(Rav Yehudah): Anyone who ceases to learn Torah is consumed by fire - "veha'Esh Tochelem".

(Rav Dimi): Anyone who separates himself from learning Torah falls to Gehinom - "To'eh mi'Derech Haskel bi'Khal Refa'im Yanu'ach";

'Refa'im' refers to Gehinom - "Refa'im Sham b'Imkei She'ol."

(Mishnah): If one sells a wasteheap, the manure is included...

(Mishnah - R. Yehudah): If something is fit for (can be offered on) the Altar but not for Bedek ha'Bayis, or is only fit for Hekdesh Bedek ha'Bayis, or is not fit for either, Me'ilah applies to it and its contents;

If one was Makdish a pit full of water, a wasteheap full of manure, a dovecote full of doves, a field full of grass, or a tree laden with fruit, Me'ilah applies to it and its contents;

However, if he was Makdish an empty pit (or wasteheap...) and it became full of water (or manure...), Me'ilah applies to it, but not to what came later.

R. Yosi says, if one was Makdish a field or a tree, Me'ilah applies to it and what grows, for what grows is Hekdesh.

(Beraisa - Rebbi): Nir'im (I agree with) R. Yehudah's opinion about a pit and dovecote, and R. Yosi's opinion about a field and tree.

Question: What does this mean?!

We understand 'I agree with R. Yehudah about a pit and dovecote', which implies that R. Yosi disagrees about a field and tree (Rebbi holds like R. Yosi regarding them);

However, 'I agree with R. Yosi regarding a field and tree' implies that R. Yosi disagrees about a pit and dovecote. We do not find that R. Yosi and R. Yehudah argue about these!

Suggestion: R. Yosi addresses R. Yehudah according to R. Yehudah's reasoning. (I (R. Yosi) argue in all cases. I understand why you (R. Yehudah) argue about a pit and dovecote, but you should admit about a field or tree, for what grows is Hekdesh!)

Rejection (Beraisa - R. Yosi): I disagree with R. Yehudah about a field and tree, for what grows is Hekdesh.

Inference: He agrees about a pit and dovecote!

Answer: Rebbi means, R. Yehudah's words about a pit and dovecote are Nir'im to R. Yosi (he agrees with them); R. Yosi argues only about a field and tree.

(Beraisa): If one was Makdish them when they are empty and then they became full, Me'ilah applies to it, but not to what came later;

R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon says, Me'ilah applies also to what came later.

(Rabah): They argue about a field and tree. The first Tana holds like R. Yehudah, and R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds like R. Yosi;

All agree about a pit and dovecote (that Me'ilah applies to the contents).

Question (Abaye - Beraisa): If one was Makdish them when they are full, Me'ilah applies to them and their contents;

R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon switches (what he said about one who was Makdish them empty. Here he says that Me'ilah does not apply to the contents.)

If R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon argued about a field and tree, why does he switch his opinion?

Retraction (Rabah): They argue about a pit and dovecote;

All agree about a field and tree that Me'ilah applies to them and their contents.

Question: Regarding a pit and dovecote, what do they argue about when they are initially empty and when they are initially full?

Answer - part 1: When they are initially empty, they argue as R. Meir and Chachamim argue.

The first Tana holds like Chachamim, that one cannot transfer ownership of (or be Makdish) something that is not yet in the world;

R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds like R. Meir, that one can transfer ownership of something that is not yet in the world.

Question: R. Meir said so only regarding fruits of a date tree, for they normally grow. An empty pit or dovecote will not fill itself!

Answer (Rava): The case is, the pit is at the bottom of an incline (water normally flows into it), and the dovecote is near a thriving dovecote (presumably, offspring from the full dovecote will inhabit the empty one).

Question - part 2: When they are initially full, what do they argue about?

Answer (Rava): The case is, he said 'the pit (or dovecote) is Hekdesh' without specifying;

R. Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds like his father. We learn the law of Hekdesh from the law of commoners;

A seller could say 'I sold only the pit, but not the water. Likewise, the pit becomes Hekdesh, but not the water.

(The first Tana does not learn the law of Hekdesh from the law of commoners. Maharshal deletes this from the text.)

Question: A seller could not say 'I sold only the pit'!

(Mishnah): If one sells a pit, the water is included.

Answer (Rava): That Mishnah is the opinion of one Tana. Chachamim argue.

(Beraisa): If one sells a pit, the water is not included;

R. Noson says, the water is included.