In a case where Shimon claimed that he had already repaid the debt that Reuven was claiming with a Sh'tar, what did Reuven counter?
(b)
Rav Nachman ruled 'Isra Sh'tara'. What does he mean by that?
(c)
What did Rav Papa say?
1)
(a)
In a case where Shimon claimed that he had already repaid the debt that Reuven was claiming with a Sh'tar - Reuven admitted that he had received money from Shimon, but claimed that it was in payment of a different debt ('Sitra'i Ninhu').
(b)
Rav Nachman ruled 'Isra Sh'tara' - seeing as Reuven admitted to having been paid, the Sh'tar was considered negated (since he did not have the authority to claim 'Sitra'i Ninhu' [see also Tosfos DH 'Isra']).
(c)
According to Rav Papa - Reuven was believed, and the Sh'tar retains its validity.
2)
(a)
We cite a similar case, but where Reuven claimed 'Sitra'i Ninhu' only after Shimon had countered that Reuven had given him the money for a specific purpose. Which purpose?
(b)
And what did he mean when he added 've'Asivas a'Mischasa'?
(c)
What did Rav Papa rule there?
(d)
How do we reconcile the two 'contradictory' rulings of Rav Papa?
2)
(a)
We cite a similar case, but where Reuven claimed 'Sitra'i Ninhu' only after Shimon had countered that Reuven had given him the money - to purchase oxen to enter into a joint venture (to Shecht them and share the profits).
(b)
And when he added 've'Asivas a'Mischasa', he meant that - Reuven had received his money when he turned up at the location where the meat was sold, and taken his share of the profits (and that this was the money under discussion).
(c)
Rav Papa ruled there - 'Isra Sh'tara' ...
(d)
... seeing as Reuven already went as far as to admit the details of the loan that Shimon described. Consequently, the likelihood that the Sh'tar was indeed invalid was stronger than in the previous case (see Ritva).
3)
(a)
Regarding the initial case, Rav Papi ruled 'Lo Isra Sh'tara' (like Rav Papa), whereas Rav Sheishes b'rei de'Rav Idi ruled 'Isra Sh'tara' (like Rav Nachman). What is the Halachah?
(b)
We restrict this ruling however, to where Shimon paid Reuven in the presence of witnesses. Why is that?
(c)
What would have been the Din had he paid him privately?
3)
(a)
Regarding the initial case, Rav Papi ruled 'Lo Isra Sh'tara' (like Rav Papa), whereas Rav Sheishes b'rei de'Rav Idi ruled 'Isra Sh'tara' (like Rav Nachman). The Halachah is - 'Isra Sh'tara'.
(b)
We restrict this ruling however, to where Shimon paid Reuven in the presence of witnesses - because Reuven failed to point out that he still had a documented claim on Shimon ...
(c)
... but if he had paid him privately - then Reuven would have been believed to say 'Sitra'i Ninhu' with a 'Migu' that he could have denied that Shimon paid him (like Avimi b'rei de'Rebbi Avahu ruled in Kesuvos).
4)
(a)
What happened in a case where Shimon stipulated that he would believe Reuven whenever the latter claimed that he had not yet paid?
(b)
On what grounds did Rav Papa object to Abaye and Rava's ruling that Shimon must now abide by his own condition and pay?
4)
(a)
In a case where Shimon stipulated that he would believe Reuven whenever the latter claimed that he had not yet paid - he went and paid in front of two witnesses.
(b)
Rav Papa objected to Abaye and Rava's ruling, that Shimon must now abide by his own condition and pay - on the grounds that he only accepted Reuven's word against his own (because he did not trust his own memory for whatever reason), but not against that of two witnesses.
5)
(a)
In which case are three witnesses an advantage over two?
(b)
What did Rav Papa therefore rule in a case where Shimon stipulated that he would believe Reuven like two witnesses, should he claim that he had not yet paid, and then went and paid him in front of three witnesses?
(c)
On what grounds did Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua disagree with that?
(d)
In the second Lashon, Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua again maintained that there is no difference between two witnesses and a hundred. What did he add this time with regard to a case where Shimon stipulated that he would believe Reuven like three witnesses ... ?
(e)
What is the difference between the two cases?
