1)

(a)What do we extrapolate from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in our Mishnah, who holds 'Yaldah Tumtum ve'Androginus, Ein Kedushah Chalah aleihen'. What principle governs this ruling?

(b)What would the Din otherwise be?

1)

(a)We extrapolate from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in our Mishnah, who holds 'Yaldah Tumtum ve'Androginus, Ein Kedushah Chalah aleihen' that - he must hold 'V'lados Kodshim be'Havayasan hein Kedoshim' (V'lados Kodshim adopt the Kedushah of their mother only when they are born).

(b)Otherwise - the Kedushah of the mother would take effect on the V'lad immediately.

2)

(a)The Beraisa discusses the Pasuk in Bechukosai "Ach B'chor asher Yevukar la'Hashem bi'Veheimah Lo Yakdish Ish oso". How would we have understood the Pasuk had it just written ...

1. ... "B'chor Lo Yakdish"?

2. ... "B'chor Lo Yakdish Ish oso"?

(b)What does the Tana now learn from the Torah's insertion of ...

1. ... the word "bi'Veheimah"?

2. ... "asher Yevukar la'Hashem"?

3. ... the word "Ach"?

(c)Which principle does the Tana learn from this final ruling?

2)

(a)The Beraisa discusses the Pasuk in Bechukosai "Ach B'chor asher Yevukar la'Hashem bi'Veheimah Lo Yakdish Ish oso". Had the Pasuk just written ...

1. ... "B'chor Lo Yakdish", we would have thought that - a B'chor is not authorized to declare any animal Hekdesh.

2. ... "B'chor Lo Yakdish Ish oso", we would have thought that - he cannot declare a B'chor Hekdesh, but other Kodshim he can.

(b)The Tana now learns from the Torah's insertion of ...

1. ... the word "bi'Veheimah" that - the Pasuk is not referring to a B'chor Adam at all (as we thought until now), but to the Din of a B'chor Beheimah.

2. ... "asher Yevukar la'Hashem" that - once an animal is pregnant with its firstborn, one is not permitted to switch it to any other kind of Hekdesh.

3. ... the word "Ach" that - this latter prohibition does not extend to the fetuses of other Kodshim ...

(c)... from which we learn that this Tana holds 'V'lados Kodshim be'Me'ei Iman hein Kedoshim' (V'lados of Kodshim adopt the Kedushah of their mother immediately).

3)

(a)Rav Amram asked Rav Sheishes about a case where the owner declares a B'chor an Olah at the precise moment that the majority of the B'chor is born?

(b)If, on the one hand, it might be an Olah due to the fact that it is completely burned (and is therefore more Kadosh), why on the other hand, might it be a B'chor?

(c)Alternatively, it is an Olah, because its Kedushah is greater than that of a B'chor (because it is Kodesh Kodshim). What alternative reason is there for the animal to be a B'chor?

3)

(a)Rav Amram asked Rav Sheishes whether, if the owner declares a B'chor an Olah at the precise moment that the majority of the B'chor is born - it is an Olah or a B'chor.

(b)On the one hand, it might be an Olah due to the fact that it is completely burned (and is therefore more Kadosh); whereas on the other, it might it be a B'chor - because that is what it was destined to be from the outset.

(c)Alternatively, it is an Olah, because its Kedushah is greater than that of a B'chor (because it is Kodesh Kodshim), or perhaps it is a B'chor - which is Kadosh from birth (which an Olah is not).

4)

(a)Rav Sheishes replied by citing Ilfa, who asked a similar She'eilah with regard to Leket. What did he ask in a case where most of the grain has fallen to the ground? What does the owner then declare?

(b)What would the Din be if he declared the grain Hefker before that stage?

(c)What is the difference between Pe'ah and Hefker?

(d)How did Abaye resolve Ilfa's She'eilah (and Rav Amram's, too)?

4)

(a)Rav Sheishes replied by citing Ilfa, who asked a similar She'eilah with regard to Leket - where the owner declares the kernels Hefker just as most of the grain has fallen to the ground, and the question he asked was whether it is now Hefker or Pe'ah.

