Explanation: All of these do not have to do with Kidushin. Bringing and taking a Get are due to not wanting to make it difficult for a woman to get remarried. However, here she does not have to take the Kidushin if she does not want it.

A Kusi witness is not possible by Kidushin. Only by Get is this kosher as stated later. This is because the witnesses of a Get only sign the document together. Accordingly, unless this Kusi was a religious Kusi, the regular Yisrael would not have allowed him to sign on top of his signature (see Rashi 10b, DH "Zos Omeres"). However, by Kidushin they could sign one without the other, and it is therefore impossible to make a decree because of "all of you" (explained immediately below, and on 10b).

Regarding Get we decree that the person might say "all of you should sign," and if they sign without each other, after two people sign and they give it to the women she will think she is divorced. She will go and remarry, while her husband was stringent that she should only be divorced if all of these people signed. However, regarding Kidushin there is no such suspicion if she will think she is married. It is also unlikely she will accept Kidushin from someone else (and therefore really be married to him), being that she thinks that she is married to the first person.

By courts of Nochrim as well, being that there are Jewish witnesses the Kidushin is kosher, even though Nochrim signed on the document. There is no cause for concern that people will come to rely on the document, as nothing will happen if they do rely on it to think she is married.

Question: Isn't there the date in the document, which is similar both regarding the Get of women and slaves? (Note: Accordingly, why isn't this listed as one of the things that these two types of Gitin have in common (9a)?) This is as stated in Yevamos (31b) that a slave is bought sometimes with money and sometimes with a document, and the Rabbanan said that the date must be written in the document. This last statement is talking about the document freeing the slave.

This is unlike the explanation of Rashi there that this last part is discussing a slave being bought. If so, the Gemara could have asked from land or any document (see Gemara in Yevamos ibid.). Additionally, a document of purchasing a slave is valid when it does not have a date, unlike a document when a slave is freed which is invalid, just as the Get of a woman is invalid without a date.

Answer: Being that a date on a document is something common done on all documents (whether or not it makes the document invalid if it is not done), it is not listed as a common concept shared by these two types of Gitin.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains, the Beraisa therefore means that these Gitin are the same as the messenger can be made a messenger against the will of the recipient. If the husband/master wants, he can retract. This is unlike Kidushin, where even if he retracts it is not similar (as the messenger of the prospective husband cannot force her to accept Kidushin against her will, see Rashba).

Question: This does not seem correct. If it is referring to a messenger against his will, the Rabbanan agree that a person who sends a messenger to free a slave can retract the Get, and that the Get cannot be acquired for him by someone else against his will.

Explanation #2: It seems the correct approach is that of the Rach. He says that since there is a concept of sending a messenger against their will by a woman and a slave, one would think that the husband/master cannot retract the Get once he has given it to the messenger. One would presume that once it gets to the hand of the messenger, it is as if it has already reached her hand, being that they cannot prevent receiving it. However, being that a woman can decide not to accept Kidushin, it is obvious that a person who sends Kidushin to a woman can retract the Kidushin before she accepts it. When the Gemara says this is something that does not apply to Kidushin, it means that there is no novelty in this topic regarding Kidushin.

Question: This is difficult. The Mishnah should say that they are similar in that they both can be done against the recipient's will. This would mean that there are four things that they are similar in even according to the Rabbanan (according to those who hold like Rebbi Meir (see 9b and Tosfos DH "b'Eidei") it would be five).

Question: Didn't Chazal decree that their bread cannot be eaten? The reasoning is given in Pirkei d'Rebbi Eliezer (ch. 38) that they were trying to delay the building of the Beis Hamikdash in the times of Ezra. It is taught there that Rebbi Eliezer stated that whoever eats the bread of a Kusi is as if he is eating pig's meat. We also learned in Chulin (13a) that the bread of a heretic is like the bread of a Kusi.

Answer: Rabeinu Tam explains that this is referring to the dough of a Jew that a Kusi made into Matzah.

Question: Why does one fulfill his Mitzvah with such Matzah? Perhaps the Kusi did not watch it for the sake of making it into Matzah, as he is suspected of transgressing the prohibition of Lifnei Iver?

Answer: The case is where we know that the Kusi has no other Matzah that he can use to fulfill his Mitzvah. This is as the Gemara says in Chulin (4a), that if one cuts off the head of one (of the slaughtered birds in a Kusi's possession) and gives it to him to eat and he eats it, one can eat from his Shechitah. (Note: This is because while he himself would not eat from unkosher Shechitah, he would give it to others. His eating it himself is a sign that this batch of birds that he slaughtered is kosher.)

