What Isi Says: Isi Darshens it in Perek ha'Umnin (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 83.) from "Ein Ro'eh", implying that if someone saw it, he is only Patur if he brings the witnesses who saw the animal being ripped apart.

No Ramifications: Their argument is confined to the source (and has no Halachic ramifications)..

Explanation #1: This means that it died without a B'rachah.

Explanation (Text) #2: Others have the text 'Adurah', and the meaning of the word is as in the Pasuk in Yeshayah (37) "Achas meheinah Lo Ne'edarah" (missing).

Explanation (Text) #3: Whereas Rashi has the text 'Adudah' - as in the Pasuk in Vay'chi "ba'Boker Yochal Ad" [spoil].

Explanation (Text) #2: He has the text 'Amar Shmuel "Amar li Aba" '.

Explanation #1: This is not like Rashi, who explains that it was the Minhag of Dayanim to do this.

Clarification: Rashi explains that one does not assess the carcass and the owner receives the pieces, inasmuch as the Ganav must pay for the depreciation ...

Clarification (cont.): ... but that he must pay a complete animal or complete vessels, and he is permitted to keep the broken pieces

Implied Question: And even though we Pasken (above, Daf 7.) "Yashiv", 'to include the value of money instead of money, and even 'oats' ...

Answer: ... Ganav and Gazlan are different ...

Reason: ... since the Torah writes "asher Gazal" - 'Just like the article that he stole' (later, Daf 67.). Consequently he is obligated to pay either the article itself or its monetary value, but not oats.

Support: And so it is implied in the Yerushalmi (in this Perek at the end of Halachah Alef) where Rebbi Aba learns from "Chayam Shenayim Yeshalem" that one must pay live animals and not dead ones.

Support (cont.): And Rebbi Aba bar Mamal adds that we know that the same Din applies to Gezeilah from the Pasuk "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah asher Gazal" - 'Just like the article that he stole'.

Reason: And the reason for this is - because a Ganav and a Gazlan acquire the article the moment they take it out of the owner's domain, whilst a Mazik is only obligated to pay according to the damage that he inflicted.

Reason (cont.): And the opinion that holds that by a Sho'el too, 'Ein Shamin', maintains that he acquires it the moment he takes it out of the domain of the owner, seeing as he then becomes liable for Onsin. Consequently, his obligation to pay is the same as that of a Ganav and Gazlan.

Clarification: In other words, she will count fourteen days of a Nekeivah from the first one, and the blood that she sees on the fifteenth will then be Tahor.

Question: Why is she not indeed Tahor? Perhaps the baby's head or most of it emerged on the first day, and even if it didn't, perhaps it was a boy?

Answer: One cannot declare her Tahor on the grounds of a S'fek S'feika, seeing as it would then be a matter of two leniencies that contradict one another ...

Answer (cont.): ... because in the event that she sees blood on the forty-first day, she will also be permitted on the basis of a S'fek S'feika - perhaps the majority of the baby did not emerge on the first day, and even if it did, perhaps it was a girl.

Answer (concl.): And it now transpires that initially, we permitted her because the baby may have been a boy, and then we permit her again because it may have been a girl, and Mah Nafshach (either way) she has performed an Isur.

Precedent: Similarly, the Mishnah in 'ha'Mapeles (Nidah, Daf 29.) rules that 'She sits (the days of Tum'ah) for a boy, for a girl and for a Nidah', even though each Isur independently is a S'fek S'feika.

Question: According to Rebbi Elazar, who says 'Chosh;shin', because of 'Ein Miktzas Shilya be'Lo V'lad', but if if there was Miktzas Shilya be'Lo V'lad, she would be Tahor.

Question (cont.): How is it speaking? If it is in the R'shus ha'Rabim, she would be Tahor even on the basis of one Safek; whereas if it is in the R'shus ha'Yachid, even if it is a S'fek S'feika, she ought to be Tamei

Source: ... seeing as we learned in the Mishnah in Taharos (Perek 6, Mishnah 4) 'Any S'feikos that one can add in the R'shus ha'Yachid, render Tamei, even if it is a S'fek S'feika'.

Answer: Our Mishnah is speaking with regard to forbidding her on her husband (which is not a matter of Tum'ah, but of Isur).

Clarification: This means that even what is inside is forbidden, since perhaps the head of the baby emerged together with the bit of Shilya, in which the entire baby is considered born and we cannot therefore apply the ruling that 'Whatever is inside the animal is permitted.

Reason: Because if there was 'Miktzas Shilya without a V'lad', we ought to permit it to be eaten on the basis of a 'S'fek S'feika'.

Question: In the Sugya here, it is evident that Rebbi Elazar permits a Shilya part of which emerged to be eaten if it would be a S'fek S'feika, whereas at the end of 'Beheimah ha'Maksheh' (Chulin, Daf 77:) it implies that he forbids even a S'fek S'feika?

