QUESTION: The Tana'im argue about the law in a case in which the Shtei ha'Lechem were brought outside of the Azarah between the Shechitah and Zerikah of the Kevasim. The Zerikah of the blood of the Kevasim was then done with a thought of Chutz l'Zemano, intent to eat the Kevasim after their allotted time period, and the Kevasim therefore became Pigul. Rebbi Eliezer maintains that the Shtei ha'Lechem do not become Pigul. Rebbi Akiva maintains that the Shtei ha'Lechem do become Pigul.

The SHITAH MEKUBETZES (#4) questions the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer. The Gemara implies that the only question is whether the Shtei ha'Lechem become Pigul. The Gemara assumes that the Kevasim certainly become Pigul, since their blood was sprinkled with a thought of Pigul. However, there is a rule that Pigul takes effect only when the condition of "Karav ha'Matir k'Mitzvaso" is fulfilled -- when the main procedures that make the Korban valid (such as the Zerikah) are done properly, aside from the improper thought of Chutz l'Zemano. When the Kevasim and Shtei ha'Lechem are both present, the loss of the Shtei ha'Lechem causes the Kevasim to be invalid as well. Consequently, when the blood of the Kevasim is sprinkled, the condition of "Karav ha'Matir k'Mitzvaso" is not fulfilled! Why, then, according to Rebbi Eliezer, should the Kevasim become Pigul?

(a) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that the Gemara is discussing a case in which the Zerikah was done not only Chutz l'Zemano, but it was also done she'Lo Lishmah, with intent that it is a different Korban. The Gemara later (47b) says that if the Zerikah is not done Lishmah, the Korban is valid even though the Shtei ha'Lechem are not present (see Insights to 46:1 for the reasoning behind this, and for the exact status of the Korban itself). Once the meat of the Korban is able to be eaten (aside from the fact that there was a thought of Chutz l'Zemano when the Zerikah was performed), the condition of "Karav ha'Matir k'Mitzvaso" has been fulfilled.

(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 17:20) seems to be in doubt about this point. The Rambam writes that when there was a thought of Chutz l'Zemano during the Zerikah (as in the case of the Gemara), it is "doubtful" whether or not the Kevasim may be eaten. The Rambam does not mention that the Zerikah was done she'Lo Lishmah as well.

The KESEF MISHNEH does not understand the Rambam's doubt. If the Korban was brought Chutz l'Zemano, then what will enable the Korban to be eaten? He says that the text of the Rambam should read that "the Zerikah was done with intent for the wrong Korban" (that is, she'Lo Lishmah), and the Rambam is in doubt about the statement of the Shitah Mekubetzes.

However, the Kesef Mishneh says that he still does not understand the doubt of the Rambam. In the Gemara later (47b), Rebbi Yirmeyah asks Rebbi Zeira about whether one should do the Zerikah she'Lo Lishmah in case the Shtei ha'Lechem became lost after the Shechitah, in order to permit the meat to be eaten. Rebbi Zeira answers, "Is there any Korban that is invalid when done with the correct intention and valid when done with the wrong intention?" The Kesef Mishneh writes that he does not understand why the Rambam does not rule like Rebbi Zeira, who implies that the Korban is Pasul even when the Zerikah is done with the wrong intention. It seems obvious to the Kesef Mishneh that the Korban is Pasul and therefore it cannot be considered as though the condition of "Karav ha'Matir k'Mitzvaso" has been fulfilled.

(It is not clear why the Kesef Mishneh insists that the Rambam must rule like this opinion. In Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos (18:10), the Kesef Mishneh himself understands that the Rambam rules against a similar opinion (that of Rebbi Chilkiyah bar Tovi, who argues with Rav Huna in Zevachim 114b). The Kesef Mishneh seems to contradict himself. A number of other Acharonim, including the OR SAME'ACH and CHAZON ISH (Likutim 5, DH veha'Ram), argue with the Kesef Mishneh there and maintain that the Rambam does rule like this opinion, as the Kesef Mishneh here says.)

1. The MAHARI KURKUS explains that the Rambam does not rule like Rebbi Zeira because the Gemara does not state clearly that this is the Halachah. (That is, Rebbi Zeira does not say that this is "Peshita," obvious.)

2. The Kesef Mishneh quotes HA'NAGID RABEINU YEHOSHUA, a descendant of the Rambam, who explains the Rambam differently. He explains that after the Shtei ha'Lechem are lost, there is no purpose at all in slaughtering the Kevasim. Slaughtering the Kevasim at that point would be like slaughtering Chulin. In a case in which the Shechitah was already done but the Zerikah was not yet done, the Rambam is in doubt about whether the Kevasim now are considered like Chulin, and are not Pigul and may be eaten, or whether they are Pigul because they were slaughtered when the Shtei ha'Lechem were still present. This was the doubt of the Rambam. According to this explanation, there is no need to add the words, "the Zerikah was done with the wrong intention," into the text of the Rambam.

