1)
(a)Alternatively, Shamai and Hillel agree (that all the Taharos in a box that has not been examined are Tamei), and Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yochanan are arguing over one that has (a Bedukah). When was it examined last?
(b)Then why does Rebbi Yochanan declare even the first Taharos, Tamei?
(c)How do we reconcile this case with that of a Nidah (in our Mishnah), to which the case of the box is being compared, and who did examine herself?
1)
(a)Alternatively, Shamai and Hillel agree (that all the Taharos in a box that has not been examined are Tamei). Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yochanan are arguing over one that was examined (a Bedukah) - before he placed the Taharos inside it ...
(b)... and the reason that Rebbi Yochanan declares Tamei even the first Taharos is - because he contends with the possibility that the Sheretz fell in the moment the examiner turned away.
(c)Even though the case of a Nidah (in our Mishnah), to which the case of the box is being compared, speaks where the Nidah examined herself - it is considered as if she did not, because it is common for her to see blood.
2)
(a)Another alternative is that both cases speak about a 'Bedukah'. Then how do we establish the Machlokes between Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yochanan (in order to reconcile Chizkiyah with Shamai and Hillel?
(b)How is it then possible for the Sheretz to have fallen into the box?
(c)On what grounds is Rebbi Yochanan then strict even on the initial Taharos?
(d)And what does Chizkiyah say?
(e)How do we reconcile this case with that of the Nidah (in our Mishnah), to which the case of the box is being compared, who is covered.
2)
(a)Another alternative is that both cases speak about a Bedukah, and to reconcile Chizkiyah with Shamai and Hillel we establish the Machlokes between Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yochanan - by a covered box (whereas Shamai and Hillel are speaking about one that is uncovered).
(b)And the Sheretz fell into the box - because we are speaking about a box that is in use, and which the owner uncovered whilst using it.
(c)Nevertheless, Rebbi Yochanan is strict even on the initial Taharos - because he is afraid that as the owner uncovered the box to place the Taharos inside, the Sheretz fell in ...
(d)... whereas Chizkiyah holds that as long as he is using the box for Taharos, he is careful, and it is only after he removed the Taharos that the Sheretz must have fallen in.
(e)Even though the Nidah (in our Mishnah), to which the case of the box is being compared, is covered - it is considered as if she was not, because it is common for her to see blood (as we stated in the previous explanation).
3)
(a)Yet a fourth explanation to reconcile Chizkiyah with Shamai and Hillel, establishes the Machlokes where the Sheretz was found, not in the corner of the box, but in the corner of the house. How do we reconcile this with the Lashon 'Kupah' mentioned by Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yochanan?
(b)What is then Chizkiyah's reason for being lenient? What is his bone of contention with Rebbi Yochanan?
(c)We query this however, from a Mishnah in Taharos (in connection with someone who touches somebody sleeping beside him during the night, and discovers the next morning that he is dead. Why does Rebbi Meir declare him Tahor (see Bartenura, Taharos)?
3)
(a)Yet a fourth explanation to reconcile Chizkiyah with Shamai and Hillel, establishes the Machlokes where the Sheretz was found (not in the corner of the box, but) in the corner of the house. And when Chizkiyah and Rebbi Yochanan mention 'Kupah' - they mean that the box was used for Taharos in one corner, and it was when they transported it to another corner that they found the Sheretz.
(b)Chizkiyah holds - that one cannot transfer a Chezkas Tum'ah from one location to another, whereas Rebbi Yochanan holds that one can.
(c)We query this however, from a Mishnah in Taharos (in connection with someone who touches somebody lying beside him during the night, and discovers the next morning that he is dead. Rebbi Meir Metaher - because he saw him alive yesterday, in which case he has a Chezkas Chai.
4)
(a)The problem with Rebbi Yochanan is from the Rabbanan. What do they say?
(b)What does the Beraisa comment on that? Why is this a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan?
(c)What compromise do we attempt to make, to reconcile Rebbi Yochanan with the Beraisa?
(d)We counter that however, with another Mishnah in Taharos (in connection with a needle that is found completely rusty or broken lying among a pile of Taharos). What is the significance of a rusty or broken needle regarding the Dinim of Tum'ah?
