't we say that this specifically refers to silver?

Answer: You might say that this is because we have a principle that what is worth silver (i.e. money) is considered silver.

Question #1: Firstly, we see regarding damages that we require a Pasuk, "he shall return" to include paying with things that are worth silver instead of silver (implying that in general money means actual money not what is worth money).

Question #2: Secondly, if so we should include land? How do we know land is excluded?

Answer: The Ri says that this is derived from a Klal u'Perat in Bechoros (51a). The Mishnah there says that one does not redeem with servants, land, or Hekdaishos. The Gemara there (51b) explains that this means that Hekdesh cannot be redeemed with servants or land.

Answer (cont.): The Gemara there (51a) explains that regarding redemption of a firstborn we derive a Klal u'Perat. "And his redemption from one month old" is a Klal, "Kesef" is a Perat, and "you should redeem" is a Klal making this a Klal u'Perat u'Klal. We therefore derive that just as the Perat is something that is carried etc. So too we can apply this to redeeming Hekdesh and say, "v'Nasan" is a Klal, "Kesef" is a Perat, and "v'Kam Lo" makes a (similar) Klal u'Perat u'Klal.

Implied Question: However, the Toras Kohanim derives this from a different Pasuk. It says: "And all your value should be using the holy Shekel." What does this teach us? This is because the verse says, "You should redeem." Perhaps this means one can use servants, (loan) documents, and land? This is why the Pasuk teaches, "With the holy Shekel." This implies that only money can be used. How do we know that anything that can be carried (and is worth money) can be used? The Pasuk says, "And he will redeem with its value." If so, why does the Pasuk say, "With the holy Shekel?" It is to exclude servants, documents, and land." (Does our Gemara have to argue with the Toras Kohanim? It seems it does, as our Gemara discusses the Pesukim that the Ri discussed, not these Pesukim, as the source of this law!)

Answer: (The Bavli does not have to argue with the Toras Kohanim.) Rather, it is normal for our Gemara to shorten a derivation and not quote the actual derivation.

Proof: This is similar to the Gemara in Kesuvos (46b) that often quotes the Pasuk, "b'Neurehah Beis Avihah" to say that whatever benefits she has in this time go to her father, even though that Pasuk is referring to negating her vows (and is not discussing benefits, and is therefore not the actual source of this law). There are may other examples.

Explanation: This implies that he admits to the Tana Kama who permits mustard.

Implied Question: The Mishnah says that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits Lof (a type of legume). (Doesn't this imply he does not admit to mustard?)

Answer: It means he certainly would permit mustard.

Explanation: It is possible to say that he means as follows: If he merely brought them in without a specific intent, they are presumed to be as if he brought them to be animal food. This explanation helps to ensure one should not say the first part of the Beraisa is contradicting the second part of the Beraisa.

Opinion: This is proof that blood from limbs that did not leave the limbs is permitted, as we say that it is fit to be eaten raw even though it was not salted.

Question: This is difficult. Since he permits meat that is not salted, it implies he holds like Rebbi Shimon. If so, why shouldn't fish that is not salted be similarly permitted?

Answer #1: Fish that is not salted is not even fit for dogs.

Answer #2: Alternatively, he holds like Rebbi Yehudah. Even though unsalted fish is fit for dogs, it is forbidden to carry it. This is because anything that is fit for a person is not set aside for dogs. Unsalted meat is permitted to carry according to Rebbi Yehudah because it is food that is fed specifically to animals.

Explanation: According to Rebbi Yehudah who holds of Muktzah this is referring to a case where they already did not have meat on them on the previous day.

Question: This is difficult. Why doesn't he say it is because it is dog food?

Answer: This is according to Rebbi Yehudah. It does not smell bad, as explained by Rashi, rather it is fit for a person. Anything that is fit for a person is not set aside as being for dogs. However, because it is animal food in general it is permitted to carry it, as all Jews are (considered like) sons of Kings.

Implied Question: Rav Chisda does not permit unsalted meat for this reason. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because he does not hold of the logic that all Jews are (considered like) sons of kings.

Text #1: According to the Sefarim that have the text, "public domain," this Beraisa argues on the previous Beraisa in two ways. This is because we deduce that one can lead it even in the public domain, as opposed to the previous Beraisa that implies that this can only be done in a yard.

Text #1 (cont.): Additionally, the second Beraisa states that this cannot be done to a chicken in the public domain, and the first Beraisa says it cannot even be done in a yard.

Text #2: According to the Sefarim that have the text "One cannot uproot an animal or bird in a yard" these two Beraisos are better (i.e. closer in understanding).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that in Yoma (83a) it says that we only give a sick person food to eat on Yom Kippur if an expert (i.e. doctor) says he should eat. In our Gemara, we permit a woman giving birth to eat just to put her mind at ease. (Isn't this a contradiction?)

Answer: This is because a woman giving birth is more likely to be in grave danger if she is very frightened that people are not doing what needs to be done for her than an average sick person who feels he is very hungry.