1)

(a)In another Beraisa, Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili learns from "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki", 'Naki mi'D'mei V'lados'. He is referring to a case where the ox gored a pregnant woman, killing her unborn babies.

(b)Rebbi Akiva queried Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili inasmuch as since we already have the Pasuk "Ki Yinatzu Anashim, v'Nagfu Ishah Harah" from which we can extrapolate "Anashim", 've'Lo Shevarim', why does Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili require another Pasuk?

(c)To answer this Kashya, Rav Ula Brei d'Rav Idi interprets "Anashim" differently. Based on his Derashah "Anashim", 've'Lo Shevarim Dumya la'Anashim', he confines the P'tur by animals to a Mu'ad (similar to a person, who is always a Mu'ad), but a Tam will be Chayav (and it is with regard to a Tam that Rebbi Yosi Hegelili Darshens "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki", 'Naki mi'Demei V'lados').

2)

(a)Rabah objects to Rav Ula b'rei d'Rav Idi's Derashah on the grounds that the initial Derashah is illogical in that it is more stringent with regard to a Tam than a Mu'ad.

(b)Rabah therefore explains "Anashim", 've'Lo Sh'varim Dumya la'Anashim' (before the Pasuk adds "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki") to mean that a Mu'ad is Patur, and certainly a Tam ...

(c)... until "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" teaches us that it is Davka a Tam that is Patur and not a Mu'ad.

3)

(a)We learn from the same Pasuk ("v'Chi Yinatzu Anashim", "Anashim", v'Lo Sh'varim') that if an animal shames a person, the owner is Patur from Boshes.

(b)Abaye asks why according to Rabah, we do not say by Boshes too, that only a Tam is Patur, but a Mu'ad is Chaya; because if we did Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili should have said 'Patur mi'D'mei V'lados u'mi'Boshes'.

(c)Abaye and Rava therefore, learn "Anashim", 've'Lo Shevarim Dumya la'Anashim' differently. The case where we would have obligated an animal that killed, to pay for the babies, even though a person in the equivalent case would be Patur is where with the same stroke, he also killed the woman, in which case he would be Chayav Misah. Consequently, based on the principle 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih' he will be Patur from paying.

4)

(a)Rav Ada bar Ahavah queries Abaye and Rava's answer. According to him, even a person would be Chayav in the case of "Ki Yinatzu Anashim", even if he killed the woman with the same stroke, because he holds like Rebbi Shimon, who rules that if Reuven means to kill Shimon and he strikes Levi by mistake (the case discussed by the Torah) he is Patur from Misah and Chayav to pay.

(b)He is not Patur from paying anyway, due to Tana d'bei Chizkiyah (who exempts even someone who killed b'Shogeg from paying for the damage) because Rav Ada bar Ahavah does not hold like Tana d'bei Chizkiyah.

(c)Rav Ada bar Ahavah finally establishes "Anashim", 've'Lo Shevarim Dumya la'Anashim' there where the animal actually meant to kill the woman, in which case a person would be Patur (because of 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih'), but an animal is Chayav (which is why Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili requires "u'Ba'al ha'Shor Naki" to exempt animals too).

(d)When Rav Chagai came from the south, he brought with him a Beraisa in support of Rav Ada bar Ahavah.

5)

(a)In yet another Beraisa, Rebbi Akiva says "Ba'al ha'Shor Naki", 'Naki mi'Demei Eved' with reference to a Shor Tam that killed an Eved (teaching us that the Din of thirty Shekalim Kenas that one has to pay if one's ox gored an Eved is confined to a Mu'ad).

(b)To answer why Rebbi Akiva does not ask on himself the same Kashya that he asked earlier on Rebbi Eliezer (when he Darshened 'Naki me'Chatzi Kofer') Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak establishes the case where the owner went and Shechted the animal before Beis-Din managed to stone it.

(c)Rebbi Akiva nevertheless asked this Kashya on Rebbi Eliezer thinking that maybe he had a better answer.

6)

(a)Rebbi Eliezer on the other hand, did not establish the case where the owner Shechted it first, like Rebbi Akiva because in such a case, where the animal is actually Chayav Misah (as opposed to his case, 'Miskaven La'harog Es ha'Beheimah ... ', where it is not), we do not need a Pasuk to exempt the owner from having to pay if he Shechted it first.

(b)The problem with Rebbi Akiva now is on what grounds he did give that answer.

(c)Rav Asi quoted a great man by the name of Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina, who explained Rebbi Akiva.

7)

(a)Rebbi Yosi b'Rebbi Chanina based his answer on another statement of Rebbi Akiva, who stated that if a Shor Tam injured a person the owner has to pay Nezek Shalem min ha'Aliyah.

(b)This would answer the Kashya that we asked on Rebbi Akiva ('Naki mi'D'emei Eved') adequately because the Kashya was based on the fact that a Shor Tam pays mi'Gufo ... , whereas in this case, Rebbi Akiva holds that he pays min ha'Aliyah.

