1)
The Mishnah in Me'ilah discusses the Din of Me'ilah regarding three categories of Hekdesh. What is the Tana referring to when he speaks about Hekdesh that is fit for ...
... the Mizbe'ach but not for Bedek ha'Bayis?
... Bedek ha'Bayis but not the Mizbe'ach?
... neither? Then on what basis are they Hekdesh?
Why are the things listed in the first group not fit for Bedek ha'Bayis?
What does the Tana say about all three cases? What do they all have in common?
What is the significance of the sequence in which the Mishnah lists the three groups?
When is one Mo'el?
1)
The Mishnah in Me'ilah discusses the Din of Me'ilah regarding three categories of Hekdesh. When the Tana speaks about Hekdesh that is fit for ...
... the Mizbe'ach but not for Bedek ha'Bayis - he is referring to unblemished oxen, sheep and goats, pigeons and doves, flour, wine and oil, which are all fit to go on the Mizbe'ach.
... Bedek ha'Bayis but not the Mizbe'ach - he is referring to things like gold, silver and precious stones, wood, stones and other building materials.
... neither - he is referring to foodstuffs such as milk cheese, and fish-juice, trash-heaps, grass and the likes, for which Hekdesh has no specific use. These are known as 'Kedushas Damim', which are holy for their sale value, but not intrinsically.
The things listed in the first group are not fit for Bedek ha'Bayis - because there is an Asei prohibiting the use of something that is fit to go on the Mizbe'ach for Bedek ha'Bayis.
The Tana says about all of these that - they, as well as whatever is inside them, are subject to Me'ilah.
The significance of the sequence in which the Mishnah lists the three groupings is that - due to the fact that their Kedushah is regressive, the Chidush is progressive.
One is Mo'el - as soon as one derives a Perutah's-worth of benefit from the Hekdesh article.
2)
What does Rebbi Yehudah say in a case where they are all filled only after the owner declared them Hekdesh?
What does Rebbi Yossi say about a field and a tree?
2)
Rebbi Yehudah says that in a case where they are all filled only after the owner declared them Hekdesh - only the 'containers' are subject to Me'ilah, but not the contents.
Rebbi Yossi holds that what grows afterwards in a field or on a tree of Hekdesh, is Hekdesh as well.
3)
Regarding the above Machlokes, what Halachic distinction does Rebbi draw between the case of the pit and that of the dove-cotee on the one hand, and a field and a tree on the other?
What is the basis for this distinction?
What problem do we have with the latter half of Rebbi's ruling?
Why could we just as well query Rebbi in the same way regarding the former half of his ruling?
3)
Regarding the above Machlokes, Rebbi rules that - the Halachah is like Rebbi Yehudah in the case of water in a pit and doves in a dove-cotee, but like Rebbi Yossi in the case of herbs in a field and fruit on a tree.
The basis for this distinction is the fact that - in the case of the field and the tree, the herbs and the fruit actually grow from Hekdesh, whereas the water in the pit and the doves in a dove-cotee do not grow from the dove-cotee.
The problem with the latter half of Rebbi's ruling is that - it implies that Rebbi Yossi argues by a pit and a dove-cotee too, whereas in fact, he only mentions a field and a tree in his statement, but says nothing about the pit and the dove-cotee.
We could just as well query Rebbi in the same way from the former half of is ruling ('Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Yehudah be'Bor ve'Shuvach') - since Rebbi Yossi agrees with it.
4)
What do we mean when we suggest that Rebbi Yossi only mentioned a field and a tree in order to challenge Rebbi Yehudah?
We refute this suggestion however, from another Beraisa. What does Rebbi Yossi say there, which proves that what he said in the previous Beraisa was his personal opinion (and not just a challenge on Rebbi Yehudah ruling)?
Then what did Rebbi really say?
4)
When we suggest that Rebbi Yossi only mentioned a field and a tree in order to challenge Rebbi Yehudah, we mean that - in reality, he argues with Rebbi Yehudah even by a pit and dove-cotee too, and he only mentioned a field and a tree, to suggest that at least there, Rebbi Yehudah ought to agree with him (for the reason that we just mentioned).