Implied Question: If the bread of a Kusi is permitted, why does the Tosefta also have to say that we can fulfill the Mitzvah of Matzah with it on Pesach?

Answer: The style of the Tosefta is "this, and even this." The second part of the Tosefta is teaching us that they are indeed experts at the watching required for the sake of making Matzas Mitzvah (and therefore one can use their Matzah for Matzas Mitzvah on Pesach).

Explanation: The Ri states that the Tana Kama implies that the fact that a Mitzvah is written in the Torah itself, even if the Kusim are not established as being careful about it, has the status of something about which they are credible. This is evident by the fact that the Gemara does not ask on the Tana Kama like it does on Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel, "If they are established etc."

If so, it must have been obvious to the Gemara that they were not established regarding Matzah, meaning, that there is no specific information that they were particularly careful about Matzah. If Matzah is a Mitzvah that is written in the Torah and about which they are careful, how does the Gemara know that the Tana Kama holds they are credible regarding any Mitzvah that is written in the Torah (without knowing that they are established to be careful about that Mitzvah)?

This is also implied in Chulin (4a). The Gemara there originally establishes the argument between the Tana Kama and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding a case of a Mitzvah written in the Torah where it is not specifically known that they are careful about that Mitzvah. According to the Tana Kama they are believed, while according to Rabban Shimon they are not. The Gemara proceeds to ask, if this is their argument, then Rabban Shimon's statement, "any Mitzvah that they are careful about," should in fact read, "if they are careful about it!" This implies that Rabban Shimon would not believe them if we do not know for certain that they are careful, as the Gemara says that he should say, "if they are careful" (see below).

Question: This is difficult according to the Gemara's conclusion that their argument is in a case where they are known to be careful but the Mitzvah is not written in the Torah. According to the Tana Kama they are not believed, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is adding that they are believed. However, how do we know that the Tana Kama will hold that they are not believed? Being that a Mitzvah written in the Torah makes them believed even though they are not believed based on this alone according to Rabban Shimon as the Gemara implies, certainly if it is known they are careful about any Mitzvah they should be believed! This is especially in light of the fact that this factor alone makes them believed according to Rabban Shimon.

It is difficult to say that even though it cannot be proven from the Tana Kama that specific knowledge that they are careful about a Mitzvah does not help (if the Mitzvah is not written in the Torah), it is possible to deduce that Rabban Shimon is coming to add this point. This implies that the Tana Kama argues that in such a case they would not be believed.

Answer: It appears to the Ri that according to the Gemara's conclusion that Matzah is a case which is both written in the Torah and they are known to be careful about, this position (in the paragraph above) can be proven to be the position of the Tana Kama. This is why the Beraisa discussed Matzah that is both. If the Tana Kama held that they are believed regarding a Mitzvah that they are known to be careful about (without it being written in the Torah), the Tosefta should have given Shechitah as an example of such a Mitzvah.

Question: According to the above, how do we know that if a Mitzvah is written in the Torah the Tana Kama holds that they are believed? Being that the Tana Kama only addressed Matzah which is a Mitzvah that is both written in the Torah and about which it is known that they are careful, how do we know that if a Mitzvah is written in the Torah alone the Tana Kama holds they are believed?

Answer: The fact that the Tana Kama does not explicitly say that the Matzah of a Kusi is permitted because they are known to be careful about it implies that the reason is because it is written in the Torah. This is the reasoning that everyone would assume (why they would be believed) when such a statement is made (by the Tana Kama that Matzas Kusi is permitted) without explanation.

Question #1: According to the Tana Kama, the fact that it is known that they are careful about a Mitzvah does not help. Accordingly, how do we know that if a Mitzvah is written in the Torah it is not reason enough that they should believed according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and instead the Gemara asks "if they are known to be careful etc.?" Perhaps the fact that it is written in the Torah is better than they being known to be careful, as this alone helps according to the Tana. Therefore, this should certainly help according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Question #2: Additionally, according to the conclusion of the Gemara in Chulin (4a) the Gemara should say that they also argue regarding a Mitzvah that they are known to be careful about that is not written in the Torah. The fact that the Gemara does not make this distinction implies that if it is written in the Torah alone they are believed according to everyone.

Answer: The Gemara is in doubt whether Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel argues on the Tana Kama in a case where the Mitzvah is written in the Torah but it is not known that they are careful regarding its laws. This is evident from the fact that the Gemara did not say that "any Mitzvah that is either written or they are known to be careful about etc."

Even though it is possible to say that this is a Kal v'Chomer, as the Tana Kama holds that if it is written in the Torah they are believed but if they are known to be careful they are not believed, even so the Gemara is in doubt. This is because it is possible that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that being written in the Torah is not as good of a reason that they should be believed as is knowing that they are careful about a certain Mitzvah, as he does not talk about this explicitly.

