Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Toras Kohanim derives this from a Perat u'Klal, and it quotes this Pasuk.

Answer: The Toras Kohanim means to state an indication (i.e. akin to an abbreviation) as to how it is derived, as here the Gemara states this is derived from a Klal u'Perat u'Klal.

Observation: It appears that regarding Shabbos, everyone agrees that they are not considered as if they are harvested. They are considered connected, as he derives from the harvesting of the plants used for the dyes that they must have been harvested once they were ready for harvesting.

Opinion#1: Regarding a creditor, being that the grapes do not require being connected to the land, they are considered as being harvested according to everyone.

Proof: This is apparent from the Gemara in Kesuvos (51a) regarding Rav Yosef's statement that dates should be given to the creditor from the mat that was placed under the tree. The Gemara asked, whatever is supposed to be harvested should be considered as if it is already harvested. If this was part of our argument, why would the Gemara there ask this question on Rav Yosef? Perhaps he holds like the Rabbanan in our Gemara! (It is therefore obvious that even the Rabbanan hold that they are considered as if they are already harvested when it comes to the collection of a creditor.)

Opinion#2: However, Rabeinu Chananel explains that the Gemara there rules according to Rebbi Meir. We rule like this because in Bava Kama (59b) we rule like Rebbi Shimon who says that if someone's animal eats ripe fruits, he must pay for ripe fruits.

Opinion(cont.): This is as explained in the Gemara that when the Torah says, "And he will destroy in another field" it means that the evaluation of the damage should be done as if it was in another field. However, this is only if the items damaged needed the field (i.e. they still needed to grow from the field). However, these fruits, being that they no longer needed the field he needs to pay for them as they are. This implies that they are as if they are detached from the ground.

Opinion#1: The Riva explains that it appears from that which is taught in Bava Kama (63b) "dress - excluding something that cannot be precisely identified," meaning that it has no obvious length, weight, or number of objects in it (that an owner would remember as a Siman that it is his).

Opinion#2: However, some give a different explanation in that Gemara that it is coming to exclude half of a pomegranate or nut. This is as stated in Bava Metzia (47a) regarding an acquisition (of Chalifin using a vessel) that just as a shoe is a clear item, so too any clear item (can be used for Chalifin). This is as opposed to half of a pomegranate or nut that cannot be used for Chalifin.

Implied Question: There is an opinion in Bava Metzia that if someone says to his claimant, "Take whatever it is that you gave me," he is exempt. (Why, then, does the Mishnah say the person is liable?)

Answer: It must be that the case of the Mishnah is where the amount he admits he owes is no longer present (and he therefore cannot say that the claimant should actually "Take whatever it is that you gave me").

Explanation: The Mishnah must be discussing a specific house. Otherwise, even when they argue about whether the house was full until the beam or the window it would not be about a specific amount (and he therefore would not have to swear).

Question: Why isn't "this full house" considered something that is clearly measured? Once he says "this full house" and the person returns it to him missing a certain amount, it is clearly lacking. This should be like a case of "until the roof" or "until the beam!"

Answer#1: It is possible to answer that when it is only missing a little bit it is still called full. It is therefore not clear how much they are arguing over.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it could be that we require that he mention an amount when he admits.

Question: Perhaps this includes a case of a house in general? We still have not learned that the reason that he is exempt in the first case is because he did not admit to the type of thing that was claimed, as is explained. In a case of "a (full) house," he (even) admits to the type of claim!

Answer: The term "that he should claim from him" implies that their claims are apparent, and it is clear how much of a difference there is between them. This is also the language of Rava himself. The term "and he should admit" implies that he mentions in his admission an amount that he owes.

Question: However, there is a difficulty. Why does the Beraisa say, "This is the rule?" This is not relative to the first part of the Beraisa where the admission is not from the type of item claimed!

Answer: Based on the understanding that this is referring to a lamp of many parts, this is understandable, as in the first part of the Mishnah he is exempt even if he admits to owing a lamp of many parts which is similar to his claim. This is because we require a defined size.

Answer(cont.): This also helps us understand why the Gemara says this includes "this (full) house." "A (full) house" is not needed, as from the first part of the Beraisa we understand this, being that it is not an object with a clearly defined size.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that this is because he might not have been exact in how much the object is worth. This will cause him to be invalid for testimony and oaths in the future. This is also the explanation of Rabeinu Chananel here.

Question: However, in Bava Metzia (34b), Rabeinu Chananel asked on this reason, "Do we make a decree in order to help evildoers?" (In other words, why should we protect someone who is lying? Let him become invalid for testimony and oaths! He is a liar!)

