1) PERFORMING "LEKICHAH" WITH ONE'S HAND
OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (13b) cites two apparently contradictory Beraisos. The first Beraisa states that Pigul can take effect during Tevilas Etzba (dipping the finger into the blood before Zerikah) of a Korban Chatas. The second Beraisa states that Pigul cannot take effect during Tevilas Etzba. The Gemara (14a) concludes that the Tana of both Beraisos is the Rabanan, and the first Beraisa is discussing a Chatas Penimis, while the second Beraisa is discussing a Chatas Chitzonah.
The Gemara asks why the Rabanan need to teach that Tevilas Etzba of a Chatas Chitzonah is not subject to Pigul. It obviously is not subject to Pigul, because the Torah does not write the word "v'Taval" with regard to Chatas Chitzonah, showing that Tevilas Etzba is not an essential part of the Avodah. The Gemara answers that one might have thought that Tevilas Etzba of a Chatas Chitzonah is subject to Pigul, because the verse says, "v'Lakach" (Vayikra 4:30), teaching that the Kohen must take the blood himself, as opposed to having a monkey take the blood from the vessel and place it on the Kohen's hand. Since the Torah says that the Kohen must take the blood himself, one might have thought that Pigul will take effect during the procedure (see Insights to 13b). Therefore, the Rabanan teach that a Chatas Chitzonah is not subject to Pigul during this stage of the Avodah.
The Gemara seems to derive from the word "v'Lakach" that one must take the object himself and not be given the object by someone else. Does this also apply to other Mitzvos for which the Torah uses the word "v'Lakach"? For example, the Torah says with regard to the Mitzvah of the Arba'as ha'Minim, "u'Lekachtem" (Vayikra 23:40). Does this mean that one must pick up the Lulav and Esrog himself in order to fulfill the Mitzvah, and if someone else places it in his hands he does not fulfill the Mitzvah?
(a) The MEROMEI SADEH writes that some authorities learn from this Gemara that a person should pick up the Lulav from the surface on which it is resting and not have it handed to him by someone else, in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of "u'Lekachtem." The CHAZON ISH (OC 149:3) quotes this view in the name of the BINYAN SHLOMO (#48, and Hashmatos), who quotes it in the name of the "Gedolei Acharonim."
(b) The Meromei Sadeh himself asserts that this is a mistaken conclusion. He proves that TOSFOS in Pesachim (7b, DH la'Tzes) clearly does not learn this way. Tosfos says that one may hold an object of Mitzvah and have in mind not to fulfill the Mitzvah until after some time has passed, such as until he is ready to make the blessing. If the main part of the Mitzvah is picking up the Lulav with one's hand, then how can one have in mind to delay the fulfillment of the Mitzvah when one picks it up? When one later has in mind to fulfill the Mitzvah, he is already holding the Lulav and is no longer actively picking it up.
The Meromei Sadeh explains that there is a significant logical difference between the case of the Gemara here (the Kohen's act of taking the blood in his hand) and the case of Lulav. In the case of the Gemara here, when the monkey places the blood on the Kohen's fingers, the Kohen exerts none of his own effort to get the blood on his fingers, and thus he does not fulfill the requirement of "v'Lakach." In contrast, the very act of holding a Lulav requires that the person use his strength in order to continue holding it and not let it slip out of his hand. This act of holding the Lulav (and not merely the act of picking it up in the first place) is what the Torah calls "u'Lekachtem."
The Chazon Ish comes to the same conclusion. He discusses the case of a person who takes hold of a Lulav before the time of the Mitzvah arrives (that is, before Alos ha'Shachar) and holds it in his hand until the time of the Mitzvah arrives. Does he need to put it down and pick it up again, since his initial act of picking up the Lulav was done before the Mitzvah could be fulfilled? The Chazon Ish writes that this is not necessary, and the case of the Gemara here does not conflict with this ruling. There is a Mitzvah for the Kohen to take the blood specifically from the vessel. Accordingly, even if he actively takes the blood from the monkey who took it from the vessel, he does not fulfill the requirement to take it directly from the vessel. In contrast, in the case of Lulav, holding onto the Lulav is called "u'Lekachtem." (Y. MONTROSE)
2) OFFERING THE KORBAN PESACH ON A "BAMAH"
QUESTION: The Gemara discusses how Rebbi Shimon learns that a thought of "Chutz l'Mekomo" invalidates a Chatas Penimis. The Gemara explains that he cannot learn it from the fact that a thought of she'Lo Lishmah invalidates a Korban, because the Pesul of a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah applies to a Korban brought upon a Bamah, while a Machshavah of Chutz l'Mekomo does not apply (since there is no limited Makom for the Korban when it is offered on a Bamah). The Gemara answers that the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo indeed may be learned from Lo Lishmah because, in truth, the Pesul of Lo Lishmah also does not exist on a Bamah. The only Korbanos that become Pasul with a thought of she'Lo Lishmah is the Korban Pesach and Korban Chatas (all other Korbanos remain valid when offered she'Lo Lishmah). Those two Korbanos, however, cannot be offered on a Bamah, and therefore there is no situation in which a Machshavah of she'Lo Lishmah will invalidate a Korban offered on a Bamah. Therefore, Rebbi Shimon can learn from the Pesul of she'Lo Lishmah that Chutz l'Mekomo is also Pasul.
