Question: This is difficult. At the end of Makos (22a), the Gemara asks that we should also include someone who says that he will not plow on Yom Tov. It is difficult to say this Tana does not hold that an Issur Kollel takes effect. Why, then, doesn't the Gemara there answer as does our Gemara, that a prohibition that takes effect on things that are not tangible are not listed?

Answer: It is possible to answer that the Gemara there gives a better answer.

Observation: This is derived in Nedarim (16b) from the Pasuk, "to Hash-m." In Nazir (5a) we derive from the Pasuk, "From wine and Sheichar he should be separated" that wine used for Mitzvos is forbidden, just as regular wine is forbidden.

Question: This is difficult. Why do we need two such Pesukim? Nedarim and Nezirus are compared to each other in Nedarim (3a)! [This should be derived through a comparison, and should not require any Pesukim, let alone two Pesukim!]

Answer: These Pesukim are required. Nezirus forbids all wine on the person. Therefore, it takes effect regarding wine used for Mitzvos just as it takes effect on regular wine. However, perhaps Nedarim where one only forbids himself from a Mitzvah such as Sukah, Shofar, Lulav, or Tefilin are not valid! If only Nedarim would be stated, I would think that this is because one forbids the item used to perform the Mitzvos upon himself. However, a Nazir who forbids himself from drinking wine might not have his vow take effect. Even when a person forbids himself from going into the Sukah by using a Neder it does not take effect!

Question: The Gemara in Nedarim (16b) asks, why do we say regarding Nedarim that they are even valid when one forbids a Mitzvah (item) upon himself? This is because the Pasuk says, "When he will make a Neder to Hash-m (...his word should not become mundane)." (This teaches us that a Neder regarding a Mitzvah should also not become mundane.) The Pasuk also states regarding a Shevuah, "Or he will make a Shevuah to Hash-m (...his word should not become mundane)!" [Why, then, isn't this also the law regarding a Shevuah?]

Answer: The Gemara (ibid.) answers there is a difference between him saying that he forbids the sitting of a Sukah from him (Neder), and saying he will not sit in a Sukah (Shevuah).

Observation: This implies that being that when one makes a Neder he forbids the Sukah to himself, it is understandable that the Neder should be valid. The Sukah becomes forbidden to him like a Korban, and the Sukah itself is not commanded in performing any Mitzvos. However, when making a Shevuah, a person forbids himself from sitting in a Sukah. This Shevuah is invalid, as he is already committed to indeed sit in a Sukah.

Question: This is difficult. If so, why is this considered to a more stringent aspect of Nedarim over Shevuos? A Shevuah would be valid if he said that sitting in a Sukah is forbidden to him. In such a case he only forbids the item (i.e. Sukah) to himself, and the Shevuah should therefore take effect!

Proof: This is as the Gemara says later (29a) and in Nedarim (24b) regarding a Shevuas Shav, where someone says, "All of the fruit in the world should be forbidden upon me with a Shevuah if I did not see a camel flying in the air." [This is a valid Shevuah because he forbade the fruit to himself instead of forbidding himself from the fruit.]

Implied Question: The Gemara in Nedarim (2b) says that being that the Tana stated Nedarim, where a person forbids items to himself, he also stated Charamim where a person forbids items to himself as opposed to Shevuos where a person forbids himself from an item. [This implies that there is no such thing as a Shevuah where one forbids an item to himself!]

Answer: This just means that Shevuos can also be made by a person forbidding himself from an item. However, Nedarim and Charamim are only made by forbidding an item from himself.

Answer#1: The stringency in Nedarim is that whenever it would take effect on a regular item, it would take effect on a Mitzvah item. This is when he forbids the item to himself. However, when he forbids himself from the item it does not even take effect if he is forbidding himself from a regular item. For example, saying "Konam my body on an item," with Konam meaning that it should be like a Korban, is not possible regarding a Neder. However, a Shevuah does not take effect on a Mitzvah item like it does on a regular item when he forbids himself from an item.

Answer#2: Rabeinu Elchanan answers in the name of the Ri that regarding a Shevuah, even if he would say, "The sitting of a Sukah is to me a Shevuah" he has forbidden himself from the item (not the item from himself). This is because the term Shevuah by definition means forbidding himself, and Konam by definition means he is forbidding an item to himself like a Korban (and not forbidding himself). This is also why a Shevuah does take effect regarding sleeping, as he has forbidden himself. However, if a person takes a Neder to forbid sleep to himself, he has forbidden something that is intangible (and it is therefore clearly invalid).

Proof: In Nedarim (15a), Ravina concludes that Nedarim take effect according to Rabbinic law (not Torah law) on something that is intangible.

Observation: It is now understandable that the Gemara in Nedarim (2b, says that Nedarim) excludes Shevuos, as a Shevuah is an oath where one forbids himself from an object.

Answer#3: Rabeinu Tam explains that later (29a) and in Nedarim (24b), the Gemara is not discussing a case where he said, "They should be forbidden upon me with an oath." Rather, it means that he says a phrase that means that through a Shevuah fruits should be forbidden to him. The case is when he says that he swears that he will not eat fruit.

