Explanation: Rashi explains that since Rebbi Shimon said that he is "always" a free man until etc., this implies that whether or not the slave also acquired other things (together with his freedom), he goes free. An example of acquiring other things is where the document specifies what he acquires along with his freedom, and what he does not acquire. An example of not acquiring is where the amount he did not acquire was not even identified, such as he acquires all of my possessions "besides for a Beis Kur of land."

In such a case he does not acquire any land, as by every piece of land it is possible to say that he meant this piece of land is the exception. However, he is still free. This implies that we do split his words, as although he said that the slave acquires all of his property, he only really acquires himself (due to this exception).

Question: This is difficult. Even though that he did not mention the name of the land (or location) that is the exception, the slave should still acquire all of his land. The only thing the exception should do is give the slave the weaker hand in determining the location of the Beis Kur that he does not own. The master could therefore take the best Beis Kur from amongst his properties. This is evident from the Mishnah in Bava Basra (107b) that says that if someone sells is friend half of a field, the seller must leave him half a field. The Gemara there explains that this means that the buyer is left with the lesser half, as the seller has the advantage (and can say that this is the half he meant).

Answer: The Ri answers that Rebbi Shimon is coming to add that even if the slave owner only owns that city or field (that he said the slave does not acquire), the slave acquires his freedom (see below). (Note: If he owned other things besides for a city or field, the slave acquires those other things as well (see Maharam).)

This is as stated in the second part of the Tosefta in Bava Basra (9:11) and in Pei'ah (1:13). Rebbi Shimon says that he is always a free man until the slaveowner says that all of his possessions are given to Ploni, his servant, besides for one ten-thousandth. If he says, "besides for this city" or "besides for this field," even if there is only that field or city there, the slave acquires the (other) possessions and acquires himself as a free man.

The terminology "All my possessions (...goes to the slave)," only works regarding the slave going free (when nothing else is specified, and his possessions total the exception that he stated later). One would think that his statement "besides for..." totally negates his statement of "All my possessions (...go to the slave)." This teaches us that even so he goes free, as we separate his terminology.

Explanation: The Gemara currently thinks that Rebbi Meir does not hold that we split the statement. This is apparent from the fact that Rebbi Shimon said, "Forever, etc." This implies that even when the statement is contradictory, that according to Rebbi Meir he would not go free because he made a contradictory statement that is not split as he only owns that one city (see (c) in previous Tosfos), even so Rebbi Shimon holds he goes free.

The Gemara concludes, however, that Rebbi Meir's reasoning is not because he does not split the statement, but rather because it is not "Krus Gita" (see immediately below).

This means that there is no "Krisus" - "definitive separation" (between the person and his property) being that he left over for himself something that he stated he was letting free. He said he is giving (the slave) "all of his property," but then does not keep all of this condition (as he later says "besides certain property"). However, if a slave were to bring a document freeing him that states, "All of my property is acquired by you," we would split the statement (that he acquires the property even though he himself is technically property of this person) because here there is a definitive separation in the document.

Opinion: Rashi explains that there is no definitive separation in such a document, because it is possible to say that if he leaves some property over he also left the slave in his possession. Accordingly, if he only owns one city which he left over, and we cannot say that because he left some things out he also left the slave, Rebbi Meir would agree that he goes free, as we would say that we split his statement.

Implied Question #1: This is not the implication of the Tosefta, as I have explained (see previous Tosfos (c 1.).

Implied Question #2: Additionally, the term "Afilu" - "even" does not seem to sit right, as even if he only owns that city implies that certainly if he owns other property Rebbi Shimon will say that he goes free. On the contrary, Rebbi Meir only argues when he has other property. (Note: Therefore, according to Rashi the term "Afilu" in the Tosefta is out of place, as this is specifically when everyone agrees.)

Implied Question: What does putting one's lips together have to do with saying a good explanation?

Answer: When a person says something that is clearly correct, those around him put their lips together, as they are quiet and have no response.

Question: Why should we say he is a free man and is permitted to marry a regular Jewish woman? Being that his freedom is a present of a Shechiv Meira (person on their deathbed) which is not acquired until after he dies, and it is impossible to give a document freeing the slave after his owner dies, how can this possibly be valid?

Answer #1: The case is where he wrote that the present was effective today (while he was alive).

Answer #2: Alternatively, even without it explicitly saying "today," being that his mindset is clearly to set his slave free, his mindset is that the document should be valid at a time when it is possible to be validly set him free, meaning while he is alive.

Question: Being that the mindset of a Shechiv Meira is to retract his present if he will feel better, why does his slave not return to being a slave? (Note: In other words, being that his mindset is generally to retract this document if he gets better, how can Chazal say he his is free anyway based on the fact that he already has been called a free person? How does this help the fact that he essentially retracted the document and therefore the slave should not be called free?)

Answer: This (the ruling in this case) is a decree of the Chachamim. This decree includes both the fact that he can retract his possessions and also that he cannot retract freeing his slave. This is because his mindset is whatever the Chachamim say it should be in any given case (and being that they made this decree, this must have been his mindset in this case).