(b)If he declared it Hefker before that stage - it would be Patur from Pe'ah.

(c)The difference between Hefker and Pe'ah is that - the latter is Hefker for the poor only, whereas the former is Hefker for anybody to take.

(d)Abaye resolved Ilfa's She'eilah (and Rav Amram's, too) with the principle - Divrei ha'Rav ve'Divrei ha'Talmid, Divrei Mi Shom'in (surely Hash-m's declaration that the grain should become Pe'ah (and the animal a B'chor), takes precedence over that of the owner, who wants to change it to Hefker (or to an Olah).

5)

(a)What does our Mishnah say about someone who declares the V'lad of his pregnant animal an Olah, and the animal itself a Shelamim?

(b)Rebbi Meir holds that, were he to reverse the order of the two statements, the baby would be a V'lad Shelamim. Why is that?

(c)What does Rebbi Yossi say? How do the owner's intentions determine the status of the V'lad?

5)

(a)Our Mishnah rules that if someone declares the V'lad of his pregnant animal an Olah, and the animal itself a Shelamim - his words are upheld.

(b)Rebbi Meir holds that, were he to reverse the order of the two statements, the baby would be a V'lad Shelamim - because he holds T'fos Lashon Rishon (that if a person makes two consecutive contradictory statements, then we always follow the first one).

(c)Rebbi Yossi - agrees with Rebbi Meir, provided the owner changed his mind between the two statements. If he did not however, then he accepts both statements (seeing as the owner only divided them into two statements because it is not possible to make them simultaneously).

6)

(a)We already discussed Rebbi Yochanan, who, in a case where the owner designated a pregnant animal for his Chatas, which subsequently gave birth, gives the owner the option to use whichever animal he wishes, because he holds Shayro, Meshuyar. What does that mean?

(b)On which other principle is his ruling based?

(c)To what does Rebbi Yochanan therefore compare it?

(d)Rebbi Elazar queries this from our Mishnah. According to Rebbi Yochanan, in the case of Hi Shelamim u'Veladah Olah, what ought Rebbi Meir to have said (rather than 'Harei Zu V'lad Shelamim')?

(e)Rav Tivla answers by citing Rav. What did Rav instruct the Beraisa expert to do?

6)

(a)We already discussed Rebbi Yochanan, who gives the owner the option to use whichever animal he wishes, in the event that he designated a pregnant animal for his Chatas, which subsequently gives birth - because he holds Shayro, Meshuyar - What the owner does not declare Kadosh, is not Kadosh and ...

(b)... Ubar La'av Yerech Imo hi ...

(c)... in which case it is comparable to - designating two Chata'os, one for Acharayus.

(d)Rebbi Elazar queries this from our Mishnah, where, according to Rebbi Yochanan, in the case of Hi Shelamim u'Veladah Olah, Rebbi Meir ought to have said - 'Harei Zu Shelamim' (rather than 'Harei Zu V'lad Shelamim').

(e)Rav Tivla answers by citing Rav, who did indeed instruct the Beraisa expert - to amend the Mishnah to 'Harei Zu Shelamim'.

7)

(a)We also query Rebbi Yochanan from a Beraisa. What does the Beraisa rule in a case where a man says to his Shifchah 'Harei At Shifchah u'Veladech ben Chorin' (and gives her a Get Shichrur on the baby's behalf)?

(b)On which dual principle is this based?

(c)This would then have the Din of Meshachrer Chatzi Avdo, according to Rebbi Meir? What does Rebbi Meir say about a case of ha'Meshachrer Chatzi Avdo?

(d)Why is that?

7)

(a)We also query Rebbi Yochanan from a Beraisa, which rules in a case where a man says to his Shifchah 'Harei At Shifchah u'Veladach ben Chorin (and gives her a Get Shichrur on the baby's behalf) - Im Haysah Me'uberes, Zachsah lo'.

(b)This is based on the dual principle Shayro, Eino Meshuyar and Ubar Yerech Imo hi.

(c)This would then have the Din of Meshachrer Chatzi Avdo, according to Rebbi Meir - who rules that 'ha'Meshachrer Chatzi Avdo, Yeitzei le'Cheirus' ...