The TZON KODASHIM asks that this Gemara does not seem to take into account the fact that it is dealing specifically with the view of Rebbi Shimon. The Gemara later (114b) quotes Rebbi Shimon as saying that a Korban Pesach may be offered on a Bamah -- on a Bamas Tzibur (public Bamah), but not on a Bamas Yachid (private Bamah). Why, then, does the Gemara here, in its explanation of the view of Rebbi Shimon, say that a Korban Pesach is not offered on a Bamah?
ANSWER: The KEREN ORAH and SEFAS EMES answer that a Korban Pesach offered on a Bamas Tzibur is also subject to the Pesul of Chutz l'Mekomo, since the Korban would be limited to the area of the Bamas Tzibur. Hence, the Gemara does not ask that there is a Chumra which applies to she'Lo Lishmah that does not apply to Chutz l'Mekomo. The Gemara questions the Limud only from a Bamas Yachid, where Chutz l'Mekomo certainly does not apply. (This seems to be the intention of RASHI in DH she'Lo Lishmo.) (Y. MONTROSE)
14b----------------------------------------14b
3) THE ARGUMENT CONCERNING "HOLACHAH" PERFORMED BY A "ZAR"
OPINIONS: Rabah and Rav Yosef state that the validity of Holachah performed by a Zar is subject to the dispute between Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan in the Mishnah (13a). Rebbi Shimon maintains that a Zar's Holachah is valid, because he maintains that any Avodah which is not absolutely necessary is not called an Avodah which must be done by a Kohen. The Rabanan, who argue with Rebbi Shimon in the Mishnah, maintain that a Zar's Holachah is Pasul.
Abaye questions Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion that Rebbi Shimon and the Rabanan argue about a Zar's Holachah. Abaye asks, "Shechitah is an indispensable Avodah, and yet it is valid when done by a Zar!" They answer that Shechitah is not considered an Avodah (and that is why it is valid when done by a Zar).
How exactly does Abaye attempt to refute the assertion of Rabah and Rav Yosef from the law of Shechitah done by a Zar?
(a) RASHI (DH v'Ha Shechitah) explains that Abaye challenges Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion by questioning their understanding of the Rabanan's position. Rabah and Rav Yosef say that Rebbi Shimon's reason for why a Holachah done by a Zar is valid is that Holachah is an Avodah which does not need to be done, which implies that the Rabanan maintain that Holachah does need to be done, and therefore a Zar may not perform it. Abaye questions this from Shechitah, which is valid when done by a Zar even though it certainly is a necessary Avodah. It must be that whether or not an Avodah is necessary does not affect whether or not it may be done by a Zar. Rabah and Rav Yosef answer that no proof can be brought from the laws of Shechitah, because Shechitah is not called an Avodah (since, as Rashi explains, it may be performed by those people who are unfit to perform any of the other Avodos of a Korban). Holachah, however, is called an Avodah, and since, according to the Rabanan, it is absolutely necessary, it is Pasul when done by a Zar.
The KEREN ORAH and MEROMEI SADEH have difficulty with Rashi's explanation of the answer. Rashi says that Shechitah is not called an Avodah, as indicated by the fact that all people who normally are unfit to perform other Avodos may perform the Shechitah. According to Rebbi Shimon, however, the same is true for Holachah; anyone may perform it! Why, then, does Rashi say that this is the factor that determines whether or not a certain procedure is considered an Avodah?
The Keren Orah answers that there is an exception with regard to Holachah. The dipping of the Kohen's finger in the blood of a Korban Chatas, which is called Holachah (see 13b, and Rashi there, DH Ela), cannot be done by a Zar. This shows that Holachah is an Avodah, unlike Shechitah. (See also Meromei Sadeh.)
TOSFOS (DH v'Ha) argues with Rashi's approach. Abaye cannot be challenging Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion from the opinion of the Rabanan. It is obvious that the Rabanan's reasoning has nothing to do with whether or not an Avodah is necessary. That factor -- whether or not an Avodah is necessary -- makes a difference only according to Rebbi Shimon. The Rabanan maintain simply that every procedure from the time of accepting the blood (Kabalah) and onward must be done by a Kohen, as the Gemara later (32a) states.
(b) Tosfos explains that Abaye challenges Rabah and Rav Yosef's assertion by questioning their understanding of Rebbi Shimon's position. How can Rabah and Rav Yosef say that the reasoning of Rebbi Shimon for permitting a Zar to perform Holachah is that Holachah is not necessary? That reasoning is illogical, since Shechitah -- which is necessary -- also may be done by a Zar! Rabah and Rav Yosef answer, as Rashi explains, that no proof can be brought from Shechitah, because Shechitah is not considered an Avodah.
The Meromei Sadeh explains that the argument between Rashi and Tosfos is based on whether or not everyone agrees that Holachah is unnecessary. Rashi learns like the Toras Kohanim (Parshas Tzav 8:5) which says that this is the argument between Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Shimon. Rebbi Meir says that a wrongful thought during the Holachah can invalidate a Korban, because it is impossible for a Korban to be offered without Holachah. Rebbi Shimon argues and says that a Korban cannot become Pasul as a result of a wrongful thought during Holachah, since it is unnecessary for a Korban to have Holachah.
According to the argument as recorded in the Toras Kohanim, one may suggest that the Rabanan maintain that a Zar's Holachah is Pasul for the same reason that Rebbi Meir maintains that a Korban can become Pasul during Holachah. Tosfos understands that everyone agrees at this point in the Gemara that Holachah is unnecessary (unlike Rashi's explanation of the question). (Y. MONTROSE)