However, if he wrote explicitly in the document that the present is "from today if he dies," the argument that he has already been called a free man is not going to help to say he is free (if the person gets better). This is because he made an explicit condition that the document should only be valid if he dies (and the slave therefore was never really called free). (Note: The Rashash takes the words in brackets out of the text.)

Question: The Gemara in Bava Basra (150a) wants to suggest that a slave is like land. The Gemara asks from the Mishnah Pei'ah (3:8) quoted in our Gemara that if one leaves a little bit of land the slave is not considered freed. Rav Dimi there says that movable objects are also considered to be something left over regarding a slave.

Rava said to Rav Nachman, why is this so? Rav Nachman answered that a slave is like a movable object, and movable objects are considered to be something left over regarding a slave. Rav Ashi answered that the reason he does not go free is because there is no definitive separation in the document (see Tosfos 2 above). This implies that Rav Nachman who says that a slave is like a movable object does not hold of the reason of definitive separation (as he said instead that it was because servants were like movable objects). (Note: Accordingly, how can Rav Ashi here state that Rav Nachman does hold that definitive separation in this document is essential?)

Answer: Rabeinu Tam says that this is the explanation of the Gemara there (in Bava Basra 150a). When Rav Ashi answers that the reason is because there is no definitive separation, he means that this was what Rav Nachman actually answered to Rava, not that servants are considered like movable objects. Rav Nachman never made that statement.

Now we understand that Rav Ashi's reasoning here according to Rav Nachman regarding no definitive separation in this document is the same reasoning that he uses in Bava Basra (according to himself and Rav Nachman).

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam says that the main statement of Rebbi Yochanan was said regarding a Gemara in Kesuvos (23b) regarding the argument of whether or not we accept that someone has the status of a Kohen if only one witness testifies to this effect. Even though the same statement is made in both places, it was originally said about that case.

Explanation: Why not rely on those witnesses who say the signature is invalid and establish that the woman is still married?

Explanation: The same would apply if there is a complaint from people who bought fields from the husband, and the woman is now coming to seize them, as is stated in the Yerushalmi.

Question: It is understandable that regarding the Get of a woman (from overseas that only one witness must say b'Fanay Nechtav) the Chachamim were lenient in order to ensure she does not remain unmarried. However, regarding a slave, what room is there for this leniency (that we do not require two witnesses)? If it is because he is forbidden to marry both a regular free Jewess and a Shifchah Kenanis, let the messenger simply not give him the Get from overseas which frees him, and he will not be forbidden to marry a Shifchah Kenanis? (Note: This is the way the question is asked in the Ran.)

Answer: The equivalent of being able to remarry by a regular woman regarding a slave is the fact that the slave cannot marry a regular Jewess and he is not obligated in Mitzvos.

Implied Question: The opposite term should have been used in the Beraisa, that freeing slaves was equated to divorcing women, being that the main source of the law of saying b'Fanay Nechtav etc. was by divorcing women. (Note: Why does the Beraisa instead say divorcing women was equated to freeing slaves?)

Answer: Being that until now the Beraisa was talking about Gitin, it mentioned Gitin first.

Implied Question: Why are the Gitin of women and slaves unfit when they are effected in a Nochri court?

Answer #1: The Ri says that when the signatures of the witnesses are those of Nochrim, the document should be invalid even when a Yisrael wrote it, as they cannot effect Kerisus (as stated later).

Answer #2: Additionally, a Get needs to be written Lishmah, and a Nochri writes these documents based on his own understanding (not Lishmah), as stated later (23a).

Answer #3: Additionally, Nochrim cannot be messengers as they are Halachically invalid as messengers. Being that the husband must say to the scribe to write the document and tell the witnesses to sign, the implication is that one must be a messenger.

Answer #4: Additionally, they are generally invalid for testimony.

This is even according to Rebbi Meir who says that a slave (Eved Kenani) is not necessarily unfit for testimony due to the Pasuk, "he answered lies about his brother." A slave is not disqualified from testifying by this Pasuk, as Rebbi Meir says that a slave is considered one's brother due to his obligation to perform Mitzvos. However, a Nochri who is clearly not "your brother" is obviously unfit.

Implied Question: Being that they are unfit for testimony, it would seem fit that all documents whose source is a Nochri court should be unfit according to Torah law, even those that are just documents of proof (not effecting transactions). (Note: Why does the Beraisa say that only Gitin are invalid from a Nochri court?)

Answer: This is a Rabbinic decree that whenever we know that the testimony that was given was truthful (the document is considered valid), as they do not impeach their credibility (as a court).

Observation: However, the Gemara later (10b) states that a gift document (from their courts) is like a piece of earthenware, even though we assume it is truthful, as they have no power to effect a transaction through a document.

The Gemara establishes later (ibid.) that the case (where such a document can be kosher) is according to Rebbi Eliezer, and when there are witnesses that the document was given over. In such a case where a Jew wrote the document, the only other problem that would make it invalid is if it contains a forged element. (Note: See 10b where the Gemara mentions that if there are unkosher witnesses on the Get in this case the Get will be invalid (see also Rashi there DH "Modeh").)

