Rav Ashi and Ravina too, hold like Abaye (that even Rebbi Meir agrees with both 'Chosheshin le'La'az' and 'Chosheshin li'Chevodan shel Rishonim' ... ). Rav Ashi establishes the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir (who requires three judges by Motzi-Shem-Ra) and the Rabbanan (who require twenty-three), when the witnesses warned the woman that she would receive Malkos, and Rebbi Meir's reason is - because he holds that Malkos requires only three judges.

This conforms to the opinion of the Tana Kama in our Mishnah. The Rabbanan hold like Rebbi Yishmael - who requires twenty-three.

The problem with the fact that the woman is subject to Malkos at all is - that it clashes with the principle that 'A La'av that is subject to Misas Beis-Din is not subject to Malkos'.

We solve the problem by establishing that - this Tana does not concur with that principle.

Ravina establishes the case where one of the witnesses is found to be a relative of the woman or who is disqualified from testifying for some other reason. That transforms the case from Dinei Nefashos into Dinei Mamonos according to Rebbi Meir - because he holds that once one of the witnesses is disqualified, all the witnesses become disqualified, so she can no longer be sentenced to death.

The Rabbanan agree with this on principle, but they restrict it to where the third witness participated in the warning; otherwise, they say, when it comes to Dinei Nefashos, he is not considered part of the group of witnesses.

This conforms to the Machlokes in the Mishnah in Makos between Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi, explaining Rebbi Akiva, who extrapolates from the Pasuk in Shoftim "al-Pi Shenayim Eidim O Sheloshah Eidim ... " that - an accessory to a group of sinners is considered part of the group (even though the sinner would have been sentenced even without him).

And he learns from there that - if that is the case by sinners, how much more so will someone who joins a group of people performing a Mitzvah will he receive a reward together with the others ...

... based on the principle - that 'Hashem's measure of good exceeds His measure of bad five hundred-fold' ('Midah Tovah Merubah mi'Midas Pur'anus ... ').

Rebbi Akiva continues 'u'Mah Shenayim, Nimtza Echad meihem Karov O Pasuk, Eidusan Beteilah, Af Sheloshah ... Eidusan Beteilah', which Rebbi Yossi qualifies - by confining it to Dinei Nefashos, but not to Dinei Mamonos.

The S'vara behind Rebbi Yossi's distinction is - based on the Pasuk "ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah", from which we derive the obligation upon Beis-Din to do everything possible to save the defendant's life.

Rebbi disagrees with Rebbi Yossi's distinction. He does however - restrict Rebbi Akiva's ruling to where the Pasul witness participated in the warning. Otherwise, he will not disqualify the other witnesses.

Rebbi's reason is - because otherwise 'what should two brothers who witnessed a murder do' (it is ridiculous to suggest that neither of them may testify in Beis-Din).

Ravina now connects the Machlokes between Rebbi Meir and the Rabbanan in our Mishnah with the Machlokes Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi - by equating Rebbi Meir with Rebbi Yossi, and the Rabbanan with Rebbi.

Another alternative is that they repeat the Machlokes between Rebbi Yossi and the Rabbanan. Rebbi Yossi learns from the Pasuk "al-Pi Shenayim Eidim" that - the two witnesses must be the ones who warn the sinner.

According to the Rabbanan, anyone is eligible to do so.

And the Machlokes in our Mishnah concerns - a case where it was a third person who warned the woman. According to Rebbi (who holds like Rebbi Yossi), the woman can no longer be put to death, and three witnesses will suffice; whereas the Rabbanan hold like the Rabbanan and require twenty-three.

And a final alternative is that they argue over the same point as ben Zakai and the Rabbanan in the Mishnah in 'Hayu Bodkin', in connection with whether a discrepancy in 'Bedikos' is considered a discrepancy or not.

'Bedikos' are - the questions that Beis-Din ask the witnesses during the cross-examination that are not connected with the time or the place of the crime, nor are they crucial to prove the guilt of the accused.

Chakiros are - questions to do with the time and place of the crime, which are crucial.

The significance of the Tana's statement 'Ma'aseh u'Badak ben Zakai be'Uktzei Te'einim' is that - ben Zakai considers Bedikos an intrinsic part of the evidence, and any discrepancy in their answers disqualifies their testimony.

ben Zakai - actually questioned the witnesses about whether the stalks of the figs of the tree under which the crime took place were thick or thin.

Had the witnesses not known the answer to such a question - they should have declined to answer (by saying 'I don't know'), since this would not have disqualified their testimony.

According to the Rabbanan - even though one does ask the witnesses such questions, they are not considered an intrinsic part of the evidence, and the testimony remains intact even if their testimonies clash.

Our Mishnah too, speaks where the witnesses who testified against the woman contradicted each other in the Bedikos - Rebbi Meir holds like ben Zakai, in which case the woman can no longer be sentenced to death, and three judges will suffice, whereas the Rabbanan here hold like the Rabbanan there.

In a case where the husband brings witnesses who testify that his newly-wed wife committed adultery after the betrothal, and the father then brings witnesses who render them Eidim Zom'min, Rav Yosef rules that the first set of witnesses are sentenced to death, but are not obligated to pay. Despite the fact that they attempted to make the woman lose her Kesubah, they are not obligated to pay - due to the principle 'Kam leih bi'de'Rabah Mineih' (someone who is Chayav two punishments, receives the stricter one, and is absolved from the lighter one).

In a case where the husband then brings witnesses who render the father's witnesses Zom'min, he rules that - the latter are sentenced to death (for attempting to have the husband's witnesses put to death), and have to pay the hundred Sela (that they tried to make the husband pay).

The reason that they are obligated to pay, in spite of the fact that they too, are sentenced to death is - because the death-sentence is for what they tried to do to the witnesses, whereas the payment is for what they tried to make the husband himself pay ('Miysah la'Zeh u'Mamon la'Zeh').

And the reason that the husband's witnesses are not also obligated to pay the father the hundred Sela (of a Motzi-Shem-Ra) that they attempted to make him pay with their testimony is - because in fact, the husband's obligation to pay only comes into effect after they become Zom'min. That in turn is - because, based on the principle 'Modeh bi'Kenas, Patur', even if the husband had admitted that he had lied, he would have been Patur from paying.

In a case where Reuven claims that Levi raped him ...

... against his will - he is believed to join Shimon to have Levi sentenced to death.

... with his consent - he is not believed, because his testimony implies that he is a Rasha, and the Pasuk states in Mishpatim "Al Tashes Rasha Eid" (disqualifying a Rasha's testimony).

Rava disagrees with the latter - on the basis of the principle 'Palginan Dibureih' (we split his testimony), in which case we believe that Levi raped him in the Seifa too, but not that he consented to the rape. Consequently, Levi will be sentenced to death there as well.

Rava also rules that in a case where he, together with Shimon, witnesses Levi have relations with his wife - he is believed to testify that Levi committed adultery with a married woman (so he is Chayav Misah), but not that the married woman was his wife.

We cannot infer the latter ruling from the former one - because we would not have known that a man's wife is considered like himself in this regard.

In fact, we would have thought - that since he is believed with regard to Levi, he is also believed with regard to his wife.