5)
(a)
Three witnesses are an advantage over two in cases of assessment, where the assessment of three is preferable to that of two.
(b)
Rav Papa therefore ruled that, in a case where Shimon stipulated that he would believe Reuven like two witnesses, should he claim that he had not yet paid, and then went and paid him in front of three witnesses - Reuven would not be believed (since here too, Shimon had said 'like two witnesses', but not like 'three').
(c)
Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua disagreed with that, because - since in general, 'T'rei ke'Me'ah' (there is no difference between two witnesses and a hundred), Reuven is believed, irrespective of how many witnesses were present when Shimon paid him.
(d)
In the second Lashon, Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua again maintained that there is no difference between two witnesses and a hundred. This time however, he added that - where Shimon stipulated that he would believe Reuven like three witnesses ... - then he meant specifically three and not four ...
(e)
... because this time, since he already specified three, he clearly meant to preclude more than that; whereas in the previous case, where he specified 'two', he merely meant any amount of witnesses (seeing as 'T'rei ke'Me'ah').
6)
(a)
We learned in our Mishnah 'Ein Nishba'in al Ta'anas Cheresh, Shoteh ve'Katan'. Seeing as a Cheresh cannot speak, how can he present a claim?
(b)
What do we learn from the word "Ish" (in the Pasuk in Mishpatim, in connection with the Din of Shevu'as ha'Dayanim) "Ki Yiten Ish el Re'ehu Kesef O Keilim Lish'mor"?
(c)
From where do we learn the Din by Cheresh and Shoteh?
(d)
Rav reconciles the above with the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Aval Nishba'in al Ta'anas Katan', by establishing the latter like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov. What does Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov say?
6)
(a)
We learned in our Mishnah 'Ein Nishba'in al Ta'anas Cheresh, Shoteh ve'Katan'. Even though a Cheresh cannot speak - he can present a Ta'anah using sign language.
(b)
We learn from the Pasuk (in connection with the Din of Shevu'as ha'Dayanim) "Ki Yiten Ish el Re'ehu Kesef O Keilim Lish'mor" that - the claim of a Katan (whose Nesinah cannot create legal repercussions) does not obligate a Shevu'ah.
(c)
We learn the Din by Cheresh and a Shoteh - from the same source as Katan, since like him, they have no Da'as.
(d)
Rav reconciles the above with the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Aval Nishba'in al Ta'anas Katan', by establishing the latter like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov, who rules in a Beraisa that - if someone admits to a Katan that his father lent him a Manah of which he returned half, he is Chayav to swear.
7)
(a)
Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov actually refers to the case as 'Nishba al Ta'anas Atzmo'. Why is that?
(b)
On what grounds do the Chachamim therefore argue with him?
(c)
What problem do we now have with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov?
(d)
We reject the suggestion that the Katan actually claimed from him, because did the Mishnah not say 'Ein Nishba'in al Ta'anas Katan' (see Maharshal). So we establish it where the claimant is a Gadol. Then why does the Tana refer to him as a Katan?
7)
(a)
Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov actually refers to the case as 'Nishba al Ta'anas Atzmo' - because it is the debtor who admitted to the Katan that he borrowed the money, and not the Katan who claimed from him.
(b)
The Chachamim argue with him - on the basis of the principle of 'Meishiv Aveidah' (incorporating all cases where there is no claimant [as we have already learned]) which is not subject to a Shevu'ah.
(c)
The problem with Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov is - how he can argue with 'Meishiv Aveidah'.
(d)
We reject the suggestion that the Katan actually claimed from him, because did the Mishnah not say 'Ein Nishba'in al Ta'anas Katan' (see Maharshal). So we establish it where the claimant is a Gadol, whom the Tana refers to as 'a Katan' - because when it comes to the affairs of his father, he is considered a Katan.
42b----------------------------------------42b
8)
(a)
Regarding the Kashya why Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov refers to it as 'Ta'anas Atzmo', on what grounds do we reject the answer 'Ta'anas Acherim ve'Hoda'as Atzmo'?
(b)
So we establish the Machlokes Tana'im when in fact it is a Katan who is claiming from him, and they argue over Rabah's explanation of 'Modeh be'Miktzas'. What makes this claim subject to a Shevu'ah any more than the regular claim of a Katan?