Text: Most Sefarim do not have the text "with a Shevuah." However, saying, "they should be forbidden to me with a Shevuah" is nothing, even when trying to forbid a regular item. This is because he is forbidding an item to himself. We now indeed understand why Nedarim are more stringent than Shevuos (the question in (d) above).

Question: Based on the Gemara's current train of thought that he means he will never sleep, this is difficult. The Gemara should have asked this as a question earlier (19b), regarding the Mishnah that discusses a person who makes a Shevuah that he will or will not eat!

Answer#1: It is possible to answer that regarding eating there is no way to mistakenly think that he means forever. (See the Maharsha who asks that there does not seem to be any difference between eating and sleeping in this regard.) The Tana therefore had no need to explain that he meant for the immediate future.

Answer#2: Alternatively, there too it can mean forever. The case could be where he swore on a loaf in front of him (that he will or will not eat it). (This is why there is no question that it is impossible, as he could easily keep his Shevuah regarding this loaf.)

Question: Earlier, Shmuel stated that the reason was because he cannot control whether or not someone will do so or not do so in the future. [How can he now say a different reason?]

Answer: This (the reason given earlier) is not from Shmuel's own words. Rather, the Gemara is giving a possible explanation of Shmuel. This is seen in many places throughout Shas (i.e. see TOSFOS YOMA 40B, DH V'ASAHU).

Question: Rabeinu Ezra Ha'Navi asks that Rav here derives using the "Ribuy and Miut" -- "inclusive and exclusive" method of understanding the Pesukim. In Bava Kama (96b), Rav holds like Rebbi Meir who says that we say regarding the theft of slaves that one can give back the slave and simply tell the owner, "Here is what is yours before you," as they are not actually stolen, just like land is not actually stolen. However, the opinion that holds that slaves are like land derives this using the "Klal and Perat" -- "inclusive and exclusive" method of understanding the Pesukim, as is apparent later (37b) and in Bava Kama (117b). [How, then, can Rav also hold that slaves are like land?]

Answer: He must hold of a Pasuk which is exclusive, implying that slaves are not like regular items (and are like land), as I explained earlier (4B, DH REBBI AKIVA).

Implied Question: One cannot establish that the case is on Shabbos or Yom Tov (when one cannot put on Tefilin). (Why not?)

Answer#1: Why would the Mishnah state, "I didn't put on (Tefilin)" unless the purpose was to teach that even though there is no possibility that he can Halachically skip a day of putting on Tefilin he is still liable?

Answer#2: Alternatively, the Gemara is giving an answer even according to the opinion that Shabbos is a time when one could put on Tefilin.

Implied Question: The Gemara could have established that this is according to Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah, who does not require that there be a permitted possibility to either do or not do this action in order to bring a Korban Shevuah. (Why didn't the Gemara do so?)

Answer: The Gemara would rather establish that this is according to everyone.

Question: This is difficult. There should be a question on Ula from the Mishnah itself! The Mishnah later (29a) says, "What is a Shevuas Shav? It is if someone swears to change something that is known." This implies that if he does not change something that is known, he is liable because of Shevuas Bituy, even though it is not possible to be in his control to do so in the future.

Proof: This is also implied by the Mishnah (ibid.). It discusses a person who swears, "If I did not see a snake as thick as the beam of a press" and says that this is a Shevuas Shav, because no such thing exists. This implies that if it would be possible to see this, he would be liable because it is a Shevuas Bituy, even though he has no control regarding whether or not he would indeed see a snake that is that big. [The Gemara earlier said that it must be in one's ability to either do or not do what he has stated in order for him to have to bring a Korban Shevuah.]

Answer#1: However, according to Rava's explanation that he said, "All of the fruit of the world should be forbidden to me if I did not see etc." this is understandable. Our Gemara cannot deduce anything from there, as the oath there is regarding whether or not he will be forbidden from eating fruit. (If he forbids himself from eating all fruit he has made a Shevuas Shav because he cannot refrain from eating all fruits, see TOSFOS 29A DH B'OMER.)

Answer#2: Alternatively, there it would be possible for him to control whether or not he would see a snake as thick as a beam from a press, being that it is in the world.

Explanation: This is not referring to a Shevuas ha'Eidus, as the case is where he does not currently require this testimony.

Question: This is difficult. The Toras Kohanim derives from the Pasuk, "l'Achas" -- "for one" that if someone swears not to eat bread from wheat, barley, and rye he is liable for each one separately. However, our Gemara derives from this Pasuk that he is only liable for one prohibition altogether!

Answer: It is possible to answer that in Toras Kohanim the derivation is from the word "l'Achas," while our Gemara derives from the word "from these." This latter word implies that he is only liable for some of these that are stated in the Parshah, not everything.

Answer#2: Alternatively, our Gemara derives this from the Lamed in the word "l'Achas." Shmuel derives from the entire word the lesson derived by the Toras Kohanim.

Observation: It could have said that this was in order to make witnesses liable, even if they are sworn by others who say the oath and they do not say Amen. This is as opposed to a Shevuas Bituy where this would not be the case.