Opinion#2: Rather, the reason is because the lender might take out the deposited item, and this will cause the borrower's oath to be for nothing. [See also Tosfos in Bava Metzia 34b, DH "Shema."]

Explanation: We will explain later, with Hash-m's help, why this is not stated later among the cases of those who swear and collect.

Observation: The Gemara implies that Rav Ashi's answer stands.

Question: In Bava Metzia (35a), the Gemara implies that Rav Ashi himself retracted his own answer. The Gemara asks a question there from the beginning of the second part of the Mishnah, which is a case where the borrower says that his loan was one Sela but his collateral was worth two Sela. The lender says that both the loan and collateral were worth one Sela. He is exempt from taking an oath.

Question(cont.): The Gemara asks, if you will say that the lender must swear that it is not in his possession, he should also be obligated to swear through a Gilgul Shevuah how much it was worth! Rav Ashi says that the case is where the borrower believes the lender that he has not taken it for himself (in which case there is no oath it is not in his possession, and certainly no Gilgul Shevuah). This implies that Rav Ashi retracted his answer, as otherwise we could have answered this also for the first part of the Mishnah, and the entire case could be when he believes the lender.

Answer: It is possible to answer that in the first case of the Mishnah it is not normal that he should believe the other person. He would then be unable to swear, as the other person might proceed to pull out the deposit and he will lose.

Text#1: Rashi's statement that this is actually referring to the second part of the Mishnah as the oath is on the lender seems to be a printer's error.

Text#2: Rather, Rashi must mean that this is referring to the first part of the Mishnah, as the oath is on the borrower.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that being that a metal bar can be used as payment, he only accepted it as collateral for what it was worth.

Question: This is difficult. Later, the Gemara asks from a Mishnah, why is the borrower liable? He can say to the lender, you accepted this (opposite the value of the loan)! Why is this a question? Shmuel admits that when something can be used for payment it is clearly not opposite more of the loan than it is worth!

Question(cont.): One cannot say that the Gemara is only asking on the opinion of Nehardai, as the Gemara answers, "Shmuel said this when etc."

Answer: We are pressed to differentiate that Rav Nachman admits regarding one metal bar or two metal bars. However, when the collateral is a bar plus a handle (of a scythe), it is clear that the handle is the collateral and the bar is for payment.

Opinion#2: It seems that this is what the Gemara means. However, not a handle or metal bar. Rather, if he loses each, he loses the amount of the loan proportionate to the sum total of the value of the two items given as collateral. If the metal bar was worth ten handles, then if he loses the metal bar he loses ten out of eleven parts of the loan. If he loses the handle, he loses one eleventh of the loan.

Opinion#3: Additionally, it seems we can explain that "not a handle or metal bar" means that if he loses the handle first he does not lose half, but rather whatever the handle is worth. The lender is primarily relying on the metal bar. If the lender then proceeds to lose the bar, he loses everything. However, if the lender loses the bar first he loses half of the loan. If he then proceeds to lose the handle, he loses the entire loan. Nehardai say that even if he loses the handle first he loses half.

Text: The text in the beginning of their words is, "If he loses the handle, he loses half."

Text: Rabeinu Chananel and Rabeinu Tam have the opposite text. Their text is that Shmuel was discussing a case where he explicitly said that the collateral is equivalent to the value of the loan. This is because there is no reason to say that the lender should lose his entire loan when they did not explicitly state that the collateral is equivalent to the entire value of the loan.

Question: The Gemara later entertains that the argument between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva is dependent on whether or not they hold like the statement of Shmuel. If the case is where it was explicitly stated that the collateral is equivalent to the value of the loan, what is the reasoning of Rebbi Eliezer?

Answer#1: Rebbi Eliezer holds that this is an Asmachta (condition that was never binding due to the disproportionate penalty, see Tosfos in Sanhedrin 24b, DH "Kol"), and therefore he does not even lose the amount of money that the collateral is worth. This is as the Gemara states in Bava Metzia (66b) that an Asmachta cannot be used as an Apotiki to collect from.

Answer#1(cont.): Rebbi Akiva does not consider an Asmachta to be something besides a case where a sharecropper says to his employer, "If I will let the land lie fallow and do not plant (I will pay you a huge amount of money)." This is because he does not intend to be held liable, and is just promising this to the landowner in order to make him trust him and believe him. However, here his intent is indeed that if he loses the collateral he will not collect, and it therefore is said to be a valid condition.

Implied Question: This is even true according to the opinion that gambling is considered an Asmachta in Sanhedrin (24b). (Why is gambling an Asmachta while this is not considered an Asmachta?)

