Clarification: This implies that Rav Yehudah, who holds that 'an old Manah and a new Manah do not combine', does not hold like R. Shimon ben Elazar.

Question: In 'Chezkas ha'Batim' in the case where Rav Kahana took a piece of land', it is clearly implied that he does?

Refuted Answer: One cannot answer that Rav Yehudah himself speaks in all cases, even by an old Manah and a new Manah, and when Rava establishes the case by a black purse and a white purse (and not by an old Manah and a new Manah) he is presenting his own opinion, but not that of Rav Yehudah.

Reason: because in that case, he ought to have said 'I swear that Rav Yehudah said it even by an old Manah and a new Manah!'

Proof: Like we find in the first Perek of Gitin 'Logically Rav's ruling applies by Pikadon, but I swear that he said it by Milveh too!'

Answer: In fact Rav Yehudah holds like R. Shimon ben Elazar, only he draws a distinction between one and two Manah (where the witnesses combine) and an old Manah and a new one (where they don't).

Question: Since by one group of witnesses, Beis Shamai hold that their testimony is divided (since they contradict one another), by two groups, it ought to be considered as if one of them was a relative or Pasul?

Answer #1: That would indeed be the case if the P'sul was known (but not here where it is not).

Answer #2: Alternatively, this follows the opinion that holds that even if some of the witnesses become Pasul, the testimony stands with the remaining witnesses.

Answer #3: Alternatively, the principle that if one of the witnesses is declared a relative or Pasul, all the witnesses are disqualified' is confined to where they all arrived together and testified within 'Toch K'dei Dibur' of each other; whereas we are speaking here where the two pairs of witnesses arrived one after the other.

Answer #4: Finally, when we say that if one of them is a relative or Pasul, he disqualifies all of them, that is only if the witnesses support each other, but not if they contradict each other.

Clarification: Rav Nachman does not agree with the principle of 'not claiming from the property of Yesomim unless it is being consumed by Ribis.

Source: Because in Perek Shum ha'Yesomim he made a statement that initially he did not claim from the property of Yesomim, until he heard Rav say that Yesomim who eat up what does not belong to them, will follow their father to the grave. Then he began to do so.

Inference: And it is for the same reason that, even though that ordinarily one does not accept witnesses in the absence of the other litigant, by a Katan (who is considered absent), we do.

Refutation: Alternatively, Rav Nachman would only accept claims against Yesomim if there was a Sh'tar, seeing as one is permitted to substantiate a Sh'tar even in the defendant's absence, and in our case there was a Sh'tar.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that it contained a Henpek (Beis-Din's stamp).

Question: Why do we nevertheless not believe the defendant, with a 'Migu', since, if he wanted, he could have burned it.

Explanation #2: When they stamped it they saw it in the woman's hands, like the case in Perek Mi she'Meis, where the man's signature was established in Beis-Din (see Tosfos there DH 'K'gon').

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that the receipt produced by the debtor, as it should be.

Explanation #2 (Part 1): Rabeinu Tam however, explains that a receipt that is produced by the debtor is called a 'Shover', and it is when it is produced by the creditor that it is called ' 'Simpon'.

Explanation #2 (Part 2): 'Yiskayem be'Chosamav' therefore means (not that it is established through ts witnesses, but) that we ask the witnesses whether it has been paid or not, as we have learned in the first Perek of Bava Metzi'a.

Clarification: If the Sh'tar and the Simponos are produced by a third person, it is Kasher.

Inference: Rava seems to understand that it speaks even if the Sh'tar has been substantiated, similar to where the Simpon comes after the signatures on the Sh'tar.

Alternative Explanation: Alternatively, 'no Eidim on it' does not mean that there are no Eidim at all, but that they do not know whether the Sh'tar has been paid or not, and the Simponos are in the hands of a Shelish.

Inference: From here we can learn that the guilty party in a Din Torah is not obligated to pay the winner's costs, even there where he forced him to take his case to another town.

Clarification: This speaks exclusively where Beis-Din forced him to come and be judged by them, but not otherwise.

Proof: And so it is implied in 'Eizehu Neshech' in the case of two people who entered into a business deal, where one of them said to Rav Nachman 'See that you seem to always side with me, where the Gemara concludes that in such a case one certainly needs to present the litigants with the reason (but not under normal circumstances).

Refutation: One can refute the proof however, in that what Rav Nachman meant was that in such a case one certainly needs to present the litigants with the reason, even there where they have not asked for it; but there where they have, one is always obligated to do so.

Rejected Explanation: This cannot mean that 'If they do not accept his ruling, that he cannot force them ...

Reason: Because in that case, th Nasi (in Eretz Yisrael) would certainly not be able to force the litigant to accept his ruling, seeing as here (in Bavel) they are called 'staff' whereas there (in Eretz Yisrael) they are only called 'Mechokek' (see first Perek 5a).

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains 'If he does not listen ... ' to mean that the litigant declares that he wants to go to the Beis-Din ha'Gadol (which is his prerogative).