QUESTION: The Gemara says that when the second Beis ha'Mikdash was built, the Jewish people brought twelve Korbenos Chatas to atone for the sins of each tribe during the generation of Tzidkiyahu. The Gemara discusses the question of how they could bring such offerings, when the law is that a Korban Chatas whose owner has died may not be offered. Rav Papa answers that since the sin was a sin of the public, and "the public does not die," the Korban Chatas may be brought even for the sin of a previous generation.

TOSFOS in Temurah (15b, DH v'Ha) in the name of the RASH MI'SHANTZ points out an obvious difficulty with the Gemara. Whenever the Gemara discusses a "Chatas she'Mesu Ba'aleha," a Chatas whose owner has died, it always refers to a person who realized that he accidentally sinned and proceeded to designate an animal as a Korban Chatas, and then he died before he was able to offer his Korban. The Torah requires that in such a case the animal be put to death. This is the law of Chatas she'Mesu Ba'aleha. This is unrelated to the Gemara's case of a later generation offering a Korban to atone for the sins of a previous generation, when the previous generation never designated an animal as a Korban Chatas!

ANSWER: RABEINU NESANEL answers that the Gemara's comparison of this case to the case of a Chatas she'Mesu Ba'aleha is based on a Kal va'Chomer. If it is true that a Korban may be brought for people who never even designated an animal as a Korban for their sins, then certainly if they had designated a Korban for themselves, that Korban may be offered.

The KEHILOS YAKOV has difficulty with this explanation. The Gemara searches for a source for Rav Papa's law. The Gemara initially assumes that his source is the Korban offered on Rosh Chodesh. Just as it is possible that the Korban of Rosh Chodesh is offered with money that was donated by someone who has died and yet the Korban still is valid, one may bring a Korban for people who have died. According to Rabeinu Nesanel's explanation, what is the relationship between the validity of the Korban Tzibur of Rosh Chodesh and its ability to atone for the people who have died? Just because the Korban Tzibur of Rosh Chodesh is valid and atones for those who are alive does not mean that a Korban may be brought to atone for people who have died. The Kehilos Yakov leaves this question unanswered.

QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Rav Papa who says that when the public commits a sin which obligates it to bring a Korban, even if the public of that generation passes away the Korban still must be brought by the surviving generations. It does not have the status of a "Chatas she'Mesu Ba'aleha," a Chatas whose owner has died, which must be condemned to death.

How does Rav Papa know that this case is exceptional? The Gemara first attempts to prove his law from the Korban of Rosh Chodesh. This Korban is bought with the collection of Shekalim given by the Jewish people at the beginning of each year (Nisan), even though some of the people who donated the money may no longer be alive. It must be that even when a person dies, a Korban may be brought from his funds when it is a public Korban.

The Gemara rejects this proof on the grounds that it is possible that none of the owners (those who contributed the money) of the Korban of Rosh Chodesh have died, while a Korban for a previous generation is for people that certainly have died. Although it may not be likely, it is at least possible that every person who donated money for the Korban Tzibur of Rosh Chodesh is alive (see TOSFOS HA'ROSH).

The KEHILOS YAKOV has difficulty with the words of the Gemara. If a person gives money to Hekdesh for the purchase of public Korbanos, what difference does it make if he is not alive at the time the pubic Korban is offered? The Korban is the obligation of the Jewish people, and they certainly are alive at the time the Korban is offered. The Gemara implies that the donor of the money is considered the owner of the Korban, and not the one who causes the obligation to bring the Korban.

On the other hand, the Gemara in Yoma (55a-b) implies otherwise. The Gemara there asks that among the collection boxes in the Beis ha'Mikdash, there should be a collection box for women who are obligated to bring bird offerings, so that the women can place money in the box and the Kohanim can use the money to purchase bird offerings for the women who needed to offer such Korbanos. The Gemara explains that this process is not feasible, because if a woman places money into the box and dies, when the Kohen buys a Korban with that money it will be a "Chatas she'Mesu Ba'aleha," a Chatas whose owner has died. The Gemara then asks that Beis Din should stipulate that any woman who puts money into this box does so on condition that if she dies, her money becomes designated for another woman's Korban. This implies that the owner of the Korban is the person who brings the Korban, and not the person who gave the money for the purchase of the Korban (as long as she designated the money for a different woman's Korban).

Who is the real owner of the Korban, the donor or the one who has the obligation to bring the Korban?

ANSWER: The KEHILOS YAKOV differentiates between a private Korban and a public Korban. In the case of a private Korban, the owner is considered the person who is obligated to bring the Korban, as implied by the Gemara in Yoma. In the case of a public Korban, however, there is no single person who is obligated to bring the Korban; the obligation rests on the entire community of Klal Yisrael.

The Kehilos Yakov cites the Gemara in Menachos (78b) which discusses the prohibition against slaughtering one's Korban Pesach (after midday) while one owns Chametz, or while the one who performs the Zerikas ha'Dam owns Chametz, or while any of the owners of that particular Korban Pesach own Chametz. The Gemara says that this is also the law for other Korbanos on Erev Pesach as well, such as the Korban Tamid. Tosfos there (DH O l'Echad) explains that this means that the Kohen who slaughters the afternoon Korban Tamid or performs Zerikah cannot own Chametz. However, if any member of the Jewish nation -- for whom the Korban Tamid is offered -- owns Chametz at that time, the Kohen does not transgress the prohibition. If every member of the Jewish nation is considered an owner of the Korban Tamid, why does the Kohen not transgress when he slaughters the Korban and one of its owners owns Chametz? Clearly, Tosfos understands that every individual member of the Jewish nation is not considered the "owner" of every Korban Tzibur. Rather, one needs to have a more specific relationship with the Korban in order to be called the owner of the Korban. The Gemara here teaches that if one's money is used to bring the Korban Tzibur, he is called the owner of the Korban. (Y. MONTROSE)