Answer: Gambling is different, as he does not necessarily lose. (The reason it is an Asmachta is because he is convinced he will not lose.) However, when he loses the collateral, he has agreed beforehand to lose his loan. Certainly if Shmuel is discussing a case where he did not specify beforehand that the collateral is equivalent to the loan, we require this reason.

Answer#2: It is also possible to say that their argument does not involve Asmachta. When the Gemara says he was explicit, it does not mean that he explicitly stated that if he loses the collateral he will lose the entire loan. Rather, it is as Rabeinu Chananel explains, that even though the collateral is not worth one thousand zuz, he accepts this. (The argument is regarding what exactly he accepts.) Rebbi Eliezer holds that this means that he will keep the collateral until the entire debt is paid. Rebbi Akiva understands this means that he accepted that if he loses the collateral, he loses the loan.

Question: In Bava Metzia (81b), why don't we say that the Mishnah that says that if someone lends with collateral he is a Shomer Sachar is even like Rebbi Eliezer? Why can't we say that if he explicitly made a condition, Rebbi Eliezer would agree to Shmuel's law?

Answer: It is possible to say that if Rebbi Eliezer admits in a case where he was explicit, and the argument is in a case where he was not explicit, why shouldn't he lose the value of the collateral according to Rebbi Eliezer? The phrase, "He should swear and receive his money" implies that even the value of the collateral

Observation: It is now understandable why the Gemara says that everyone does not agree with Shmuel. One would have thought it would say that everyone agrees with Shmuel.

Observation(cont.): It is understandable according to the text of the Sefarim and Rashi that Shmuel is discussing a case where this was not made clear beforehand, one cannot say that everyone holds like Shmuel. Being that even if he is not explicit he loses the entire loan, if he is explicit he should (perhaps) not lose the entire loan, but he should still lose the value of the collateral. Why, then, would Rebbi Eliezer say that he should take all his money, implying even the amount of the loan that is the value of the collateral? (In other words, it is clear that everyone will not agree with Shmuel.)

Observation(cont.): However, according to Rabeinu Chananel's explanation that Shmuel is discussing a case where he was explicit about the collateral, the Gemara should have said that everyone agrees with Shmuel. According to Rebbi Eliezer he can swear and take his money in a case where he was not explicit. Rebbi Akiva's reasoning is because of Rebbi Yitzchak's law, as explained now (44a).

Observation(cont.): However, according to what Rabeinu Chananel explained that the amount opposite the collateral is considered explicit, this is understandable. Rebbi Eliezer certainly does not agree with Shmuel, as his statement that he should take implies that he should even take the amount opposite the value of the collateral. It is not possible to say that he merely took the collateral to remember the loan regarding the value that is opposite the collateral.

Implied Question: The Gemara says later (44b) that he took the collateral just to remember the loan. (Why can't we say this regarding the value opposite the collateral?)

Answer: This is only if everyone does not agree with Shmuel.

Observation: If the Gemara would have explicitly said that the law does not follow Shmuel, it would have been more understandable why it did not say that everyone does hold like Shmuel (as how could they if we do not rule like his position).

Opinion#1: For this reason (that the Gemara says everyone does not agree with Shmuel), Rabeinu Chananel rules that the law does not follow Shmuel. This is also the opinion of the Bahag.

Opinion#2: This does not seem right, as this is not a proof. The Gemara could not have said that everyone holds of Shmuel, as we have explained above.

Proof#1: On the contrary, it seems that the law does follow Shmuel, as we rule like Rav Nachman in monetary matters.

Proof#2: Additionally, according to Rabah, whom we rule according to when he argues with Rav Yosef, we must say that the argument between Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Akiva is whether or not they hold like Shmuel. We rule like Rebbi Akiva (who holds like Shmuel) in that argument, as Rebbi Eliezer was from the school of Shamai (and we do not rule in accordance with the school of Shamai).

Proof#3: Additionally, the Gemara compares the case later (44b) where the collateral is worth half of the loan to the law of Shmuel. In Bava Metzia (48b), the Gemara compares this case to Rebbi Yochanan's law that one acquires the entire loan opposite the collateral. If so, Rebbi Yochanan holds like Shmuel. We know that when there is an argument between Rav and Rebbi Yochanan, the law follows Rebbi Yochanan.

Implied Question: There is no proof to be brought from the fact that Shmuel himself holds this way regarding the case quoted later (44b). This is despite the fact that the question is one of monetary matters, and we usually rule like Shmuel in monetary matters. (Why isn't this a proof?)

Answer: This is because the case of collateral discussed there is a matter of prohibition (whether or not Shemitah takes away the loan).

Observation: According to Rabeinu Chananel that Shmuel is referring to a case where the collateral was explicit, the case of the collateral (44b) is also when it was made explicit.