1)

(a)According to the Tana of the Beraisa, if two pairs of witnesses clash over whether a woman is betrothed or not, or as to whether she is divorced or not, she is forbidden to marry a second man. In the former case, however - once she has married, she may remain with her husband; whereas in the latter case, she may not.

(b)Abaye establishes the Beraisa when it is a clash of one witness against one, and not two against two. Consequently - in the former case, both witnesses are testifying that she was a Penuyah (unmarried), and the witness who testifies that she is betrothed, is not believed because he is one witness against two (see Tosfos DH 'Mai') (And that explains why, once she is married, she may remain with her husband). In the latter case however, where both witnesses testify that she was married, it is the witness who testified that she is now divorced who is the single witness testifying against two.

(c)In a case of two against two - she would be obligated to leave either way (despite the Chezkas Penuyah in the first case - see Tosfos DH 'Mai').

2)

(a)Rav Ashi retains the original version of the Beraisa ('Trei u'Trei), but he switches the Halachos of the Reisha and the Seifa. The Tana now holds ...

1. ... in the Reisha by Kidushin - Tetzei.

2. ... in the Seifa by Gerushin - Lo Tetzei.

(b)He explains Trei u'Trei both in the Reisha and in the Seifa - where the first two witnesses say that they saw the Kidushin or the Gerushin (respectively), and the second two say that they did not.

(c)The Tana needs to inform us that, if two witnesses say that they saw ...

1. ... the Kidushin, and two say that they did not, the woman is considered betrothed (and Tetzei) - because the Tana speaks where the witnesses reside in the same Chatzer as the man and the woman, and we might have thought that, had the woman been betrothed, the witnesses would certainly have known about it, and seeing as they did not, it is clear that she is not betrothed.

2. ... the Gerushin, and two say that they did not, that she is permitted to remain with her husband - because of the same logic as we just gave by Kidushin. Only we would have thought that, even if we can explain the Chidush in the Reisha on the basis that some people tend to betroth discreetly, this will not be the case by divorce. Consequently, seeing as the second pair of witnesses did not know about the divorce, it clearly did not take place.

(d)The outcome of the Sugya is that both as regards Kidushin and as regards Gerushin, there are people who do it discreetly and not everyone knows about it. Consequently, we apply the principle 'Lo Ra'inuhah, Einah Re'ayah' (not seeing something is not considered a proof).

3)

(a)The Tana of our Mishnah concludes that if witnesses came after she was already married, she may remain with her husband. According to Rebbi Oshaya, this refers to the Reisha, when the woman said that she had been married, but was now divorced. According to Rabah bar Avin - it refers to the Seifa ('Amrah Nishbeisi u'Tehorah Ani. ... ') ...

(b)... it cannot pertain to the Reisha - because the Tana is only lenient by a captive, because of the principle 'bi'Shevuyah Heikilu' (seeing as it no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that her captors abused her), but not to marriage and divorce.

(c)we reject the suggestion that Rav Oshaya and Rabah bar Avin argue over Rav Hamnuna, who says that a woman who claims in front of her husband that he divorced her is believed (and that Rabah bar Avin disagrees with Rav Hamnuna) - on the grounds that, he too, might well agree with Rav Hamnuna, only in his opinion, Rav Hamnuna restricts his principle to when the woman is speaking to her husband, but not to when she made the claim not in his presence ...

(d)... in which case she is not believed (according to Rabah bar Avin) because the S'vara 'that a woman would not have the Chutzpah to claim that her husband divorced her, if he didn't, only applies to where she makes the claim in his presence.

4)

(a)Still with regard to the end of our Mishnah, Shmuel's father interprets the words ...

1. ... 'v'Im mi'she'Nises Ba'u Eidim' - to mean (not from the time that she actually married, but) from the time that Beis-Din permitted her to marry'.

2. ... 'Lo Setzei' - to mean that she does not leave her Heter (i.e. it remains in force).

5)

(a)If a woman claims that she was captured, but that she had not been violated, and that she had witnesses to prove it - we allow her to marry a Kohen immediately, without making her wait until the witnesses arrive.

(b)The Chidush is - that we do not make her wait until the witnesses arrive.

(c)In order to be effective - those witnesses would have had to testify that they were with her all the time, and that there was no time that she was alone with her captors.

(d)If, after Beis-Din have permitted a woman who had a 'Peh she'Asar' to marry, witnesses arrive who testify that she was captured ...

1. ... but who do not know whether she was violated or not - she remains permitted.

2. ... and that she was violated - then she must leave her husband immediately.

6)

(a)When Shmuel father appointed chaperones to keep guard over some women captives who had arrived in Neherda'a to be sold - Shmuel asked him who had kept watch over them until then.

(b)His father replied whether he would not have done the same thing had it been his own daughters who were captured (not to permit them to marry, but to prevent further violation). The result of his fateful question was ("ki'Shegagah ha'Yotzei mi' Pi ha'Shalit" - Koheles) - that Shmuel's daughters were indeed captured.

(c)When the captors took them to Eretz Yisrael to be sold - Shmuel's daughters entered the Beis-Din whilst their captors waited outside, and testified that they had been captured but had not been violated.

(d)What prompted Rebbi Chanina to comment that they must be the daughters of a great Talmid-Chacham, was the fact that - they made a point of entering the Beis-Din without their captors, indicating that they knew the Halachah of 'ha'Peh she'Asar Hu ha'Peh she'Hitir'.