(c)
Why does Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov then refer to it as 'Ta'anas Atzmo'?
8)
(a)
With regard to the Kashya why Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov refers to it as 'Ta'anas Atzmo', we reject the answer 'Ta'anas Acherim ve'Hoda'as Atzmo' - on the grounds that every claim is 'Ta'anas Acherim ve'Hoda'as Atzmo'.
(b)
So we establish the Machlokes Tana'im where in fact it is a Katan who is claiming from him, and they argue over Rabah's explanation of 'Modeh be'Miktzas', and what makes this claim subject to a Shevu'ah any more than the regular claim of a Katan is the fact that - it was a Gadol who handed the debtor the money and not the Katan (as we thought until now).
(c)
And Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov then refers to it as 'Ta'anas Atzmo' - because the claim of a Katan is generally considered Ta'anas Atzmo (even though in this case, it is not).
9)
(a)
What does Rabah say to explain why every 'Modeh be'Miktzas' is not Patur from a Shevu'ah with a 'Migu' of 'Kofer ba'Kol'?
(b)
If, as Rabah goes on to say, the debtor really wants to admit to the entire claim, then why doesn't he?
(c)
Why does Rabah need to add that he really wants to admit to the entire claim?
(d)
We finally establish the basis of the Machlokes Tana'im on the She'eilah whether 'Ein Adam Me'iz Panav bi'Fenei Ba'al Chovo' extends to the creditor's son (from whom the debtor did not actually borrow) or not. What is then the reasoning behind ...
1.
... Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov's ruling, who holds that it does?
2.
... the Chachamim's ruling, who holds that it doesn't?
9)
(a)
Rabah explains that 'Modeh be'Miktzas' is not Patur from a Shevu'ah with a 'Migu' of 'Kofer ba'Kol' - because a debtor would not have the Chutzpah to deny entirely, the claim of someone who did him a favor and lent him money.
(b)
As a matter of fact, he really wants to admit to the entire claim, as Rabah goes on to say - but cannot, because he doesn't have the means to pay, so he makes a compromise and admits to half, with the intention of admitting to the rest when he obtains the rest of the money.
(c)
Rabah needs to add that he really wants to admit to the entire claim - because if he didn't, the Torah would not allow someone who is suspect in money-matters to swear (because whoever is suspect in the one is suspect in the other).
(d)
We finally establish the basis of the Machlokes Tana'im on the She'eilah whether 'Ein Adam Me'iz Panav bi'Fenei Ba'al Chovo' extends to the creditor's son (from whom the debtor did not actually borrow) or not. The reasoning behind ...
1.
... Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov's ruling, who holds that it does, is that - consequently, the debtor is not 'Meishiv Aveidah' (since he has no 'Migu' of Kofer ba'Kol, as we explained).
2.
... the Chachamim's ruling, who holds that it doesn't is that - consequently, he has a 'Migu' of Kofer ba'Kol, rendering him a 'Meishiv Aveidah'.
10)
(a)
What does the Reisha of our Mishnah rule in the case of 'Manah le'Aba be'Yadcha; Ein l'cha be'Yadi Ela Chamishim Dinar'?
(b)
Why does this not contradict the Seifa, which we just established like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov?
10)
(a)
The Reisha of our Mishnah rules - 'Manah le'Aba be'Yadcha; Ein l'cha be'Yadi Ela Chamishim Dinar - Patur Mipnei she'Hu ke'Meishiv Aveidah'.
(b)
This does not contradict the Seifa, which we just established like Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov - because it speaks where the son himself is not sure (in which case even he [Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov) agrees that the debtor will be Me'iz Panim, and is therefore a 'Meishiv Aveidah' as we just explained).
11)
(a)
Shmuel establishes the Seifa where Reuven claims from the property of Yesomim (unconnected to Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov). What is then the source of the Shevu'ah?
(b)
To answer the Kashya that we have already learned this in a Mishnah in 'Kol ha'Nishba'in', we cite a Beraisa quoted by Abaye Keshisha. What does Abaye Keshisha's Beraisa say to explain why we need two Mishnos regarding this Shevu'ah?
