Explanation: It already became ruined and unfit for people, and therefore his mindset the day before was that he has in mind to give this to his animal.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that hair of peas and lentils is forbidden as Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah even though they can be fed to animal. Similarly, the Gemara earlier (29a) says that if a person ate dates he cannot use the date pits as fuel for a fire according to Rebbi Yehudah. (Why should there be a difference between the cases?)

Answer: Even so it is permitted here, as I explained there (29a, DH "Achlan).

Explanation: It appears to Rabeinu Tam that the explanation of the Halachos Gedolos that this is forbidden due to fixing a vessel is correct. According to this explanation, even though he does not set it aside, we decree that it should not be moved in order that he should not come to fix it.

Explanation: Rashi's explanation that this is even true if they are hard and not fit for dogs to eat is incorrect.

Question: The Gemara says that this Tana holds like Rebbi Shimon, and Rebbi Shimon requires that items be at least fit for the consumption of animals as the Mishnah says one can take crumbs off the table...because it is animal food. The Gemara establishes this as being according to Rebbi Shimon. (Rather, it must be they are fit to be eaten by animals.)

Observation: In Meseches Eiduyos this is not listed amongst the leniencies of Beis Shamai and the stringencies of Beis Hillel, indicating that Rav Nachman is correct.

Implied Question: The Gemara does not note this is a proof to Rav Nachman. (Why not?)

Answer: The Mishnah is Eiduyos is not stronger than our Mishnah (it is very possible the Mishnayos argue regarding which opinion is that of Beis Hillel and which is that of Beis Shamai - Chasam Sofer).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the proof is from the fact that the Mishnah says, "Mavirin" - "we pass" and not "Zorkin" - "we throw."

Question #1: Rebbi asks that this is difficult, as the first part of the Mishnah also said, "we raise bones and shells from the table" and it did not say, "we throw" even though it is permitted to destroy them by hand!

Question #2: Additionally, we say in Berachos (52b) that Beis Hillel says that if the waiter is a Talmudic scholar he will take pieces that are the size of a Kzayis and leave pieces that are not the size of a Kzayis. This is quoted as proof to the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan that one is allowed to destroy by hand any pieces that are not the size of a Kzayis. One cannot say that the text there should really read that this is forbidden.

Explanation #2: Rebbi understands that the text here in fact should read that it is permitted. The Gemara deduces from the text, "since it is animal food" that it is no longer deemed food that is fit for people and it therefore has the status of animal food which can be destroyed by hand.

Text #1: There are some Sefarim that have the text, "And the Chachamim say that either way it can be used to wipe."

Question: This text cannot be correct, as the Gemara says that when it does not have a leather handle even Rebbi Shimon agrees that it is forbidden as this is a Psik Reisha.

Text #2: Rebbi Yitzchak from Delfira has the text, "either way it cannot be used to wipe." This is according to the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah who says that a Davar she'Aino Miskaven is forbidden.

Question: The Ri understands that this is incorrect, as the Gemara implies that Rebbi Yehudah admits regarding the first case. This is as the Gemara says, "I will state the second case: A sponge that has a leather handle can be used for wiping, and if not it cannot be used for wiping. This is according to Rebbi Yehudah." If so, the opinion that it cannot be used for wiping at all is not the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah nor the opinion of Rebbi Shimon!

Text #3: Rather, we do not have this text ("And the Chachamim say either way etc.") at all.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that he holds like Rebbi Shimon who permits later (156b) a Neveilah that became Neveilah on Shabbos. (Why couldn't Shmuel carry the date pits without using the bread?)

Answer: He was acting stringently since he was an important person, similar to the actions of Abaye and Rava as stated earlier (142b) - Rabeinu Tam.

Question: Rava holds like Rebbi Yehudah who holds of Muktzah. How could he Lechatchilah permit carrying date pits if they are on a pitcher of water?

Answer: Rava differentiates between being able to carry something the previous day and being unable to do so. He had the bundles of stalks and the pigeon meat the day before, and he could have carried them then. However, he did not have the date pits the day before (as they were in the dates), and they therefore could not have been carried the day before. They are therefore permitted in this fashion even according to Rebbi Yehudah, and even for an important person.

Proof: This is as the Gemara in Beitzah (21b) says that Abaye asked Rav Yosef, how can we throw these date pits to the animals on Yom Tov according to Rebbi Yosi who says "for you - and not for your dogs? They are fit for burning...What about Shabbos? We carry them on the bread as per the opinion of Shmuel." This implies that even Rav Yosef, who earlier (142b) did not want to permit carrying Muktzah items on spoons and knives even if it was something that was fit for a person, permits carrying date pits on bread.

Explanation: Even if it does not have a leather handle and therefore there is no suspicion of squeezing it is prohibited. This is as the Gemara explains that he should not do like he does during the week.

Text: It appears that we do not have the text, "And he eats" as the second case states, "But not into the basket or the box." This implies that these specifically are problems because it is the way it would be done during the week. However, if it is gathered into his palm it would be permitted.

Implied Question: In Beitzah (3a), Rebbi Yochanan asks that there is a contradiction in the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah. The Mishnah says that Rebbi Yehudah says that if it is for the food that comes out of them it is permitted, but if it is for the juice etc. This implies that anything that is for the purpose of food is considered food that is separated.

Implied Question (cont.): This is apparently contradicted from the following: Rebbi Yehudah also says that a person can make a condition regarding a basket of fruit on the first day and eat it on the second day (see Rashi in Beitzah at length regarding the exact case). Similarly, an egg laid on the first day can be eaten on the second day. This implies it (the egg) can only be eaten on the second day but not the first day. (The Mishnah implies that food coming from food is permitted, while the Beraisa indicates that the egg that separates from the chicken on Yom Tov, which is also food from food, is forbidden. What is Rebbi Yehudah's opinion?) Rebbi Yochanan therefore says that it must be that Rebbi Yehudah's opinion is switched around. (Which opinion of his did he change?)