Question (cont.): Because Rebbi Elazar establishes the Mishnah of 'she'Lo Yatz'sah Miktzasah' where it is not attached to the baby, but where it is, then one is not Choshesh for another baby.

Question (concl.): And where it is not attached to the baby, it is only a S'fek S'feika, as we learned there in a Beraisa 'Perhaps the Sh'fir (the sack of the fetus) of the Shilya melted. In that case, where it is not attached, it ought to be permitted - perhaps there is no other baby, and even if there is, perhaps the majority did not yet emerge?

Answer #1: The Beraisa, which states there 'Perhaps ... ', is speaking about a Shilya that emerged after the baby, whereas Rebbi Elazar is speaking about a Shilya that emerged before the baby, where, if the Shilya is not attached to the Sh'fir, there is definitely another baby there ...

Source: ... as the Gemara says in 'ha'Mapeles' (Nidah, Daf 26.) that we only assume that the Shilya came with the V'lad in the case of a Shilya that emerged after it.

Answer #2: Moreover, one can say that in that case we only forbid part of the Shilya with a S'fek S'feika in the form of a Gezeirah - on account of the entire Shilya, as the Gemara actually says in the Sugya.

Question: Why does it learn Beheimah from Ishah, even though the Mishnah is speaking only about Beheimah?

Answer: Because the Gemara considers Ishah more obvious than Beheimah ...

Reason: This in turn, is because a Sh'fir is the sign of a baby by a woman, but not by a Beheimah ...

Source: ... as we learned in 'ha'Lokei'ach' (Bechoros, Daf 19:) 'Si'man V'lad bi'Veheimah Shilya, u've'Ishah, Sh'fir ve'Shilya'.

Clarification: This is not specifically so ...

Proof #1: ... because how could one possibly permit all of it, seeing as even where only part of it emerged, the part that emerged is Asur mi'd'Oraysa, and we do not decree what remains inside on account of what emerged?

Proof #2: If we decree on account of where it all emerged, then we ought to decree by a woman too?

Explanation: What the Gemara therefore means is ' ... on account of where the majority emerged ...

Explanation (cont.): Because if, where a part emerged, one were to permit what remains inside, based on the Pasuk "Kol asher bi'Veheimah" (despite the suspicion that maybe that part contained the head), one would come to permit it even where the majority emerged and the minority remained inside for the same reason ...

Explanation (cont.): ... and they would not realize that where a small part emerged, it is permitted due to a S'fek S'feika.

Why a Woman is Different #1: Whereas in the case of Ishah, there is no justification to decree, seeing as it not possible to err ...

Why a Woman is Different #1 (cont.): ... because there is no basis to make a mistake and to compare the majority (that emerged) to the minority (that emerged); but by a Beheimah, they will err to say that what remains inside is not considered born as long as it has not emerged.

Why a Woman is Different #2: Alternatively, they did not decree by Ishah to count from the first day, since it is a Chumra that will lead to a Kula, because they may not count from the second day to give her the days of Tum'ah.

Why a Woman is Different #3: Alternatively, they did not decree since the Chachamim do not increase Tum'ah (unnecessarily) ...

Source: As the Gemara says in Beitzah (Daf 7.).

Refutation: However, Tosfos above (on Amud Alef, DH 'de'Ein') explained that the case of Ishah is not speaking about Tum'ah, only about forbidding her on her husband.

Why a Woman is Different #4: Rashi explains that there is no reason to decree by Ishah because, since everyone sees that when she gives birth the second time, they declare her Tamei, they will not err.

Question: When they see that after the second birth, they declare her Tamei, (they will realize that it is because the entire Shilya emerged).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that he was killed ...

Explanation #1 (cont.): Since, where he simply died, we do not require a Pasuk to teach us 'Ein Podin' ...

Reason: Seeing as the Pasuk writes "u'Feduyav mi'ben Chodesh Tifdeh" ...

Reason: But where it is killed on the other hand, we do need a Pasuk, to teach us not to say that 'Had he not been killed, he would have survived, in which case he is not a Nefel, and needs to be redeemed.

Inference: This implies somewhat that if we were to know for sure that it is a ninth-month baby that would have lived, one would be Chayav to redeem him.

Question #1: In Perek Yesh B'chor (Bechoros, Daf 49.) in connection with someone who redeemed his son within thirty days and the money was used up - the Gemara rules that after the time, his son is not redeemed.

Question #1 (cont.): Why is that, seeing as it became revealed retroactively that he was not a Nefel?

Question #1 (concl.): Clearly, it is a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv from the Pasuk "u'Feduyav mi'ben Chodesh Tifdeh" that, even if we know for sure that he is a ninth-month baby, one still requires (him to survive) thirty days?

Implied Question: Even though the Gemara in Shabbos (Daf 135:) learns that 'whoever waits thirty days with regard to a human baby is not a Nefel' ...