(c)
What other special ruling with regard to claiming from Yesomim does the Beraisa mention?
11)
(a)
Shmuel establishes the Seifa where Reuven claims from the property of Yesomim (unconnected to Rebbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov). In that case, the source of the Shevu'ah is - the principle that one can never claim from Yesomim without a Shevu'ah.
(b)
To answer the Kashya that we have already learned this in a Mishnah in 'Kol ha'Nishba'in', we cite a Beraisa quoted by Abaye Keshisha who says that - the Mishnah speaks even by Gedolim, how much more so, Ketanim. Consequently, one of the Mishnos refers to Ketanim, the other, to Gedolim.
(c)
The other special ruling that the Beraisa mentions with regard to claiming from Yesomim is that - whoever claims from them may only claim Ziburis (inferior quality lands), as opposed to the Beinonis that a creditor normally has the right to claim.
12)
(a)
Our Mishnah concludes 'Aval Nishba'in ... le'Hekdesh'. How does Shmuel establish this ruling?
(b)
How do we query this from the same Mishnah in 'Kol ha'Nishba'in'?
(c)
How do we answer this Kashya? Why might we have thought that Hekdesh is different and does not therefore require a Shevu'ah?
(d)
What does Rav Huna say about a Sh'chiv-Mera who declares 'Manah li'Peloni be'Yadi' after declaring all his property Hekdesh? Why is that?
(e)
How do we reconcile this with our Mishnah, which holds 'Adam Oseh Kenunyah im Hekdesh'?
12)
(a)
Our Mishnah concludes 'Aval Nishba'in ... le'Hekdesh'. Shmuel establishes this ruling - in the same way as he established 'Aval Nishba'in le'Katan ... ' (that precedes it) 'Lipara mi'Nechsei Hekdesh' (meaning that, if Reuven produces a Sh'tar-Chov against Shimon, who has declared all his property Hekdesh, he must swear).
(b)
We query this however, from the same Mishnah in 'Kol ha'Nishba'in' - in that here too, the Tana has already taught us that one cannot claim from Nechasim Meshubadim without a Shevu'ah (and there seems to be no reason why Meshubad to Hekdesh should be any different than Meshubad to a Hedyot).
(c)
We answer that Hekdesh might indeed be different - inasmuch as a person who is suspected of collusion against Hedyot, will not necessarily do such a thing against Hekdesh ('Ein Adam Oseh Kenunyah al Hekdesh'), in which case, a Shevu'ah ought not to be necessary).
(d)
Rav Huna rules that a Sh'chiv-Mera who declares 'Manah li'Peloni be'Yadi' after declaring all his property Hekdesh - is believed, and we give the Manah to P'loni without a Shevu'ah, because 'Ein Adam Oseh Kenunyah al Hekdesh'.
(e)
We reconcile this with our Mishnah, which holds 'Adam Oseh Kenunyah im Hekdesh' - by pointing out that Rav Huna is speaking about a Sh'chiv-Mera, who stands to gain nothing anyway, and we have a principle 'Ein Adam Chotei ve'Lo lo' ('Reuven will not sin on Shimon's behalf)
13)
(a)
Our Mishnah lists four things over which one does not swear. The first three are Avadim, Sh'taros and Karka'os. What is the fourth?
(b)
What else are these four things not subject to?
(c)
A Shomer Chinam does not swear over them. Does a Shomer Sachar have to pay?
(d)
According to Rebbi Shimon, one swears over Kodshim she'Chayav be'Acharayusan. What does this mean?
13)
(a)
Our Mishnah lists four things over which one does not swear, Avadim, Sh'taros and Karka'os and - Hekdesh.
(b)
Neither are they subject to - Tashlumei Kefel or Tashlumei Arba'ah va'Chamishah.
(c)
A Shomer Chinam does not swear over them - neither does a Shomer Sachar have to pay?
(d)
According to Rebbi Shimon, one swears over Kodshim she'Chayav be'Acharayusan - Kodshim for which one is responsible, such as someone who declares 'Harei alai Olah' (which he is obligated to fulfill even if he designates an animal which is subsequently stolen [as opposed to 'Harei Zu Olah', which he not obligated to replace ]).