7)

(a)When Rebbi Chanina told Rebbi Sheman bar Aba to look after his relatives, he meant - that he should marry one of them ...

(b)... even though he was a Kohen (and, had Shmuel's daughters been abused, they would have been forbidden to him).

8)

(a)Rebbi Sheman bar Aba objected to Rebbi Chanina's ruling - on the grounds that there were witnesses in the north who (we initially think) could testify that they had been captured ...

(b)... to which Rebbi Chanina replied - that since the witnesses were not present, the Heter to get married remained.

(c)Rebbi Chanina implied that, if the witnesses had been present, Rebbi Sheman bar Aba would have been forbidden to marry Shmuel's daughters - in spite of Shmuel's father earlier ruling that if the witnesses arrive after Beis-Din have permitted the woman to marry, the concession to get married remains.

(d)We reconcile the two - by pointing out that, according to the rumor, it was not just that Shmuel's daughters had been captured that these witnesses were coming to testify, but that they had been violated.

9)

(a)The Tana of our Mishnah states that if each of two women, who have witnesses who testify that they were captured, claims that she is Tahor, they are not believed. They are however, believed - if each one testifies that the other one is Tahor.

(b)We believe one witness in this case (even though it concerns marriage) - because, as we learned earlier, the assumption that a captive has been violated, is no more than a Chumra d'Rabanan, and the same Rabanan believed even one witness to permit her to marry a Kohen, and (as we learned in Yevamos) wherever one witness is believed, a woman is believed too.

(c)If a woman testifies that she is Tamei and her friend, Tahor, she is believed, but vice-versa (that she is Tahor and her friend Tamei), she is not, says the Beraisa. The latter case must speak when there are witnesses that she was captured - because, if there were not, why would she not be believed regarding herself (due to a 'Peh she'Asar').

10)

(a)We now cite a Beraisa that issues three rulings (regarding two women who were captured), the first that if a woman testifies that she is Tamei and her friend, Tahor, she is believed, but vice-versa, she is not. This case be speaking when there are witnesses that she was captured - because otherwise, why would she not be believed regarding herself

(b)The second ruling refers to a case where a woman claims that both she and her friend are Tamei, in which case she is believed regarding herself but not regarding her friend; and the third, where the woman claims that they are both Tahor, where she is believed regarding her friend but not regarding herself. The ...

1. ... the former case must be speaking when there are no witnesses that they were captured - because, if there were, she would be believed regarding her friend.

2. ... the latter case must be speaking where there are witnesses - because if there were, she would be believed regarding herself.

(c)In the second case, when the Tana says that she is not believed regarding her friend, he means - that her friend is Tahor (even though the same words in the Reisha do not imply that).

(d)When they questioned the feasibility of the current contention, that the Metzi'asa speaks in a different situation than the Reisha and the Seifa, Abaye commented - that it was perfectly acceptable.

11)

(a)Rav Papa re-establishes the Beraisa to speak when there are two witnesses, but when, in each of the four cases, one witness inverts what she claims. The two principles (besides 'Shavisah l'Nafshah Chatichah d'Isura') that now govern all four cases are - a. that a woman is not believed to exonerate herself, and b. that she is believed to exonerate her friend, even against another witness.

(b)In the case where she says ...

1. ... 'Ani Teme'ah v'Chaverti Tehorah' - she is believed to incriminate herself because of 'Shavisah l'Nafshah Chatichah d'Isura', and to exonerate her friend, where she is believed even against another witness.

2. ... 'Ani Tehorah v'Chaverti Teme'ah' - she is not believed to exonerate herself, because there are two witnesses who testify that she was captured; nor is she believed to incriminate her friend, because there is a witness who exonerates her.

(c)Despite the fact that we already know 'Shavisah l'Nafshah Chatichah d'Isura' from the first case, and that she is believed regarding her friend from the second one, the Tana needs to add the third case ('Ani v'Chaverti Teme'ah') - because we might otherwise have thought that there where she incriminates her friend as well, she merely incriminates herself due to 'Tamos Nafshi im Pelishtim' (Let me die with the Philistines!), and that she is really Tahor.

(d)And he needs to add the fourth case ('Ani v'Chaverti Tehorah'), despite the fact that we already know that she is believed to exonerate her friend even against another witness from the first case (and the fact that she is not believed to exonerate herself when there are witnesses that she was captured, we have many sources) - because we would otherwise have thought that, there where she exonerates herself too, she will not even be believed regarding her friend.

12)

(a)Similarly, says the Mishnah, when two men arrive in town, one says 'I am a Kohen', and so does the other, they are not believed. According to the Tana Kama, they are believed however - if each one testifies on his friend.

(b)They are believed - with regard to eating Terumah.

(c)Rebbi Yehudah says - that one witness is not believed regarding Kehunah (and certainly not when there are two testifying on behalf of each other (known as 'Gomlin'), which will be explained later in the Sugya).

13)

(a)According to Rebbi Elazar, as long as no-one protests, one witness is believed (like the Tana Kama). He argues with the Tana Kama however - when there are two people testifying for each other, because of 'Gomlin' (like Rebbi Yehudah).

(b)Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says - that one establish a Kohen through the testimony of one witness (this will be explained in the Sugya).