(d)... because the half-free Eved acquires his Get and his Yad simultaneously. Consequently, the same will apply here, and the V'lad will go free.

25b----------------------------------------25b

8)

(a)The problem with Shayro Meshuyar (like Rebbi Yochanan) is based on yet another Beraisa. How does the Tana there qualify the Din of an Eved accepting a Sh'tar Shichrur on behalf of another Eved? Under which circumstances is that permissible?

(b)Why is that?

(c)What is now the problem with Rebbi Yochanan?

(d)What is therefore the conclusion regarding Shayro Meshuyar?

(e)What about Rebbi Yochanan?

8)

(a)The problem if we hold Shayro Meshuyar (like Rebbi Yochanan) is based on yet another Beraisa, which confines the Din of an Eved accepting a Sh'tar Shichrur on behalf of another Eved - to where he accepts it from someone who is not his master ...

(b)... because if he accepts it from his own master, bearing in mind that an Eved is merely the extension of his master, it transpires that - the Get Shichrur never really leaves his master's domain.

(c)The problem with Rebbi Yochanan is - how the Shifchah can accept the Sh'tar Shichrur on behalf of her V'lad (seeing as he holds Shiyro Meshuyar).

(d)We therefore conclude - Shiyro Eino Meshuyar and Ubar Yerech Imo.

(e)And we remain with a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan.

9)

(a)We cite a Beraisa which discusses a case where someone declares that his Shifchah is free but her Ubar is an Eved. Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili holds that the V'lad is like her. What do the Chachamim say?

(b)What do we suggest to be the basis of the Machlokes? How will that answer the Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan?

(c)Following the Chachamim's ruling, the Beraisa quotes the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ha'Ishah vi'Yeladehah Tih'yeh la'Adonehah". What does the Pasuk come to prove?

(d)Rebbi Yochanan goes still further, maintaining that even Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili will hold Shayro Meshuyar. Then why does he not agree that the V'lad remains an Eved?

9)

(a)We cite a Beraisa which discusses a case where someone declares that his Shifchah is free but her Ubar is an Eved. Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili holds that the V'lad is like her. The Chachamim hold that - we uphold the owner's declaration.

(b)We suggest that the basis of the Machlokes is - whether Shayro Meshuyar (the Chachamim, like Rebbi Yochanan), or not (Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili).

(c)Following the Chachamim's ruling, the Beraisa quotes the Pasuk in Mishpatim "ha'Ishah vi'Yekladehah Tih'yeh la'Adonehah" - which is the source, of Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili.

(d)Rebbi Yochanan goes still further, maintaining that, on principle, even Rebbi Yossi ha'Gelili will hold Im Shayro Meshuyar, and the reason that he does not agree that the V'lad remains an Eved is - because of the Pasuk (which is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv that the V'lad of a Shifchah follows its mother).

10)

(a)In another set of Beraisos which discusses a case where someone Shechts a Chatas and finds inside a four-month old fetus (which we already cited in the first Perek), one Beraisa rules that it may only be eaten by male Kohanim, in the Azarah and for one day. What does the other Beraisa rule?

(b)Assuming that both Beraisos speak where the owner declared Hekdesh an already pregnant lamb (or kid-goat), what do we suggest is the basis of their Machlokes?

(c)Once again, Rebbi Yochanan maintains that both Beraisos hold Im Shayro Meshuyar. How does he establish the case?

(d)What is then the basis of their Machlokes?

(e)As a third alternative, both Tana'im may well hold like Rebbi Yochanan and V'lados Kodshim be'Havayasan hein Kedoshin. Then why does the first Beraisa hold that the V'lad has the Din of a Chatas?

10)

(a)In another set of Beraisos which discusses a case where someone Shechts a Chatas and finds inside a four-month old fetus (that we already cited in the first Perek), one Beraisa rules that it may only be eaten by male Kohanim, in the Azarah and for one day; the other Beraisa rules that - it may be eaten by anyone, anywhere (except for in the Azarah) and for any period of time.

