QUESTION: The Mishnah (96b) states that when one steals an animal or slave and they age while in his domain, the thief must pay back to the owner their value at the time of the theft. Rebbi Meir says that if he stole slaves he may say to the owner, "Harei Shelcha Lefanecha" -- "Here is yours before you," which means that he may return the slave as is, even though the slave is worth less now than it was worth at the time of the theft. RASHI (DH b'Avadim) explains that Rebbi Meir maintains that "slaves are like land," which do not change ownership by being stolen. Since a stolen slave is considered as though he never left the domain of the owner, the thief may return the slave "as is."

The Gemara (96b) quotes Rav Chanina bar Avdimi in the name of Rav who said that the Halachah follows the view of Rebbi Meir that "slaves are like land." The Gemara here challenges Rav's assertion from a different statement of Rav. Rav Daniel bar Rav Katina said in the name of Rav that when one snatches his friend's slave and makes him work, he is exempt from payment. The Gemara asks that if Rav maintains that "slaves are like land," why should the thief be exempt? The slave is still in the domain of the owner!

(TOSFOS (DH u'Mi) explains the Gemara's question as follows. If a slave is like land such that when the thief snatches him he is still considered to be in the owner's domain, the thief is considered as though he is renting the slave from the owner. If it is usual to rent out the slave, the thief should have to pay rent for the use of the slave, just as one who snatches his friend's ship (without intent to steal it but merely to use it) must pay rent to the owner if the ship is usually rented out.)

The Gemara answers that Rav rules that the thief is exempt because he snatched the slave at a time when the slave normally would not have done work. Rashi (DH Shelo) explains that since the slave would not have done work during that time, the principle of "Zeh Neheneh v'Zeh Lo Chaser" applies. The thief who worked with the slave received benefit, and the owner of the slave did not lose as a result. This is why the thief who worked with the slave does not have to pay.

The Gemara implies that according to the opinion that "slaves are like Metaltelin" (and not like Karka), one who snatches his friend's slave and works with him is exempt from payment, even if he steals the slave at a time when the slave usually works. (This is because a thief must pay according to the value of the stolen object at the time of the theft, and not for profits derived afterwards.)

This inference, however, contradicts the view of the RIF (34b of the pages of the Rif). The Rif writes that the Halachah is not like Rav, who rules like Rebbi Meir that slaves are like Karka, but the law is that slaves are like Metaltelin. However, immediately after the Rif writes that the Halachah is not like Rav, the Rif cites the ruling of Rav Daniel bar Katina in the name of Rav that one who snatched his friend's slave and worked with him is exempt only if he snatched the slave at a time when he would not have been working for his master. The Rif's ruling appears to contradict the Gemara that implies that according to the view that "slaves are like Metaltelin," even if the thief would work with the slave at a time when the slave normally works for his master, the thief is exempt! (He is considered to have acquired the slave at that time, and therefore he need not return the profits.) How is the position of the Rif to be reconciled with the Gemara?

ANSWER: The KETZOS HA'CHOSHEN (363:2) answers that the reason why the person who snatches the slave at the time he usually works is liable is not that he is considered a thief who steals a slave from the owner, but rather that he is directly damaging the owner. The Mishnah (83b) states that one of the five payments which one must pay for causing damage to another person is Sheves, compensation for lost time and earnings from work. The Gemara (85b) states that one who locked his friend in a room and prevented him from working, he must pay for the lost income.

The Ketzos ha'Choshen cites the Ramban who states that the latter form of damage is not considered "Dina d'Garmi" (a more causal form of indirect damage; see 98b and 100a for more details). Rather, it is considered direct damage. Accordingly, preventing the slave from working for his master is not comparable to stealing an inanimate object; the law of Sheves applies only when one damages a human being. Consequently, even according to the opinion that "slaves are like Metaltelin," the thief nevertheless must pay the owner for the lost work-time of the slave. Therefore, the Rif rules that although "slaves are like Metaltelin," the thief is liable for snatching the slave at a time when he normally works.

The Ketzos ha'Choshen asks an obvious question on this approach. If the one who snatches the slave is obligated to pay the owner for the lost work-time only when he snatches the slave at a time when the slave otherwise would have been working for the master -- whether slaves are like Karka or like Metaltelin, what is the Gemara's question? The law is the same whether Rav maintains that a slave is like Karka or like Metaltelin!

The Ketzos ha'Choshen answers that when the Gemara asks why the person who snatched his friend's slave and worked with it is exempt, it does not ask according to the opinion that "slaves are like Metaltelin." The Gemara understands that according to that opinion, the case certainly refers to when he snatched the slave at a time when there was no work for the slave to do for his master.