Answer #1: It must be that he switched his opinion regarding the condition.

Answer #1 (cont.): If he switched his opinion in our Mishnah, instead of saying here Rebbi Yehudah he should have said the Rabbanan, and that the Halachah follows the Rabbanan regarding other fruits.

Answer #2: It seems to me that even if our Mishnah is switched it is understandable.

Proof #1: This is as we found in Bava Kama (96b) that the Mishnah states that if someone stole an animal and it became weak or he stole servants and they grew old, he pays their value at the time of the theft. Rebbi Meir says that regarding servants he can merely say, "Here is your (servant) in front of you."

Proof #1 (cont.): The Gemara says that Rebbi Chanina bar Avdimi says in the name of Rav that the Halachah follows Rebbi Meir. He asks, does Rav leave the Rabbanan and rule like Rebbi Meir? The Gemara eventually concludes that Rav understood that the opinions in the Mishnah should be reversed. This indicates that even though the Mishnah states that the Chachamim say regarding servants that one may say, "Here is your (servant) in front of you," and therefore the Gemara should say that the law follows the Chachamim, even so it says the law follows Rebbi Meir because it is based on how others understand the text of the Mishnah. Accordingly, it is understandable why Rebbi Yochanan says the law follows Rebbi Yehudah in our Gemara (as he also stated the Halachah based on what was the reading that others had in the Mishnah, even though he held it was incorrect).

Proof #2: We similarly find in Sukah (19a) that the Mishnah states that if someone makes his Sukah like a tent, Rebbi Eliezer says it is invalid while the Chachamim say it is valid. We say in the Gemara that Abaye found Rav Yosef sleeping in a tent used by grooms in a Sukah. Abaye asked, whose opinion does your action follow? Rav Yosef answered it is according to the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer. Abaye countered, are you leaving the opinion of the Rabbanan and acting according to Rebbi Eliezer? Rav Yosef answered, the Beraisa is stated in the opposite fashion.

Proof #2 (cont.): It would seem that Rav Yosef should have answered that he is acting according to the Rabbanan and not Rebbi Eliezer, since the Beraisa is supposed to read in the opposite fashion. However, this appears to me to be the way of the Gemara in every place.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that in Beitzah (3a) Rebbi Yochanan decrees that an egg born on Yom Tov is forbidden due to liquid that oozes out of a fruit, but here we do not find he makes such a decree regarding other fruit. (What is the difference between eggs and fruit?)

Answer: It is more understandable to decree regarding an egg since it is supposed to be squeezed (i.e. hatched) from the chicken and it is normally swallowed raw (after being cracked). However, other fruit are not normally squeezed at all.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that "she'Mashach" means that they flowed on their own like the term "rivers that are Moshech (flow)."

Question #1: According to his opinion one must say that "he gathered them whether for food etc." means that he gathered them originally for these purposes. The language of the case does not imply this.

Question #2: The Ri has another difficulty with this explanation. If he means that the juice flows by itself, regarding strawberries that have juice drawn from them it should have said, "that they were drawn or that they were caused to be drawn," as words used with the word "Mayim" always are said in plural.

Question #3: The Ri has another difficulty with this explanation. If so, this Beraisa is a strong question on Rav and Rebbi Yochanan who say earlier that Rebbi Yehudah argued regarding olives and grapes. This Beraisa implies that he admitted regarding olives and grapes!

Explanation #2: Rather, the Ri understands that "Mashach" refers to the person. He first squeezed them and then gathered them. It is now understandable according to Rav and Rebbi Yochanan who hold that Rebbi Yehudah argued regarding olives and grapes, as it specifically says a case where he squeezed them first, as there is more reason to suspect he will want to squeeze other liquids from fruit that was brought in as food since he already did so. If he did not do so, this would not be the case.

Explanation #2 (cont.): According to Shmuel who says that Rebbi Yehudah admits regarding olives and grapes the word "Mashach" is used to include strawberries and pomegranates. Even if he squeezed them first, if he then brought them in to be food whatever liquid comes out of them is permitted.

Implied Question: The Mishnah in Machshirin (ch. 1) says that any liquid that is originally wanted by the owner even though it is not wanted in the end, or if it is eventually wanted even though it is not originally wanted, causes impurity.

Answer: The "want" here is not the same as the want "there." The Mishnah (ibid.) is referring to the owner wanting the liquid to fall on the seeds, and saying that we require that "Yutan" be similar to "Ki Yitein." Just as Yitein means he wants it, so too Yutan must be that he wants it. However, our Gemara is referring to the moment when the milk exits the woman or animal. (The Shabbos Shel Mi explains that the difference is whether the owner is happy when the liquid interacts with whatever possibly can now become impure and whether the liquid is considered liquid when it enters the world.)

Explanation #1: This is as explained later that the reason is because blood from her wound is impure, and milk and blood is the same thing, as we know that blood (of a woman) turns into milk.

Explanation #2: We do not require Rashi's explanation that this is because it is called a liquid, as the Pasuk states, "And she opened the container of milk and gave him to drank."

Implied Question: The Ri understands that there is a reason why this reason has to be given in Nidah (55b) regarding a woman's milk. (How can we say Rashi's reason is unnecessary if it is indeed quoted by the Gemara in Nidah 55b as the reason?)

Answer: This is only according to the opinion of Rebbi Akiva in our Gemara who does not agree with the reason of separating, or according to the opinion that does not hold blood becomes muddied and turns into milk. However, according to the Rabbanan of our Gemara we do not need this reason regarding a woman's milk, as we explained earlier, but rather only require it for making wanted animal's milk impure.