4)
(a)The problem with Rebbi Yochanan is from the Rabbanan - who say that he is Tamei 'she'Kol ha'Tum'os ke'Sha'as Metzi'asan' ...
(b)... the Beraisa comments on that 'ke'Sha'as Metzi'asan - u've'Makom Metzi'asan' (a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan, who holds that we do transfer a Chezkas Tum'ah from one location to another, as we just learned).
(c)To reconcile Rebbi Yochanan with the Beraisa, we try to compromise - by establishing the Mishnah with regard to burning (which one is not Chayav to do if it is found in a different location, since it is a Safek]), but Tamei it is anyway.
(d)We counter that however, with another Mishnah in Taharos (in connection with a needle that is found completely rusty or broken lying among a pile of Taharos) - and broken Keilim are not subject to Tum'ah, as is well known.
5)
(a)Assuming that the owner recognizes the needle as one that was Tamei, what does the Mishnah in Taharos say about ...
1. ... it?
2. ... a burned Sheretz or a worn-out cloak belonging to a Zav, that is lying on top of a pile of olives?
(b)What are we trying to prove from there?
(c)We query this however, from a Beraisa (in connection with a loaf of bread that is lying on a board, underneath which a Tamei garment is lying on the floor). What does the Tana say about a case where one finds the loaf on the floor in such a way that if it had fallen by itself, it would inevitably have touched the garment?
(d)Why is that? Under which circumstances would the loaf be Tamei?
5)
(a)Assuming that the owner recognizes the needle as one that was Tamei, the Mishnah in Taharos says ...
1. ... that it is 'Tahor, she'Kol ha'Tum'os ke'Sha'as Metzi'asan' (and we do not assume that when the needle fell into the Taharos, it was still whole).
2. ... that a burned Sheretz or a worn-out cloak belonging to a Zav, which is lying on top of a pile of olives does not render the olives Tamei.
(b)We are trying to prove from there - that when we say 'she'Kol ha'Tum'os ke'Sha'as Metzi'asan', we mean (not just that they do not need to be burned, but) - that they are Tahor (and we assume that the same applies to 'ki'Mekom Metzi'asan').
(c)We query this however, from a Beraisa (in connection with a loaf of bread lying on a board, underneath which a Tamei garment is lying on the floor). The Tana rules there that even if one finds the loaf on the floor in such a way that if it had fallen by itself, it would inevitably have touched the garment - it is nevertheless Tahor ...
(d)... because we assume that a Tahor person came and placed it there (unless the owner says with certainty that nobody entered that area).
6)
(a)What does Rebbi Elazar comment on that? In which case will the reason of 'she'Ani Omer' be redundant (see Tosfos DH 'Lo Nitzrechah')?
(b)How do we refute the proof from this Beraisa?
(c)Why can we then not also say in our case (regarding the box) that a raven dropped the Sheretz into the box after it was moved to the other corner?
6)
(a)Rebbi Elazar comments - that the Mishnah is speaking in a case where the floor is on a slope. Otherwise, it is obvious that the loaf would be Tahor, since if it fell on the garment, how did it then end up on the floor?
(b)We refute the proof from this Beraisa however - because the Tana only issued this ruling there, because of the possibility that a Tahor person came and moved it, implying that otherwise, we would say that it is not burned, but it is not Tahor either.
(c)We cannot however, rely in our case (regarding the box) on a raven having dropped the Sheretz into it after it was moved to the other corner - because the current S'vara is confined to a human being moving the object intentionally (and will not therefore apply to an animal).
7)
(a)What do we mean when, in answer to the Kashya that this is a case of Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, and ought to be Tamei, 'Mishum de'havi Davar she'Ein bo Da'as Lisha'el'?
(b)What is the source for this distinction?
(c)What other answer do we give to the question?
(d)How do we prove that, based on the word "Nidaf" (in the Pasuk in Bechukosai [in connection with the rebuke] "Kol Aleh Nidaf")?
(e)Based on what we just learned, how do we reject the translation of 'Madaf' as the top blanket covering a Zav?