The KEREN ORAH (47b) is perplexed by this interpretation of the words of the Rambam. Among other difficulties, he asks how one could suggest that something designated, slaughtered, and sprinkled as Kodshim becomes something which is permitted to be eaten like ordinary Chulin food. He therefore supports the Kesef Mishneh's emendation to the Girsa of the Rambam. (Y. MONTROSE)

OPINIONS: The Gemara quotes a Beraisa which states that if four loaves were prepared for the Shtei ha'Lechem instead of two loaves, two are taken in order to perform the Tenufah (waving the loaves together with the Kevasim, when the Kevasim are alive and after they are slaughtered), and two are "redeemed" and eaten by the Kohanim. The Gemara concludes that the Beraisa may be consistent even with the view of Rebbi, who maintains that it is the Shechitah of the Kevasim which sanctifies the Shtei ha'Lechem.

If the Beraisa follows the view of Rebbi, that the Shechitah of the Kevasim sanctifies the Shtei ha'Lechem, then what determines which of the four loaves become Kadosh? All four loaves were present in the Azarah when the Kevasim were slaughtered. When the Beraisa says that two loaves become Kadosh and are used for the Tenufah, how does it know which two are to be used? Does the Kohen merely take two loaves of his choice?

(a) RASHI (DH v'Iy) says that according to Rebbi, all four loaves need to be eaten inside the Azarah. Apparently, this is because each one of the four might be Kadosh. There is no way to determine retroactively which ones were made Kadosh by the Shechitah and which ones remained Chulin. Rashi later (48a, DH Ha Vadai) says that the Gemara concludes that the Beraisa cannot be following the opinion of Rebbi. One of his reasons is that according to Rebbi, all four loaves would have to go through the Tenufah process, and the Beraisa says that only two are to be taken for Tenufah.

(b) TOSFOS (DH Moshech Shtayim) also asks that the language of the Beraisa, which specifically states that "two" loaves are to be used for Tenufah, does not seem consistent with the opinion of Rebbi. Tosfos answers that according to Rebbi, all of the loaves must be used for Tenufah. Tosfos explains that since there is a doubt about which of the two loaves became Kadosh at the time of the Shechitah, the Tenufah must be done with every possible combination of the four loaves, two at a time. (The Tenufah cannot be done simply with all four loaves together, because there must be some sign that the Zerikah is done only because of two of the loaves.) This means that the Tenufah must be done six times. According to Rebbi, when the Beraisa says that Tenufah is to be done with "two" of the loaves, it means that Tenufah is to be done with all of the loaves, but with two at one time.

(c) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Temidin u'Musafin 8:12) rules that in this case, one simply takes two loaves for the Tenufah, and he may redeem the others when they are inside the Azarah, and then he may eat them outside the Azarah. The KESEF MISHNEH points out that the Rambam is ruling like Rebbi, since the Gemara later says that according to Rebbi Eliezer (who argues with Rebbi) the loaves are redeemed outside, and not inside, the Beis ha'Mikdash.

The LECHEM MISHNEH questions the Rambam's ruling. How can the Rambam say that the Kohen may choose two of the loaves to redeem and eat them outside? The Halachah is that with regard to all matters that are mid'Oraisa, "Ein Bereirah" -- the status of an object cannot be designated retroactively. How, then, can the Kohen designate, after the Shechitah, which loaves are Kadosh and which are not? Moreover, if for some reason the loaves that are Kadosh could be designated retroactively, then why can the loaves not be redeemed outside the Beis ha'Mikdash?

1. The ZEVACH TODAH (DH Moshech) maintains that even though the wording of the Rambam is the same as the wording of the Gemara, the Rambam learns like Tosfos and understands that the Beraisa is saying that one must take "two loaves at a time," and not just two loaves.

2. The MIRKEVES HA'MISHNEH answers that "Bereirah" is not an issue here at all. In many similar cases of Korbanos, when there is an extra amount available, the extra is relegated as "backup" material in case something happens to the present Korban, and not that the extra is intended to be the Korban itself. "Bereirah" is an issue only when all of the items are intended for one purpose, and not when some are originally intended to be backups. (See similar cases in Rashi to 78b, DH Man d'Amar Kadshu, and in the Rambam, Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 4:5.)

3. The KEREN ORAH explains that the Rambam understands that the redemption of the loaves must take place inside the Beis ha'Mikdash, because at this point all of the loaves have an equal possibility of being the ones that are Kadosh. However, because not all of the loaves are supposed to have Kedushah, an act of redemption removes the doubt about which ones are Kadosh. The Kedushah remains on only two of the loaves once the action of redemption occurs. Only when the loaves are redeemed may they be taken outside and eaten. (The Keren Orah adds that a similar logic is used by the Rambam in Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos (16:8), where he writes that a blemish in an animal causes another animal to become Kadosh.) (Y. MONTROSE)