1) DOES SALT COMBINE TO MAKE A "K'ZAYIS" OF "EIMURIN"?
OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (107b) records a dispute between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the composition of the k'Zayis necessary for one to be liable for offering parts of a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rebbi Yochanan maintains that even the k'Zayis is comprised of a bone combined with the flesh, the person is liable, because things attached to Eimurin are considered like the Eimurin themselves. Reish Lakish argues and says that in order to be liable, one must offer a k'Zayis of something which normally is offered on the Mizbe'ach. Reish Lakish maintains that things that are attached to the Eimurin are not like the Eimurin themselves.
Rava asks about one who offers, outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, the head of a dove that is less than the size of a k'Zayis, and he adds salt to it, bringing the total size to a k'Zayis. Does the person transgress the prohibition against offering a k'Zayis of a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash? The Gemara says that this question is relevant according to both the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan and the opinion of Reish Lakish. Even though Rebbi Yochanan maintains that bone can complete the Shi'ur of a k'Zayis, perhaps that is because bone is part of the bird. He might agree that salt, which is not part of the bird, does not complete the k'Zayis. Similarly, Reish Lakish might maintain that only bone does not add to the size, because there is no Mitzvah to return bones to the Mizbe'ach if they fall off; bones are placed on the Mizbe'ach only because they are physically attached to the Eimurin. Reish Lakish might agree that salt, which should be returned to the Mizbe'ach if it falls off, completes the Shi'ur of k'Zayis. The Gemara leaves this question unanswered.
What is the source for the Gemara's assumption that salt should be returned to the Mizbe'ach if it falls off?
(a) RASHI (DH Rosh Yonah) explains that the requirement to return salt to the Mizbe'ach is an explicit commandment in the Torah. The Torah states, "v'Lo Sashbis Melach Bris Elokecha" -- "You shall not hold back the salt of the covenant of your G-d" (Vayikra 2:13). This verse commands not only to put salt on the Korbanos, but to return to the Korban any salt that falls off of the Eimurin that are on the Mizbe'ach.
The SEFAS EMES has difficulty with Rashi's explanation of the Gemara. If one would offer in the Beis ha'Mikdash the head of a dove, which is less than a k'Zayis, he definitely would not receive Malkus for not salting it. Almost all opinions agree with this (except perhaps for TOSFOS on 107b, DH Rebbi Yochanan), because of the rule that offering Eimurin which are less than a k'Zayis is not called "offering," and thus the requirement to bring salt with them does not apply (see also MINCHAS CHINUCH 120:8). Why, then, does the Gemara suggest that according to Reish Lakish, one must put the salt back on the head of the dove if it falls off of the Mizbe'ach? The head never required salting in the first place, since it is less than a k'Zayis! In such a case, one certainly should not be required to return the salt to its place.
(b) The PERUSH HA'MEYUCHAS LA'RACH (cited by the KENESES RISHONIM) appears to have a different explanation of the Gemara. He says that according to Reish Lakish, if the salt falls off one must return it to the Mizbe'ach, since it is considered attached to the Korban. What exactly does the Rach mean?
The BRISKER RAV (Chidushim to Menachos 11a) and the CHAZON ISH (Menachos 25:16) propose a similar explanation of the Gemara. They explain that the reason why the salt must be returned to the Mizbe'ach is that it becomes part of the Korban that was placed on the Mizbe'ach, and not because of a special law regarding salt. Just as the Korban must be returned to the Mizbe'ach if it falls off, so, too, the salt must be returned to the Mizbe'ach if it falls off. The Chazon Ish says that the source for this law is the Gemara in Menachos (21b). The Gemara there says that one transgresses the Isur of Me'ilah when he uses salt that was placed on Eimurin. This is derived from the verse, "The Kohanim will throw salt on them (the Eimurin), and they will offer them up as an Olah offering to Hash-m" (Yechezkel 43:24). The Chazon Ish understands that the Gemara there teaches that the reason why one transgresses the Isur of Me'ilah when he uses the salt of a Korban is that the salt itself becomes part of the Korban.
The SHA'AR MORDECHAI suggests that this is also Rashi's intention when he says that salt must be returned to the Mizbe'ach because of "v'Lo Sashbis." Rashi knows that the verse cited by the Gemara in Menachos teaches that the salt is part of the Korban. Rashi here is explaining the reason for why salt is considered part of the Korban. Since the Torah says that it must always be placed on the Korban, the verse in Yechezkel may be understood to mean that salt is considered like the Eimurin themselves, and it is unlike bones which are always considered separate entities once they come off of the Mizbe'ach. (Y. MONTROSE)
108b----------------------------------------108b
2) THE NEED FOR A VERSE TO TEACH THE LAW OF "ONES"
QUESTIONS: The Gemara (beginning on 108a) discusses the difference between one who slaughters a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash in order for a person to eat it, and one who gives a Korban as an offering to a person outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. In the first case, the person who slaughters the Korban transgresses the prohibition against slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, while in the second case, the person does not transgress that prohibition, but rather he transgresses the prohibition of Avodah Zarah. At one point, the Gemara says that the verse of "ha'Ish ha'Hu" -- "that man" (Vayikra 17:4), which is stated with regard to slaughter, shows that only an individual who slaughters is liable, while two people who hold a knife and slaughter the animal together are not liable. The Gemara asks that a similar verse of "ha'Ish ha'Hu" is written with regard to offering a Korban (Vayikra 17:9), and thus the law should be that two people who offer a Korban together outside the Beis ha'Mikdash are exempt. The Gemara answers that this verse teaches something else; it teaches that one is exempt when he offers a Korban b'Shogeg (accidentally), b'Ones (against his will), and Mut'eh (a mistaken offering).