This is the reason why the Gemara in Chulin (ibid.) doesn't say that if it is known that they are careful about a Mitzvah but it is not written in the Torah is also dependent on the argument between the Tana Kama and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. This is because it is unclear to the Gemara if Rabban Shimon would argue, as we have just explained.

Question: This is difficult, as if so the entire reliability of the document is based on one Jew who signed at the end of the document!

Answer: This is not a problem. Being that this Kusi is a kosher witness according to Torah law as they are essentially true converts, he is by letter of the law a kosher witness in his own right.

Explanation: According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel they are believed to be careful about signing on Gitin, but not about other documents. (Note: When giving this explanation, the Tosfos Rid explains that because they were careful about Eishes Ish (the status of married women) he believed their signatures on Gitin.)

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the Gemara could have answered that the case is where there were witnesses that the document was given over, and it is according to Rebbi Elazar (that these witnesses effect the transaction). However, this would have been a difficult answer. This is because the Gemara earlier (bottom 9b) said that Rebbi Shimon (in the second part of our Mishnah) was according to Rebbi Elazar, implying that the first part of the Mishnah (the Tana Kama) was not according to Rebbi Elazar.

Question: This explanation of Rashi is difficult. On the contrary, the explanation that there were witnesses and the Tana Kama holds like Rebbi Elazar remains in the Gemara's conclusion, where the Gemara answers that the list in the Beraisa (9a-b) only includes concepts that do not have to do with Kidushin. If we would say that this document was without witnesses observing the transaction and according to Rebbi Meir (who holds that such witnesses do not effect a transaction), even Kidushin is unfit when done in such courts according to Torah law. (Note: Therefore, it is clear that even the Tana Kama holds like Rebbi Elazar, and Rashi's reason falls away.)

Explanation #2: The Ri states that we say that a Get done by a Nochri court is invalid even if there are Jewish witnesses for the giving of the Get. Moreover, even if the names of those who signed are obviously those of Nochrim in order that no one will come to rely on their testimony without Jewish witnesses about the giving of the Get, it is still invalid.

Accordingly, we also invalidate a gift document (done in a Nochri court). The Chachamim only decreed that we believe their loan and sale documents that are used as proofs, and their testimony does not effect any transaction. However, a gift document done in their courts cannot be used to acquire according to Torah law, unless there are kosher Jewish witnesses when the document is given over.

Even if we will say that a gift document that has a Jew signed on it can be used to effect a transaction without witnesses that it was given over, this is because it is known through the signed witnesses who are kosher according to Torah law that the giver of the gift gave the document to the recipient. It is also valid if the giver admits he gave the gift, which is equal to one hundred witnesses.

However, a document that has Nochrim signed on it, that does not have kosher witnesses for the giving of the document nor kosher witnesses signed on the document, and the giver does not admit, is not considered a document that effects a transaction and is like a piece of earthenware.

Implied Question: However, it is not possible to say that (when our Gemara asks) this is like earthenware, (it is doing so) because our Mishnah lumped together gift documents with other documents that are kosher even if they were written and signed by Nochrim. This is because witnesses that the document was given over will clearly not help. (Note: The Tosfos Ha'Rosh explains Tosfos' implied question in the following manner. One might suggest that the Gemara's question was the following. Being that Nochrim cannot acquire (anything) through a document transaction, their writing of a document should invalidate the document from having the full powers of a gift document that effects transactions, even if there were kosher witnesses for the giving of the document. Accordingly, Rebbi Elazar should say such a document is invalid because even kosher witnesses of the giving of the document do not make it effective, and certainly Rebbi Meir would say it is ineffective because their signatures are invalid. This explanation answers the Maharam's difficulty with Tosfos.)

Answer: The Beraisa later (11a) includes all of the documents that are kosher when done in a Nochri court, even Gitin given to women, and even so it only says that a Get given to women is kosher when it is written by a Jew and when the witnesses of the giving of the Get are Jewish. Other documents are kosher even without this. (Note: This implies that certainly other documents can be valid when written by Nochrim, especially if witnesses of the giving over of the document are Jewish. It should be noted that the Tosfos Ha'Rosh defends the explanation given in (d) above.)

Implied Question: The Gemara could have similarly asked, "they are not fit to testify?" (Note: Why didn't the Gemara choose this question instead? The fact that Tosfos does not give a reason why the Gemara chose the other question instead, as he does in many other places (i.e. Chagigah 18a, DH "Mah Rishon" and Bava Kama 3b, DH "Toldah") implies somewhat that Tosfos did not have a good answer as to why the Gemara chose the other question.)