Answer: So too, do we learn (there) from the Pasuk "mi'Yom ha'Shemini va'Hal'ah, Yeratzeh le'Korban", that 'eight days with regard to an animal is not a Nefel'; nevertheless, even if we know that that it waited out its full term of pregnancy, we Pasken that within eight days it is considered premature...

Source: ... as is evident in the first Perek of Rosh ha'Shanah, Daf 6:) ...

Source (cont.): ... where in answer to the question 'From when do we count a year by a B'chor?', one opinion states "From the time that it is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach", and the other "From the time it is born". And they do not argue - One speaks about a Tam, the other, a Ba'al-Mum ...

Source (concl.): ... and the Gemara establishes it there where we know that it waited out its full term of pregnancy; nevertheless it is not fit to go on the Mizbe'ach before eight days.

Question #2: Moreover, at the end of ha'Kometz (Menachos, Daf 37.) the Gemara obligates someone who has a B'chor with two heads to give ten Sela'im to the Kohen ...

Question #2 (cont.): ... and it queries this from 'B'chor she'Nitraf', which is Patur. Now if 'Nitraf' means 'killed', how can the Gemara compare it to the case there?

Question #3: Furthermore, the Gemara ought not to have said 'Nitraf', but 'Neherag'?

Question #4: And finally, the Gemara ultimately learns it from "Ach", 'Chalak'. But since it was killed within thirty days, we learn it from "u'Feduyav mi'ben Chodesh Tifdeh"?

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Tam therefore interprets 'Nitraf' to mean that it became a T'reifah ...

Conclusion: ... thereby justifying the Gemara in ha'Kometz's comparison of 'B'chor she'Nitraf' to a B'chor with two heads, which is also a T'reifah.

Observation: This is not the chief location for this ruling. And Tosfos elaborates in the first Perek of Kidushin (Daf 25:).

Clarification: Since they are too embarrassed to bring them to Beis-Din, and they are therefore Mochel each other.

Halachah: The Rif confines this ruling to weekday clothes, but Shabbos clothes once does assess.

Source: And that is how the Yerushalmi rules (Kidushin, Perek 1. End of Halachah 4).

Clarification: They are entitled to object, should they so wish, only as long as they have not done so, we assume that they agree, so that his words are accepted ...

Source: ,,, as the Gemara states in 'ha'Nizakin' (Gitin, Daf 52:) in the case of Amram the painter.

Clarification: This means that he is Patur in the event that the article is stolen or lost.

Halachah: When the Shomer Sachar pays however, he pays to the owner ...

Source: As the Gemara states in 'ha'Mafkid' (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 36:), where we Pasken like Rebbi Yossi, who says 'Reuven cannot make money on Shimon's cow'.

Refuted Explanation: One cannot explains 'Alyeih' to mean that if it is stolen, it is returned to the owner ...

refutation: Since it is not possible to explain 'Geu'i Garyeih' in that way.

Correct Explanation: What the Iluy and the Gera'on of a Shomer Sachar therefore mean is that he exerts himself more than a Shomer Chinam.

Ramification of Reason: According to this reason, in the event that the second Shomer is more trustworthy than the first one, he ought to be Patur.

Reason #2: But in 'ha'Mafkid' (Ibid.) the Gemara gives the reason as 'I do not want my Pikadon to be in the hands of anyone else (other then you)'.

Different Ramifications: And the two reasons are not equal, as is evident there (on Daf 36:).

Refuted Question: One cannot ask how Ula here can argue with that reason, which appears in the Mishnah in Gitin (Daf 29.) 'If Reuven asks Shimon to take an object from Levi, he is not permitted to send it through Levi, because "Ein Retzoni ... " '? ...

Answer: ... Because that speaks Lechatchilah. We do not however find that one is Chayav for doing it.

Clarification #1: If he possesses two, because where he possesses only one, the Gemara says in ha'Mekabel (Bava Metzi'a, Daf 114.) 'Mesadrin le'Ba'al-Chov (One leaves the debtor his basic needs)'.

Clarification #2: Alternatively, it speaks where he has a cloak that is worth a hundred Manah, in which case one leaves him one that suits his means, not like Rebbi Akiva who maintains that 'All of Yisrael are worthy of such an expensive coat!'

Clarification #3: Rabeinu Tam however, Paskens 'Ein Mesadrin le'Ba'al-Chov'.

Clarification: And one may now claim from the Yesomim just as one claims from the purchaser.

Implied Question: Even though the reason of 'Kala' does not apply to them as it does to him?

Answer: Nevertheless, as one claims from the Lekuchos, so does one claim from the Yesomim.

Precedent: Just as we find by a documented loan which one claims from both Yesomim and Lekuchos, even according to the opinion that 'Shibuda is not min ha'Torah'; whereas an oral loan one can claim neither from Meshubadim nor from Yesomim. (cont. on Daf 12 Amud Alef).