14)
(a)
To what is Rebbi referring when he says 'Yesh Devarim she'Hein ke'Karka, ve'Einan ke'Karka'?
(b)
What do the Chachamim say?
(c)
What principle governs the Tana's ruling 'Bayis Malei Masarti lach ... ve'Halah Omer Eini Yode'a, Ela Mah she'Hinachta Atah Noteil, Patur'?
(d)
What does the Tana rule in the case 'Zeh Omer ad ha'Ziz, ve'Zeh Omer ad ha'Chalon'?
14)
(a)
When Rebbi says 'Yesh Devarim she'Hein ke'Karka, ve'Einan ke'Karka' he means that - if Shimon denies five out of ten laden vines that are still attached to the ground and that Reuven is claiming from him, he is obligated to swear.
(b)
The Chachamim maintain that - whatever is attached to the ground is considered Karka (and is not therefore subject to a Shevu'ah).
(c)
The principle that governs the Tana's ruling 'Bayis Malei Masarti lach ... ve'Halah Omer Eini Yode'a, Ela Mah she'Hinachta Atah Noteil, Patur' is - 'Ein Nishba'in Ela al Davar she'be'Midah, ve'she'be'Mishkal, ve'she'be'Minyan' (One only swears over something that has a specified measure, weight or number) .
(d)
In the case of 'Zeh Omer ad ha'Ziz, ve'Zeh Omer ad ha'Chalon' - the Tana rules 'Chayav (Shevu'ah)'.
15)
(a)
What does the Beraisa learn from the ...
1.
... Pasuk in Mishpatim (in connection with Kefel)"Al Kol D'var Pesha ('Klal') al Shor al Chamor ... (P'rat), al Kol Aveidah' (K'lal)?
2.
... the word "le'Re'eihu" (in the following phrase "Yeshalem Shenayim le'Re'eihu ")?
(b)
What is the source to exempt Avadim, Sh'taros, Karka'os and Hekdesh from 'Tashlumei Arba'ah va'Chamishah'?
(c)
And what do we learn from the Pasuk there ...
1.
... (in connection with the Shevu'ah of a Shomer Chinam) "Ki Yiten Ish el Re'eihu (K'lal) Kesef O Keilim (P'rat) Lishmor (Klal)"?
2.
... (in connection with the Chiyuv Geneivah va'Aveidah of a Shomer Sachar) "Ki Yiten Ish el Re'eihu (K'lal) Chamor O Shor O Seh (P'rat) ve'Chol Beheimah Lishmor (K'lal)"?
3.
... "Re'eihu" in both cases?
15)
(a)
The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Mishpatim ...
1.
... "Al Kol D'var Pesha ('Klal') al Shor al Chamor ... (P'rat), al Kol Aveidah' (K'lal) that - one is only Chayav Kefel for things that are similar to the P'rat (if they are moveable and have an intrinsic value, to preclude Avadim, Sh'taros and Karka'os).
2.
... the word "le'Re'eihu" (in the following phrase "Yeshalem Shenayim le'Re'eihu ") that - Hekdesh is not subject to Kefel either.
(b)
The source to exempt Avadim, Sh'taros, Karka'os and Hekdesh from 'Tashlumei Arba'ah va'Chamishah' - is the fact that one is already Patur from Kefel, and the Torah obligates 'Tashlumei Arba'ah va'Chamishah, and not 'Tashlumei Sheloshah ve'Arba'ah'.
(c)
And we learn from the Pasuk there ...
1.
... (in connection with the Shevu'ah of a Shomer Chinam) "Ki Yiten Ish el Re'eihu (K'lal) Kesef O Keilim (P'rat) Lishmor (Klal)" - that a Shomer Chinam of Avadim, Sh'taros or Karka'os is not obligated to swear.
2.
... (in connection with the Chiyuv Geneivah va'Aveidah of a Shomer Sachar) "Ki Yiten Ish el Re'eihu (K'lal) Chamor O Shor O Seh (P'rat) ve'Chol Beheimah Lishmor (K'lal)" - that a Shomer Sachar of Avadim, Sh'taros or Karka'os is not obligated to pay.
3.
... "Re'eihu" in both cases - that a Shomer of Hekdesh is Patur from swearing and from paying.