(a) Why is a verse needed to exempt one who offers a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash b'Ones from the punishment of Kares? An Ones is always exempt from liability for his actions! The Gemara (see Nedarim 27a) derives from a verse in the Torah that "Ones Rachmana Patrei" -- the Torah exempts one who is forced to sin.
(b) Why is a verse needed to exempt one who offers a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash b'Shogeg from the punishment of Kares? One who sins b'Shogeg is never punished with Kares, but rather he must bring a Korban Chatas! (TOSFOS DH Shogeg)
ANSWERS:
(a) The Rishonim give two basic approaches to answer this question.
1. TOSFOS explains that the Ones mentioned in the Gemara here does not refer to one who is forced to offer a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Rather, it refers to one who thinks that offering Korbanos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is permitted. (The Gemara elsewhere refers to this as "Omer Mutar"; see, for example, Makos 7b.)
The TZON KODASHIM has difficulty with Tosfos' answer. Everywhere else in the Gemara, Tosfos takes the approach that a case of "Omer Mutar" is not considered a case of Ones. For example, Tosfos in Shabbos (68b, DH Aval Tinok) writes that who is "Omer Mutar" is considered a Shogeg, with the exception of an "Omer Mutar" who kills, who is not considered Shogeg and is not sent to an Ir Miklat (based on verses which teach the various levels of accidental killing that are exempt from going to Galus to an Ir Miklat). (According to Rava in Makos (7b), this question on Tosfos is even more difficult. Rava maintains that an "Omer Mutar" is exempt from Galus only because he is considered worse (i.e. more intentional) than a Shogeg, and certainly he is not an Ones.) With the exception of an act of killing, the Torah always considers "Omer Mutar" like a Shogeg. Why does Tosfos here say that the Gemara means "Omer Mutar" when it says "Ones"?
2. The RASHBA in Kidushin (43a) answers in the name of the RA'AVAD that one might have thought that slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is included in the category of "Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor" -- "one must be killed rather than transgress," because the verse says, "Dam Shafach" -- "he has spilled blood" (Vayikra 17:4), with regard to one who slaughters a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. One might have compared this prohibition to the prohibition against murder, for which one must give his life in order not to transgress, even when he is forced to transgress. Therefore, the verse of "ha'Hu" is needed to teach that an Ones indeed is exempt, and this prohibition is not comparable to murder.
(b) The Rishonim give two answers for why a verse is needed to exempt one who unintentionally, b'Shogeg, offers a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash.
1. TOSFOS answers that one might have thought that if the unintentional transgressor eventually fails to bring a Korban for his transgression, then he indeed is punished with Kares. This is because the Torah says the words, "v'Nislach Lo" -- "and it will be forgiven for him" (see, for example, Vayikra 5:10) only after the Torah says that one should bring a Korban for his sin. This implies that he receives atonement only upon bringing his Korban, but until he brings his Korban he is Chayav Kares. Therefore, an additional verse is needed to teach that one who sins b'Shogeg is not Chayav Kares.
However, this answer is difficult to understand. Why would one have thought, as Tosfos suggests, that an unintentional offender should receive the same punishment as one who sins willfully?
The GEVUROS SHEMONIM (note 67) gives two possible explanations for Tosfos. One possibility is that when someone realizes that he accidentally transgressed a severe sin which is punishable with Kares, and he does not care enough to bring a Korban for atonement, his uncaring attitude makes his sin considered as though it was done on purpose. A second possibility is that one might have thought that in this case the person will be Chayav Kares for his unintentional sin, because it is possible for him to remove the sin that he did retroactively. He can annul his original Neder that made the animal into a Korban and thereby remove his sin of slaughtering the animal outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. Since he does not attempt to remove his sin when he has the opportunity to do so, he is considered as though he committed the sin willfully.
(b) The RASHBA gives one answer similar to that of Tosfos, and he suggests a second answer. The Rashba explains that the exemption for one who sins b'Shogeg indeed needs no verse. However, once the Torah gives a verse to exempt one who sins b'Ones (as explained above), the Chachamim also included in this teaching sins of Shogeg and Mut'eh.
The RAMBAN and RITVA in Kidushin (43a) give this answer as well, but they give it in response to the first question (why the Torah needs to exempt one who is Ones). They give Tosfos' reason for why a verse is needed to exempt one who sins b'Shogeg, and they say that once the Torah gives a verse to exempt Shogeg, the Chachamim included in the teaching the sins of Ones and Mut'eh (for which no verse is needed to exempt). (Y. MONTROSE)