Question (Ri): This is a Migo (a reason to believe a litigant, for had he wanted to lie, he could have said a better lie) against witnesses! (Such a Migo is invalid.)

Answer (Ri): The Gemara means "if he wants to say explicitly 'I was Mezid' (he would be believed)";

Also now that he said "I did not eat", he means to say "I did not eat b'Shogeg, rather, b'Mezid!"

It is proven like this in Kerisus (12a).

Question: How does the Gemara prove that since Rabanan exempt, obligation to bring a Korban depends on his admission, since two witnesses do not obligate him a Korban?

Even though he contradicts them, they do not contradict his claim that he was Mezid. It is impossible to obligate him through the witnesses in any case. (They can never know that he was Shogeg.)

Really, we can say that above, one witness obligates him because one witness is believed without his admission;

Since he does not say that he was Mezid, we should say that presumably he was Shogeg, for we do not establish someone to be a Rasha!

Answer (Ri): There is a proper proof. The Gemara holds that if we should say that presumably he was Shogeg, we would not believe him to exempt himself from a Korban and establish himself to be a Rasha and say that he was Mezid, unlike the Stam case!

The Gemara infers that even if two [witnesses] said to him "you ate Chelev b'Shogeg", Rabanan exempt, for it is not common that witnesses can know clearly whether he was Shogeg or Mezid. (I.e. it is not common that they know that he was Shogeg, and not Mezid. Through warning, we can know that he was Mezid, and lash or kill him!)

Conclusion: You are forced to say that Rabanan obligate him when he is silent because silence is like admission, for we cannot obligate him through any testimony.

Question: The Ri was unsure if he said "I did not eat Chelev, not b'Shogeg and not b'Mezid", whether or not he is believed;

He is not believed to contradict the witnesses.

Or, perhaps he is believed, for they do not contradict his words "I did not eat b'Shogeg";

Regarding his words "I did not eat b'Mezid", even though they contradict him, this does not matter to us, since it does not pertain to a Chiyuv Korban. It is good that he does not publicize his sins!

Suggestion: We learn from Kerisus (12a). It gives a difference between the reasons [how to explain why witnesses do not obligate him a Korban, i.e.] we explain his words [to say that he was not Shogeg, rather, Mezid], or one is believed about himself more than 100 witnesses;

[They reasons differ about] if they told him "you became Tamei", and he says that he did not. We cannot explain his words (for it does not matter whether this was Shogeg or Mezid. This is when there was not enough time for him to become Tahor, so he cannot mean "I did not remain Tamei, rather, I received Haza'ah and/or immersed.")

The Gemara did not say that a difference is if he said "I did not eat, not Shogeg and not Mezid"! (This implies that also then, he is believed according to both reasons.)

Rejection #1: Even if you will say that he is not believed, the Gemara preferred to discuss when they said "you became Tamei", and he says that he did not, similar to when they told him "you ate", and he says "I did not" without any additional words.

Rejection #2: Also, we discuss Tum'ah, for afterwards the Gemara brings Beraisos that discuss [whether he is believed about] Tum'ah.

Explanation: Since he is silent, it seems to him that it is true, and he knows that there are Raglayim l'Davar (circumstantial evidence) for it.

Suggestion: Perhaps it means that it is a real admission. He knows that surely it is true, since he is silent.

Rejection #1: If so, in Kidushin (66a), [a man told a blind man "your wife was Mezanah"; Shmuel] told him "if he is trustworthy to you, that he is not a thief (i.e. wanton liar), divorce her";

Even if he thinks that he is a thief, he must [divorce her] since he is silent (if silence is an admission that he knows that it is true)!

Support: This is like R. Tam explains there, based on Gitin (54b);

When one witness tells Ploni "you ate Chelev", "someone had bestiality with your ox", or "your Taharos became Tamei", and Ploni is silent, the witness is believed because silence is like admission, like we conclude here.

Rejection #2: If it were a real admission, it would not be appropriate to say "the witness is believed."

Rejection #3: The blind man could not know Vadai that his wife was Mezanah!

Conclusion: Surely, we do not mean that it is a real admission.

Explanation: Some explain that we learn (that one witness is believed) from Nidah. It says in Kesuvos (72a) "v'Safrah Lah" - by herself (a Zavah who must count seven days without blood is believed).

Question: If so, [we should believed one witness] even when there was Ischazek Isura (we know that the matter was forbidden)!

Answer (Ri): Nidah is not considered Ischazek Isura. Even if she saw blood now, there is no Chazakah that she will always see.

Question: How concerned we learn a [married] woman from Tevel and Hekdesh? Devar sheb'Ervah (a change in marital status, or Heter to one's husband) always requires two witnesses!

Answer (Ri): If it were possible to learn from Tevel and Hekdesh, we would say that Devar sheb'Ervah always requires two witnesses, i.e. to forbid her to her husband, for one witness is not believed to forbid;

Regarding Isur it says "Ki Matza Bah Ervas Davar" (from which we learn that Devar sheb'Ervah requires two witnesses), but to permit her, even one is believed.

Explanation: This applies even to another's Hekdesh. (If it is monetary Hekdesh, anyone can redeem it.)