(c)Rebbi Zeira refutes this however, on the basis of another Beraisa, where Rebbi Akiva learns from the Pasuk "ka'Mishpat ha'Zeh Ye'aseh Lo" that if an ox kills a child, the owner pays mi'Gufo and not min ha'Aliyah (even though he pays Nezek Shalem).

(d)When Rebbi Zeira said 'Tavra Rebbi Akiva li'Gezizeih' (he broke the power of his fist), he meant that he compromised on his original Chidush (Nezek Shalem, yes, but min ha'Aliyah, no).

8)

(a)Rava finally explains that Rebbi Akiva requires "Ba'al ha'Shor Naki", to preclude from the 'Havah Amina' that the owner of the Tam would have to pay min ha'Aliyah by Eved more than by any other case of Nezek because the owner has to pay thirty Sheloshim should his Mu'ad ox kill him, even if he is worth only one.

(b)We know for sure that Rava's explanation is the right one because it has the support of a Beraisa.

(c)Before concluding that Eved by Tam ought to be more stringent than Mu'ad (as we just explained), the Tana gives two reasons why we really should not require a Pasuk to exempt him from D'mei Eved. One of them is because an Eved should not be any different than a ben Chorin (where Tam pays mi'Gufo). The second reason is because it is even a 'Kal va'Chomer' from a ben Chorin, whose full value one has to pay, yet there is a difference between a Tam and a Mu'ad, how much more so in the case of an Eved, where one only pays thirty Shekalim (even if he is worth a hundred).

9)

(a)In a Beraisa, Rebbi Akiva discusses the Hekesh "v'Heimis Ish O Ishah". The Pasuk cannot be coming to obligate a Mu'ad that killed a woman just like when it killed a man because that we already know from the previous Pasuk "v'Chi Yigach Shor Es Ish O Es Ishah".

(b)In fact, the Pasuk is comparing a woman to a man with regard to the Din of Yerushah, to teach us that the Kofer for killing a woman goes to her heirs (just like the Kofer for killing a man goes to his heirs) and not to her husband.

(c)Rebbi Akiva learns from the Pasuk "v'Yarash Osah" that a husband inherits his wife.

(d)We actually derive this from the word "li'She'eiro" mentioned in the Pasuk, and 'She'eiro' means his wife. The Torah cannot be saying that the man's property goes to his wife), as is implied by the Pasuk because the Torah also writes there "mi'Mishpachto", from which we extrapolate "mi'Mishpachto", v'Lo mi'Mishpachtah.

10)

(a)Reish Lakish reconciles the two Derashos of Rebbi Akiva (that, on the one hand, her property goes to her husband, and on the other, her Kofer goes to her heirs) by differentiating between her regular property, which goes to her husband, and Kofer, which goes to her heirs, because a husband only inherits what the woman actually had when she died ('Muchzak'), but not what falls due only after her death ('Ra'uy').

(b)We learn from the sequence of the Pasuk "v'Heimis Ish O Ishah ha'Shor Yisakel v'Gam Be'alav Yumas. Im Kofer Yushas Alav" that the Chiyuv Kofer only falls due after the Nizak is actually dead.

(c)If not for this Pasuk, we would have thought that the obligation to pay Kofer takes effect as soon as Beis-Din have assessed the Nizak for death, even though he is still alive (in which case, the Kofer would not then be considered 'Ra'uy', but 'Muchzak' (thereby negating the previous answer).

(d)The Beraisa rules that someone who strikes a pregnant woman and kills her babies, must pay the woman for Nezek and Tza'ar, and the value of the babies to her husband. In the event that ...

1. ... her husband has died it is his heirs who receive the D'mei V'lados.

2. ... the woman has died then it is her heirs (and not his) that receive her Nezek and Tza'ar.

11)

(a)In the event that the woman is a Shifchah Meshuchreres or a Giyores, and neither she nor her husband are still alive the Mazik may retain the Nezek, the Tza'ar and the D'mei V'lados. Generally, it would be a matter of 'Kol ha'Kodem Zachah' ('First come, first served!'). Here however, where the Mazik already has the ox in his possession, he automatically acquires it.

(b)Rabah and Rav Nachman reconcile this Beraisa (i.e. the second case where the woman died), where it is the woman's Yorshin who inherit her and not her husband's, with Rebbi Akiva's Derashah from "v'Yarash Osah" (from which he learns that it is the husband who inherits his wife) by establishing the current Beraisa by a divorcee, who had no husband when the damage occurred.

(c)Rav Papa learns from the Pasuk "Ka'asher Yashis Alav Ba'al ha'Ishah" that the babies belong to the Bo'El, even if he was not married to the woman (which explains why the woman does not receive a share in the babies in any of the above cases).