(b)Assuming both Beraisos speak where the owner declared Hekdesh an already pregnant lamb (or kid-goat), we suggest again that - the first Tana holds Shayro, La'av Meshuyar, and the second Shayro, Meshuyar.

(c)Once again, Rebbi Yochanan maintains that both Beraisos hold Shayro Meshuyar, and he establishes the case - where the animal became pregnant after being declared Hekdesh ...

(d)... in which case the first Beraisa holds V'ladei Kodshim be'Me'ei Iman hein Kedoshim, and the second Beraisa V'ladei Kodshim be'Havayasan hein Kedoshim (and the four-month old V'lad was never born).

(e)As a third alternative, both Tana'im may well hold like Rebbi Yochanan on the one hand, and V'lados Kodshim be'Havayasan hein Kedoshin, on the other, and the reason that the first Beraisa (which does not argue with the second one) holds that the V'lad has the Din of a Chatas is - because it is speaking where the Chatas was already pregnant at the time of the Hekdesh, and because he holds Shayro Meshuyar, it is subject to an independent Kedushah immediately, as long as the owner has not precluded it.

11)

(a)To answer the initial Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan (from the Beraisa of 'ha'Omer le'Shifchaso') Rava suggests that Rebbi Yochanan's reason may not be because of Shayro Meshuyar after all. What then, might it be?

(b)How will we reconcile that with the Din of Meisah?

(c)What did Rav Hamnuna answer him, bearing in mind that it was Rebbi Elazar who, earlier in the Sugya, queried Rebbi Yochanan from 'Hi Shelamim u'Veladah Olah'?

11)

(a)To answer the initial Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan (from the Beraisa of 'ha'Omer le'Shifchaso') Rava suggests that Rebbi Yochanan's reason may not be because of Shayro Meshuyar after all but because - Adam Miskaper bi'Shevach Hekdesh (a person has the right to utilize the V'lad Chatas as his Kaparah ...

(b)... whereas the Din of Meisah only applies to a V'lad where the owner declined to use it in this way.

(c)Rav Hamnuna answered him that, in that case, then - why, on the previous Amud, when Rebbi Elazar queried Rebbi Yochanan from 'Hi Shelamim u'Veladah Olah', did Rebbi Yochanan not say so?

12)

(a)Rebbi Yossi, in our Mishnah, rules that, if after declaring 'Harei Zu Shelamim', the Makdish decides to make the V'lad an Olah, it remains a Shelamim. What problem do we have with this ruling?

(b)How does Rav Papa answer it? Why do we think that he could have changed his mind?

(c)Then why can he indeed not do so (see Tosfos DH 'Lo Nitzr'cha')

(d)Our next Mishnah repeats the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yossi with regard to a case where the owner declared 'Harei Zu Temuras Olah, Temuras Shelamim'. What are the ramifications of Rebbi Yossi's ruling 'Im le'Kach Niskaven Techilah ... Devarav Kayamin'?

12)

(a)Rebbi Yossi, in our Mishnah, rules that, if after declaring 'Harei Zu Shelamim', the Makdish decides to make the V'lad an Olah, it remains a Shelamim - which we query on the grounds that it is obvious.

(b)Rav Papa answers that - the Mishnah is speaking about someone who changes his mind 'Toch K'dei Dibur', which is the time period that a person is given to change his mind from a declaration that he made ...

(c)... only 'Toch K'dei Dibur refers to the time it takes for a Rebbe to greet his Talmid ('Shalom Alecha'), whereas our Mishnah is speaking about the time it takes for a Talmid to greet his Rebbe ('Shalom Alecha Rebbi' [some add 'u'Mori']), which, our Mishnah is teaching us, we do not hold (Tosfos DH 'Lo Nitzr'cha')

(d)Our next Mishnah repeats the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yossi with regard to a case where the owner declared 'Harei Zu Temuras Olah, Temuras Shelamim'. The ramifications of Rebbi Yossi's ruling 'Im le'Kach Niskaven Techilah ... Devarav Kayamin' are that - when the animal is sold, half the proceeds are used to purchase a T'muras Olah, the other half, a T'muras Shelamim.

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