We refute this suggestion however, from another Beraisa, where - Rebbi Yossi specifically states that he argues with Rebbi Yehudah by a field and a tree exclusively, proving that what he said in the previous Beraisa was his personal opinion (and not just a challenge to Rebbi Yehudah ruling).
Consequently, what Rebbi really said was that - Rebbi Yehudah's words appeal to Rebbi Yossi only in the case of a pit and a dove-cotee, but not in that of a field or a tree, where he argues with him.
5)
In another Beraisa, which discusses 'Hikdishan ve'Achar-kach Nismal'u', the Tana Kama holds 'Mo'alin bahen ve'Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tochan'; Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon disagrees. How does Rabah initially establish their Machlokes?
What will the Tana'im then hold by a pit and a dove-cotee?
How does that tally with the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi?
5)
In another Beraisa, which discusses 'Hikdishan ve'Achar-kach Nismal'u', the Tana Kama holds 'Mo'alin bahen ve'Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tochan', and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon disagrees. Initially, Rabah establishes their Machlokes ...
... by a field and a tree (but by a pit and a dove-cotee, both will agree that the water and the doves that came only later, are not Hekdesh ...
... which is synonymous with the Machlokes between Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi in the previous Beraisa that we just established.
6)
In the Seifa 'Hikdishan Melei'in', the Tana Kama says 'Mo'alin bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan'. What does the Tana mean when he says 'Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon Machlif'?
What problem does Abaye present Rabah from Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon's opinion in the Seifa of the Beraisa?
One reason that renders it obvious that if the fruit was there initially, it ought to be Hekdesh is because it is 'Gidulei Hekdesh' (it grew from Hekdesh). What is the other reason?
6)
In the Seifa 'Hikdishan Melei'in', the Tana Kama says 'Mo'alin Bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan'. When the Tana says 'Rebbi Elazar be'Rebbi Shimon Machlif', he means that - in this case he holds 'Moa'lin bahen, ve'Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tochan'.
The problem Abaye presents Rabah from the Seifa of the Beraisa is that if, as Rabah explained, the Beraisa speaks about Sadeh ve'Ilan, then, seeing as Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds 'Mo'alin bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan' where the herbs and the fruit grew only afterwards, then 'Kal va'Chomer' how much more so if they were there before?
It is obvious that if the fruit was there initially, it ought to be Hekdesh because a. it is 'Gidulei Hekdesh' (it grew from Hekdesh) and b. - since he declared the entire pit Hekdesh, it is not worse than a sale, where everything inside the pit is sold (see Tosfos DH 've'I').
79b----------------------------------------79b
7)
How do we now amend Rabah's interpretation of the Machlokes? In which case do they really argue?
And what will both Tana'im hold in the case of a field and a tree?
We now have two Machlokos, one in the Reisha and one in the Seifa. What is the basis of their Machlokes in the Reisha (where the water and the doves came after the Hekdesh, and) where the Tana Kama holds ' ... Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tocho' and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds 'Mo'alin'?
7)
We therefore amend Rabah's interpretation of the Machlokes - to establishing it by a pit and a dove-cotee (in which case, Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon argues with Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi in the previous Beraisa).
But in the case of a field and a tree - both Tana'im will agree that whatever subsequently grows there is Hekdesh (like Rebbi Yossi there).
We now have two Machlokos, one in the Reisha and one in the Seifa. The basis of their Machlokes in the Reisha (where the water and the doves came after the Hekdesh, and) where the Tana Kama holds ' ... Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tocho' and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon holds 'Mo'alin' is whether it is possible to effect a Kinyan on something that is not yet in the world ('Adam Makneh/Makdish Davar he'Lo Ba le'Olam' like Rebbi Meir [Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon]), or not (the Rabbanan).
8)
On what condition does Rebbi Meir hold 'Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'?
It is not Rebbi Meir himself who draws this distinction, but Rav Huna, who holds like him. What example does Rav Huna give of something that is 'Avidi de'Asu'?)
Then how can we establish Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon like Rebbi Meir in the case of ...
... the water in the pit?
... the doves in the dove-cotee (neither of which appears to be inevitable)?
What if the dove-cote that is close by belongs to somebody else?
Why is that?
8)
Rebbi Meir does holds 'Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' provided it is ' ... 'Avidi de'Asu' (which is bound to grow).