Implied Question: Rashi explains that they would etch the paper (in the form of the witnesses names and have the witnesses fill in the ink). They did this despite the fact that the etching itself is sometimes considered writing, like when someone writes on a tablet or notebook. (Note: Why is not considered writing here?)

Answer: In our case it is not considered (that the witnesses are) writing on top of someone else's writing that we say is invalid (19a), as there is no real writing. Rather, it is only a small etching into the paper that is done in order to have the witnesses sign.

Proof: Additionally, (there is proof that it is valid writing as) even ink on top of a reddish coloring is called writing by the Gemara (ibid.) regarding violating Shabbos. This is despite the fact that the writing with the reddish coloring itself was already considered writing regarding Shabbos.

Implied Question: However, the term "we tear" does not imply the explanation Rash is giving. According to Rashi, it would have been more appropriate to say "we etch."

Opinion: The Rach explains that the Gemara means that one takes smooth paper and tears out the names of the witnesses from inside the paper. He then puts this stencil on the parchment of the Get, and the witnesses come and fill the space of what was torn with ink, and then their writing (i.e. signature) is made obvious on the Get.

The Yerushalmi asks, "isn't this the first writing?" This means that the Get should not be able to be valid with its signatures (as the witnesses signature was really made up by the people who made the stencil).

The Yerushalmi answers that the case is when the tears were widened, and the witnesses did not totally fill the entire width of the tear (making this their own signature, see Ramban). (Note: The Maharsha explains that Tosfos is defending the Rach against the Yerushalmi which seems to support Rashi's explanation that there is reason to think the etching is considered writing in its own right. Tosfos therefore gives an explanation of the Yerushalmi according to the Rach.)

Implied Question: This is not a problem of a witness testifying based on another witnesses testimony. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: This is because they do not have testify regarding what actually happened, but rather say that what they know happened is written in this document.

In such a case, two people must read the document, or even one person is sufficient like Rav Nachman and the judge's (his) scribes (who would read the document in front of Rav Nachman), who feared Rav Nachman, as stated in the Gemara later (19b).

Implied Question: Rashi explains that this even according to the Rabbanan who say that this is a merit for the slave, and one is allowed to acquire a positive thing for someone else even when he is not present. (Note: Why, then, can't this giving of a Get be viewed as having already been acquired for the slave before the person died?)

Answer: While it is true that once he receives this he cannot retract it, the Rabbanan admit that as long as he did not actually receive the Get he is not freed.

Question: This line of reasoning seems bewildering. Being that it is a merit for him, he should obviously acquire the Get right away as we say later regarding freeing a slave that, "Ten k'Zechi" - "the command to "give" is like saying acquire this (for the slave)."

It is evident that Rashi himself retracted this explanation from the Mishnah later (13a). Rashi explained there that the correct text is "you should give this Get " not "give this Get," the difference being that in the first case he never gave a Get to the messenger during his lifetime (and therefore the above Implied Question is inapplicable). This is why the Chachamim never argued about this statement, saying that once the messenger gets the Get the slave should be considered free.

Question: Isn't the gift document invalid because it originated from a Nochri court? This is obvious from the Gemara later (10b) where the Gemara says that any Gitin-like document (a document effecting transactions as opposed to a mere document of proof, see Tosfos above 1h) is not valid when it comes from a Nochri court?

Answer: The Gemara currently holds like the other answer later (ibid., where Shmuel says that the law of the land makes it valid, see Maharsha).

Implied Question: It is also possible for a Get to be invalid according to Rabbinic law because it is connected to the ground. For example, even the regular part of the Get cannot be written while connected to the ground, because one might come to write the important part of the Get while it is connected to the ground, as stated in the Gemara later (21b that this renders the Get unfit according to Rabbinic law).

Answer: However, the root of the invalidity of a Get being attached to the ground is a Torah law. The root of the law that a person who brings a Get from overseas or visa versa must say b'Fanay Nechtav etc. is Rabbinic. Despite the fact that according to Rabah the reason that the law was instituted was because we were worried about a Torah law, that the Get would not be written Lishmah, the root of the law is Rabbinic in nature.

Implied Question: This is a valid answer, despite the fact that the Beraisa says that according to Rebbi Meir there are four such cases. (Note: According to Rebbi Meir who argues on Rebbi Elazar and says that the witnesses who sign effect the transaction, this is indeed a reason that the document is invalid according to Torah law. How, then, can the Gemara answer that this is only a Rabbinic invalidation because it is according to the opinion of Rebbi Elazar?)

Answer: The Beraisa means that whoever holds like Rebbi Meir in the case "give this Get etc." can possibly hold that there are four cases (though Rebbi Meir himself will not hold there are four cases).

Implied Question: A similar query comes up when the Gemara asks that according to Rebbi Meir, what does the number come to teach us? (Note: Rebbi Meir can't hold this way!)

Answer: This question means, according to one who holds like Rebbi Meir in the case "give this Get etc."