The Gemara asks only according to the opinion that a slave is like land: Even though the thief derived benefit and the owner did not lose anything, why is the thief exempt? This case is not similar to the case of one who lives in a unoccupied house without the permission of the owner, in which he does not have to pay rent. In that case, the owner benefits as a result of the squatter (he prevents the house from deteriorating). In contrast, the owner of a slave does not benefit when the thief works with and weakens his slave.

A similar question according to the opinion that "slaves are like Metaltelin" would not have been appropriate. One difference between whether slaves are like Karka or like Metaltelin is whether the thief keeps the profits produced by the slave. If the slave is like Karka, the thief keeps the profits. Accordingly, the Gemara does not ask that the thief should be liable even when he snatches the slave at a time when he otherwise would not have worked for his master.

Finally, the Gemara answers that even according to the opinion that "slaves are like land," the owner still is pleased that his slave should be made to work, so that he not acquire habits of laziness. Therefore, everyone agrees that in this case the thief gains and the owner does not lose. This is why the one who snatched the slave is exempt if he did so at a time when the slave was not working. (See also KEHILOS YAAKOV #40.) (D. Bloom)

QUESTION: The Gemara (97a) discusses a case in which one lends money to his friend based on a coin, and the coin then becomes invalid. RASHI (DH ha'Malveh and DH Al) explains that he loaned merchandise on the basis of the coin, specifying that the borrower must return the value of the coin in return for the merchandise.

According to Rav, the borrower must return a valid coin at the time of repayment. Shmuel disagrees with Rav and maintains that the borrower may return the invalid coin, because the coin was invalidated only in that country, but it still is valid in a distance place (such as Meishan). The borrower can claim to the lender that he should go and spend the money in Meishan. Rav Nachman adds that it is logical that Shmuel's ruling applies only when the lender has a way of getting to Meishan. If he has no way of getting there, the borrower may not return to him a coin that is valid only in Meishan.

Rashi (DH u'Meishan) apparently understands that the phrase, "he has a way of getting to Meishan," means that the lender needs to go there anyway. (See also the footnotes (197 and 200) to the CHIDUSHEI HA'RASHBA, who suggests that according to the Rashba, even if the lender is not going to Meishan the borrower may return to him the invalid coin as long as it is possible for the lender to go there.)

Later (97b), Rava asks Rav Chisda what the law is in a case of one who lends a coin to his friend and then the authorities add to the value of the coin (they add more weight of metal to the standard coin). Rav Chisda replies that the borrower must return the standard coin which is in circulation at the time of repayment. Rava asks whether this means that he must return the larger coin even if it has been enlarged to the size of a Nafya or Tartiya (coins that are significantly larger than the original coins), and Rav Chisda answers that the borrower must return even such coins.

Rava asks that since the lender will be able to buy more fruit with the larger coin, paying back with this coin should pose a problem of Ribis. Rav Ashi answers that if the larger coin indeed buys more fruit because of its greater buying power, the lender must refund to the borrower the difference in value between the two coins. However, if the reason why the larger coin buys more fruit is that it was an exceptionally rainy and productive year and the fruit is plentiful (and therefore inexpensive), he need not refund the difference.

When Rava asks Rav Chisda about the enlarged coin, is his question according to the opinion of Rav or the opinion of Shmuel?

(a) RASHI (DH v'Hosifu) explains that Rava asks his question only according to Rav, who maintains that if the first coin was invalidated the borrower must give the lender a new, valid coin. Rava's question is that if the first coin was not invalidated but rather enlarged, does he also have to return the updated, enlarged coin?

The RASHBA explains that the reason (according to this explanation) why Rava does not ask also according to Shmuel is that according to Shmuel the borrower does not need to return the new coin; he may return the old coin and tell the lender to go and spend it in Meishan.

(The HAGAHOS ASHIRI writes that Rashi rules according to Rav. Perhaps Rashi rules like Rav, and does not adhere to the general rule that the law follows the view of Shmuel in monetary matters, is that the fact that Rava asks his question according to Rav indicates that Rava rules like Rav.)

The RA'AVAD (cited by the Shitah Mekubetzes) also writes that Rava's question is according to the view of Rav. Rava considers two possibilities: Does the enlargement of the coin with more metal mean that the coin is inherently worth more, and therefore repayment with that coin poses a problem of Ribis, or since the coin's value has not actually changed (i.e. it was worth 100 both before and after the change) there is no problem of Ribis?

(b) The ROSH (see also RASHBA) implies that Rava asks his question according to Shmuel, and he refers to a case in which the lender is unable to travel to Meishan. In such a case, the borrower may not return the old coin and argue that the lender can spend it in Meishan.

The YAM SHEL SHLOMO (#15) writes that this must be the intent of the Gemara. Since the Halachah follows the view of Shmuel, it is logical that Rava would ask a question only according to the view of Shmuel. The SHULCHAN ARUCH (CM 74:7) explicitly rules in accordance with the view of Shmuel. (D. Bloom)