It is not Rebbi Meir himself who draws this distinction, but Rav Huna, who holds like him and who gives an example (of 'Avidi de'Asu') - of the fruit of a date-palm.
Nevertheless, Rava establishes Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon like Rebbi Meir, by establishing the case of ...
... the water in the pit - where there is a slope leading to his pit, in which case, when it rains, the water will inevitably flow into it.
... the doves in the dove-cotee - where he owns another dove-cotee nearby, and the doves are bound to fly from one to the other.
This will not apply however (i.e. the doves will not be Hekdesh) - if the neighboring dove-cotee belongs to somebody else ...
... because then there is nothing stopping the owner from taking the doves for himself (in which case it is not 'Avidi de'Asu').
9)
How does Rava establish the declaration of Hekdesh in the Seifa (where the water and the doves were there before the Hekdesh)?
And to explain Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon ('Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tocho'), he establishes him like his father in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis'. What does Rebbi Shimon say there about someone who sells a pit which is full of water (though that is not the actual case of Rebbi Shimon there)?
What is his reason?
What does his son Rebbi Elazar now hold?
Then why does he hold in the Reisha (where the Hekdesh preceded the water and the doves) 'Mo'alin bo u'va'Meh she'be'Tocho'? Why does he not apply the S'vara 'Makdish, be'Ayin Ra'ah Makdish' there too?
9)
Rava establishes the declaration of Hekdesh in the Seifa (where the water and the doves were there before the Hekdesh) where he was Makdish the pit and the dove-cotee Stam (without including its contents).
And to explain Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon ('Ein Mo'alin ba'Meh she'be'Tocho'), he establishes him like his father in 'ha'Mocher es ha'Bayis', where Rebbi Shimon rules that if someone sells a pit that is full of water - he has not sold the water (though that is not the actual case of Rebbi Shimon there) ...
... because he holds 'Mocher be'Ayin Ra'ah Mocher'.
His son Rebbi Elazar now holds that - just as a seller sells reluctantly, so too, is someone who is Makdish, does so reluctantly.
Nevertheless, in the Reisha (where the Hekdesh preceded the water and the doves) he holds 'Mo'alin bo u'va'Meh she'be'Tocho' - because the S'vara 'Makdish, be'Ayin Ra'ah Makdish' is only applicable where the owner already owns it (and wants to retain what he owns).
10)
How does Rava reconcile this with our Mishnah 'Machar Bor, Machar Meimehah'? Like whom does he establish it in order to consolidate his explanation?
10)
Rava reconciles this with our Mishnah 'Machar Bor, Machar Meimehah' - by establishing the latter like Rebbi Nasan, who argues in a Beraisa with the Rabbanan (with whom Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon concurs).
11)
We just established our Mishnah like Rebbi Nasan (whom we referred to as an individual opinion). Why does it not necessarily follow that the Halachah is not like him?
Then why do we refer to it as an individual opinion?
Would the same apply if an Amora, in refuting a Kashya directed at him from a Stam Mishnah, answered 'Yechida'ah hi'?
What might the Rabbanan of Rebbi Nasan ('Hikdishan Melei'in, Mo'alin bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan') then hold, even assuming that they hold 'Mocher 'be'Ayin Ra'ah Mocher'?
How else might we explain their opinion?
11)
The fact that we just established our Mishnah like Rebbi Nasan (whom we referred to as an individual opinion) does not necessarily mean that the Halachah is not like him - because we have a principle 'S'tam be'Masnisin u'Machlokes bi'Beraisa, Halachah ki'Stam be'Masnisin' (and our Stam Mishnah holds like Rebbi Nasan).
We nevertheless refer to it as an individual opinion - in order to justify Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon disagreement (though one Tana is not really bound by other opinions).
However, if an Amora, in refuting a Kashya directed at him from a S'tam Mishnah, would answer 'Yechida'ah hi' we would rule like the Amora (and not like the S'tam Mishnah).
The Rabbanan of Rebbi Nasan ('Hikdishan Melei'in, Mo'alin bahen u'va'Meh she'be'Tochan') either hold - 'Makdishm be'Ayin Yafah Makdish' (even though they hold 'be'Ayin Ra'ah Mocher') ...
... or like Rebbi Nasan, that - both a seller and a Makdish both sell and are Makdish be'Ayin Tovah.