7)
(a)When, in answer to the Kashya that this is a case of Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, and ought to be Tamei, we say 'Mishum de'havi Davar she'Ein bo Da'as Lisha'el' - we mean that since the object of the Safek is a loaf, and a loaf is unable to reply if asked whether it touched the Tamei garment or not, it is Tahor.
(b)The source for this distinction - is Sotah (which is also the source for the Din of 'Safek Tum'ah bi'Reshus ha'Yachid, Tamei', and a woman is subject to the Din of Sotah only after claiming that she did not commit adultery and is Tahor.
(c)Alternatively, we answer - that the Beraisa is speaking about a case of Tum'ah de'Rabbanan (such as a garment of a Parush which is Medras for Kohanim who eat Terumah [see Tosfos DH 've'Iba'is Eima']).
(d)We prove this answer - by comparing the word 'Madaf' (an uncommon word for a garment) to the word "Nidaf" (in the Pasuk in Bechukosai [in connection with the rebuke] "Kol Aleh Nidaf") which implies something light (i.e. an Isur de'Rabbanan, as opposed to an Isur d'Oraysa).
(e)Based on what we just learned, we reject the translation of 'Madaf' as the top blanket covering a Zav - on the grounds that the top blanket of a Zav is Metamei a loaf min ha'Torah, and not mi'de'Rabbanan, as we just concluded.
4b----------------------------------------4b
8)
(a)According to the Chachamim in our Mishnah, Me'es Le'es detracts from mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah and vice-versa. What is the case of ...
1. ... Me'es Le'es detracting from Pekidah li'Pekidah, assuming that the woman saw the first sighting on Sunday and was Tahor?
2. ... mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah detracting from Me'es Le'es, assuming that she saw the first sighting at one p.m. and was Tahor?
(b)What problem do we have with the latter case (mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah detracting from Me'es Le'es)?
(c)How do we solve it?
(d)What did Abaye ask Rabah when the latter attributed the Chachamim's opinion to the principle that a woman senses when the blood begins to flow?
(e)Then why did Rabah say that?
8)
(a)According to the Chachamim, Me'es Le'es detracts from mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah and vice-versa. The case of ...
1. ... Me'es Le'es detracting from Pekidah li'Pekidah, assuming that she saw the first sighting on Sunday night and was Tahor is - that if on Wednesday, when she next examines herself, she sees blood, she is Tamei as from Tuesday night.
2. ... mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah detracting from Me'es le'Es, assuming that she saw the first sighting at one p.m. and was Tahor is - that if when she next examines herself at four p.m. she is Tamei, she is Tamei retroactively from one p.m., and not from four p.m. of the previous day.
(b)The problem with the latter case (mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah detracting from Me'es le'Es) is - that it is obvious (that we will not declare her Tamei retroactively to a time prior to the examination in which she found herself Tahor.
(c)We answer - that the Tana inserts 'mi'Pekidah li'Pekidah Mema'etes Me'es Le'es' to balance with Me'es Le'es Mema'etes from Pekidah li'Pekidah' (even though it is impractical).
(d)When Rabah attributed the Chachamim's opinion to the principle that a woman senses when the blood begins to flow - Abaye asked him why they do not then say 'Dayah Sha'atah' (like Shamai).
(e)In fact, Rabah only said that - in order to sharpen Abaye's wits.
9)
(a)So we ascribe the Chachamim's opinion to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel's Takanah. Why, according to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel, did Chazal institute the obligation for a woman to examine herself each morning and evening?
(b)How does that explain the Chachamim's ruling?
(c)Bearing in mind that 'Me'es Le'es' incorporates two Onos, what do they mean by 'Onah'?
9)
(a)So we ascribe the Chachamim's opinion to Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel's Takanah, that Chazal instituted the obligation for a woman to examine herself each morning - in order to validate the Tahoros of the previous night, and each evening - to validate the Taharos of the previous day.
(b)And they - penalized a woman who did not do this, by forbidding her one Onah (half-day time period) retroactively.
(c)Seeing as 'Me'es Le'es' incorporates two Onos, 'Onah' must mean - an extra Onah (since the Onah following the first examination, she would have lost anyway.