Implied question: Why is this unlike Neta Revai (fruits grown in a tree's fourth year)? Only the owner can redeem it!

Answer: Revai is considered in the owner's Reshus, even though it belongs to Hash-m, because he may eat it [or authorize others to eat it] in Yerushalayim;

However, Hekdesh is not considered in the "owner's" (i.e. the one who made it Hekdesh) Reshus more than anyone else.

Question (Rivam): In Shevuos (22a), it connotes that even according to the opinion that Me'ilah applies to Konamos (vows to forbid something like a Korban), there is no redemption!

Citation (22a - Beraisa): If one said "this loaf is Hekdesh" and ate it, whether he or someone else, he transgresses Me'ilah. Therefore, it can be redeemed;

Citation (cont.): If he said "this loaf is Alai (to me) Hekdesh", he transgresses Me'ilah [if he eats it], but someone else does not transgress Me'ilah. Therefore, it cannot be redeemed.

Citation (cont.): Chachamim say, he does not transgress Me'ilah.

Inference: In the Reisha, it is total Hekdesh, it has redemption. In the Seifa, he said "Alai", i.e. Konam, even though he transgresses Me'ilah, it cannot be redeemed!

Answer (R. Tam): [Those] Konamos that forbid to everyone, have redemption according to R. Meir there, since they are like Hekdesh.

Proof: It discusses "this loaf is Alai." (He did not forbid it to everyone.)

Question: [The Beraisa] should distinguish within Konam itself (between forbidding to himself or to everyone, rather, than between Konam and Hekdesh)!

Answer: The Reisha itself discusses Konam.

Implied question: It says "this loaf is Hekdesh"!

Answer #1: He means "it is like Hekdesh." R. Meir does not distinguish "Korban" from "like a Korban" (Nedarim 13a), and similarly he does not distinguish "Hekdesh" from "like Hekdesh", since he intends for Konam.

Answer #2: The case is, he explicitly said "it is like Hekdesh";

Since [the Tana] need not specify [like Hekdesh] in the Seifa, for he said Alai [which shows that it only Konam], also in the Reisha he does not specify.

Explanation: According to this, Chachamim argue both in the Reisha and Seifa.

Citation: In most texts, in Nedarim (35a) Chachamim say "in both cases he was not Mo'el";

Also there, the text says in the "this loaf is Hekdesh."

Explanation (Ri): We should not say "we can testify that she checks carefully before marrying", and believe one witness mid'Oraisa;

Rather, it is an enactment mid'Rabanan that he is believed.

Implied question: This is uprooting a matter from the Torah! (The Torah requires two witnesses for Devar sheb'Ervah.)

Answer: Since it seems proper to believe him, like I will explain below (89b), that something with a reason and support is not considered uprooting something from the Torah.

Question: Since two witnesses say that he died, even if 100 say that this is him, it does not matter. Two are like 100!

Answer: Regarding something that is evident and known to all, Rav would not say that if two [testify that he died], she does not leave.

Implied question: Rav requires a piece [that is Vadai forbidden] among two pieces [to obligate Asham Taluy] in Kerisus (17b)!

Answer - part 1: This is like two pieces, according to R. Zeira, who explains Rav's reason because when there are two pieces, it is possible to clarify the Isur;

Explanation: When there are two pieces, it is possible that an expert will come and recognize which piece is left to clarify the Isur;

Also here, it is possible to clarify through Hazamah!

Answer - part 2: Also Rav Nachman, who explains Rav's reason because when there are two pieces, Ikva Isura (there Vadai was Isur here), also here she had Chezkas Eshes Ish!

Question #1: According to the conclusion above (31a), when two witnesses contradict another, it is a Safek mid'Rabanan. [Mid'Oraisa], we leave the matter in its Chazakah;

Why does it say that there is Asham Taluy? There is a Chatas [if they were Shogeg], for [mid'Oraisa] we leave her in Chezkas Eshes Ish!

Question #2: What was the answer "she married one of her witnesses? Why do we leave him? He is Chayav Misas Beis Din, for we leave her in her Chazakah!

Answer (Ri): The [Chazakah] that a woman checks carefully before marrying weakens her Chazakah.

Implied question: [How can we answer] for the case below when two witnesses say that she was divorced?

Answer: Also she checks carefully, for she fears lest witnesses be Mezim her witnesses or disqualify them through [testifying that they are] thieves;

Therefore, we do not leave her in her Chazakah [for it was weakened].

Implied question: Why don't we bring (ask from) one who married without permission (of Beis Din, rather, based on two witnesses), which is in the Reisha of the Mishnah?

Answer #1: We could say that there [she may return to her first husband] through a Get [from the latter].

Note: Also there, if so why may she return to her first husband? Maharshal explains that the Makshan holds that we require a Get only to marry someone else, but not to return to her husband. The Maharsha says that we ask from the Seifa, for it connotes that no Get is needed. In the conclusion, the Reisha is not difficult. Since she did not transgress, there is no fine.

Answer #2: Below (91a), some establish that to be like R. Shimon, who holds that even one who married with permission [of Beis Din] does not need a Get.