10)
(a)Rav Papa asked Rava that sometimes, there are three Onos in twenty-four hours (so why did they say 'Me'es Le'es'?). What did he mean by that?
(b)What did Rava reply?
(c)Alternatively, it is to prevent the sinner from gaining (those few hours that she delayed examining herself from morning until mid-day). What is the difference between the two answers?
10)
(a)Rav Papa asked Rava that sometimes, there are three Onos in twenty-four hours (so why did they say 'Me'es Le'es'?). What he meant was - that if for example, after the first examination (where she found herself Tahor), she failed to examine herself until mid-day of a few days later (where the previous twenty-four hours covers three Onos.
(b)Rava replied - that the Chachamim preferred to give one fixed time period of 'Me'es Le'es' ('Lo P'lug'), irrespective of the different possibilities that this includes.
(c)Alternatively, it is to prevent the sinner from gaining (those few hours that she delayed examining herself from morning until mid-day) - in which case we would not include the third Onah if that delay was caused by an Oneis (beyond her control).
11)
(a)Rebbi Eliezer, in a Beraisa (and in the next Mishnah), holds that we say 'Dayan Sha'atan' with regard to only four women. If two of them are a virgin and a woman who is pregnant, what are the remaining two?
(b)What does Rebbi Dosa say?
(c)How do we initially refute the suggestion that the author of our Mishnah ('Kol Ishah she'Yesh lah Veses, Dayah Sha'atah') is Rebbi Dosa (and not the Rabbanan)?
(d)How do we therefore establish Rebbi Dosa? To what extent does he say 'Dayah Sha'atah?
11)
(a)Rebbi Eliezer, in a Beraisa (and in the next Mishnah), holds that we say 'Dayan Sha'atan' with regard to only four women, a virgin, a woman who is pregnant - a feeding mother and an old woman.
(b)Rebbi Dosa rules - that any woman who has a Veses is subject to 'Dayah Sha'atah'.
(c)We initially refute the suggestion that the author of our Mishnah ('Kol Ishah she'Yesh lah Veses, Dayah Sha'atah') is Rebbi Dosa (and not the Rabbanan) - by pointing out that the Rabbanan concede Dayah Sha'atah, in a case where the woman sees at the time when the Veses is due (which is the case in our Mishnah), and they only argue with Rebbi Dosa there where she sees outside the time of her Veses.
(d)We therefore conclude that Rebbi Dosa holds 'Dayah Sha'atah' - even when she sees outside the time of her Veses.
12)
(a)The Beraisa rules that the Kesem (bloodstain) of a woman who has a fixed Veses is Tamei retroactively. What does the Tana mean by retroactively?
(b)What reason does he give for this ruling?
(c)On what grounds do we reject the suggestion that (based on what we just learned) the author of this Beraisa is the Rabbanan of Rebbi Dosa?
(d)Why will we then be forced to establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Dosa?
(e)On what grounds do we accept this latter version of the Machlokes, and reject the initial assumption that the Chachamim and Rebbi Dosa argue over she'Lo be'Sha'as Vestah?
12)
(a)The Beraisa rules that the Kesem (bloodstain) of a woman who has a fixed Veses is Tamei retroactively - from the time that she last washed the bloodstained garment ...
(b)... because were she to have a sighting outside the time of the Veses, she would be Tamei Me'es Le'es.
(c)We reject the suggestion that (based on what we just learned) the author of this Beraisa is the Rabbanan of Rebbi Dosa - by now confining his ruling to where the woman saw it at the time when the Veses was due ...
(d)... and we will then be forced to establish our Mishnah like Rebbi Dosa (like we did initially) - because the Tana is speaking where she saw it at the time when the Veses was due, and even there, the Rabbanan hold that the woman is Tamei Me'es Le'es.
(e)We accept this version of the Machlokes, and reject the initial assumption that the Chachamim and Rebbi Dosa argue over she'Lo be'Sha'as Vestah - based on the principle that whenever we are faced with a choice to interpret a Mishnah or a Beraisa either le'Kula or le'Chumra, then we always interpret it le'Chumra.